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00:00Transcription by CastingWords
00:30On January 8, 1959, a triumphant procession through the Cuban capital of Havana marked the return of Fidel Castro.
00:48His vastly outnumbered and under-equipped revolutionary forces had defeated the army of dictator Fulgencio Batista just a week before.
01:00Castro was on the way to returning Cuba to self-rule and self-respect, free of its long-lived role as an international pawn.
01:09On January 10, as he addressed the delirious masses, a single dove, one of many released in celebration, landed on Castro's shoulder and remained there as he spoke.
01:22To Cubans of the ancient Santeria religion, it was undeniable proof that the gods themselves had selected Fidel Castro to lead Cuba.
01:33Little more than a year later, Castro was again recognized by a higher power, but this time for extermination.
01:43The United States targeted the Cuban revolutionary government and Fidel Castro himself for his anti-American rhetoric and his growing relationship with the Soviets.
01:53Castro quickly realized that an effective Cuban intelligence network would be a critical component to prevent American aggression from toppling his regime.
02:06It would even be needed to navigate his complicated relationship with Nikita Khrushchev, but above all, he knew that inside information on the intentions of world superpowers would be the key to his personal survival.
02:22Today, Fidel Castro, an enduring symbol of the revolution, continues his unchallenged rule of Cuba.
02:32It is a tribute to Cuban intelligence successes, American intelligence failures, and to Castro himself.
02:41Castro is a charismatic leader.
02:45Without any question, the Cuban people would have followed him into anything.
02:49Even people who might wish that he would retire still have a grudging respect for Castro.
02:57He put Cuba on the map.
03:01I think most Americans misjudge him.
03:04He's extremely bright. His IQ is high.
03:06He's very, very well-read.
03:08He's done a tremendous amount for that country that we don't credit him with.
03:11The infant mortality rate in Castro's Cuba is lower than in the capital of the richest country in the world, Washington, D.C.
03:20Similarly on education, literacy.
03:23For its income level, Cuba's ahead of most of the world in terms of literacy.
03:28But he's an ideologue, and he's used very poor judgment in his management of the economy.
03:36It's true that he faces a great penalty today because we apply economic sanctions again.
03:42We're the only country in the world that applies economic sanctions against Cuba.
03:47It is a penalty.
03:48But he could overcome it to a far greater degree he has if he had introduced more, I'm going to call it, market principles into his economy.
03:56He's made a great mistake on that.
04:00Now in the 21st century, the Soviet Union is gone.
04:04U.S. relations with Vietnam and North Korea are on the mend.
04:09Even the People's Republic of China is moving in the direction of capitalism.
04:13But the world's last true communist dictatorship still rules in the Caribbean, despite tremendous economic hardship.
04:22As it has been for generations, growing up and surviving in Cuba is a struggle, something that Castro was made very aware of as a child.
04:32The son of a wealthy landowner, Fidel Castro-Rus, grew up privileged.
04:43But his father instilled in the Castro children an appreciation for the plight of the unfortunate.
04:48Both Fidel and his younger brother, Raul, committed themselves at an early age to improving conditions for Cuba's downtrodden.
04:59However, they took different political paths.
05:03Raul Castro, by all accounts, by all evidence, was a communist.
05:08He had gone to a communist youth camp in Central Europe in the 1950s.
05:15He had become friendly with young members of the KGB at that time.
05:20There's no evidence his brother was ever so inclined.
05:24After graduating with a law degree from Havana University in 1951, Fidel pursued his passion, politics.
05:33He joined the Orthodox Party, a conventional political organization.
05:37When Fulgencio Batista seized power in 1952, Castro came to believe that armed revolt was the only way to restore nationalist pride and basic human rights.
05:53In July 1953, Fidel Castro led an army of 125 men in an attack on a Cuban army barracks.
06:02The Castro revolution had begun, but in failure.
06:05Most of Castro's force was killed, and Fidel was captured, tried, and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
06:16The date of the rebel attack, the 26th of July, became a sacred day to the revolution and is still the most celebrated of Cuban holidays.
06:26In May 1955, less than two years later, Batista bowed to popular pressure and granted Fidel Castro amnesty.
06:38Forbidden to make public speeches, Castro left for Mexico to escape Batista's wrath.
06:45During Castro's exile, life in Cuba under Batista grew steadily worse for those who opposed him.
06:52Batista turned the entire country against him.
06:58That was true in the cities where anyone suspected of opposition sympathy was kidnapped and very often murdered.
07:07And in the countryside, where whole villages were sometimes either massacred or displaced.
07:14Batista had become a rich puppet of American business.
07:17By 1958, Americans owned much of Cuban industry and was the main importer of Cuba's number one product, sugar.
07:29Fidel Castro, a strong nationalist, felt he could not stand by as Cuba became more influenced by U.S. interests.
