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00:00Transcribed by ESO, translated by —
00:30In late April 1961, President John F. Kennedy, in a private moment with his special counsel, Theodore Sorensen, asked a question that he would repeat to himself over and over in the following weeks.
00:51Kennedy wondered aloud, how could I have been so stupid as to let them proceed?
00:56He was referring to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which had just humiliated itself, the new president and the nation by completely bungling its secret invasion of Cuba.
01:10Known as Operation Zapata, the mission was intended to overthrow Fidel Castro and was to appear to be the work of Cuban exiles.
01:22There was to be no trace of U.S. government involvement.
01:29The disaster came to be known as the Bay of Pigs, which historian Theodore Draper would later call the perfect failure.
01:37This was an especially bitter pill to swallow for a president who believed in the effectiveness of this type of operation.
01:46Kennedy certainly had a fascination with the world of spies and special agents.
01:55James Bond was part of his favorite reading and he liked to find ways by which the United States could engage in international affairs, a minimum risk to the United States.
02:08And this seemed to him to be a natural way.
02:11Also, I think there was a deeper reason for his interest, which was a view that the next stage of the Cold War, the coming stage, involved the third world.
02:22And that required a different sort of warfare.
02:24But what you had to think about was guerrillas, counterinsurgency.
02:29And this required a much more subtle blend of politics and direct action.
02:34While the president publicly accepted the blame for the debacle, he privately threatened that heads would roll at the CIA.
02:45Just three months into his presidency, Kennedy had suffered a monumental embarrassment.
02:51The relationship between the president and the CIA would never be the same.
02:56The director of the CIA under Kennedy was veteran spymaster Alan Dulles, a key member of the Eisenhower administration.
03:07Dulles and his director of plans, Richard Bissell, were highly regarded in Washington.
03:13It was widely believed that Bissell would be the next in line to head the CIA.
03:18Kennedy and his cabinet, including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, were very impressed with Bissell.
03:28Dick Bissell was an extraordinarily bright, able man, former professor from Yale University.
03:35It was he, more than any other single person, who built the overhead reconnaissance capability of the country.
03:42First, through the U-2, it was a major source of intelligence for our nation under Eisenhower and Kennedy and Johnson, to some degree even today.
03:54But Bissell had been the man directly in charge of the Bay of Pigs plan.
03:59Such a calamity tarnished his golden boy image beyond repair.
04:03Kennedy removed both Dulles and Bissell from office, cutting short the careers of one intelligence legend and another legend in the making.
04:19The Bay of Pigs was not born of the Kennedy administration.
04:22In March 1960, President Dwight Eisenhower approved a CIA plan entitled,
04:30A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime.
04:36This 10-page document outlined the plan to, in its words,
04:41bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people,
04:47and more acceptable to the U.S.
04:52Ike demanded total secrecy for the operation.
04:59The initial plan called for a small force of 300 CIA-trained Cuban exiles to be landed on a Cuban beach.
05:08They would then link up with what CIA intelligence reports confirmed were pockets of many thousands of anti-Castro Cubans.
05:16The CIA force was to organize these pockets into an army that would take Havana and remove Fidel Castro.
05:27Kennedy inherited the Cuba project in January 1961 and was never enthusiastic about it.
05:35By mid-March 1961, after considering the many pitfalls of the plan,
05:41Kennedy called Alan Dulles to discuss cancelling the operation.
05:47Dulles convinced the President that it was too late to pull the plug, for two reasons.
05:53One was the impression Kennedy would give if he, a minor naval officer in World War II,
05:58were to challenge the wisdom of Eisenhower, the former Supreme Allied Commander, during that war.
06:04Then there was the problem of dealing with the exile force.
06:11Dulles said, how are you going to dispose of these Cuban exiles if you don't let them land at the Bay of Pigs?
06:17If we let these people loose in the United States, it was said that they would create a political problem.
06:25The Cuba project was already an irreversible mess.
06:28Part of the problem was a lack of checks and balances within the operation.
06:34From the start, Bissell had maneuvered for complete control of Operation Zapata.
06:41Bissell counted on his close, very quick affinity with Kennedy
06:46to essentially withhold information from people around him in the Bay of Pigs operation,
06:52figuring he had the personal ear of the President and he could get Kennedy to do what he wanted to do.
06:58Even secrecy and plausible deniability were no longer on the side of the U.S.
07:05In early April, the CIA intercepted a communique from the Soviet embassy in Mexico City to Moscow,
07:12giving the exact date of the intended invasion, April 17th.
07:18A few days later, the New York Times ran a story entitled
07:22Anti-Castro Units Trained to Fight at Florida Bases.
07:26It was suspected that the press gained its information from loose-lipped members of the Cuban exile community in the U.S.
07:37Some historians believe that Richard Bissell never imagined such a defeat
07:42because Fidel Castro himself was to have been removed from the equation.
07:48Bissell's plan included the assassination of Castro,
07:51which Bissell expected to be carried out prior to the actual invasion.
07:58The job was given to members of the U.S. Mafia
08:01who had been raking in profits from Havana nightclubs and casinos,
08:06which Castro seized along with all other American holdings in 1960.
