Will the US help India grapple with China's expansionist tendencies in South Asia?
Not really, says Dhruva Jaishankar, Executive Director at Observer Research Foundation America. "The US is not going to come to your aid. The US has its own interests, Trump doesn't care about South Asia. What's in it for him? Increasingly, the US doesn't care. Most Americans cannot find Bangladesh on a map," he tells Outlook Business Editor Neeraj Thakur.
In this compelling episode of Strategic Minds, Jaishankar unpacks what Trump's second presidency means for India regarding trade, security, and technology sovereignty.
Not really, says Dhruva Jaishankar, Executive Director at Observer Research Foundation America. "The US is not going to come to your aid. The US has its own interests, Trump doesn't care about South Asia. What's in it for him? Increasingly, the US doesn't care. Most Americans cannot find Bangladesh on a map," he tells Outlook Business Editor Neeraj Thakur.
In this compelling episode of Strategic Minds, Jaishankar unpacks what Trump's second presidency means for India regarding trade, security, and technology sovereignty.
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NewsTranscript
00:00:00Trump is a big aberration in U.S. politics, a big disruption in U.S. politics.
00:00:04Originally, what seemed to attract a lot of people to him was that he was not a politician,
00:00:08that he says what he means, he's unfiltered.
00:00:11That seemed to appeal to a lot of people, at least a certain constituency.
00:00:14The media needs him more than the other way around.
00:00:16He's just criticized Canada, Mexico, China, the European Union, Denmark, Panama.
00:00:21He hasn't so far said anything negative about India.
00:00:24I sometimes feel the people who have the least faith in India are sometimes members of India's
00:00:28strategic community because the way they talk about India, it's like it's 1955.
00:00:32Yeah, you're a major power.
00:00:34You have to deal with it.
00:00:35And that means you have to take care of your neighborhood.
00:00:37The U.S. is not going to come to your head.
00:00:45World's most powerful nation has elected the world's most unpredictable president.
00:00:50We are talking about President Donald Trump.
00:00:52And in today's strategic minds, we would be discussing how India would be dealing with
00:00:58Trump presidency over the next four years.
00:01:01To discuss India-U.S. relationships during Trump presidency, we have with us today,
00:01:06Mr. Truva Jayashankar.
00:01:07He is the executive director of Observer Research Foundation of the U.S. chapter.
00:01:12He is a prolific writer and his latest book is called Vishwish Shastra.
00:01:17Welcome to our show, Truva.
00:01:19So let me begin with my first question with you, Truva.
00:01:21What do you make of the phenomenon called Donald Trump?
00:01:25So in some ways, Trump is a big aberration in U.S. politics, a big disruption in U.S. politics.
00:01:32Just in terms of his personality, his background, he didn't come from a conventional, you know,
00:01:37a political path to the presidency.
00:01:39He was a well-known celebrity figure and business person.
00:01:43In many ways, he has fought more within his party, within the Republican Party, particularly
00:01:48the first time around when he was first elected, than against anybody else.
00:01:52So in some ways, he's a very disruptive figure in American politics, a very unusual figure
00:01:56in American politics.
00:01:57But in other ways, he's actually a manifestation of some trends that we have seen build up for
00:02:03some time over the past 10, 15, 20 years in American politics and, you know, partly it's
00:02:11a function of American society and the economy.
00:02:13And so you had seen this growing disruptive undercurrent sensitivity, particularly on the
00:02:20right, although aspects on the left as well, that was building up for some time in the U.S.
00:02:25and concerns about, this is a combination of concerns about jobs, about overextension of
00:02:31the United States globally, whether it was militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, that the feeling that
00:02:38they were not winning from, not benefiting, the average people were not benefiting from
00:02:43the global trading system, that there was a corrupt, self-serving elite at the center.
00:02:49And so a lot of what Trump was saying, you know, drain the swamp, make America great again,
00:02:54all of that resonated with, you know, the anti-immigration sentiment, all that resonated with a
00:02:59surprisingly large number of voters.
00:03:01And so, again, in some ways, again, we'll see disruptiveness and in some ways, continuity.
00:03:06And bringing it to what it means, I think, again, there's sort of two or three ways of
00:03:11looking at him.
00:03:11One is, there are some things he's been very consistent about.
00:03:14We know what he wants.
00:03:16We know he wants to stem undocumented migration.
00:03:20We know he's skeptical of free trade.
00:03:22We know he's skeptical of open-ended military interventions.
00:03:25He's skeptical of alliances.
00:03:26He believes that American allies are taking advantage of the U.S. and are not bringing
00:03:31sufficient benefits to the U.S.
00:03:33So on those things, he's been very consistent, even before he was elected president the first
00:03:36time.
00:03:37On other issues, he changes his mind and sometimes quite dramatically.
00:03:41And so there's still a lot of movement around what he thinks.
00:03:46He has competing impulses, both within him, but also the people who advise him have different
00:03:52interests.
00:03:52And so on issues, particularly the details surrounding his approach to Russia, his approach to China,
00:03:59his approach to trade, and his approach to legal migration changes sometimes quite a lot.
00:04:04So I think that would be how I view him.
00:04:06What are areas where he's been consistent and where his re-election marks a major shift
00:04:12in America's engagement with the world?
00:04:15And in what areas will, is there still a great deal of uncertainty?
00:04:19Dhruva, I just said that, you know, he can change his mind at any point of time.
00:04:24Whatever he says, he can just do its opposite as well.
00:04:26A lot of Trump supporters have also changed their minds to become Trump supporters because
00:04:31a lot of them were actually Democrats, including Tulsi, including Elon Musk and all those people,
00:04:38you know, so what is so attractive about Trumpism?
00:04:43Do you really think that because he's very upfront in what he says, unlike the what you
00:04:47call the so-called elitist Democrats who have a very sophisticated way of doing things and
00:04:52Democrats across the world, you know, the liberals across the world, they are very
00:04:55sophisticated and they have this allegation of being very elitist.
00:04:59Whereas someone like Trump himself, you would not call him a proletariat, you know, so he's
00:05:06also an elite, he's a businessman, he's a rich person.
00:05:09But then how does he communicate and connect with the non-elites of the United States of
00:05:15America?
00:05:16So I think a few things.
00:05:17One is originally what attracted, seemed to attract a lot of people to him was that he
00:05:21was not a politician, that he told it like it is.
00:05:24He says what he means, he, you know, he's unfiltered.
00:05:27That seemed to appeal to a lot of people, at least a certain constituency.
00:05:31I think there was also just, again, a growing frustration with the status quo, and that
00:05:35has broken.
00:05:36And then again, there was a growing number of people who I think agreed with aspects, not
00:05:40all of it necessarily, but aspects of what he stood for.
00:05:44Concerns about growing migration, about crime, about border issues, about some of the social
00:05:50agenda that the Democrats were pushing.
00:05:52And it's different for different voters, obviously, but some combination of those things.
00:05:57To be honest, I mean, I thought, you know, there was, even before the election, there
00:06:00was a good possibility that he might win.
00:06:02But I think the scale of his win, which was by a sufficient margin, was quite surprising,
00:06:07and particularly how he made inroads with new immigrant groups, with minorities, with
00:06:14young men, voters.
00:06:17So again, he seemed this time around, particularly to appeal to a wider group, but it was for
00:06:21a variety of reasons.
00:06:22And I think some of it had to do with his communication style.
00:06:25And, you know, he's done something, which, by the way, is echoed in many other countries,
00:06:29which is going around the mainstream media.
00:06:31He talks directly to people.
00:06:33And he does that in rallies.
00:06:34He does that through his social media.
00:06:37And so in some ways, it's gone to a point where the media needs him more than the other
00:06:42way around.
00:06:43So he went on podcasts a lot, rather than, again, traditional television shows.
00:06:49He reached out to media.
00:06:51Yeah, Joe Rogan.
00:06:52He reached, you know, he did comedy shows.
00:06:53He did, he would go to professional wrestling events, you know, things like that.
00:06:56And so that kind of, in some ways, reflects the sort of new media landscape today in the
00:07:02US.
00:07:03And again, not just in the US, in many other places in the world.
00:07:05Do you really think that it's really possible to understand someone like Trump for anyone
00:07:09in the world?