07:36From Mexico, Castro made a solemn promise that by the end of 1956, Cuba would be free.
07:48Batista did not send Cuban intelligence operatives to monitor the rebels,
07:52but did casually keep an eye on them with the help of Mexican officials.
07:59Raul Castro and other idealistic revolutionaries joined with Fidel in Mexico.
08:04At Batista's request, the Mexican government put pressure on Fidel Castro and provided reports on his activities to Havana.
08:15Crowded into one small boat, Castro and his 81-man force left Mexico for Cuba in December 1956 to resume the War of Revolution.
08:28Mexican authorities informed Havana of Castro's departure.
08:32When the rebels reached Cuba four days later, they were attacked by the waiting Cuban army.
08:40Only 16 of the 82 rebels survived.
08:44Fidel, Raul and the 14 others vanished into the Sierra Maestra Mountains.
08:49But over the next two years, they managed to build an army of 10,000 to carry out the revolution.
09:00Among those was a young Argentinian doctor, Ernesto Shea Guevara.
09:05Fidel and Shea developed a relationship of mutual admiration and of true friendship.
09:11However, when it came to politics, Raul Castro and Shea had more in common.
09:18Shea was openly Marxist-Leninist, but was anti-Soviet.
09:24Though Shea and other communists were part of the rebellion,
09:28Fidel feared that a communist label might be attached to the revolution.
09:32That could negatively affect world opinion, which Fidel greatly valued.
09:40Out of respect for his brother's concerns, Raul kept his communist beliefs a secret.
09:46During the Cuban insurrection, there were occasional attempts by Batista to infiltrate Castro's army, but with little success.
09:57Those few who managed to penetrate were identified and executed as traitors before they could do any harm to the rebel cause.
10:07Castro, on the other hand, depended heavily on intelligence to keep tabs on Batista's forces.
10:13Perhaps the most important intelligence Castro gained during the war came in the summer of 1958,
10:21when Batista launched a major military offensive against the rebels at their mountain base.
10:30The people in the area supported the revolutionaries,
10:33and through a series of runners, kept the revolutionary forces apprised of where Batista's troops were at every moment.
10:40And so the revolutionaries were able to attack individual units of Batista's army
10:44and defeat them one after another, and win that battle, even though they were outnumbered 10 to 1.
10:50That signaled to the army that this war was probably going to be lost.
10:55And from that moment on, the performance of the army began to deteriorate,
10:59morale fell, desertions increased, and the rebels moved down out of the mountains
11:04and began to advance on the cities of the island.
11:07The push toward Havana was on.
11:12But Castro desperately needed additional supplies to be assured final victory.
11:18That need led to the secret beginnings of what would become
11:21one of the most notorious and tumultuous relationships
11:24between two countries throughout the Cold War.
11:27By mid-1958, ultimate victory for Fidel Castro's rebel forces
11:39over the army of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista was within sight.
11:44The rebel guerrilla war tactics were very effective against Batista's conventional forces.
11:51But for Castro's men, guns and ammunition remained in short supply.
11:56In late 1958, Castro made the difficult decision to approach the Soviet Union for help.
12:06Castro did not want to align the revolution with any superpower
12:10and risk having that power assume control of Cuba,
12:14as America had for more than 50 years.
12:16But Castro badly needed assistance, and he knew of Moscow's open support of wars of liberation.
12:26Fidel expected one big offensive before he could take Havana.
12:32He wasn't far from the capital, but he still believed that Batista and his army
12:36would put up one last-ditch effort to save their government.
12:39The Soviets decided in a Kremlin meeting at the end of December 1958
12:45to provide the Cubans with some rifles.
12:51At the outset of the revolution, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had no real interest in Cuba.
12:57But he knew of Raul Castro and Che Guevara's involvement and of their communist beliefs.
13:05As a rebel victory became more likely, Khrushchev was enticed by the thought of the USSR
13:10gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere by assisting a potentially Marxist revolution.
13:16Khrushchev secretly provided German World War II surplus rifles to Castro.
13:24Routed through Czechoslovakia, the rifles were sold to a private company in Costa Rica,
13:30sympathetic to Castro.
13:32The Costa Ricans then delivered the weapons to the rebels.
13:37Secrecy was vital to prevent U.S. intervention on Batista's behalf.
13:42U.S. backing for Batista was fading fast.
13:48To salvage his support in Washington, Batista had to vilify the rebels.
13:53He pointed to Castro and called him a communist.
13:57At that point, the CIA moved to determine if it was in fact a communist revolution
14:02that was challenging Batista.
14:04In 1958, the CIA sent an investigative team to Cuba's Oriente province,
14:12where Castro had grown up, to learn all it could of Castro's political beliefs.
