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⚠️ In this explosive deep dive, military experts Steve Jermy and Daniel Davis break down Zelensky’s subtle yet serious warning about potentially targeting Russia’s Victory Day Parade. Could this be a turning point in the ongoing conflict between 🇷🇺 Russia and 🇺🇦 Ukraine?

🎯 Topics Covered:

Zelensky’s strategic messaging

Symbolism of the Victory Day Parade

Military implications and international responses

Real threats vs psychological warfare

Analysis from military insiders

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Transcript
00:00Volodymyr Zelensky, who seems to have gone out of his way to resist any move of President Trump
00:05to reach negotiated settlement, he was talking about the issue about, again, how he's trying to find
00:11a peace deal on his terms, but then makes a comment about something that's coming up on May 9th in Russia.
00:30Russia must do this. Now they are worried that there is a parade for questions. They are worried right.
00:41Kind of a veiled thread. I want to start with that. I got a couple of things from that I want to ask about.
00:45Do you think that Ukraine actually would attack the parade when there are a number of even Western leaders
00:51are going to be in attendance there? I think it would be the height of strategic full-heartedness to do that.
00:57I wouldn't put it beyond them, but it would be incredibly foolhardy. I would also expect, though,
01:02the Russians to have made sure that they've taken the full measures to ensure that that attack was
01:09not possible. So I'd imagine that they would have very good air defense in position around Moscow,
01:14wherever the parade's taken, and extremely tight security as well. Not that would necessarily
01:22stop it, but I think it would reduce the chances a lot. But it would be
01:25incredibly foolhardy, especially with Western leaders there, and leaders from across the world
01:31as well. So no doubt there will be leaders from, well, we know that there will be leaders from
01:37Czech Republic. I suspect that Orban will be there. But to attack those leaders would be
01:43the height of strategic full-hardness. They would lose any final support, I think, that they've got,
01:49including in Europe, which is important. Because once the Europeans do finally change their mind
01:55and decide to get out, then I think the Americans will be relieved, and that will be that. But no,
02:01I would be surprised if they did it, but wouldn't put it completely past them.
02:06If I'm not mistaken, Xi Jinping is going to be there in person, I believe I saw. Certainly Brazil and
02:12several other ones. But one of the other things he said in there is just the same thing he keeps
02:17trotting out time after time, and gets repeated in Europe time after time, and just puzzles me,
02:23I got to say, and just kind of wonder if you can help pierce through with the surface level
02:29inconsistency here of continuing to say we need to put more sanctions on Russia to force them
02:37into compliance with the terms that we want to see. Is there any rationale for that whatsoever?
02:42No, none. I can see none. I mean, we know that the sanctions have had a worse effect on Europe than
02:48they have had on Russia, which is entirely foreseeable and predictable. But also we know the
02:55Russian economy is growing, and according to Alexander Mercurius' analysis, which I support,
03:00it makes logical sense to me. One of the reasons the Russian economy is growing is because Russian
03:06businesses are moving into the space that European and American businesses left. So we've lost business,
03:14the Russians are gaining business, and their economy is growing, I think the figure is around about 4%.
03:18Here it's in Europe. I mean, there's good evidence to say that Germany is already in recession,
03:24and France and Britain on the verges of recession. And part of that is because of the sanctions. So,
03:31you know, I wouldn't put it past European leaders to try more sanctions. But I also would expect those
03:36sanctions to have a much worse boomerang effect on the sanctioners as opposed to those who are
03:41sanctioned. And the idea that Zelensky can dictate what European leaders and American leaders should do
03:48in pursuit of an obviously unobtainable objective. I always find that it's a delusional way of
03:55thinking, insisting on conditions which you know and I know that on the battlefield are militarily
04:02unachievable. Absolutely. You know, I think one of the reasons why Zelensky may have these delusions is
04:10because he's not alone. Here on American television, I think it was yesterday, we had Keith Kellogg,
04:16who's designated as Trump's envoy to Ukraine to try and solve this war, went on to talk about
04:22what he thought of the Russian side. It's not quite the same as what you and I think.