00:07:11No, I think it's possible.
00:07:12I think, I mean, I would give an example.
00:07:15I think India sort of understands, you know, we've seen so far, no, so far, this may change,
00:07:21no criticism by Trump since he was elected of India.
00:07:25He's lashed out.
00:07:26I mean, he's criticized Canada, Mexico, China, the European Union, Denmark, Panama, you know,
00:07:33any number of countries, he, you know, he hasn't so far said anything negative about
00:07:39India.
00:07:39And part of it is, I think, is how India has chosen to engage him, right?
00:07:44So meet him early, lean into certain issues that he cares a lot about.
00:07:50He wants to see buying American.
00:07:52He wants to see how he's dealing with the issue of undocumented migration.
00:07:57But again, I think there's a, you can spell out a positive agenda for him.
00:08:01And that is what is being attempted.
00:08:04And Prime Minister Modi is going to be meeting him next week in a few days time.
00:08:07Then, and so part of that engagement is, I think, to see how can we engage with somebody
00:08:12who is otherwise quite mercurial?
00:08:14Yeah.
00:08:14So, Adhrabab, this time after getting elected as a president of US, he has not criticized
00:08:20India.
00:08:20But last time he called India a tariff king.
00:08:23And you never, you know, the thing about Donald Trump is that he's unpredictable.
00:08:27Well, just maybe soon after meeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi, he might just, after a week,
00:08:32he may issue a statement that, you know, it gives fuel and fodder to opposition India
00:08:36that, you know, India is on the wrong side of Donald Trump.
00:08:38In fact, even in this duration, you know, while he has not criticized India, he has actually
00:08:44done away with the waiver that India enjoyed on Shabbat court.
00:08:48Already he has, you know, threatened BRICS countries where India is part of with higher
00:08:55tariffs if they use their BRICS currency.
00:08:58So, Donald Trump can do anything irrespective of whether he, you know, says positive things
00:09:04about India or PM Modi or negative things about India because he's as unpredictable as
00:09:08he can be.
00:09:10So, how do you interpret this thing?
00:09:12Like, because even if he's not criticizing India or, you know, India's foreign policy,
00:09:20he might do something that puts us in some sort of jeopardy.
00:09:23Sure.
00:09:23I'm sure we will have many such moments over the next four years.
00:09:26But look, I think two things.
00:09:28One is he wants to sell things as a political win in the US.
00:09:33And if he can get a win, and if he can get a win without, you know, easily, then he's
00:09:37happy, right?
00:09:38So, that's one thing I think that he wants to show results.
00:09:42And again, even Mexico now has shown that, you know, you can actually do relatively little
00:09:48and he can sell it at home as a win.
00:09:51So, I think there's that.
00:09:52The second thing, I think he, obviously, he likes to build up leverage in negotiation.
00:09:55He's been doing this since he was a real estate developer.
00:10:00And oftentimes, and again, I wouldn't be surprised if he'd say something even prior to a meeting
00:10:04with Prime Minister Modi.
00:10:05He'll say something and do something to build up leverage that he can use to negotiate.
00:10:11So, I think understanding that and going in.
00:10:13And again, in the past, as you rightly pointed out, there are lots of things he said.
00:10:16I mean, India being the tariff king, he got it into his head that, two of my favorite
00:10:21things from his first term, he got into his head that India had high duties on Harley-Davidson.
00:10:26Now, for some reason, Harley-Davidson motorcycles stuck with him, even though Harley-Davidson sold,
00:10:31you know, a few, at that time, a few hundred units and then stopped after a while.
00:10:35So, it has gone to his head that there was a hundred percent tariff on Harley-Davidson.
00:10:39Why is India doing this?
00:10:41And he repeated that several times.
00:10:42Another thing, you know, at some point, he was saying India needs to do more in Afghanistan.
00:10:46At that time, the U.S. was still in Afghanistan.
00:10:49And Prime Minister Modi told him, you know, actually, we're doing a lot.
00:10:52We're building dams and we're building electric power lines and providing all this assistance
00:10:56and training.
00:10:57And, you know, we built the parliament building.
00:11:00And for some reason, Trump remembered it as he built a library.
00:11:06And so, he repeated it a couple of times afterwards.
00:11:08He said, you know, Modi says that India is doing a lot in Afghanistan and they built a library.
00:11:13Why should I care about a library?
00:11:15So, he sort of misremembered it.
00:11:17But he sometimes gets these things lodged in his head that he...
00:11:21But look, overall, he has a lot of problems.
00:11:23He has a lot of challenges right now.
00:11:24Now, domestically, he has a very clear agenda and it's meeting some resistance in courts,
00:11:29particularly when it comes to the federal government and certain social and political
00:11:33issues domestically.
00:11:35And then he's also, you know, now has these issues with China, with Russia, with Iran,
00:11:40but also in these crises in Ukraine and Israel, but also these issues with the NATO allies
00:11:46and others with Canada and Mexico.
00:11:48So, in all of this, in all of this turbulence, India is not a big problem for him.
00:11:54There are some issues on trade and some issues on immigration, but it's not a...
00:11:58So, again, if you read all of this, will, again, will there be some challenges and differences?
00:12:03Probably.
00:12:04In the scale of things that Trump is doing, it's just not going to be that severe.
00:12:08And I think in some cases, just rolling with it is just, you know, that's just how Trump is.
00:12:12All right.
00:12:12Now, coming to the defense sector through a quote, you know, it was envisaged as a bulwark against China.
00:12:21But if we just look at some of the tweets that Trump has said, and Trump is actually trying to get the best deal
00:12:27with every country for the U.S.
00:12:30And, but India was part of court.
00:12:32What if tomorrow, actually, Trump resolves its relationship, all the problems with China?
00:12:40But on the other hand, because India has got very aggressive with China.
00:12:43So, how do you think India should navigate this kind of a situation?
00:12:46Maybe, you know, one year down the line, China and Trump, they're Xi and Trump becomes friends.
00:12:51And whereas India is on the wrong side of China.
00:12:53Do you think this exists?
00:12:55There are two different things.
00:12:57I think Trump can try and cut a deal with Xi Jinping.
00:13:00I think the bigger concern, and this just gets into the Chinese domestic political economy.
00:13:07I don't know if Xi is even capable of delivering on the issues that Trump wants them to deliver on
00:13:15because of some structural imbalances in the Chinese economy.
00:13:19Essentially, to put it very simply, if China is to rebalance some of its, the trade deficit,
00:13:25which will be the over the long run, the single biggest issue, it would require increasing
00:13:31vulnerabilities in China, which Xi does not want at this point of time, because Xi is focused
00:13:38on economic resilience at home.
00:13:41So, essentially, I'm not sure.
00:13:43Again, this doesn't mean there won't be some tactical dealmaking, and there'll be a photo
00:13:47op and all of that.
00:13:48This could very well happen.
00:13:50But there is, in some ways, China has boxed itself into a corner economically, where it
00:13:57needs exports as a pressure valve to retain, to keep its economy going, because domestic
00:14:03consumption and debt have been piling up.
00:14:07And they're making some changes around the edges.
00:14:09And one thing they did recently was they increased the debt levels for provinces.
00:14:13But it's not a big stimulus package.
00:14:17So, the only way they can keep going is doing what they're doing, which is keep on building
00:14:22up this overcapacity, which will lead to this flooding of exports out of China, including
00:14:27to the US and the European Union and India.
00:14:30So, this, I think, is the big challenge, which is I don't know if Xi wants to, I don't think
00:14:37he wants to, but even if he wants to, if he can, actually deliver in a way that Trump
00:14:41will find satisfactory.
00:14:43And so, all of this is a way of saying, I think we're in for this long-term structural
00:14:47competition between the US and China, that no true grand bargain that both sides can abide
00:14:53by is actually possible.
00:14:55And in a very strange way, there's a similar dynamic in the China-India relationship that,
00:14:59again, just because of the nature of the boundary dispute, the nature of the two economies
00:15:04growing side by side, these two powers growing side by side, it's very hard to see, barring
00:15:10some tactical changes, where this not being a competitive relationship in the long run.