14:20The sense that this team brought back was that Fidel was a revolutionary.
14:24He was a nationalist, dedicated to sovereignty for the Cuban people,
14:31and therefore not necessarily an agent of international communism.
14:36On December 31st, 1958, Fulgencio Batista fled Havana with millions of dollars in embezzled funds.
14:44The next afternoon, New Year's Day, 1959, Raul Castro and Che Guevara arrived in Havana
14:55to the cheers of rapturous crowds.
14:59Fidel, who was fighting in the far end of the island when victory came,
15:03finally reached Havana on January 8th.
15:08Castro passed 1,500 new laws in the first year of his regime.
15:13He increased wages, reduced rents, and seized foreign-owned farmland,
15:19which he partially distributed to landless Cuban peasants.
15:24In 1960, all foreign holdings in Cuba were nationalized,
15:28resulting in a tremendous loss for U.S. business and American-organized crime,
15:34which owned Havana casinos.
15:38Castro's popularity in the U.S. continued to suffer
15:41with the executions of some Batista officials who had not escaped from Cuba.
15:49Despite his hatred for U.S. mistreatment of his country,
15:52Fidel immediately set out to cultivate his relationship with Washington
15:56and with the American public.
15:58In April of 1959, he visited several American cities.
16:05When Fidel Castro came to the United States three months after his triumph,
16:10the CIA actually had a secret meeting with him.
16:13And they said to him,
16:14there are communists in your government,
16:16and we want to help you find them and ferret them out.
16:19Let's set up a Bat-channel between the CIA and your government
16:26so that we can pass you intelligence on those communists.
16:30And Castro, of course, played along with this.
16:32And for a number of months, the CIA actually did pass intelligence to Cuba.
16:37But very quickly, they came to be persuaded
16:40that their initial impression of Fidel Castro was wrong.
16:43He was not somebody that they could control.
16:46And by the end of 1959,
16:48memos began to appear inside Langley headquarters
16:51recommending that Castro be assassinated.
16:55During this trip,
16:56Fidel faced tough questions from the press
16:59about whether or not he and his brother Raul were communists.
17:03I am not communists.
17:05I am not agreeing with communists.
17:07While Fidel was in the United States
17:10denying communist affiliation,
17:12Raul Castro, appointed head of the Cuban military,
17:16was in Moscow,
17:17secretly furthering Soviet involvement in the Cuban armed forces.
17:22Nikita Khrushchev agreed to send Spanish communists to Havana
17:26to assist in the training of an army
17:28that would remain loyal to Fidel
17:30and to the goal of Marxism in Cuba.
17:35When Fidel returned to Cuba,
17:38there was tension between the brothers.
17:40Fidel did not want a big power to step in
17:44and dictate to him
17:46what course his revolution ought to take.
17:49Raul Castro's efforts
17:51were making it more difficult for him
17:55to deny Soviet involvement.
17:57However, some scholars are convinced
18:01that Fidel not only knew of Raul's efforts in the USSR,
18:06he secretly supported them.
18:09Other communist members of the revolutionary government
18:12encouraged Castro to develop trade with Moscow
18:15by exchanging sugar for agricultural and manufacturing equipment.
18:20In February 1960,
18:22a Soviet delegation arrived in Havana
18:25to sign a trade agreement between Cuba and the USSR.
18:29That pact was all that the U.S. needed
18:32to confirm its suspicions
18:33that Fidel Castro was indeed a communist.
18:39Fidel's greatest struggle had begun
18:41to survive the wrath of America,
18:44a nation that would seek to destroy him.
18:46In February 1960,
18:51with Cuba and the Soviet Union
18:54having established trade relations,
18:57President Dwight Eisenhower decided
18:59that Fidel Castro was a clear threat
19:02to American security.
19:05In March, he approved a CIA plan
19:08to invade Cuba
19:09for the purpose of overthrowing Castro.
19:11The operation was designed to appear
19:14to be the act of Cuban exiles.
19:18CIA director Alan Dulles
19:20had already begun his own efforts
19:22to justify a covert U.S. invasion of Cuba.
19:26Dulles' plan was based on Castro's need
19:29to purchase military aircraft.
19:31In November 1959,
19:36the British ambassador writes a memo
19:38we now have to his foreign secretary.
19:42And the memo said,
19:43I've just met with the CIA director Alan Dulles.
19:47And Dulles has asked us
19:49not to sell Hunter aircraft to Cuba.
19:52And the reason is,
19:53is that if we, Britain,
19:54do not sell Hunter aircraft to Cuba,
19:56they will be forced to buy aircraft
19:59from the Soviet Union
20:00or the Soviet bloc.
20:02And then the United States
20:03can use the justification
20:05it used in Guatemala in 1954
20:08to overthrow the Cuban government.