08:10But by April 10th, the mob hadn't killed Castro.
08:18Bissell had to go through with the invasion with Castro still in power.
08:23The problems didn't end there.
08:24The initial landing site near Trinidad was vetoed by President Kennedy
08:30at the suggestion of Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
08:34Rusk felt that a surprise invasion was not possible there due to the dense population.
08:41Kennedy gave Bissell just four days to come up with another plan.
08:45The new site was at Bahia de Cochinos, the Bay of Pigs.
08:51The area was remote and there was a nearby airfield.
08:55But the new politically acceptable landing area
08:57could not satisfy the operation's main military objective,
09:02quickly linking up with the largest concentration of rebels
09:05who were hiding in the Escambray Mountains.
09:09Access to those mountains was cut off by a vast swamp.
09:13Marine Colonel Jack Hawkins, attached to the CIA
09:18as chief paramilitary specialist in charge of the invasion,
09:23explained the new landing area's shortcomings to Bissell.
09:27I said, we can land there.
09:29And we can hold on there for a little while, but not for long.
09:33And the troops can't get out of there
09:35to get over to the mountains where they need to be.
09:39And he said at that time,
09:41well, if that is the only place
09:43that can satisfy the president's requirements,
09:46that's where we have to go.
09:50Kennedy approved the plan,
09:52but Jack Hawkins and his immediate superior,
09:55Jacob Esterlein, knew that it could not succeed.
09:58The brigade could not reach the mountains,
10:02and without air support, critical supply drops could not be made,
10:06and the men in the beach would be picked off by Castro's air force.
10:11Hawkins and Esterlein confronted Bissell
10:14and announced they were resigning their posts.
10:17But Bissell managed to change their minds.
10:19He said, I depend on you, and here I am.
10:23You can't leave me alone about this.
10:25He says, we'll do the best we can.
10:27I'll try to get more air for you, he says.
10:30I think maybe I can get the president to get more air.
10:35A plan to improve the operation's chance of success
10:38was approved at the last minute by the president.
10:41On April 15th, two days before the invasion,
10:47eight American B-26 bombers,
10:49painted with Cuban Air Force colors and insignias
10:52and piloted by Cuban exile pilots,
10:55flew a bombing mission to destroy the Cuban Air Force.
11:00To complete the deception, one plane landed in Key West,
11:04and the pilot asked for political asylum in the U.S.
11:07He claimed Castro's air force had been severely crippled.
11:13When the Cuban ambassador to the United Nations
11:16accused the U.S. of masterminding the attack,
11:19American ambassador Adlai Stevenson
11:21emphatically denied the charges.
11:24And I deny them categorically.
11:26But the veil over the plot was transparent,
11:29and Stevenson, who was purposely misled by the CIA
11:32about U.S. involvement in the attack,
11:35was livid when he found out the truth.
11:37To save himself any more embarrassment,
11:41he insisted that President Kennedy
11:43cancel any further air raids on Cuba.
11:48Kennedy decided to go forward with the operation,
11:51but canceled the second air raid.
11:54That decision had dire consequences.
11:56By April 1961, the cost of Operation Zapata,
12:04the CIA's secret invasion of Cuba,
12:06had ballooned from the original $4.4 million
12:09to an astounding $48 million.
12:13The invasion force had also grown
12:16from just over $300 to over $1,400.
12:20The CIA's deputy director of plans, Richard Bissell,
12:26claimed that there was significant internal support in Cuba
12:29to overthrow Castro.
12:31He insisted that Brigade 2506 would be welcomed
12:34and joined by thousands who would march on Havana.
12:38President Kennedy had no reason to doubt him,
12:41but Bissell's sources regarding internal support were dubious.
12:47The CIA intelligence was overly optimistic
12:50and was to a great extent collected
12:53from Cuban refugees in Miami who had left Cuba.
12:57And, of course, their natural inclination
13:03would be to report things
13:04that would be supportive to their own agenda.
13:10In the pre-dawn hours of April 17, 1961,
13:15Brigade 2506 began its assault at the Bay of Pigs.
13:20Only the Cuban military was there to meet them.
13:24Against this Cuban force
13:28with its superior firepower
13:30and surprising devotion to Castro,
13:32the exile army never had a chance.
13:36The brigade was pushed back to the sea,
13:39soundly defeated, in less than 72 hours.
13:45Instead of depriving the Soviet Union
13:48of an ally in the Western Hemisphere,
13:50the United States actually helped
13:52to solidify Havana's relationship with Moscow.
13:57Just the day before,
13:59at the Cuban state funeral
14:00for those killed in the April 15th air raid,
14:03Castro defiantly declared
14:05that Cuba was now a Marxist-Leninist state.
14:11Jack Hawkins holds three men
14:13most responsible for the failure
14:15at the Bay of Pigs.
14:17Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk
14:19for canceling the critical second air raid,
14:22and Richard Bissell
14:23for not telling the president
14:25of Hawkins and Esterlein's belief
14:27that Operation Zapata could not succeed.
14:32We were the professionals, actually,
14:35not Mr. Bissell.