04:27Russia is not winning this war. Russia has not made any major advances in the last year and a
04:31half. They haven't taken the city of Kiev, the capital. They haven't pushed to the west of the
04:35Dnieper River, which is a major obstacle. They haven't taken Odessa. They've lost
04:40hundreds of thousands of soldiers and they haven't really moved anything. It moves by meters, not by
04:44miles. And the Ukrainians are fighting on their own soil. They're fighting hard. So when Russia says
04:48they're winning, no, they're not. If they are winning, they've already won this war after three
04:52years. And now we're into our fourth year. Well, let's just take that on the on the surface level.
04:56Is Russia winning? Yeah. Yeah. I mean, I mean, it's I mean, see that we don't have a monopoly on
05:02on not very clever generals. You've got some over there as well. The I mean, I'm sorry to say it,
05:09but but actually the I think the International Institute for Study War, Ukraine, Russia have
05:16been advancing for the last 30 months. Now, the assumption that we get that Russia will do this in
05:22a way which is the maneuver doctrine that we're which you and I were trained on is is is yeah,
05:29they don't have to follow that. And we people keep or he's obviously forgotten the objective of Russia,
05:34which was not to capture territory. The objective of Russia was to actually de-Nazify and de-militarize
05:42Ukraine. And so they're doing that on the battlefield by attrition and very effectively,
05:49as far as we can see, if the figure is as bad as we think of 1.4 million Ukrainians dead. I mean,
05:55it's a horrible thing to say, but that's very, very effective in terms of achieving the de-militarization
06:00aim. And when you think about things like the Dnieper River, yeah, I'm sure the Russians would want to
06:06get to the Dnieper River, but they'll do it in their own way. And why would they do it in a way which
06:11actually sponders Russian manpower when they can do it in a much more effective and way where actually
06:17slowly, I would expect them to break the Ukrainian forces. I think Budenov actually said that they
06:24could last until the summer, and then they could expect a collapse. And there's going to be some
06:30culminating points at that stage. You could imagine the Russians moving much more quickly as they're
06:37through this largely urban area into a much more difficult to defend rural area. And then I would
06:42imagine them wanting to go as far as the Dnieper. He talked about Kyiv, but the Russians haven't gone
06:47for Kyiv because it's not within their strategy. I mean, I think what the general was trying to
06:53put to guess was what was Russian strategy. And I think it's nowhere near what Russia's strategy is,
06:59because it wouldn't have been a strategy that, as he described it, that would have achieved Russia's
07:05objectives. So I think objectives, you know, we've talked about denazification, we've talked about
07:09demilitarization. And I think the last of these, well, of course, there's not not having Ukraine
07:15and NATO as well. But the last of these is the general security of Russia. And to me, I keep coming
07:20back to what if they can see that it's going to be difficult working with the Europeans, and with the
07:27Americans, then they want to get to a situation where they've got a buffer, and a strategic depth. And
07:33that strategic depth seems to be a natural line for the strategic depth is the Dnieper, all the way down
07:38to and then the question remains about Odessa. And I might get if I bet, I would bet that if time
07:46allows, they'll take take Odessa. And yeah, and in fact, I think it's Petrushchev, one of the Putin's
07:54advisors, has been saying on Russian media in just the last 48 hours, that yeah, it's it would be really
08:00great if we took Odessa, because there's a lot of Russians there, again, kind of bringing the issue and
08:04and fanning some light up underneath it. One other, okay, so that's militarily that that's General
08:11Kellogg. On the media slash intellectual side here in the United States, we also have some trouble
08:18here. Now, one wonders, you know, chicken or the egg kind of thing, just just people like Farid Zakaria,
08:24who has, in some quarters, quite a good reputation. He's really an intellectual fellow. And a lot of the
08:30things he said over the years, I think are very rational and, and even thought provoking in many
08:35places. But on this issue here, he seems to be reading from the Keith Kellogg book from the
08:41Volodymyr Zelensky book, because they all seem to be aligned on what they believe are the overall
08:45conditions. Watch him here talking about a complaint against Trump for not putting enough pressure on
08:52Vladimir Putin. What isn't getting discussed is what Ukraine needs to stop fighting is some kind
09:00of security guarantee, both from outside countries and also the ability to build and maintain a very
09:07powerful army. If it doesn't have those security guarantees, Anderson, it's not going to stop
09:12fighting. These guys are fighting for their country, for their freedom, for their independence,
09:17for their lives. They're not going to just even even Donald Trump, no matter how powerful the
09:21American president is, will not be able to order the Ukrainians to sign their, you know, their their
09:28extinction as a nation, they won't accept that. So see, he has this view that Ukraine, they just won't
09:35accept that, meaning there's a choice to be made in his mind. There's a simple choice. Putin, I mean,
09:42Trump can either make a choice to help Zelensky, or he can make a choice to help Putin. Golly,
09:48I don't know why he's trying to help Putin. But the Ukraine side, they're not going to play with
09:51that. They'll choose simply not to ignore that. But here's the question. Can he choose? Can the
09:57the West writ large choose not to follow through with the terms that are offered by Russia?