20:11The British denied Dulles' request
20:14and sold the fighter planes to Cuba.
20:18As part of the Eisenhower plan,
20:21the CIA began recruiting
20:23and training an invasion force
20:25made up strictly of Cuban exiles.
20:28This was to be a paramilitary operation
20:31that called for the exile force
20:33to make a secret beach landing
20:34and then connect
20:36with the large anti-Castro factions
20:38the CIA believed were in Cuba.
20:42Together they would take Havana
20:44and depose the Castro regime.
20:48Cuba's intelligence network,
20:50first coordinated by Raul Castro
20:52Castro and Che Guevara during the insurrection
20:55was still in its infancy in 1960.
20:59But he did have the support
21:01of many Latin people
21:02throughout Central and South America
21:04who considered Castro a hero,
21:07a symbol of hope
21:08against what they perceived
21:09as imperialist aggression.
21:14Many of those people
21:14provided valuable information
21:16to Cuban intelligence.
21:19Even details on locations
21:21of the camps in Guatemala
21:22where the CIA was training
21:25its Cuban invasion force
21:26were revealed.
21:27Among the Cubans in Guatemala
21:29being handed this critical information
21:32was a young Cuban intelligence officer,
21:34Domingo Amuchastegui.
21:36A very wealthy person
21:39came to me to tell me
21:41that there was this
21:43known rich landowner in Guatemala
21:48who was giving away
21:49one of his big farms
21:51to train for an invasion to Cuba.
21:55I would say perhaps two weeks later,
21:58a very simple, ordinary man,
22:01a peasant, obviously,
22:03knocked the door off the embassy
22:05to tell us the same story.
22:07The Cuban community
22:09in Miami, Florida
22:10was also a great source
22:12of information and gossip.
22:15However, by the beginning
22:17of April 1961,
22:19Castro still did not know
22:20the designated site
22:21of the coming invasion of Cuba.
22:25But through sources in Miami,
22:27the DGI, DirecciĂ³n General
22:30de la Intelligencia,
22:31Cuba's primary intelligence agency,
22:34had learned the date
22:35was April 17th.
22:38Castro desperately needed
22:40Soviet protection
22:41from what he believed
22:42would be a full-scale
22:44American invasion.
22:45But Moscow was not going to risk
22:48angering Washington
22:49over a small island nation
22:51that had not even declared
22:52its revolution to be socialist.
22:54In order to justify an attack,
22:58on April 15th,
23:00two days before the invasion
23:01was to take place,
23:03the CIA sent bombers
23:05painted with Cuban markings
23:06to destroy Castro's
23:08air force planes
23:09as they sat in the ground.
23:12The U.S. also hoped
23:13to create the illusion
23:15for the world
23:15that Castro's own military
23:17had turned against him.
23:20The American deception
23:21didn't stand up to scrutiny.
23:24The day after the bombing,
23:26at the funeral
23:26for those killed in the raid,
23:28Castro publicly aligned Cuba
23:30with the U.S.S.R.
23:32He declared Cuba
23:33a Marxist-Leninist state.
23:37This is a transparent effort
23:39on Castro's part
23:40to force the Soviets
23:42to come to his support.
23:44And so over the next year,
23:46Castro began to create
23:48that Marxist-Leninist state
23:50with the ruling Communist Party.
23:55The CIA's invasion of Cuba
23:57began during the dark morning hours
23:59of April 17th, 1961
24:02at Bahia de Cochinos,
24:04the Bay of Pigs,
24:05on Cuba's south-central coast.
24:09Castro's quarter-million-man army
24:11and civilian militia
24:12defeated the invaders
24:13in just 72 hours,
24:16suffering only about 150 casualties.
24:19Of the 1,500-man-invading army,
24:22just over 120 were killed.
24:26Roughly 1,200 were captured
24:28and the rest vanished
24:30into the surrounding countryside.
24:33The CIA's hopes
24:34for a revolt against Castro
24:36by the local population
24:38also failed.
24:39In the hours
24:40after the invasion began,
24:42Cuba's state security
24:43jumped into action,
24:45rounding up 20,000
24:46and suspected dissidents.
24:49The Cuban Communist Party
24:51expressed concern to Fidel
24:53that state security in Cuba
24:55was too weak.
24:56They wanted KGB assistance
24:58to bolster the DGI.
25:02He invited a group
25:04of KGB officers
25:05to work at various levels
25:07of the domestic and foreign
25:09Cuban intelligence services.
25:11This meant that he was creating
25:15a Cuban KGB
25:17using some of the techniques
25:19that had been developed
25:20by the Soviets
25:21to put down dissent
25:23in Central Europe
25:25and in the Soviet Union itself.
25:29Following the humiliating defeat
25:32at the Bay of Pigs,
25:33President John F. Kennedy's brother,
25:35Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
25:37vowed vengeance.