14:36He later finally said,
14:38long afterward,
14:39I should have listened to Hawkins
14:41and Esterlein,
14:43but he never reported
14:45to anybody
14:46in any of his writings
14:47that I know of
14:48the fact of our
14:50urgent Sunday meeting
14:51where we told him
14:52we've got to stop
14:53this thing right now.
14:55He never did report that.
14:59Alan Dulles was replaced
15:01with conservative Republican
15:03John McCone,
15:04who was immediately instructed
15:05by the president
15:06to curtail all CIA activity.
15:10To avenge his brother's embarrassment,
15:13Robert Kennedy took personal command
15:15of Operation Mongoose,
15:17an interagency task force
15:19bent on eliminating Fidel Castro.
15:24As the project's operations chief,
15:27the Kennedys chose
15:28a swaggering Air Force officer
15:30with a towering reputation
15:31in the third world.
15:32He was Brigadier General
15:35Edward Lansdale,
15:36and the president liked
15:37what he saw.
15:40I think what really
15:41probably appealed to him
15:43was the reputation
15:45of a man
15:45who understood
15:47the third world,
15:49who could open
15:50important contacts
15:52with third world leaders.
15:54He had stood
15:55at the right hand
15:55of Philippine President
15:56Mike Saisai
15:57in defeating
15:57an insurgency,
15:59and that was the kind
16:00of man Kennedy wanted.
16:02The president,
16:04although still upset
16:05about the Bay of Pigs
16:06fiasco,
16:07realized that the CIA,
16:09under Lansdale's authority,
16:11could make valuable contributions
16:13to Operation Mongoose.
16:17Lansdale was placed
16:19in the Defense Department
16:20and was given authority
16:22to call on senior representatives
16:24from state, defense,
16:25and the CIA
16:26for assistance.
16:27Economic sabotage
16:33was part
16:34of Operation Mongoose.
16:36But the best-known features
16:38of the operation
16:39were its most outrageous schemes.
16:43One plan to kill Castro
16:45involved the use
16:46of poisonous cigars.
16:49A non-lethal alternative
16:50was to put chemicals
16:51in the wetsuit
16:52he used for scuba diving
16:54that would cause
16:55his famous beard
16:56to fall out,
16:57thus diminishing
16:58his charisma.
17:00Lansdale was brilliant
17:02at self-promotion,
17:03but he did not live up
17:04to his image.
17:06Operation Mongoose
17:07was a miserable failure.
17:11Access to Castro
17:13was nearly impossible.
17:15Even when opportunities arose,
17:17bad luck would intervene.
17:19Castro every day
17:21would go for a milkshake.
17:23We found out about this
17:24and we gave the soda jerk
17:27a poison pill
17:29to put in Castro's milkshake.
17:32He was working for us.
17:34He put the pill
17:35in the freezer
17:35behind the ice cream
17:37and when it came time
17:38for him to put the pill
17:39in Castro's milkshake,
17:41the pill had stuck
17:43to the side of the freezer
17:44and he couldn't get it loose.
17:47Eventually, Lansdale
17:49was removed
17:50as chief of Operation Mongoose.
17:54Attempts to kill Castro
17:55continued for the duration
17:57of the Kennedy administration,
17:59but American operatives
18:00could never penetrate
18:01the dictator's loyal inner circle.
18:05On the other side of the world,
18:07Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
18:09saw an opportunity
18:10to take advantage
18:11of the apparently weak
18:13young American president.
18:15But what Khrushchev didn't know
18:17was that one of his own spies
18:19was about to tip
18:20the Cold War balance
18:21in favor of the United States.
18:28The CIA remained
18:30in President Kennedy's doghouse
18:32as a result of the Bay of Pigs.
18:34But Kennedy was not one
18:36to depend solely on the heads
18:38of large government agencies
18:40for critical intelligence information
18:42and counsel.
18:45Kennedy was famous for
18:46in the middle of the night
18:47calling desk officers
18:49in the State Department
18:50so he could get his
18:51first-hand information
18:53about what was going on
18:54because he believed
18:55that the information
18:56they would send
18:57to their superiors
18:58and went up through
18:59the chain of command
19:00and the State Department
19:00would get garbled.
19:03Kennedy did, however,
19:05build an inner circle
19:06consisting of some
19:07of the brightest men
19:08of the era.
19:09Secretary of Defense
19:10Robert McNamara,
19:13Secretary of State
19:14Dean Rusk,
19:16Special Counsel
19:16Theodore Sorensen,
19:18Special Assistant
19:19Arthur Schlesinger,
19:22National Security Advisor
19:23McGeorge Bundy,
19:24Head of the Joint Chiefs
19:27of Staff,
19:28Maxwell Taylor
19:28and Attorney General
19:30Bobby Kennedy
19:30were his core advisors.
19:33The opinions of these men
19:35were of great value
19:36to the President.
19:38But JFK made up
19:40his own mind
19:41on how to ultimately
19:42handle any situation,
19:44usually depending
19:45on his gut feelings.
19:48When it came
19:49to processing information
19:50and making decisions,
19:52Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
19:54was much like Kennedy.
19:57I think he was
19:58his own foreign minister
20:00the same way
20:01the President Kennedy
20:02was his own
20:03Secretary of State.