00:15:19And so, as a consequence of this, again, will both the US and India and others, by the way,
00:15:26other quad partners, Japan, Australia, but also EU, explore options with China.
00:15:31They will, everyone will continue to explore options with China, but I think we're in for
00:15:35this long-term dynamic that, you know, I mean, somewhat akin to the Cold War, where you had
00:15:42detente, you had meetings, you had, but again, these longer-term political and economic realities
00:15:49will ultimately guide the various countries.
00:15:52In his last presidency, Trump actually talked about, you know, his bigger nuclear bomb and
00:15:59having his hands on a nuclear bomb.
00:16:02This time, he's sounding a bit softer because he's trying to come across as someone who's
00:16:07trying to stop the war now in different parts of the world.
00:16:10Why do you think this change in Trump's outlook towards war?
00:16:14And what kind of signal does it give to a country like India?
00:16:18Because India has always felt the tremors of wars, you know, wherever they happen, you
00:16:23know, because on its economy and as well as its relationship with its neighbors.
00:16:28So he said in his opening inaugural address, Trump did, that he wants his biggest legacy
00:16:34to be that of a peacemaker.
00:16:36And I think he, part of him genuinely does.
00:16:39He wants to be seen as the one who brought a deal.
00:16:41And by the way, there'll be some very interesting symbolic moments over the next four years
00:16:45for him to triumph, to show, you know, which is there'll be the 250th anniversary of the
00:16:52U.S. independence.
00:16:54There will be a World Cup.
00:16:55There will be an Olympics.
00:16:57So, you know, this is in some ways an opportune moment for him to be seen as the great peacemaker,
00:17:02the great dealmaker.
00:17:03And it's quite possible.
00:17:04I mean, he could, in some ways, he's been able to push Israel to do things that the Democrats
00:17:08could not do, even though they wanted.
00:17:12He has done some very interesting outreach to Iran as well, even though there are some
00:17:18big differences there.
00:17:19In some ways, that's the one that's the most ideologically set.
00:17:23Russia is, in fact, proving a bit more frustrating than I think he would like, because I think
00:17:27the terms that Putin would want in Ukraine are something that may not be acceptable to
00:17:34the U.S., even under Trump, even the under Trump that wants a deal.
00:17:38So the Russia factor, the Ukraine might be a bit more difficult than I think he anticipates.
00:17:43And then Taiwan and China being the other big friction points.
00:17:46So, again, it's not, I think he will try.
00:17:50He has always been against open-ended military conflicts.
00:17:54At the same time, he's shown, particularly his first term, a real readiness to use force
00:17:59in very specific ways.
00:18:02And he did that in certain ways in Afghanistan.
00:18:04He actually lifted restrictions on the export of lethal weaponry to Ukraine.
00:18:08He increased the tempo of U.S. naval operations on the Taiwan Strait.
00:18:14So he does feel keen to use the military in these instrumental ways.
00:18:20But I think this coexists with the skepticism of open-ended, long-term military conflict.
00:18:25So how will it affect India?
00:18:27I mean, I think in some ways, in some respects, if we can succeed in Europe and bringing in
00:18:32India wants to see an end to the conflict in Ukraine too.
00:18:34India wants to see an end to the conflict in Gaza.
00:18:36And so if, you know, in that sense, those would be welcome.
00:18:40I think the question in many of these cases, including in the Indo-Pacific, is on what terms?
00:18:45And again, Trump will not want terms.
00:18:48He will reject terms, and he has in the past, that make him look very bad.
00:18:52And, you know, say with North Korea, they came very close to a deal when they met in
00:18:57Hanoi, that's Kim Jong-un and Trump.
00:18:59And Trump walked away from the deal because he didn't feel it was good enough.
00:19:03So, again, whether you can get up to the point, but ultimately, it will be something that
00:19:09he will want to see confers certain advantages.
00:19:12So, Dhruva, Trump wants to sell a lot of things to India.
00:19:16Of course, even the Biden administration, they wanted India to wean itself of Russian weapon
00:19:23systems, Russian oil, all those sorts of demands that they were imposing on India.
00:19:29When it comes to Trump, because Trump is very vocal about what he wants, do you think that
00:19:35Trump will not say any such thing that he thinks would not be possible for India?
00:19:41Because India has been very vocal about what it requires.
00:19:46So, but that was possible when Biden administration was there.
00:19:50But, for example, if Trump says that, you know, it's not working well with my old friend Putin
00:19:54and, you know, India should just stop buying Russian arms and ammunition, otherwise I will
00:20:00impose tariffs.
00:20:01If that kind of situation actually does come in, you know, how do you think India should
00:20:06be dealing with it?
00:20:07Well, I mean, on that specifically, I think that we have to look at two different things
00:20:11because the economies are very different.
00:20:13So, one is defense and strategic technologies.
00:20:16And there, the bigger challenge is, frankly, Russia's ability to deliver.
00:20:22So, it doesn't matter what the U.S. thinks.
00:20:24The fact is, Russia's priorities right now are the war in Ukraine, they have supply chain
00:20:29constraints, and they have problems with making payments between India and Russia.
00:20:34And for all of these reasons, India, again, regardless of the U.S., is seeking and has been
00:20:40seeking, even before the 2022 invasion, to indigenize its defense industry and to diversify
00:20:47its partners.
00:20:48And this is going to be ongoing, and it's only natural when Russia is at war that this
00:20:53will continue.
00:20:54So, we have seen a decline in Indian imports, particularly of new systems from Russia.
00:21:01Will that relationship remain important?
00:21:03Yes, absolutely, because there is existing stock in the Indian military, much of which will
00:21:06have a life cycle of 10, 20-plus years.
00:21:11And it's also important, strategically, to keep that relationship going.
00:21:14But I think for reasons that have very little to do with the U.S., to be honest, this has
00:21:20been the trend line.
00:21:22Energy and resources is a different matter because there, the war has actually led to a global
00:21:29spike in prices, and oil, most remarkably, oil, gas, coal, but even fertilizers.
00:21:36And India needs all of that.
00:21:38And so, in some ways, there, the global marketplace is really what is at play.
00:21:43So, how will Trump approach this?
00:21:45One is, I think the clear thing is, if India decides to go with U.S. vendors for certain
00:21:51defense articles, India will also have terms.
00:21:54And those terms will be greater co-production and, in some cases, co-development in India,
00:22:00because India wants to indigenize.
00:22:01So, that's, I think, where the challenge will be, which is for things that are being bought
00:22:08on small scale, even if we're talking, you know, 3, 5, 10 aircraft, then off-the-shelf
00:22:14purchases make more sense.
00:22:16But for anything that is going to be acquired at scale, India is well within its rights and
00:22:20should, in fact, for its own reasons, insist on certain co-production requirements.
00:22:25And I think a lot of the negotiations will really be at that B2B business-to-business level.
00:22:30So, again, I don't anticipate a challenge on the Russia side now, simply for that reason,
00:22:36which is India has alternatives as well, not just the U.S. and Russia.
00:22:40The second, and it has its own indigenization requirements.
00:22:43The other challenge, which is resources, is different, because there, I think, Trump is
00:22:48going to try to bring down global commodity prices, and partly, again, for his own interest,
00:22:53because it would give leverage for him to then do some steps, including tariffs that would
00:23:00help to rebalance and reshore production to the U.S.
00:23:04And there, in that sense, India would be a beneficiary of it.
00:23:07India is very dependent on resource imports.
00:23:09It's very costly.
00:23:11If it's not borne by the average consumer at home, it adds to the fiscal deficit.
00:23:18So, I think, from India's point of view, that would actually be quite welcome.
00:23:22And so, if the U.S. is able to unlock both through diplomacy, but also through its own
00:23:28domestic production of oil and gas, which Trump promises to do, it will help to bring down
00:23:34the commodity prices.
00:23:36It would help diversify India's partners.
00:23:38And I think that should be something India welcomes.
00:23:40So, again, it meets multiple objectives.
00:23:42It gives Trump more pressure on Putin.
00:23:46It helps his own trade deficits, but it also helps in India, in this case, as well.
00:23:52So, I feel like energy and resources is one area of potential win-win cooperation between
00:23:57the U.S. and India.