25:38He set out to eliminate
25:41Fidel Castro,
25:42declaring this goal
25:43the top priority
25:45of the U.S. government.
25:47Then, just four months
25:48after the Bay of Pigs,
25:50Fidel Castro began considering
25:52ways to mend
25:52the U.S.-Cuba relationship.
25:56Fidel sent Che Guevara
25:57to a meeting
25:58of the Organization
25:59of American States
26:00to meet with Kennedy aide
26:02Richard Goodwin.
26:04Goodwin reports back to Kennedy
26:06that Guevara has said
26:09that Cuba is willing
26:10to move out
26:11of the Soviet orbit
26:12in exchange
26:14for a promise
26:15that the United States
26:16not overthrow
26:18the Cuban government.
26:19Goodwin says
26:21this shows
26:22that the Soviet Union
26:23probably will not help them.
26:25This suggests
26:26what we ought to do
26:27is kick them
26:28while they're down.
26:29And he proposes
26:30a series of measures
26:31to get rid of Castro.
26:33Kennedy approved
26:37the initial plan
26:39that by the spring
26:40of 1962
26:41had evolved
26:42into Operation Mongoose,
26:44an elaborate blueprint
26:45for sabotage,
26:47deception,
26:48psychological warfare,
26:49and assassination.
26:52It also included
26:53the implementation
26:53of a trade embargo
26:55on Cuba.
26:56More than ever,
26:57the Cuban government
26:58had to depend
26:59on intelligence
26:59for the very survival
27:01of the revolution
27:02and of Castro himself.
27:05A special body,
27:08apart from
27:08the state security,
27:11dealt with providing
27:12security for the Cuban
27:13leadership
27:14and within this entity
27:17known as
27:18Seguridad Personal,
27:19personal security,
27:21there was a special
27:22desk that would
27:25deal specifically
27:26with threats
27:28of assassination.
27:31It was known
27:31as the
27:32Bureau de Atentados,
27:34and they were
27:35very successful.
27:38Those special Cuban units
27:40were helped
27:40by a fair amount
27:41of bungling
27:42on the U.S. side.
27:44The CIA even
27:45unwittingly approached
27:47Castro family members
27:48and friends
27:49in efforts
27:50to recruit Cubans
27:51to assassinate Fidel.
27:54Havana and Moscow
27:55both realized
27:56that these U.S. failures
27:57would only serve
27:58to strengthen
27:59Washington's resolve
28:00to do away
28:01with Castro.
28:02Soviet Premier
28:03Nikita Khrushchev
28:04saw a unique
28:05opportunity in this.
28:08At once,
28:08he could move
28:09the U.S.S.R.
28:10closer to world military
28:12parity with the Americans
28:13while making it appear
28:15as if he were simply
28:16looking out
28:17for the best interests
28:18of a small,
28:19weak, socialist ally.
28:22It was a gamble
28:22that sent the world's
28:24two great superpowers
28:25hurtling toward each other
28:27on a potentially
28:28catastrophic collision course.
28:38Following the Bay of Pigs,
28:39Cuban and Soviet intelligence
28:41worked tirelessly
28:42to determine
28:43if Washington
28:44was planning
28:45a second invasion
28:46of Cuba.
28:47Cuba's intelligence service,
28:49the DGI,
28:50put all its resources
28:51into uncovering
28:53any invasion plans
28:54and foiling plots
28:56to kill Fidel Castro.
28:58The KGB quietly expressed
29:01doubts to the Kremlin
29:02that Kennedy would attempt
29:03a second invasion of Cuba.
29:07However,
29:07that is not what they were
29:09reporting to their
29:09Cuban counterparts,
29:11including intelligence officer
29:13Domingo Amuchistegui.
29:14The Soviets were crying wolf
29:18since day one
29:19of our relationship
29:21because of their
29:23major stake
29:26in deploying
29:27the missiles in Cuba,
29:30playing their own game.
29:32Well,
29:33let's tell the Cuban,
29:36hey,
29:37the wolf is coming.
29:38So Cubans would be
29:41more easily persuaded
29:43to accept
29:44the Soviet deployment
29:45of forces.
29:46We were being used,
29:47manipulated
29:48for strategic considerations
29:51interests
29:52of the Soviet Union,
29:55disregarding
29:55Cuban interests
29:57completely.
29:59Castro sent
30:00Shea Guevara
30:01to Moscow
30:02in April 1962
30:03to request
30:05more Soviet
30:05military assistance.
30:07The following month,
30:10Khrushchev proposed
30:11to Castro
30:12the placement
30:12of Soviet strategic
30:14nuclear missiles
30:15in Cuba.
30:17At first,
30:18Fidel argued
30:19that such weapons
30:20were not necessary.