20:05Because the strong leader,
20:08he wanted just
20:10to perform
20:11his foreign policy
20:13and to present
20:15his understanding.
20:16The two most powerful
20:20men in the world
20:21met face to face
20:22for the first
20:23and only time
20:24at a summit
20:25in Vienna
20:26in June of 1961.
20:29Kennedy hoped
20:29to achieve
20:30a nuclear test ban
20:31treaty with Khrushchev
20:33and to develop
20:34a positive working
20:35relationship
20:36with the Soviet leader.
20:38Khrushchev, however,
20:39was in a hostile mood
20:40as a result
20:41of the Bay of Pigs
20:42just two months earlier.
20:43The discussion
20:47quickly shifted
20:48to the divided
20:49city of Berlin.
20:52What the Soviets
20:53really wanted
20:54was to eliminate
20:55an outpost
20:55for Western ideals
20:57in the midst
20:57of East Germany
20:58because it was
20:59providing an escape route
21:01to the West
21:01for thousands
21:02of their most
21:03skilled professionals.
21:06Kennedy was committed
21:07to protecting
21:08West Berlin.
21:10Khrushchev declared
21:11to Kennedy,
21:12I want peace
21:13but if you want war
21:14that is your problem.
21:17JFK stood his ground
21:18on West Berlin
21:19saying,
21:20if that's true
21:21it's going to be
21:22a cold winter.
21:24The Berlin crisis
21:26dominated Kennedy's summer.
21:29When the Soviets
21:29began construction
21:30of the Berlin Wall
21:32on August 19th
21:33U.S. intelligence
21:34was caught off guard.
21:37Kennedy's advisors
21:38first thought
21:38that the wall
21:39might have its benefits.
21:42The initial reaction
21:43was that
21:44well maybe this
21:45would defuse the crisis.
21:46The second reaction
21:47however
21:47was that
21:49maybe all that
21:51Khrushchev is doing
21:52is stabilizing
21:54his own situation
21:56in order
21:57to make
21:58the next move
21:59which would be
21:59on West Berlin itself.
22:04The two sides
22:05nearly went to war
22:06as American
22:07and Soviet tanks
22:08converged
22:09on Checkpoint Charlie
22:10and stared each other
22:11down for 16 hours.
22:16Kennedy stood fast
22:17against the Soviet threat
22:19armed with secret knowledge
22:20of the way
22:21the Kremlin
22:22was playing
22:22this game of chicken.
22:24That information
22:25was supplied
22:26by one of the most
22:27influential Soviet spies
22:29of the Cold War era
22:30Colonel Oleg Penkovsky.
22:32He was the deputy head
22:35of the foreign section
22:36of the GRU
22:37Soviet Military Intelligence.
22:42In 1960
22:44after having become
22:45disillusioned
22:46with the Soviet system
22:47Penkovsky offered
22:48his services
22:49to both
22:50Great Britain's MI6
22:51and to the CIA.
22:54From 1960
22:56to 1962
22:57Penkovsky
22:58provided the West
22:59with hundreds
23:00of pages
23:01of secretly photographed
23:02classified Soviet documents.
23:06For his valuable service
23:07Penkovsky asked
23:08to be granted
23:09either American
23:10or British citizenship.
23:12The dream
23:13of this Red Army
23:14Colonel
23:15was to become
23:15a Colonel
23:16in the U.S. Army.
23:19He was thrilled
23:20when CIA friends
23:22took these photos
23:23of him
23:23in the uniforms
23:24of an American Army
23:25Colonel
23:26and a British Army
23:27Colonel.
23:27Penkovsky's value
23:30as a spy
23:31was immeasurable
23:32because he had
23:33regular access
23:34to the top men
23:35in the Kremlin.
23:37He knew how
23:38the minds
23:38of these men
23:39worked
23:39including that
23:41of Nikita Khrushchev.
23:44At the height
23:45of the Berlin crisis
23:46Penkovsky
23:47strongly counseled
23:48that President Kennedy
23:49remain firm
23:50and not show
23:51Khrushchev
23:52the slightest hint
23:53of hesitance
23:54to defend
23:55West Berlin.
23:56That was
23:58according to
23:58Penkovsky
23:59the only thing
24:00that Khrushchev
24:01would respect.
24:03It worked.
24:04Kennedy's
24:05unwavering resolve
24:06caused Khrushchev
24:07to capitulate.
24:09Quietly
24:10the Russian tanks
24:11pulled back
24:12from the borderline
24:13and the Americans
24:14followed suit.
24:15Penkovsky's
24:16advice was key
24:17in defusing
24:18the Berlin crisis.
24:21Kennedy learned
24:22an invaluable lesson
24:24in dealing
24:24with Khrushchev.
24:26Such posturing
24:27would serve him
24:27well as the focus
24:29of the Cold War
24:30shifted back
24:30to the island
24:31nation of Cuba.
24:38In the fall
24:39of 1962
24:40a situation
24:41was brewing
24:42in Cuba
24:42that would again
24:43force a showdown
24:44between the United States
24:46and the Soviet Union.
24:47beginning in late 1960
24:51and extending
24:52through 1961
24:53the National Security Agency
24:55was intercepting messages
24:57concerning Soviet ships
24:59headed for Havana.