10:04I think the answer is no. I mean, it's come back to the balance of power argument. I mean,
10:10the balance of power, as well as the balance of the military situation, which are two slightly
10:14different things, overwhelmingly favors Russia. Russia's operation on interior lines, it has
10:20large industrial capacity mobilized for war, or for this military, special military operation.
10:26And it's outperforming the West in terms of in the West, not just the West, not just Ukraine,
10:32in terms of its industrial capacity. It's winning on the battlefield. The Europeans are weak,
10:38and they'd struggle to deploy, I don't know, a British brigade and a French brigade would be the
10:44maximum, I would imagine. And of course, those would be attacked. The Americans are unwilling,
10:49not surprisingly, to actually commit American troops on the battlefield. And the Ukrainians are
10:56slowly being worn away. So there isn't the power, even if the Ukrainians were on the right side of the
11:02moral argument. And I think that I don't think they are. But if they were, so it would be fair to say
11:07that if NATO were on the right side of the moral argument, then even if we were, then I think we would
11:12have to accept the conditions on the ground, because actually, there isn't the political appetite, nor
11:18indeed the military capacity to intervene in a way, which allows us to dictate the conditions. So as long as
11:25soon as you understand that, then everything gets much, much clearer. The conditions will be dictated by,
11:30largely speaking, by Russia. I suspect there will be a bit of give and take in there,
11:34because I think Putin is a cautious and a highly intelligent man and will want to
11:40particularly achieve a solution to this, which actually allows that reaffirmation of a good
11:49relationship or better relationship between America and Russia. He'll be less interested, I think,
11:54in Europe. But I think that would interest him.
11:56Yeah, definitely talking about that here of late. And one of the other things that Zelensky
12:02mentioned in that clip we just played there is that he's trying to demand a full 30 day
12:08unconditional ceasefire as a precursor to making negotiations. There was, and unfortunately,
12:13I don't know, it was a really long description. But earlier today, a video was released in Russia from
12:20Sergei Lavrov, who was asked the same question, would you will the Russians agree to a full 30 day
12:26unconditional ceasefire? And he went on this long thing and said, the short answer is no.
12:31The long answer is, look what happened in going back to February 2014, when they said we had
12:39negotiated an end to the crisis that was going on in the Maidan and had made the deal for early
12:45elections. And so we said, okay, fine, we're ready to let that happen. So we went with diplomacy,
12:49and then instead, they forced out Yanukovych, completely in violation of everything we did.
12:54And that never happened. And then he said, then you go to the Minsk agreements. And we said, yes,
12:59we'll agree to this situation here. We'll stop fighting, we'll stop funding, and then helping the
13:04rebels in the eastern part of the country or so. And they said, as long as you do your part, which is
13:10change your constitution to give limited autonomy to the Russian speaking people in eastern Ukraine,
13:16then we'll again, we'll withdraw our support, and we'll just, you know, basically go home.
13:21And he said that wouldn't happen. Then, of course, the Minsk, not the Minsk, the Istanbul talks,
13:26etc. And then you issue those as well. So we don't have any experience where we agree to any kind of a
13:33ceasefire that the West recognizes. And instead, they keep using it to build back up power to go
13:39against us in the future. So why would we want to do that now? Is that just an excuse on the Russian
13:44side? Or is it a valid argument? No, no, I think it's the main maintenance of a position which they've
13:50they've had for since the start of the war. Indeed, I'm surprised on that basis that Lavrov's short answer
13:58was no. And his long answer was no. Because when you think about it, I mean, they Russians have been
14:04saying this almost since the start of the special military operation. And I think what people are
14:09confusing is a ceasefire and a termination of the conflict for a long term sustainable peace.