00:23:57What the issue of energy throughout, last many years, India has been trying to push itself
00:24:03towards the renewable source of energy.
00:24:06Trump doesn't believe in that.
00:24:08And Trump's famous phrase is, like, drill, build, drill.
00:24:11So, where do you think, what kind of cues should India take from here?
00:24:14Because at the end of the day, for any kind of technology or energy, India relies on the
00:24:19U.S. and any kind of, you know, source of capital, which is actually, you know, coming
00:24:23out of U.S. and European countries only.
00:24:25So, the signaling that Trump has given to the world is that, you know, climate change is
00:24:30a hoax.
00:24:30They do not believe in that.
00:24:32That's why they have come out of the Paris Accord and everything.
00:24:34India as a nation, because India has actually invested a lot in renewable energy, following
00:24:39China's footsteps, because we believe that if China can do that, we will also have to do
00:24:43that.
00:24:43Otherwise, we'll be left behind on the ESG front, and that will impact our exports.
00:24:49What signaling, what cues should India take from here onwards for the next four years?
00:24:53Should we just continue to invest in renewable energy and our sustainable growth targets that
00:24:59we have?
00:24:59Because it requires a lot of commitment.
00:25:01India is not a resource-rich nation.
00:25:03So, what do you think India's strategy should be?
00:25:07You know, I think two bits of that.
00:25:09One is, I think there's a very clear firm commitment from the top down, from the prime
00:25:13minister down, that India is going to do what it does, regardless of others, right?
00:25:17So, just because Trump has certain views on climate change, the reality is that doesn't
00:25:22change India's reality, right?
00:25:23So, I think two things.
00:25:26One is, it's not just about climate change, right?
00:25:29That is, investment in renewables at scale, which is what India is trying.
00:25:35I mean, very ambitious targets on both solar and wind, particularly, is to increase energy
00:25:41security.
00:25:42It helps give Indian companies a technological edge.
00:25:45It increases employment in India.
00:25:47And by the way, this is happening even in the US, right?
00:25:49So, a lot of the subsidies for renewables are going to red states, to Republican states.
00:25:56It's unlikely Trump will completely do away with that, because he wants to create jobs.
00:26:02He also wants energy security.
00:26:03He wants to bring down the cost of energy.
00:26:05So, I think for reasons that have nothing to do with the ideology around climate change
00:26:11or the ideological debates around climate change, both the US and India independently
00:26:14will continue pursuing this path.
00:26:16The other factor is, actually, the federal US government doesn't do a lot to help other
00:26:20countries in its energy transition.
00:26:22A little bit here, some technical assistance here.
00:26:24Again, less India, it's more, some of the more vulnerable, smaller and more vulnerable
00:26:28economies.
00:26:28Ultimately, this is really going to be dictated by a combination of other actors, including
00:26:32the private sector, private financiers, private technology companies.
00:26:36The government can play a facilitating role.
00:26:38So, for example, there is an entity called the DFC in the US, a development finance corporation,
00:26:44which is state-backed private investments that facilitate state-backed private investments
00:26:48abroad.
00:26:49And three of their largest projects are actually solar projects in India, including in Tamil Nadu.
00:26:55So, this is not to say the government won't play a role, but these are ultimately business
00:26:58deals.
00:26:59And again, DFC has not been at the center of Trump's ire.
00:27:04He sees that as facilitating American businesses, not being aid like USAID that is given away,
00:27:12grant aid that is given away.
00:27:13So, again, all of this is a way of saying, I don't see major changes either to India's
00:27:17own approach to green energy.
00:27:20In fact, Trump pulling out of Paris and also withdrawing from Secretary of State, Mark
00:27:28Abubi is not going to be attending the G20 meeting in South Africa.
00:27:32This actually gives more space to a country like India to lead.
00:27:35I mean, there's more of a demand for India to play a role in some of these negotiations.
00:27:40But again, beyond a point, the US federal government doesn't do that much.
00:27:46The bigger thing will be just unlocking oil and gas and contributions to emission.
00:27:51And again, in the short term, this will really have implications for pricing more than
00:27:55anything else.
00:27:56So, a lot of countries, irrespective of the fact whether they agree with Donald Trump or
00:28:03not, they may not be able to catch up with Donald Trump's demands.
00:28:08And a lot of them are likely to fall out of the United States of America.
00:28:11That's what foreign affairs or economists are writing, that he will actually create more
00:28:15force than friends.
00:28:16The way does India seize itself, because India also has some global ambitions, like we represent
00:28:21the global south.
00:28:22And the way Donald Trump is going to deal with the world, it will hurt certain countries and
00:28:27they would want either China or India or some other nation to stand up to Trump's
00:28:33eccentricity.
00:28:34So where do you see Indian foreign policy in that kind of a situation?
00:28:39Will we just keep quiet and keep on siding with Trump in whatever it says?
00:28:43Because in the previous five years, India actually stood up for the global south and we actually
00:28:48stood up to the demands being put by the Biden administration as well.
00:28:53So, let me take it in two ways.
00:28:56One is actually, look, India is not, and Trump's concerns are two sets of countries.
00:29:00They are the adversarial countries, which are basically China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba,
00:29:07and North Korea.
00:29:08And they have to deal with Trump.
00:29:09And it's a contested relationship that Trump may or may not try to address.
00:29:15And in the past, he tried more with Russia and North Korea.
00:29:18He tried less with some others.
00:29:20Let's see what happens this time.
00:29:22The second set of countries that he has challenges with are the allies or the big trade partners
00:29:27or sources of illegal immigration.
00:29:29This includes NATO, Europe, Canada, Mexico, to some extent, even Japan.
00:29:34He has said, why isn't Japan doing more?
00:29:37This week, actually, the Japanese prime minister is in Washington to meet with them.
00:29:41But those are basically his countries of focus.
00:29:46For much of the rest of the world, he doesn't honestly care.
00:29:48And he has a very transactional approach.
00:29:50So, again, for India, this is not necessarily as bad as it is for some of these other countries.
00:29:55Because India is neither in either of those camps, in either of those categories,
00:29:59and therefore can deal with Trump on Trump's terms in some ways.
00:30:03But where does it come for the global south?
00:30:05I think a few things.
00:30:06One, Trump will have very little patience for demands without actions.
00:30:10So, one of the things I think the global south, this is less India, this is more some of the
00:30:15smaller countries have to do.
00:30:17And I've had very sometimes frustrating discussions with some of my friends and counterparts from
00:30:21these places, is they say, well, it's sort of a moral right for the global south to have
00:30:27its place in the world, which it may be true.
00:30:29That's correct.
00:30:30But that's not going to fly with Trump.
00:30:33He doesn't care about that.
00:30:34And so, what are ways, I mean, I think many countries and regions in the global south are
00:30:39going to have to ask themselves, if we want to deal with Trump, how do we create leverage
00:30:45with him?
00:30:46What is it that we can do that will actually invite his interest?
00:30:51And in many cases, it may be natural resources that he wants, which many of these countries
00:30:55have.
00:30:56It could be other things.
00:30:56It could be the strategic location.
00:30:58So, I think there's this idea, you're not going to get anything for free from Trump.
00:31:01What is it that you can, how can you leverage your advantages?
00:31:06And I think that that's where a conversation within the global south might be useful.
00:31:10It's then, they're not going to get reform of international institutions.
00:31:13They're not going to get the energy security needs met.
00:31:15They're not going to get debt sustainability concerns met by the US without creating leverage
00:31:19of their own.
00:31:21So, I think that's one thing.
00:31:22I think, on the other hand, this is somewhat paradoxical, is this will open up room for India
00:31:28to be one of many players.
00:31:31And by the way, there's something, if the US withdraws from the world, nobody is going
00:31:35to fill that vacuum.
00:31:37Because again, everyone else is constrained as well.
00:31:39EU, China, Russia, India, Japan, others.
00:31:43So, in some cases, there will be a vacuum.
00:31:45In other cases, there are ways in which India can play an instrumental role and has been arguably
00:31:50doing that already.
00:31:51And this opens up more opportunity.
00:31:53So, let's see how it plays out.
00:31:56But I think this idea that Trump will have very little patience for the kind of normative,
00:32:03this is right, therefore you should do the right thing.