25:01These radio messages
25:02revealed that
25:03two ships
25:04had indeed delivered
25:05military equipment
25:06to Cuba.
25:08By late August
25:091962
25:10the NSA
25:11had determined
25:12that there had been
25:1357 shipments
25:15in little more
25:15than a one month period.
25:20Then the CIA
25:21made a discovery
25:22that deeply concerned
25:23director John McCone.
25:25On August 28th
25:27U-2 spy plane photos
25:28showed that there were
25:29surface-to-air missiles
25:31in Cuba.
25:33We saw them
25:35being placed
25:35all around Cuba
25:36and the only person
25:38in Washington, D.C.
25:39who thought that
25:40that meant some trouble
25:42in the future
25:42was John McCone.
25:44He kept saying
25:45over and over again
25:46you don't put
25:47SAM sites
25:47you don't put
25:48air defense items
25:49in unless you're
25:50going to defend
25:51something
25:51and the only thing
25:52you're going to defend
25:52is going to be
25:53big missiles
25:54when they come in later.
25:55Nobody in Washington
25:56wanted to believe him
25:57but he kept insisting.
26:01President Kennedy
26:02did not feel
26:03that McCone
26:03had determined
26:04anything of value
26:05and did not act.
26:07Then on October 14th
26:09photos from the U-2
26:10flight over Cuba
26:11revealed a shocking discovery
26:13evidence of a medium-range
26:15ballistic missile site.
26:18Eight large missile transporters
26:21and four erector launchers
26:22were determined to be
26:24in a tentative firing position.
26:27The discovery of Soviet
26:29nuclear missiles
26:30in the Western Hemisphere
26:32pointed at American cities
26:33created the most dangerous
26:35moments of the Cold War.
26:37The U.S. had Jupiter missiles
26:41in Italy and Turkey
26:43pointed at the USSR
26:44and the Soviets
26:45had targeted
26:46many Western European assets.
26:49But for America
26:50missiles just 90 miles away
26:52was a new
26:53and terrifying experience.
26:57Subsequent U-2 missions
26:59revealed more medium
27:00and intermediate range
27:01of ballistic missiles
27:02in Cuba.
27:03on October 16th
27:07the President
27:07hand-picked
27:0819 men
27:09and formed
27:10XCOM
27:11an executive committee
27:13of the National Security Council
27:14to deal with the crisis.
27:18Believing this was a build-up
27:20of offensive weapons
27:21XCOM met around the clock
27:23for the next 13 days
27:25to discuss possible
27:26diplomatic
27:27and military
27:28courses of action.
27:29Secretary of Defense
27:31McNamara
27:32felt that the missiles
27:33gave the USSR
27:34no more destructive power
27:36against the U.S.
27:37than it already held.
27:40Secretary of State
27:41Rusk was concerned
27:42that,
27:43as in Berlin,
27:44some action was needed
27:45so as not to undermine
27:47U.S. alliances
27:48worldwide.
27:50The Joint Chiefs
27:51argued strongly
27:52for an airstrike
27:53to take out
27:54all the missiles
27:55before they could be fired.
27:56At this crucial moment
28:00in Cold War history
28:01Kennedy turned
28:02not to his military
28:04but to his civilian advisers.
28:07One of those
28:08closest to JFK
28:10and a member of XCOM
28:11was Arthur Schlesinger.
28:14He knew that
28:15the Joint Chiefs of Staff
28:17were a bunch of idiots
28:18in a sense
28:19and disregarded
28:22their recommendations.
28:24Had he followed
28:24their recommendations
28:25at the time of the missile crisis
28:26we would have invaded Cuba
28:29and we now know
28:30that the Soviet troops
28:33in Cuba
28:33there were 40,000 of them
28:35not the 8,000 or 10,000
28:37estimated by the CIA
28:39at the time
28:39we now know
28:41that they were
28:41armed with
28:42not only long-range
28:45nuclear missiles
28:45but tactical nuclear missiles
28:47with instructions
28:48to use them
28:49in case of
28:50an American invasion.
28:52for the moment
28:56JFK's choice
28:57of a diplomatic
28:58rather than
28:59a military solution
29:00may well have saved
29:01the world
29:02from nuclear holocaust.
29:07At this juncture
29:08Kennedy could not afford
29:10to let Moscow know
29:11that he knew
29:12that the missiles existed.
29:14as days passed
29:17more U-2 photos
29:19revealed
29:19many other missile sites
29:21on October 21st
29:23Maxwell Taylor
29:24finally admitted
29:25to the president
29:26that he could not guarantee
29:27that his bombers
29:28could destroy
29:29all of the missiles
29:30in Cuba.
29:32XCOM would have had
29:34no idea
29:34how close
29:35the missiles were
29:36to being launch ready
29:37were it not
29:38for one of the most
29:39important pieces
29:40of intelligence
29:41of the Cold War
29:42provided by
29:43Colonel Oleg Penkovsky.
29:47Penkovsky had furnished
29:48the CIA
29:49with a complete
29:50Soviet field manual
29:51for short
29:52and medium-range missiles.