14:18What the Russians want is a situation where they can make sure that those conditions are in place for
14:24that. And then they will go to a ceasefire as opposed to a ceasefire and then go into
14:28negotiation. And who can blame them? You know, we've, as you say, we in the West have, you know,
14:34with Boris Johnson's help. And actually, let me ask you a question on that military. I want to stick
14:38on that point for a second there. Military, let's just say that you took national affiliations off and
14:44you just had side A and side B. And side A or side B is the one that has the unchallenged military
14:52power and dominance over the other side there. And you're made as a negotiator or an advisor to
14:58side B here. And side A, this side on the less power is demanding a ceasefire from the side that
15:05has the most power so that they can negotiate something away. How would you advise side B,
15:10whether they should or shouldn't accept a ceasefire under those conditions?
15:13Well, I think the side which is militarily in the ascendancy or overwhelmingly so will
15:24dictate the conditions that they see them. And if I were the side which is on the reverse of those,
15:28I'd take whatever conditions I could get. Because if I were advising the Ukraine government,
15:34somebody like Klitschko rather than Zelensky, because he's beyond advice, I think. Then I would
15:39I would take what conditions I would get because I would be working on the basis that the longer I,
15:44the longer I take to settle and the worst conditions I'll end up with. I think we've seen this, you know,
15:49the conditions always get worse and worse and worse. The Russians are prepared to accept a deal.
15:53But I think that the Europeans, and I suspect that that through Klitsch, but through
16:01Trump's ambassador, I've forgotten his second name, Steve.
16:03I think through him, you're starting to see, you're starting to see reflected back into the Western
16:10dialogue, what the Russians have been telling us, which is that there is a set of conditions which
16:17the Russians want, that the way that they plan to get there is through a long dialogue or a dialogue
16:23which gets them to a situation where the conditions they're being offered meet their needs. And then
16:27they will go for a ceasefire rather than the other way around. And again, in their situation,
16:32that's exactly what I would do. I mean, I think that we're in my mind, there are now sort of three
16:38scenarios as far as I can see about the way this ends. And I think the first is what I would call
16:42a US double down, where the USA, okay, we're going to put more pressure on Russia, we're going to
16:49increase arms sales, we're going to double down on sanctions. And I think the chance of that happening
16:55are extremely and I hope that they are extremely low. So I don't think there's the political appetite
17:00for it, nor would there be the willingness to expand more money. I think the second is what
17:06I would call a US trickle out, where the US actually accepting that this isn't going to work,
17:12but actually they're perhaps waiting until deciding not to get congressional funding for the follow-on arms.
17:18They've seen that Budenov has said that they expect the war to the Ukrainian armed forces to
17:28to start to really struggle in the summer, which I would anticipate. And they're also looking towards
17:35the midterms and thinking we need to get this cleared off by the midterms. But I think the other
17:41one, I think, which is the US step out, where the USA, okay, this is it, we've done our best,
17:47and we'll step out. And to be honest, in terms of the overall war, the people on the ground, and the
17:52people who are struggling as a result of it, the step out would be quite far the best thing to do,
17:57because the trickle out would just extend the war, probably not by that, that much long, but it would
18:04mean that at the end, that the conditions which were being offered to the Ukrainians, and indeed,
18:14I suppose, to NATO, would be even less. When we, I think we, Keith Kellogg talked about security
18:20guarantees. Sorry, it was the commentator since then. People seem to miss the point that there is no
18:27credible security guarantee that I can imagine that can be given to the Ukrainians. And the best security
18:33guarantee they can have, by far, is that of neutrality. If they're in a situation of neutrality,
18:38then there's a good chance, I think, they'll have what they need.
18:42Yeah, there's a piece out that just came out. It was just forwarded to me. It's from yesterday,
18:48in the Times of London. It says, Europe would struggle to put 25,000 troops on the ground in
18:53Ukraine. Not the UK. Europe would struggle to have that many. And if you can't even scrape together
18:5925,000 as a so-called deterrence force, when Russia has about 600,000 inside the borders
19:06of Ukraine, then I don't know who's going to provide any guarantees of anything.