00:32:06He will frankly not care about that.
00:32:08Yeah, so, but see, as you said, Dhruvath, that would be vacuumed because India and any other
00:32:14country may not be filled up.
00:32:15But China has been looking for this kind of an opportunity because China has, I'll give
00:32:20an example, China has been investing a lot in South America.
00:32:22They have been investing a lot in Africa.
00:32:24And if those, just look at what's happening in Peru.
00:32:27At the moment, Trump is having his way by forcing Peru and Argentina and so many other
00:32:33countries, including Africa, to listen to whatever he wants in terms of Panama Canal and all.
00:32:39But at some point in time, they would say, boss, enough is enough.
00:32:42Let us look at the options being offered by China.
00:32:46And this is where it gets tricky for India because I believe personally that India is
00:32:51siding with the United States of America because we believe that, you know, first of all, of
00:32:56course, China is our foe and it's not a secret anymore.
00:33:01It's a communist nation.
00:33:01India is a democracy.
00:33:03So there is this difference of governance model also that we often talk about in political
00:33:09science theory.
00:33:10But at the same time, we believe that it's the United States of America that would be
00:33:13able to help us become the developed nation.
00:33:16Our part to becoming a developed nation comes through the free market model that was provided
00:33:20by the U.S.
00:33:21And we would become part of globalization.
00:33:23Maybe not four years down the line, but do you think that the schism created through Donald
00:33:29Trump's policies can become so big that at some point in time, India may have to evaluate
00:33:34its association and alignment with U.S.?
00:33:37Yeah, I just don't think it's as significant.
00:33:41I mean, you know, India is not a treaty ally of the U.S.
00:33:44It won't be a treaty ally of the U.S.
00:33:46And that's fine.
00:33:47And actually, Trump and India are quite happy about that.
00:33:51So, you know, I don't think it's going to be as dramatic.
00:33:56Will we see shifts here and there?
00:33:57Yes, but I don't think it will be as dramatic, either positively or negatively, as many fear.
00:34:04There is a broad alignment of interests.
00:34:06The alignments are, in some ways, two kinds of alignments.
00:34:09There is a sort of economic logic to the relationship, which is there.
00:34:12And it's not just trade, although that's part of it.
00:34:15But it's, you know, trade, investment, mobility of people, R&D.
00:34:20It's a much more comprehensive partnership, energy issues.
00:34:23And then there is a strategic logic to the relationship.
00:34:26A lot of it driven by shared concerns about China and the Indo-Pacific, but also, I would
00:34:32say, in West Asia, the Middle East, where there's also a growing convergence of interests
00:34:37between the U.S. and India.
00:34:39So, again, I think this broader logic will continue for the foreseeable future, barring
00:34:45some very dramatic change, whether it's under Trump or whether it's under a future Democratic
00:34:50or another Republican administration.
00:34:52But in terms of China also taking, obviously, China is going to take advantage of
00:34:56cracks.
00:34:57They have been doing it really over the past 10, 15 years, more, in fact, in some cases,
00:35:03really since about 2003 or so.
00:35:06But I think a few things.
00:35:08You know, China's resources are also limited.
00:35:10And increasingly, even the new, you know, there was a big drop in their BRI funding around
00:35:152020, 2021 or so.
00:35:17Some of it coincided with the pandemic.
00:35:19There's been a slight uptick in the last year or two.
00:35:23But what I think you're also seeing is the terms that China is now insisting upon, they're
00:35:28actually worried about defaulting countries.
00:35:30So they're not coming in as generous as they once were.
00:35:34They want much more, you know, even with, say, Nepal's leader was in China recently signed
00:35:41a BRI agreement.
00:35:43But the terms are much more tight-fisted than what you saw in a previous, you know, pre-2020
00:35:48period.
00:35:51And so, again, we'll try to, I think China is going to make massive strategic inroads.
00:35:55And it's just in the Indian Ocean, they're pursuing different projects in the Atlantic.
00:36:02So they're going to come much closer to the US.
00:36:04Peru, again, there was a commercial port.
00:36:05Xi Jinping inaugurated it recently.
00:36:08So, again, the strategic competition is going to get closer.
00:36:13But in terms of, you know, China doesn't have open-ended coffers.
00:36:17It is actually proving that it's starting to realize that even its resources are much more
00:36:22limited than they had anticipated previously.
00:36:26So, again, all of this is a way of saying, I think you should take, you know, the US and
00:36:31India should read the China challenge for what it is, which is in some cases quite serious.
00:36:36In some cases, I think people are underestimating it.
00:36:38In other cases, I think there's a fear of overestimating and being overly concerned about
00:36:43what China is capable of.
00:36:44Adrua, coming to India's neighborhood in the last 10 years, India has not had a very great
00:36:50time in the neighborhood.
00:36:51If you just look at Nepal, Pakistan has always been very bad.
00:36:55Even in the Indian Ocean, things have not gone the way India wanted.
00:36:59We have recovered a lot of ground as well.
00:37:01But of course, like, because the China intervention is very visible over there.
00:37:06Then there were talks about that, you know, the Biden administration was not helping out
00:37:11India as much as it wanted to, maybe because of the ideological reason, because India has
00:37:16a conservative government, whereas they are, you know, Democrats and due to the ideological
00:37:22differences.
00:37:23Do you think Trump being conservative and plus, you know, being very aggressive about who his
00:37:31friends are and who are his foes, the American state would help India manage its neighborhood better?
00:37:37I will recall, just before, just after the, before the Bangladesh elections, India had given a statement
00:37:44that, you know, Bangladesh stability is very important for this region, especially for containing China.
00:37:51So, U.S. state should not intervene in those elections in the name of free and paid elections.
00:37:57But eventually what we saw, a lot of people say that it was, it wouldn't have been possible
00:38:02without the hand of the U.S., even if a lot of things were initiated by China.
00:38:07So, do you think India can actually hope of getting some sort of a support in managing
00:38:12its neighborhood better?
00:38:14Look, I think the premise to your question still thinks of India as a weak, reactive,
00:38:18soft power.
00:38:19It's not.
00:38:20This is 2024, 2025.
00:38:23It's not, you know, I sometimes feel the people who have the least faith in India are
00:38:28sometimes members of India's strategic community, because the way they talk about India, it's
00:38:31like it's 1955.
00:38:33Yeah, you're a major power.
00:38:35You have to deal with it.
00:38:36And that means you have to take care of your neighborhood.
00:38:38The U.S. is not going to come to your hate.
00:38:39The U.S. has its own interests.
00:38:41What about the U.S. intervention?
00:38:43I'll get to that in a second.
00:38:45Look, I think we have to be in a world where Trump doesn't care about South Asia.
00:38:48He doesn't care about, you know, this is, he's, what's in it for him?
00:38:52Increasingly, the U.S. doesn't care.
00:38:53Most people, most Americans cannot find Bangladesh on a map, right?
00:38:57Correct.
00:38:57So, I think this is, again, I just think that, so let me start with a few things.
00:39:03First, understanding of the neighborhood is so poor in India.
00:39:06We don't pay attention enough to the neighborhood.
00:39:09We don't actually listen to anybody in our neighborhood.
00:39:11We should.
00:39:12I devote a whole chapter in my book to India's neighborhood for that reason.
00:39:17And part of it is, I think if you actually look to people and actually talk to them,
00:39:20you realize that, you know, relations are not nearly as sour as the day-to-day news makes
00:39:26it out to be.
00:39:26And I'll give some very concrete examples of this.
00:39:29Today, India is the largest institutional investor in Bangladesh.
00:39:33It is, has an open border with Nepal, right?
00:39:36Nepal is, it's the largest trade partner by far with Nepal.
00:39:40China has made inroads, but it's still not the largest trade partner.
00:39:44It's the largest lender to Sri Lanka, right?
00:39:47If you look at the entire infrastructure in the Maldives, including that, particularly
00:39:50like the health infrastructure, the police, it is completely dependent on India.
00:39:55So I think if you, and this is not, again, this has been built up over time.
00:40:00What we're seeing is something very different, which is we're seeing political volatility
00:40:05grow in India's neighborhood because of domestic issues, not related to India, right?