30:22He told Khrushchev
30:23that if the Soviets
30:24were to make Cuba
30:24part of the Warsaw Pact,
30:26the United States
30:27would not dare attack.
30:29Khrushchev stressed
30:30that the missiles
30:31were critical
30:32for Cuban defense.
30:36Shea Guevara
30:36and Raul Castro
30:38both agreed
30:39with Khrushchev's assessment
30:40and with their encouragement,
30:42Fidel accepted
30:43the missile deployment.
30:45But Castro
30:46wanted Khrushchev
30:47to be open
30:48about placing
30:49nuclear missiles
30:50in Cuba.
30:51He hoped
30:51that such a bold
30:52announcement
30:53might force
30:54Kennedy
30:54to negotiate
30:55with him,
30:56possibly leading
30:57to a non-aggression pact
30:59and ultimately
31:00normalization
31:01of relations
31:01with Washington,
31:03something Castro
31:04had always coveted.
31:06However,
31:06Khrushchev could not
31:07consider allowing
31:08the U.S.
31:09to know
31:09of such a daring move.
31:11He knew Kennedy
31:12would never stand
31:13for a Soviet nuclear
31:14intrusion
31:15into the Western Hemisphere.
31:17Khrushchev convinced
31:18Castro
31:19that secrecy
31:20was in Cuba's
31:21best interest.
31:22In September 1962,
31:27the Soviets
31:28began the covert
31:29shipment
31:29of nuclear
31:30ballistic missiles
31:31to Cuba.
31:33Moscow also
31:34provided more
31:35than 40,000
31:36Soviet troops
31:37and technical
31:38advisors.
31:40In Cuba,
31:40once the missiles
31:41began to arrive,
31:43the Cuban
31:43Intelligence
31:44Directorate
31:45decided to
31:45intentionally
31:46leak information
31:48about the
31:48deployment
31:49to members
31:50of anti-Castro
31:51groups in Miami.
31:53As Havana well knew,
31:55the news would
31:56immediately be
31:56reported to the CIA.
32:00They didn't believe it.
32:02They didn't believe it
32:03because after
32:05Bay of Pigs,
32:06they had come
32:06to the conclusion
32:07that Cubans
32:10were not reliable
32:11at all.
32:13And they would only
32:14believe that
32:15there were missiles
32:16in Cuba
32:16only if they showed up
32:18with a missile
32:19in Miami.
32:21on October 17th,
32:24after noting
32:25more American
32:26spy plane missions
32:27over Cuba
32:28and increased
32:29activity at the
32:30U.S. naval base
32:31at Guantanamo,
32:32Fidel Castro
32:33put the Cuban
32:34military
32:34on maximum alert.
32:37Then,
32:38on October 22nd,
32:39President Kennedy
32:40announced the
32:41Soviet missile
32:42presence in Cuba
32:43to the American
32:44public.
32:45The shipment
32:45to Cuba
32:46is being initiated.
32:47information coming
32:50into Havana
32:50from Cuban channels
32:52was scarce.
32:53Castro had to depend
32:54on Cuban missions
32:56in Mexico
32:56and at the United
32:58Nations
32:58via Soviet
32:59communications channels
33:01for the bulk
33:02of his intelligence.
33:05On October 26th,
33:07with no hard evidence
33:09from the DGI
33:10to support his belief,
33:12Fidel Castro
33:13became convinced
33:14that a full-scale
33:15attack on Cuba
33:16by the U.S.
33:17was just hours away.
33:20He readied his country
33:21for the worst
33:21and rushed
33:22a desperate letter
33:23to Khrushchev
33:24urging the Soviets
33:25to strike first
33:26with nuclear weapons
33:28before the U.S. could.
33:32Unknown to Castro,
33:34details of a settlement
33:35were being hammered out
33:36by Kennedy and Khrushchev
33:38with no input
33:39from the Cubans.
33:41Nikita Khrushchev
33:42broadcast the startling
33:43result of those talks
33:45on October 28th.
33:47He had agreed
33:47to remove
33:48the Soviet missiles
33:49from Cuba.
33:52Fidel Castro
33:52found out
33:53the same way
33:54the rest of the world
33:55did
33:55by listening
33:56to Khrushchev's
33:57announcement
33:57on the radio.
34:01Castro was furious.
34:02He had been humiliated
34:03and Cuba
34:04had been relegated
34:05to nothing more
34:06than a venue
34:07for a superpower conflict.
34:11Immediately,
34:12Khrushchev sent
34:13his first deputy minister,
34:14Anastas Mikoyan,
34:16to Cuba.
34:18Mikoyan was given
34:19the task
34:20of trying to calm Castro
34:22and of informing him
34:23of further Soviet
34:24concessions
34:25to the U.S.