19:11Yeah. I mean, I did, I don't know if you've spotted, but there's some, there's the,
19:16the French have been wrecking what's called the Foscani Gap. And that's sort of in Romania,
19:22and it's sort of on route to Edessa. So it might be, they're still thinking about it,
19:27but it's talk about the charge of the light brigade. I mean, you're throwing yourself into,
19:32that's it right there, throw yourself into a really difficult situation. I would be very
19:38surprised if there's much appetite, certainly in this country. I don't know, I suspect it's the same
19:45with the French military as well, much appetite at this stage to, to basically, it would make the
19:51charge of the light brigade look like a, look like a sort of a walk in the park, frankly,
19:57as you say, if we could get 25,000 against a Russian army, which has strategic bombardment
20:05capability and also has a superiority. You know, there's no chance that we would, we would want to.
20:13And I think if we ever got to that stage, I think the calculation, which was stop it,
20:18is the thought of coffins coming back into Paris, coffin coming back into London and large numbers
20:26of coffins. I mean, I think I've, I'm not even worried as much about the coffins coming back
20:30as I am about Russian missiles arriving, which I don't think is, is an unreasonable possibility
20:35if, if we got into a war like that. But, you know, I, I honestly think that, that the more likely result
20:43is that a lot of these European leaders are hoping that Trump does the, the walkout deal version that
20:50you had, number three, because then they can say, we were ready to go in with all these troops here,
20:55but Trump pulled the plug. So what can we do now? And then they're saved now that they don't have to
20:59ever make good on this. I bet that's what their hope is. Yeah, I think you might be right. I mean,
21:04what we're starting to see, aren't we, I think is, um, the early signs of, uh, okay, how do we spin this
21:09in a different way? Cause we're obviously going to lose. So how do we spin in a different way?
21:13It's going to be extremely difficult to spend, frankly. And I look forward, they'll try, but it
21:19will be, they'll, they'll do their best. I look forward to the congressional investigations and I
21:26look forward here in this country to the, to the investigations. And I hope when they do it, that they
21:32look not just at the Russia Ukraine war, but they look at Afghanistan, they look at Iraq, they look at
21:38Libya, they look at Syria and they look at this war and say, look, this is something that's gone
21:42very badly wrong because we've been on the losing side in all of these wars. And the truth is that
21:48with the possible exception of Iraq, we should never have started any of them. And it's been a major,
21:54major failure in strategic thinking in the West. And I include all of us in that, I'm afraid, Danny.
21:59Yeah, it's incredibly disappointing. And yeah, we'd like to have you back on one of these days,
22:03just to talk about that kind of in a, in a 30,000 foot level and just kind of hit
22:07all of those to see the context and the continuity between them, unfortunately.
22:12Yeah, I think, I think it's not only those individually, but when you look at the totality,
22:18you see that time and again, we failed to, we had this discussion when we first talked,
22:23we failed to do the strategic estimate in any of them. We failed to follow the Powell doctrine,
22:30I think his seven tests. And if you applied the seven tests that Powell described it worth going
22:35through that in the future podcast, but describe them, I would imagine Ukraine would fail on all
22:40of those tests, I haven't looked through, but it wouldn't surprise me. I mean, the only one I think,
22:45I think it's difficult to avoid the early years of Afghanistan, because of the political situation,
22:53and the need to hunt down. But the rest of it, I think, was almost all without exception, were all
23:00mistakes.
23:02Yes, yeah, I can't, I wouldn't argue with any of those things here. But yeah, we'll look forward
23:06to having you back on to that. I'd like to keep going down some of those paths. And as you mentioned,
23:10there's a lot to discuss, even on the Afghanistan situation, where you and I were both involved with
23:14that. So that would be a good, good session to go down as well. Yeah, let's do that one day.
23:20Danny, let's do it. Let's do it. Let's do a dissect Afghanistan and find out what went wrong.
23:25I think I think it's time for that. Yeah, but we appreciate you guys joining with us today. Thank
23:30you for coming on with this one, Steve. We always appreciate your view on all of these issues that
23:34are going on in both the Middle East and in Europe. And we'll keep watching all of them. We'll keep
23:38bringing you guys whatever happens. And also to let you know that this afternoon, we got one more show
23:44here. We got the famed Larry Johnson. Larry, the shirt is going to be back on at 3.30 p.m. this
23:51afternoon. Be sure and join us at Daniel Davis Deep Dive and we will see you then.

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