00:40:10So we're seeing a democratization.
00:40:12We're seeing growing concerns about sovereignty, growing nationalism, often directed against
00:40:16India.
00:40:17And India has a stake in this because of overlapping ethnicities, right?
00:40:22So what happens in Nepal matters to UP and Bihar.
00:40:24What happens in Bangladesh matters to West Bengal and Assam.
00:40:27What happens in Sri Lanka matters in the Maldives, sorry, matters in Tamil Nadu.
00:40:32So we have this overlapping.
00:40:34Now, what is being attempted is how do you integrate this region and give these countries
00:40:40a stake in India and vice versa?
00:40:42And I think that is actually bearing dividends.
00:40:44So we have, again, a government that campaigned on an India out campaign in the Maldives.
00:40:49And yet you had a reasonably successful visit by the president to India recently.
00:40:53You have a party that has come to power in Sri Lanka, again, which was traditionally very
00:40:58skeptical of relations with India.
00:41:00And again, you had one of their first visits was to India, and you had some very concrete
00:41:04deals signed there.
00:41:05So I suspect Bangladesh is much more significant because the change is much more significant
00:41:10after many years of Sheikh Hasina's government there.
00:41:13But I think over time, they're going to find that it's not the US that's going to help them.
00:41:19It's not China that's going to help them.
00:41:20It'll have to be India.
00:41:21And they're facing some very severe economic headwinds over the next year or so.
00:41:25So I think it'll be difficult.
00:41:27But I think over the next year or two, things will settle down because they will realize
00:41:31that they cannot move forward without some level of cooperation with India.
00:41:36Nepal, I think, is more complicated because you have sort of in some ways three major parties
00:41:40and their coalition dynamics define a lot of it.
00:41:43And again, we've seen some outreach to Beijing in just the past few months by the new dispensation
00:41:48there.
00:41:49So the neighborhood is going to remain a challenge, and it's going to require a lot more investments
00:41:54on India's part.
00:41:55But I don't think that trajectory, I think we forget sometimes how difficult relations were
00:42:00with the neighborhood in the past.
00:42:01In the 1960s and 1980s and 2000, India intervened militarily in many of these places.
00:42:07And many of them turned to China much earlier than we would like to think.
00:42:11You know, Bangladesh turned to China for military equipment in the 80s.
00:42:14Sri Lanka started getting large-scale investment from China in the 90s and 2000s.
00:42:19And yet for many in India, there was a feeling, well, that's fine.
00:42:22Let them do it.
00:42:23It was somewhat belatedly that I think there was a realization that India needs to step up
00:42:27in its own neighborhood.
00:42:28So again, I think I'm, I would say if you look at this analysis in this way, I think
00:42:34the broader, the longer term trajectory for India and its neighborhood is positive.
00:42:39It will require a very conscientious effort.
00:42:43It is not, India cannot rely on others.
00:42:44It cannot rely on the US.
00:42:45It cannot rely on anybody else to do anything.
00:42:48But it will have to take the lead.
00:42:50Now, there's some ways in which, again, the second thing I would just contest a little
00:42:54bit, I think the notion of US-India collaboration neighborhood is a little skewed.
00:42:59So in some areas, say Nepal and Sri Lanka, actually the US helped India, including under
00:43:03the Biden administration.
00:43:04So they advanced something, for example, called Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC, which
00:43:10helped with some of the financing of hydroelectric power grids from Nepal to India.
00:43:16They did this in consultation with India, by the way.
00:43:18In Sri Lanka, again, the US government actually helped invest in an Indian-managed port.
00:43:24In Sri Lanka, people conveniently forget about that now.
00:43:28So again, it wasn't as if US-India relations in the neighborhood were always contested.
00:43:32I think Bangladesh was an outlier.
00:43:35And it was an outlier that predated even the Biden administration, goes back earlier, where
00:43:39there were some fundamental differences between the US and India about how to deal with the
00:43:43government there.
00:43:44And the US, to put it simply, prioritized essentially groups and parties and ideologies that India
00:43:51thought were very dangerous and very destabilizing, as you correctly pointed out.
00:43:56And so these differences had been playing out for some time.
00:44:00And again, while there were efforts to make, you know, Sheikh Hasina met President Biden in
00:44:05Delhi during the G20 summit.
00:44:07There were attempts to kind of lessen those differences.
00:44:10We found things came to a head with the protests and after the elections recently, leading to
00:44:15the consequences.
00:44:16And the US made an effort, particularly financially after the fact, to try and help the new government
00:44:22there in a way that India was certainly not comfortable with and India had very different
00:44:26views about.
00:44:27So we did see this very sharp India-US difference emerge under the Biden administration on Bangladesh,
00:44:35which India is now having to bear the consequences of.
00:44:40But again, I think going forward, the US is cutting aid.
00:44:43The new government in Dhaka will realize that they cannot rely upon the US and will ultimately
00:44:49have to realize that they need to engage with India in a very constructive manner.
00:44:53Don't you think that they might actually rely on China more than India?
00:44:56Again, China's means are limited.
00:44:57And by the way, people forget that, you know, part of the reason the US was skeptical of
00:45:01Hasina was because they felt she was too close to China.
00:45:04And so while China has tried to, again, engage very early on, their ambassador met with the
00:45:09new government when there was a change.
00:45:10There is a bit of skepticism there.
00:45:13Also, again, as I keep mentioning, I think China's means, the terms that China will offer
00:45:18for lending to prop up the new government may not be workable.
00:45:23We saw this in Sri Lanka, for example.
00:45:24When Sri Lanka actually had a major financial crisis, China was unable to help them.
00:45:29Coming to the point of collaboration on dealing with terrorism, in the last leg of Biden administration,
00:45:34India seemed to have a fallout with the five-eye and where India was actually accused of carrying
00:45:42out killings on foreign soil.
00:45:44Do you think that thing changing during Trump's presidency?
00:45:49Because it went very bad just in the last few months.
00:45:51So too early to say, I think partly what has happened just in the past few weeks since Trump
00:45:56has taken office is actually just because of the differences between the US and Canada.
00:46:01Again, that has nothing to do with India.
00:46:02The differences between the US and Canada have played out on trade and stuff like that.
00:46:06It effectively indirectly led to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's resignation.
00:46:10There'll be a new leader very soon in Canada.
00:46:13So I think that has really overshadowed any of the other developments.
00:46:17Again, I think on that front, Canada made a very concerted effort at politicizing a situation
00:46:24and raising it to a level that seemed to be, you know, again, it became very overly politicized
00:46:29in the Canadian context.
00:46:30And it's, you know, really triggered by Prime Minister Trudeau's decision to go to make a statement
00:46:37in parliament, which was quite extraordinary without certainly public evidence to back it up
00:46:42and circumstantial evidence.
00:46:46And the US just took a very different approach, which was not a very public one,
00:46:50and found itself caught between two things.
00:46:52It was one attempt at deepening a partnership with India on the one hand, and also its traditional
00:46:58Five Eyes network.
00:47:01So the US found itself in a bit of a dilemma there and tried to navigate it in a certain way.
00:47:06And they approached what was a very American thing to do, which is they decided to take
00:47:10a very legal approach to this and keep it primarily in a legal lane.
00:47:14Now, again, there was a late attempt a few months ago for Canada to try to escalate things
00:47:19further, culminating in the removal of diplomats from each other's countries.
00:47:24And again, that made it much easier.
00:47:27But again, it's not been front of mind for the new Trump administration.
00:47:32It may not be.
00:47:33I think the question is, again, between the US and India, it is, this is a legal matter.
00:47:39Let's resolve this in a legal matter.
00:47:41Canada is going to prove much more difficult because it's become much more politicized.
00:47:46And it started to infect not just the leadership and the party there, but also the bureaucracy.
00:47:52And we saw statements from civil, you know, career bureaucrats in Canada, which I think
00:47:56were very unhelpful in this episode.
00:47:59And then also, in some ways, the opposition parties as well.
00:48:02So even if there's a change in government, things may not change as dramatically as many
00:48:06would hope.
00:48:07So I think there's a much, this could still continue to be an issue in India-Canada relations
00:48:13for a while, regardless of the politics there.