34:27But Mikoyan
34:28had another mission.
34:31Soviet military leaders
34:32in Cuba
34:33had to be quieted.
34:34They agreed with Castro.
34:36Khrushchev had sold out Cuba.
34:40The Soviet military leaders
34:42in Cuba
34:43were absolutely outraged.
34:46Many important meetings
34:48had to be held
34:50by Mikoyan
34:50and his military entourage
34:53in Havana
34:54and other sites
34:55to cool down
34:57to cool down
34:57this reaction.
35:00Even some of the Soviet news media
35:03dared to criticize Khrushchev.
35:05Castro refused to see Mikoyan
35:08for several days
35:09and then he threatened
35:10to undermine
35:10the Soviet-U.S. agreement
35:12by using the one weapon
35:14the Soviets would leave behind,
35:16the surface-to-air missiles.
35:18He vowed to shoot down
35:19any American planes
35:21detected over Cuba.
35:22Ultimately,
35:23the events
35:24of those past few months
35:25led Castro
35:26to a painful realization.
35:29By embracing
35:30the Soviet Union,
35:31Fidel Castro
35:32had isolated Cuba.
35:35Despite his anger
35:36with Nikita Khrushchev
35:38over the Soviet leaders'
35:39handling of the Cuban
35:40missile crisis,
35:42Fidel Castro realized
35:43by early 1963
35:44that he had few options.
35:47The Soviets were helping
35:48the Cuban economy
35:49by providing the Cubans
35:50with oil.
35:52The Soviets were helping him
35:53build up an industrial base.
35:56And finally,
35:57the Soviets were making noises
35:59as if they were prepared
36:00to defend Cuba
36:01in the event
36:02that the United States
36:02ever broke
36:03John F. Kennedy's guarantee,
36:05non-invasion pledge.
36:07Many of the fears
36:08he had had
36:09about American dependence
36:10were now coming true
36:12in his relationship
36:13with the Soviet Union.
36:13In order to mend fences,
36:17Khrushchev invited Castro
36:18to the USSR
36:19in the spring of 1963.
36:22He was given
36:23a hero's welcome
36:24and lionized
36:25everywhere he went.
36:27While still stinging
36:28from the missile crisis,
36:30Castro allowed the healing
36:32between the two countries
36:33to continue.
36:34But there were
36:35tremendous changes
36:36on the horizon
36:37for Cuban-Soviet relations.
36:40And as always,
36:41there was the Goliath
36:43to the north,
36:44the United States,
36:45now seemingly more powerful
36:47and more determined
36:48than ever
36:49to eliminate Fidel Castro.
36:57Although Fidel Castro
36:58was opposed
36:59to their initial deployment
37:01when Soviet Premier
37:02Nikita Khrushchev
37:03began removing
37:04nuclear missiles
37:05from Cuba
37:06in November 1962,
37:09Castro felt that Cuba
37:10was a sitting duck
37:11for any United States aggression.
37:15Khrushchev sought
37:16to comfort Castro
37:17by telling him
37:18that the Soviet agreement
37:19with President Kennedy
37:20would keep Cuba safe
37:22from American hostility
37:23until at least 1969.
37:27Kennedy was certain
37:28to be re-elected
37:29and continue
37:30to honor his pledge.
37:32But Kennedy
37:33was assassinated
37:34in November 1963.
37:36then Khrushchev
37:39was overthrown
37:40in October 1964.
37:42Leonid Brezhnev
37:43was installed
37:44as the new Soviet leader.
37:47Soviet-Cuba relations
37:48were maintained
37:49under Brezhnev,
37:51but they would never be the same.
37:54Castro continued
37:55to walk a fine line
37:57in his relationship
37:58with the Soviets.
37:59He needed their financial aid,
38:01but Castro was still eager
38:03to proclaim that Cuba
38:04was not a pawn
38:05of the Soviets.
38:08Without the Soviet missiles,
38:09Castro knew
38:10that information
38:11on U.S. and Soviet intentions
38:13would be the key
38:14to the survival
38:15of his regime.
38:18Havana was committed
38:19to creating
38:20a Cuban intelligence directorate
38:22that was no longer
38:23reliant on the KGB.
38:24There was a major thrust
38:28to make our intelligence
38:31to become more independent
38:33and more effective.
38:34And in a very short period of time,
38:37Cuba had their own codes,
38:39systems, hardware, everything.
38:43In 1966,
38:45Che Guevara,
38:46in disguise
38:47and with a false passport,
38:49left Havana for Bolivia
38:50to join communist rebels
38:52fighting the government there.
38:54In 1967,
38:58Bolivian troops
38:59captured and executed Guevara.
39:01Fidel Castro
39:02lost a good friend
39:04and a key member
39:05of his inner circle.