29:55With that manual
29:56the U.S. could determine
29:57from U-2 photos
29:59when the missiles
29:59would be ready to fire.
30:02This critical information
30:04bought Kennedy
30:05a precious few
30:06additional days
30:07to perfect his strategy.
30:08On October 22nd
30:12with his plan in place
30:13Kennedy addressed
30:14the nation
30:15on television
30:16and revealed
30:17the missiles in Cuba
30:18to a shocked world.
30:21It shall be the policy
30:22of this nation
30:22to regard
30:24any nuclear missile
30:25launched from Cuba
30:26against any nation
30:28in the Western Hemisphere
30:29as an attack
30:30by the Soviet Union
30:32on the United States.
30:34He also placed
30:35a quarantine
30:35upon Cuba
30:36a naval blockade
30:38to be enforced
30:39by the U.S. Navy.
30:42Earlier that very day
30:43Oleg Penkovsky
30:45was arrested
30:45in the USSR
30:46as a spy.
30:49He was tried
30:50and later executed.
30:53Over the next five days
30:55the threat
30:55of nuclear holocaust
30:56hung over the planet.
30:59Terrified Americans
31:00prepared for the worst
31:02while John and Robert Kennedy
31:03pursued a peaceful resolution.
31:05President Kennedy
31:08had little faith
31:09in the State Department
31:10and after losing faith
31:12in the CIA
31:12he developed
31:13a private line
31:14of communication
31:15with Khrushchev
31:16and it was time again
31:18to use it.
31:21Kennedy
31:21after the original
31:22Checkpoint Charlie clash
31:25had a back channel
31:26of his own.
31:28He would write letters
31:28to Khrushchev
31:29and Khrushchev
31:30would write him
31:30letters back
31:31called the pen pal
31:32correspondence
31:33and they would talk
31:34to each other
31:34about these various issues.
31:37It didn't resolve
31:37very much
31:38in these letters
31:38but it was
31:39useful to talk
31:40to each other.
31:42Khrushchev was aware
31:43that the U.S.
31:44clearly had missile superiority
31:46over the Soviet Union.
31:48He had no delusions
31:49of his country
31:50surviving a nuclear attack.
31:53But it was not
31:54until years later
31:55that the world learned
31:56that both leaders
31:58truly wanted
31:58to avoid war.
32:01Both Kennedy
32:02and Khrushchev
32:03would have survived
32:03a nuclear war.
32:05They both had places
32:06in secure mountainsides.
32:08They were not afraid
32:09of their own lives.
32:11They were afraid
32:11of the consequences
32:12of the decisions.
32:15On October 26th,
32:17Kennedy received
32:17a ray of hope
32:18in a letter
32:19transmitted from Khrushchev
32:21offering to remove
32:22the missiles
32:23if the U.S.
32:24promised not
32:24to invade Cuba.
32:26The following day,
32:27the 27th,
32:28a second letter
32:29arrived from Khrushchev
32:31which baffled Kennedy.
32:35The letter
32:36which arrived
32:36in Washington 2nd
32:38was actually written first.
32:39It's a tougher letter
32:40with more demands
32:41asking for the missiles
32:42to be removed
32:43from Turkey.
32:44And the story is
32:45that on the 25th
32:48of October,
32:50a TASS reporter
32:51who was really
32:52a KGB agent
32:53overhears a conversation
32:55between two
32:56American reporters
32:57one saying to the other
32:58I'm flying down
33:00to Florida
33:00later today
33:02so that I can be
33:03with the invading forces
33:04who are going
33:05into Cuba tomorrow.
33:07And the TASS reporter
33:08comes back
33:09and reports this
33:10to the Soviet embassy.
33:14Quickly,
33:14they report this
33:15to Moscow.
33:16Moscow,
33:16in an effort
33:17to stop the invasion,
33:19sends out
33:20a more conciliatory
33:21letter to Kennedy
33:22hoping that
33:23a more conciliatory
33:24letter
33:24will stop the invasion.
33:28The Soviet deputy
33:29ambassador
33:30then started
33:30to think
33:31that perhaps
33:32the Soviet news
33:33agency reporter
33:34had been a target
33:35for disinformation
33:36intended to fool
33:37the Soviets.
33:39He phoned
33:40the American journalist
33:41who was supposed
33:42to be on his way
33:43to Florida
33:44for the invasion
33:45and invited him
33:46to lunch
33:47the next day.
33:48The journalist
33:49accepted the invitation
33:50and the deputy ambassador
33:51knew that the TASS reporter
33:53had been duped.
33:56The embassy rushed word
33:58of the false invasion
33:59plan to Moscow.
34:01As a result,
34:02Khrushchev immediately
34:03sent the first,
34:04more demanding letter
34:05which he'd written
34:06to Kennedy,
34:07not realizing
34:07the confusion
34:08that the two conflicting
34:09letters would cause
34:11in Washington.
34:13Kennedy decided
34:15to respond to Khrushchev
34:16based only on Khrushchev's
34:18first,
34:19less confrontational letter,
34:21as if the second letter
34:22had never reached
34:23the White House.
34:25Kennedy offered
34:25his promise
34:26not to invade Cuba
34:27if the missiles
34:28were promptly removed.