00:48:15With the US, I think it's remained just one channel in what is a much more multifaceted
00:48:20relationship.
00:48:21And the US...
00:48:22So you think India's problems with Khalisani terrorism and terrorism coming from Pakistan
00:48:29and even Maoism, India will be in a better position now, at least in the next four years?
00:48:35I mean, it's hard to say.
00:48:36Again, I just think with Canada, there'll be some much deeper problems for a while, just
00:48:40because of the nature of their politics.
00:48:42So it's concerning.
00:48:43Now, coming to a very interesting topic, a lot of people are saying that Trump has ended
00:48:48the American deep state because it was very wary of how it was used to further the interests
00:48:54of Democrats.
00:48:55First of all, do you agree with this thing?
00:48:58And if at all he has ended the deep state, do you think a world superpower can actually
00:49:03survive without a deep state?
00:49:04Maybe he's just going to create his own deep state.
00:49:06So I think, you know, I don't like using the term deep state for the simple reason that
00:49:11I think it's very vague.
00:49:12It's a way of...
00:49:13It's talking about an aim office entity.
00:49:15So if you want to talk about...
00:49:17I always tell people when I get asked about deep state, I'm like, which...
00:49:20Tell me which institutions or individuals or entities you want to talk about, because
00:49:25the fact is all politics everywhere, all democratic politics involves multiple stakeholders
00:49:30who compete for influence, sometimes through the ballot box, sometimes through other means.
00:49:35And this happens in the US and people are quite open about it.
00:49:39In fact, you know, so you have different lobby groups that lobby for different things.
00:49:42You have a human rights lobby, you have a non-proliferation lobby, you have a, you know,
00:49:46big finance, you have big pharmaceutical companies and such, sometimes represented by formal
00:49:50organizations and sometimes acting more informally.
00:49:53The question is what do you mean by the deep state?
00:49:55And I think there are a few different meanings that are used and sometimes they merge together.
00:49:59One is the career bureaucracy.
00:50:03And there's a big difference because India and the UK or Canada or Israel or Japan are
00:50:09parliamentary systems.
00:50:11So we're used to having in India a career bureaucracy because governments come and go
00:50:14all the time.
00:50:15If the government falls, the work of government must continue.
00:50:19So there isn't really that deep skepticism of deep state.
00:50:21It's just part of the governance structure.
00:50:22Whereas in the US, which is a presidential system, you have political appointees very deep
00:50:27down.
00:50:28So a lot of, you know, thousands of positions change every time there's an election, even
00:50:32sometimes when there's an election in the same party, because these are political appointees.
00:50:37And so for that reason, the relationship with the career bureaucracy is much more different.
00:50:44And there's, in fact, more skepticism of these careerists, right, that they're unelected bureaucrats.
00:50:49And that's the term you often hear used by skeptics, by people like Elon Musk and others.
00:50:53So that, I think, is just watering out and is in some ways not unique to the US, but it's
00:50:58very unusual in the US system, which is there is this push against what they see as a career
00:51:03bureaucracy, including in the intelligence community, the law enforcement, who Trump and
00:51:10his allies believe are biased against them in various ways, not just on a partisan basis,
00:51:15not just Democrats, Republicans, because actually many of them are also Republicans as well, but
00:51:19some of them for deeper vested interests. And so they want to, in some ways, counter that
00:51:24bureaucracy. There's a different version of how the deep state is used, which is people who have
00:51:30influence. You know, people talk about like the Open Society Foundation or things like that. These are
00:51:36who sometimes critics believe have outsized influence in policymaking. But the fact is, again,
00:51:43there are multiple groups like this that lobby for and have diverse views on things, and often
00:51:49lobby against each other's interests. So I just say, like, when people talk about the deep state,
00:51:53don't take a lot of the criticism at face value. There isn't a single deep state, in some ways,
00:51:59maybe the multiple deep states is a better way of thinking about it.
00:52:02Maybe the deep state supported by the CIA and the Trump administration?
00:52:07No, again, they're all different, right? So again, even, even, I mean, I like to think of
00:52:11there's a whole field of bureaucratic politics, you know, what is it in what are institutional
00:52:16interests that they have, and oftentimes, say, the CIA's interests are not the same as the military,
00:52:20and not the same as the FBI, and not the same as the State Department. So they're not the idea that
00:52:24they all flow in one direction, necessarily, is not always true. But I think, again, there is a
00:52:30widespread belief amongst Trump and his supporters, that there are large segments of the
00:52:36bureaucracy that are inherently biased against them, and that they, you know, they must be
00:52:42replaced with a system that is much more accommodating of presidential authority, and should
00:52:49essentially constrain the presidency in many ways. And by the way, there are antecedents to this,
00:52:54even George W. Bush had a sort of variation of this about what is presidential authority versus
00:53:00what should be done through legislation and statute. So this is not a sort of entirely unique. I think
00:53:07maybe this, the scale and severity of it is unique.
00:53:10All right. So coming to the last tag of my questions, there is a term in use, this text
00:53:15sovereignty, where, you know, every big nation is trying to achieve that. We have written a paper
00:53:19on technology also. India wants to have its own tech sovereignty, whereas US is trying to protect
00:53:26its own, and they have banned the export of GPUs, which are very important for modern warfare and
00:53:32modern any kind of new technology that is being built. India, for some reasons, was put in the
00:53:37second tier with the third tier of countries where we cannot have more than 50,000 GPUs in a year.
00:53:43India, this puts India's plans of becoming a nation which is equipped with AI technologies in limbo.
00:53:50Do you think India would want to ensure that those kinds of restrictions are lifted, even if we have
00:53:56to give up on so many other things, because that's very important for India's tech sovereignty?
00:54:01A few ways to think of it. One is, I think the GPU, the chip diffusion rulings, which were really at
00:54:07the late end of the Biden administration, were kind of a last gap. I mean, I'm not sure there were
00:54:12as fully thought through as they would have otherwise been. India was in the second tier
00:54:16of countries, as were, by the way, a lot of other US allies. So a lot, most of Central Eastern Europe,
00:54:21Poland, Portugal, a number of other countries that are formal US allies were in the same category as
00:54:27India. I suspect, and by the way, people have stated on the record some of the rationale behind
00:54:34some of this, and you can go find it. But primarily, I think there were concerns about
00:54:38the security to third countries. And this gets to a larger issue that India will have to contend
00:54:43with, not just on chips and not just in this specific instance. There will be trade-offs
00:54:49between strategic autonomy and access to the most prized technologies. That is, if we want to continue
00:54:57to have a relationship with Russia, for example, there will be concerns in, say, the US, that is,
00:55:02is India taking appropriate measures to safeguard some of these technologies, again, particularly at
00:55:07the cutting edge, from what the US believes are adversaries, primarily China, Russia, India. I think
00:55:12in India's case, China is not the concern. It is more Russia, perhaps on some issues, Iran as well.
00:55:17So I think if India is able to show that some of these, it is able to create sufficient firewalls and
00:55:23security measures so that there's not, then I think that they can make a case that India can be put in
00:55:29a higher category. And by the way, this has happened on the defense side, for example, where
00:55:34India has been on certain export controls has been elevated to a status in the US, akin to certain
00:55:41allies, like Israel and certain NATO allies. So it's certainly possible. I think it requires some work
00:55:48and it will require building up of trust. And the difference, the simple difference is Taiwan and
00:55:52South Korea and Japan and Australia were able to show that they could protect these technologies from
00:55:57that. The other thing is, I think it's the bigger concern is the precedent sets. I don't think
00:56:02immediately this will have an impact because again, the kinds of chips that India needs immediately are
00:56:08not necessarily going to be affected in every way. But I do think that the concern and there is a deep
00:56:15and real concern in India is that this is the start of another round of export controls. And in the past,
00:56:22on the nuclear side, in the 1960s onwards, India was at the receiving end of a soft technology denial
00:56:28regime. And so it shouldn't be put in that place again. So that I think is a real and abiding concern.