39:07But Raul and Fidel
39:08remained committed
39:09to fostering socialist revolutions.
39:14From the late 1960s
39:16through the late 1980s,
39:18Cuba sent troops
39:19around the world
39:20to support wars
39:21against imperialist aggression.
39:24But Cuba's involvement
39:27in Nicaragua,
39:28El Salvador,
39:29Angola,
39:30Ethiopia,
39:32Guatemala,
39:33Reneda,
39:33and other countries
39:35had another purpose.
39:38Fidel Castro
39:38felt that
39:40the best way
39:41to deal with
39:42the United States
39:42is to create
39:44two,
39:45three,
39:45three,
39:46many Vietnamists.
39:48That was the best way
39:49to defend
39:51against a perceived
39:53threat from the United States.
39:55The Soviets
39:57endorsed these efforts,
39:59pleased with the arrangement
40:00that Cuba
40:01would do the fighting
40:02and the USSR
40:03would simply supply
40:04the military hardware.
40:08Then in 1991,
40:11all Cuban assistance
40:12to political struggles abroad
40:13came to an abrupt end
40:15with the collapse
40:16of the USSR.
40:19Castro was suddenly
40:20very much on his own.
40:22He had to figure out
40:24how to survive
40:25without critical
40:26financial support
40:27from the Soviets,
40:28estimated at between
40:29five and six billion dollars
40:32per year.
40:34But Fidel Castro
40:35has maintained
40:36Cuba's independence.
40:38Now in the 21st century,
40:40the years are showing
40:42on the once strapping leader,
40:44and the crippling effect
40:45of the U.S. embargo
40:46is reflected everywhere
40:47in the streets of Havana
40:49and throughout the island.
40:51While the people
40:52and government of Cuba
40:53have had to deal
40:54with staggering
40:55financial cutbacks,
40:57the Cuban commitment
40:58to funding intelligence networks
41:00remains a priority.
41:03As always,
41:04Castro feels the pressure
41:05of the United States
41:07and the worldwide
41:08Cuban exile community.
41:10He must stay
41:11ever alert.
41:14Wherever Fidel goes,
41:15of course,
41:16he has a bodyguard
41:17very close to him
41:17as all heads of state do.
41:20But because of the endless efforts
41:22to murder him,
41:23his bodyguards
41:24are more vigilant than most.
41:26We've seen in the year 2001
41:28the arrest and trial
41:30of what they call
41:31the WASP network
41:32of Cuban spies
41:34in South Florida,
41:35a whole network
41:36that the Cuban intelligence
41:38had set up
41:39in order to basically
41:40watch the southern command base there
41:44to make sure
41:45that Cuba would have
41:47advanced intelligence
41:47on any preparations
41:49for the future invasion
41:50of Cuba.
41:53But while there is
41:54a certain paranoia,
41:56on the other hand,
41:57you can say,
41:58well, isn't that
41:59almost inevitable?
42:00Because the United States
42:01has, over the years,
42:04tried to assassinate
42:05Fidel Castro,
42:06and even now
42:08the U.S. government
42:10is still saying
42:11that the objective
42:13of U.S. policy
42:14is to get rid
42:15of the Castro government
42:16so that almost anything
42:17we do
42:18is seen as subversive
42:20in intent.
42:23To this day,
42:24many believe
42:25that Castro
42:26uses the fear
42:27of constant threat
42:28of attack
42:29by the United States
42:30to his advantage.
42:32We have made Castro.
42:35We've made him.
42:36We give him
42:36a foreign devil
42:37to point to.
42:40He can say,
42:40look,
42:41this immense country
42:42on our border
42:43is the only country
42:45in the world
42:46that is applying
42:47economic sanctions.
42:49They tried
42:50to assassinate me
42:51through several administrations,
42:53Eisenhower,
42:54Kennedy, Johnson.
42:55They tried to invade us
42:57in the Bay of Pigs.
42:59They are our enemy.
43:01We must mobilize
43:03our forces against them.
43:05We've made him
43:06a hero
43:07to their people.
43:12Few world leaders
43:14have been able
43:14to maintain power
43:16for as long
43:16as Fidel Castro has.
43:18For more than four decades,
43:20he's managed
43:21to hold the attention
43:22of the entire world,
43:24whether to praise him
43:25or to condemn him.
43:27Though his ability
43:28to inspire a crowd
43:29may not be what it was,
43:31his cunning
43:31and his continued
43:33unwavering commitment
43:34to what he believes
43:35is best for Cuba
43:36cannot be denied.
43:39But it is his choice
43:40of a difficult path
43:42for his countrymen,
43:43a path nearly always
43:45leading to confrontation
43:46with the mighty USA
43:48that will be questioned
43:49and debated long
43:51after he is gone.
43:53To be continued...
43:55To be continued...