34:30If not,
34:31there would be
34:32military action
34:33against Cuba.
34:35Additionally,
34:36John and Robert Kennedy,
34:38without mentioning it
34:39to the rest of XCOM,
34:40included an offer
34:41to remove the U.S. missiles
34:43from Turkey
34:43at a later date.
34:47Then,
34:48in Moscow,
34:49Soviet intelligence
34:50received word
34:51from their agents
34:52in Washington
34:53that President Kennedy
34:54was to again
34:55address the American people
34:57on television
34:58on October 28th.
35:01Khrushchev was convinced
35:02this meant that the U.S.
35:04was going to invade Cuba.
35:09In Moscow,
35:10at 9 a.m.
35:11Washington time
35:12on October 28th,
35:13in an effort
35:14to prevent nuclear war
35:16with the United States,
35:17Khrushchev announced
35:19the removal
35:19of the missiles
35:20from Cuba.
35:23Afterward,
35:24it was discovered
35:24that the Kremlin
35:25had misunderstood
35:26the American television schedule.
35:29There was no new speech
35:30by Kennedy.
35:31And then it became clear
35:35that this spy
35:36in Washington,
35:37D.C.
35:40did not read
35:42the TV program
35:43in the right way
35:44because announced
35:45that we will repeat
35:46the Monday's
35:47presidential speech
35:49at 5 o'clock
35:50in the evening
35:51on next Sunday.
35:53So you see,
35:54it was the TV
35:55that just solved
35:57this crisis.
35:58The Soviets
36:01loaded their missiles
36:02onto ships
36:03and returned them
36:04to the U.S.S.R.
36:08In addition
36:09to the direct
36:10and level-headed
36:10communication
36:11between Kennedy
36:12and Khrushchev,
36:14Soviet intelligence's
36:15confusion
36:16over the American
36:17television broadcast
36:18schedule
36:19helped resolve
36:20the most terrifying
36:21international showdown
36:23in history.
36:28By 1963,
36:30with Berlin and Cuba
36:31now temporarily diffused,
36:34President Kennedy
36:34could deal
36:35with other hot spots,
36:37one of which
36:38he didn't consider
36:39too important,
36:40even though
36:40it would ultimately
36:41dominate U.S. foreign policy
36:43into the next decade.
36:47Southeast Asia
36:48was not an area
36:49where Kennedy thought
36:50great things
36:50could be accomplished.
36:51He repeatedly
36:53made it clear
36:53that he did not
36:54want to get
36:55into a war there.
36:57He did perceive
36:58a problem.
36:58He did perceive
36:59a threat.
36:59He did spend
37:00some time on it,
37:01but he spent
37:02far more time
37:03on other issues
37:04than he did
37:05on Southeast Asia.
37:07In 1954,
37:09U.S.-backed
37:09Ngo Dinh Diem
37:11was installed
37:12as Prime Minister
37:13of South Vietnam.
37:17Diem assured
37:17the Eisenhower
37:18administration
37:19that he favored
37:20democracy
37:20and would fight
37:21North Vietnamese
37:22insurgents
37:23to keep
37:23South Vietnam
37:24free from communism.
37:27But once entrenched
37:29as president
37:29of South Vietnam,
37:31Diem became
37:31a cruel dictator.
37:34He banned
37:35any future elections
37:36and utilized
37:37his special police
37:38headed by his brother,
37:39Ngo Dinh Ngu,
37:41to control
37:42any opposition
37:42through terror
37:43and imprisonment.
37:45by the end
37:47of the Eisenhower
37:48administration,
37:49there had been
37:49several coup attempts
37:51by Diem's own military.
37:54One of the biggest
37:55weaknesses
37:56of Diem's regime
37:57was that he did not
37:58have a solid relationship
38:00of trust
38:00with his generals.
38:01I would doubt
38:03that a month
38:05went by
38:06in the whole
38:07of the Diem regime
38:08without some discussion
38:10of the possibility
38:10of a coup.
38:12As a senator,
38:14John Kennedy
38:14had traveled to Vietnam
38:16and was impressed
38:17with Diem.
38:18But by the time
38:19Kennedy became president,
38:20Diem was no longer
38:21seen in the same
38:22glowing light.
38:25Kennedy believes,
38:27in a sense,
38:27that we can't
38:29fight the war
38:30for them.
38:31We can help them
38:32learn how
38:33to fight the war.
38:34That's where
38:35special warfare
38:36and counterinsurgency
38:37come in.
38:38Send Green Berets,
38:40send advisors
38:41to help them do that.
38:43Now, what Kennedy
38:44does do is
38:45he escalates
38:46the number
38:47of advisors
38:48and the financial
38:49assistance.
38:50When he came in,
38:51there were about
38:52500 or 1,000 advisors,
38:54maybe a little bit more.
38:55By the fall of 1963,
38:57there were
38:57over 16,000.
39:02As always,
39:03Kennedy did not want
39:04to involve
39:05American soldiers
39:06in combat.
39:08In early 1961,
39:09prior to the
39:10Bay of Pigs,
39:11JFK urged the CIA
39:13to begin subversive
39:15operations
39:15in North Vietnam
39:16to send a message
39:18that the U.S.