00:56:35But again, the question will be, can you can you create the sufficient security guarantees to ensure
00:56:43that this is not that these technologies don't diffuse to what the US considers that? The other choice
00:56:49India has is, of course, to do it, do some of this indigenously, it will be more costly, more time
00:56:53consuming, to develop a lot of these same technologies indigenously, or work with other
00:56:57partners who are more, who are less concerned about security, assuming, of course, that they have
00:57:02a sufficient, you know, if the EU, for example, were to have certain technologies and be less
00:57:08concerned about than the US, then obviously, that makes the EU a more attractive partner.
00:57:14So I think, again, there are going to be these trade offs that India will make need to make
00:57:18between its short term between its autonomy, and access to certain technologies. Again,
00:57:23I'm more concerned about the longer term precedent than the immediate steps. And that certain steps
00:57:28can be taken and have been taken, you know, on defense and space and other areas, where India
00:57:33has been able to gain access to that to certain more advantageous technologies. The bigger concern,
00:57:39I think, with indigenization, I think, is just on the domestic side, the ability to absorb
00:57:45that technology. That is really where things are at, and that will really involve the private
00:57:49sector. And so, again, we're seeing very good forward movement in certain areas, such as space,
00:57:57a little bit on semiconductors, on telecom, on defense. We're not seeing it in certain other
00:58:03areas yet, such as AI. And I think the hope is that we actually get there.
00:58:07Yeah, there is one more very contentious issue, which is H-1B visas. Now there is a contradiction
00:58:15within the US, like within Trump administration. Elon Musk is willing to go to war to have Indian
00:58:20talent. And Trump believes that, you know, people coming to the US with the dream of just
00:58:28settling down there needs to be controlled. So where do you think this debate will settle
00:58:33in the US and how India, it will impact India? I think, so there are three or four things to
00:58:38keep in mind. One, the US at least understands, particularly the corporate world, that they
00:58:44need talent from elsewhere to gain an advantage in technological areas. They don't have enough
00:58:52sufficient domestic STEM talent. And the single biggest place it's going to come from, it'll
00:58:57come from lots of places, but the single biggest place will be India, one. Two, there is growing
00:59:01anti-immigration sentiment. So people, sometimes culturally, this is the part of the MAGA, the
00:59:07Make America Great Again movement. They'll say, we don't care that this will give us an economic
00:59:14edge and benefit our economies in the long run. We are a culture, we're a society, and we don't
00:59:19want people who don't share, who don't look like us, who don't, you know. So there's a xenophobic
00:59:25aspect to it that is there. And there's a growing anti-immigration sentiment, not just
00:59:29in the US, but in many other countries as well, including in Europe. So that's, I think,
00:59:34a second reality. A third is that there is a widespread consensus that the H-1B visa is
00:59:41inadequate and insufficient for a variety of reasons. It has a very small cap, so it's very
00:59:47limiting. It is deviated from how it was originally designed in terms of what the purpose was. It was
00:59:53really sort of developed in the early 1990s, but was used in the tech sector much more than it should
00:59:59have. And then people are trying to find, have found ways to sort of game the system to, so there's a
01:00:05reason why they saw more than 70% of H-1B, successful H-1B applicants are from India. So the Indians are
01:00:10seen as overrepresented there. So I think that, you know, there's a widespread feeling the system is
01:00:14broken. We have concerns about immigration, but we also want the talent. And so I think there are,
01:00:20what does the solution look like? I think it can go in a few different ways, maybe all of the above.
01:00:25It can either be that the US actually does reform some legal immigration systems. In fact, maybe
01:00:31replaces H-1B with a slightly better system that actually gets the US what it wants, but also gets
01:00:36India what it wants. One of the big challenges with H-1B is that workers on H-1B visa are actually
01:00:42subsidizing social security for the US and most don't avail of those social security. So effectively,
01:00:47they're underwriting the system. So India says that that's unfair. We're effectively underwriting
01:00:52your social security system. So there are a lot of imperfections with H-1B as it is. So one possibility
01:00:59is there is some legal immigration reform. It's going to be difficult because it requires legislative
01:01:03changes in the US. A second possibility is you have some kind of mobility agreement between the US
01:01:10and India, similar to what India has done with, say, Germany or other European countries recently,
01:01:16that has actually led to an increase in numbers, but fewer short term, a fewer long term migrants.
01:01:22So that's something that, again, India will benefit from. And the US, it will meet at least some of the
01:01:28objectives of the new US government. Another thing that could happen, and again, I think and I hope this
01:01:35will happen is you'll start seeing much more of this work outsourced to India. So US, essentially,
01:01:42US companies relying on Indian talent that doesn't necessarily need to move to India, but gets many
01:01:46of the advantages.
01:01:48GCCs, yeah.
01:01:49Yeah, yeah. So I think, again, a lot of people are not as familiar with GCC. So that's why I was
01:01:55assessing. But I think we, what I suspect will happen will be some combination of the above,
01:01:59that we'll have some semi, perhaps full scale replacement of the H-1B program, perhaps with
01:02:05something that is better, and better suited for both the US and India, you have, so you can,
01:02:10the US gets the technical talent that it needs, India, Indian workers are not exploited, you actually
01:02:15have a larger cap, you have more short term people going short term to the US rather than long term
01:02:20settlement. But then the at the same time, you have more, more work outsourced to India. So again,
01:02:27I think there's a way out of this. But I think focusing very narrowly on this one particular
01:02:32visa program is sometimes not as helpful that it's a problematic program for many respects,
01:02:37for many reasons.
01:02:38My last question to you, what are the two most exciting things you see happening in the US
01:02:45relationship over the next four years?
01:02:47I think defence, maybe these are just two areas I am interested in. I think defence and space,
01:02:53there's already a lot that's happening. Space, I think is going to be a very
01:02:56exciting field in general. India is going to be a major player.
01:03:00Space is where we have become sort of equals, you know, because of our
01:03:03frugal animation.
01:03:06Yeah, not quite equals yet. But I think the US, India definitely has a very, you know,
01:03:10globally competitive space program. And in certain levels is really, you know,
01:03:15really respected as world class, but also just the field of the opportunities and the technologies
01:03:20are changing rapidly. You know, whether it's telecom, whether it's human space flight, whether it,
01:03:25I mean, this is less positive, but even the militarisation of spaces is moving, but it's
01:03:30creating, it's changing, for better or for worse. And this presents a lot of opportunities for cooperation
01:03:38and collaboration, it's going to be much more complex, because it'll be no longer just state to
01:03:42state. As you know, Elon Musk is a major player, is one of the major players in the US in the space
01:03:48industry. But you now have like a very thriving space sector in the US, you have a thriving space
01:03:53sector in India. And this is one area that is just ripe for much further cooperation. We'll see,
01:03:58we expect to see an Indian astronaut going up in the next few months from a US launch, which will be the
01:04:05first Indian astronaut in 40 years. And that should hopefully excite a lot of public imagination in
01:04:11India as well. So again, I think there's just a suite of technologies happening in the space sector
01:04:17that I think are very exciting. Again, some of them are quite problematic in terms of the
01:04:21militarisation, the potential military implications of that. The second area, I think, is defence more
01:04:27broadly. And again, I think we underestimate the degree to which, partly as a consequence of the
01:04:34the Russia-Ukraine war, how India's indigenisation efforts are going. And we had no exports from India
01:04:4110 years ago, virtually none. The few items we had were mostly secondhand as well, with a few
01:04:47exceptions. But I think we've started to see, again, an Indian defence sector that is starting
01:04:52to become globally competitive. And that opens up enormous opportunities, not just with the US,
01:04:57but including with the Global South. So that's, it's now something, you know, India has done now a
01:05:03defence deal with most of the many, if not most of the ASEAN countries now, such as Brahmo's missiles
01:05:09to the Philippines, being one notable example. But in South Asia and Africa, you're starting to see
01:05:16India move into the defence space a little bit. And it's early stage, it's early stage yet, but it's a
01:05:21very exciting time. And it's going to look very different. Everyone focuses on the big platforms.
01:05:26But I think we're going to start seeing a lot more smaller companies emerge in the space,
01:05:31doing, again, some very innovative, cutting edge work.
01:05:33All right, Dhuvab, thank you very much for coming on Strategic Minds. It was a wonderful discussion
01:05:38with you on a wide range of issues. We hope our audience will benefit from your views on
01:05:43in the US relationship. Thank you very much. Thank you.