39:19would no longer
39:20put up with
39:20the North's
39:21insurgency
39:22in the South.
39:24But the CIA
39:25operation,
39:26code-named
39:26Operation
39:27Tiger,
39:28failed at every turn
39:29as a result
39:30of infiltration
39:31by North Vietnamese
39:32agents.
39:34Because of the CIA's
39:36failure,
39:36Kennedy turned over
39:37the covert war
39:38in Vietnam
39:39to the military
39:40in 1963.
39:43The growing U.S.
39:44military investment
39:45in Vietnam
39:46was kept secret
39:47from the world
39:48in part because
39:49it violated the
39:501954 Geneva
39:52agreement calling
39:53for the cessation
39:54of hostilities
39:55in Vietnam.
39:56Another reason
39:57was to deceive
39:58the American public.
40:00and that creates
40:04for some people
40:05and for some
40:06analysts
40:07and some politicians
40:08a problem
40:09because they believe
40:10that what you do
40:11should be out
40:11in the sunlight.
40:13But the real world
40:13is a world
40:14in which
40:15even democracies
40:17have to sometimes
40:18do things secretly.
40:19As the war
40:22dragged on,
40:23life in South Vietnam
40:24under President
40:25Diem
40:25was steadily worsening
40:27and Kennedy
40:27could no longer
40:28ignore it.
40:30He and Diem
40:31were both
40:32Roman Catholic
40:33but Kennedy
40:34found Diem's
40:35increasing persecution
40:36of Buddhists
40:37and other
40:37non-Catholics
40:38to be a serious
40:39problem.
40:40There was division
40:43in Washington
40:44on how to deal
40:45with Diem.
40:47In August 1963
40:48an American-backed coup
40:50was considered
40:51and received
40:52great support
40:53from Henry Cabot Lodge,
40:55JFK's new ambassador
40:56to South Vietnam.
40:59Diem's generals
41:00had approached Lodge
41:02about possible U.S. support
41:03of a coup
41:04against the dictator.
41:06However,
41:06the generals
41:07were not quite ready
41:08to make their move
41:09on Diem.
41:10Then in October
41:13word breached
41:14President Kennedy
41:15that the plot
41:16against Diem
41:17was about
41:17to be carried out.
41:20The mood
41:20at the White House
41:21was somber
41:22and the opinions mixed.
41:24Robert Kennedy
41:25felt an obligation
41:26to Diem
41:27as an American ally.
41:29He, McNamara
41:30and Maxwell Taylor
41:31all resisted
41:32the idea of a coup.
41:35Dean Rusk
41:35supported the overthrow
41:37citing evidence
41:38showing that Diem
41:39despite warnings
41:40from high-ranking
41:41American advisers
41:42arrogantly resisted
41:44any change.
41:47Above all,
41:48JFK did not want
41:49another bay of pigs.
41:51He carefully considered
41:52all the information
41:53and opinions.
41:55His decision
41:57was to support
41:58the overthrow
41:58of Diem.
41:59on November 1st, 1963,
42:04the South Vietnamese army
42:05successfully deposed
42:07President Diem
42:08and his brother
42:09New
42:09and then
42:10executed them.
42:14Maxwell Taylor
42:15reported
42:16that Kennedy
42:17was deeply shocked
42:18by the news
42:19that Diem
42:20had been assassinated.
42:21In the last week
42:22of August
42:23in 1963,
42:24Kennedy said flatly
42:25that if Diem
42:26and New
42:26were overthrown
42:27they should be exiled
42:28and that was all
42:28that was supposed
42:29to happen to them.
42:31Kennedy agonized
42:32feeling a sense
42:33of responsibility
42:34for what had happened
42:35to Diem.
42:37Just three weeks later
42:39in Dallas, Texas
42:40President Kennedy
42:41himself was cut down
42:43by gunfire.
42:46Had he lived,
42:47he probably never
42:48could have imagined
42:49that the U.S.
42:50would still be embroiled
42:52in Vietnam
42:52more than a decade later.
42:57John Fitzgerald Kennedy
42:59served as president
43:00during possibly
43:01the most volatile period
43:03in the history
43:04of the United States.
43:05To counter
43:06the constant danger,
43:08Kennedy had always shown
43:09his willingness
43:10to pursue
43:11unconventional avenues.
43:15Kennedy liked
43:16to have
43:17as many options
43:18as possible.
43:20He wanted to have
43:21a multifaceted capability
43:23from covert action
43:25to special forces,
43:26ultimately to nuclear missiles.
43:29And in fact,
43:30Kennedy did strengthen
43:31all those components
43:32of our arsenal.
43:35Kennedy's reliance
43:36on intelligence
43:37and secret operations
43:39led to both painful defeats
43:41and remarkable victories.
43:43But perhaps
43:44his most important triumph
43:46was a battle
43:47that was never fought,
43:48a war with the Soviet Union.
43:51end discussing
43:52the flu
43:53of this
43:54hin ощущ
44:07that the U.S.
44:07was not
44:09ING
44:09되
44:12any plan
44:13with what
44:15the U.S.?