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00:00Transcription by CastingWords
00:30July 16th, 1945, Potsdam.
00:37Amidst the ruins of a defeated Germany, the leaders of the three great Allied powers,
00:42U.S. President Harry Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
00:47and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin met for their first conference since the end of the Second World War in Europe.
00:54On the agenda was the defeated Japan, and more significantly, the future of Europe.
01:00The Communist dictator and the leaders of the two greatest democracies were, at best, uneasy allies.
01:08In the first morning session, Marshal Stalin proved aggressive and tough.
01:13But that very morning, President Truman received a top-secret telephone message from Washington.
01:18It was a short but momentous conversation.
01:23The U.S. had successfully tested the atom bomb.
01:29Truman immediately informed Prime Minister Churchill.
01:33Churchill understood that the world would no longer be the same.
01:36The Potsdam Peace Conference is a very interesting phenomenon in terms of atomic diplomacy, as one might call it.
01:45President Truman came with what he thought was an ace in the hole.
01:49Truman was a straightforward person and basically said to Stalin,
01:52we have this new weapon and it's just been fired, test fired, and happy to tell you all about it.
01:57And essentially, Stalin showed little interest or no interest.
02:01Well, that's nice.
02:02And they went right on with the discussion.
02:04The Western leaders decided that the Soviet leader simply didn't understand the news,
02:10that he had no idea how the atomic bomb changed the global balance of power.
02:16The same day back in his residence, Stalin told his foreign minister Molotov and Marshal Zhukov,
02:26they decided I could not properly appreciate American achievements and were disappointed with my reaction.
02:33Later that day, Stalin spoke to Lavrenti Beria, the head of the atomic project.
02:38We must not allow the U.S. to have a military advantage over us and put pressure on us.
02:43Tell our people to hurry up with the project and ask them if they need anything.
02:53But unknown to Truman and Churchill, Stalin and his head of secret police Lavrenti Beria
02:59already knew a great deal about America's atom bomb from their extensive spy network in the West.
03:05They even knew the exact date and time of the first American nuclear explosion.
03:10The Soviets under Beria, who was the spy chief under Stalin, so, I mean, it's an absolute top-level operation.
03:20They have got a gigantic program to get everything they can on the atomic bomb activities in England and the United States.
03:29The American nuclear project and the Soviet hunt for atomic secrets started almost simultaneously.
03:38The race for the bomb had begun even before the start of the war.
03:43On August 15, 1939, nuclear physicists Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard sent a letter to President Roosevelt,
03:51warning him that Germany was well-advanced in the development of a super-bomb.
03:57They implored the president to act quickly to avoid global disaster.
04:04On September 1, 1939, war broke out in Europe.
04:08In less than a year, Continental Europe had fallen to the Nazis.
04:23Roosevelt realized the necessity of developing the atomic bomb.
04:28Thus was born the Manhattan Project.
04:30Leslie Groves, an army general who'd supervised the construction of the Pentagon, was appointed to head the nuclear project.
04:41Robert Oppenheimer was named head of scientific research.
04:46At Oppenheimer's request, a new top-secret scientific facility was established in the vicinity of Los Alamos, New Mexico.
04:53This sleepy town in the American Southwest became the gathering place for the most brilliant scientific minds.
05:04The world's top physicists, chemists, and mathematicians assembled here to crack the nuclear riddle.
05:11It wasn't long before Los Alamos also attracted unwanted attention.
05:15In 1940, Leonid Kvaznikov, a young, obscure officer from the Technical Scientific Department of the Soviet Secret Police, the NKVD,
05:28made his own little discovery.
05:35Kvaznikov noticed that any research information on radioactive uranium had disappeared from Western scientific journals.
05:42He came to the conclusion that it meant the beginning of practical development for a new weapon based on the fission of uranium.
05:56But this was a frightful time for Leonid Kvaznikov and other Soviet intelligence officers.
06:03The NKVD was being decimated by Stalin's purges.
06:07Our resident in New York was summoned back to Moscow and executed.
06:20My boss supervising my division was proclaimed an enemy of the people and sent to the gulag in the far north.
06:27He died there in 1943.
06:33The head of intelligence, whom I knew well, was arrested and executed.
06:39I started this job with people getting arrested and executed all around me.
06:43In 1940, I sent cables requesting any information on the atomic problem to our stations in New York, Berlin, Paris, and London.
06:59Despite the purges, Soviet intelligence was still brilliantly successful.
07:04As early as September 1941, Moscow received a copy of nuclear plans contained in a 70-page report from the British Uranium Committee.
07:15A Soviet operative had taken it from the desk of British Prime Minister Churchill.
07:21After Kvaznikov got this information, he sent an urgent memo to his boss, Lavrenty Beria.
07:32It was a critical time for the Soviet Union in the midst of the Nazi advance at Moscow.
07:37The Germans were 300 kilometers from the Soviet capital.
07:40Lavrenty Beria knew that Stalin was fully preoccupied with the challenge of defending Moscow.
07:53To lose Moscow would mean losing the war.
07:57Beria didn't tell Stalin about the race for the bomb, but he did order his agents to double-check Kvaznikov's information.
08:06By March 1942, the German blitzkrieg had failed.
08:10The Soviets launched a bitter counter-offensive at Moscow, decimating the German army.
08:18Only then did Lavrenty Beria inform Stalin in the West's research on a super bomb.
08:25Beria's file contained very sensitive, classified material.
08:31A cable from Switzerland from Ace Soviet Spy Dora, warning of German efforts to develop with a bomb.
08:37Soviet agent Charles in London sent calculations for an explosion mechanism for the bomb.
08:46Agent Homer sent abstracts from the top-secret report of the British Uranium Commission.
08:53Among the commission's conclusions was a staggering fact.
08:56The explosive force of a mere 10 kilos of uranium equaled the destructive impact of 1,600 tons of TNT.
09:05Beria's file also contained a letter from Russian physicist Diorgi Flerov.
09:13Before the war, he'd been one of Russia's key nuclear scientists.
09:19Flerov wrote to Stalin,
09:20Stalin, a single nuclear bomb is sufficient for annihilation of either Moscow or Berlin, depending on who has the bomb.
09:29The state that makes the nuclear bomb first will dictate its terms to the rest of the world.
09:36Stalin was fascinated by the idea of creating a super bomb.
09:40Stalin, he decided to give the codename uranium to the military operation against the Germans at Stalingrad.
09:48Many members of Stalin's general staff searched in vain for the meaning of the word uranium.
09:55In March 1943, the Battle of Stalingrad broke the back of the German offensive on the Eastern Front.
10:02With the Nazis in retreat, Stalin called for a meeting in the Kremlin.
10:08He ordered work on a Soviet nuclear bomb to begin immediately.
10:14A young and talented Russian scientist, Igor Korchatov, was appointed head of scientific research.
10:20Stalin personally ordered Lavarenti of Beria to supervise the mission.
10:24Ironically, Stalin's victory at Stalingrad boosted the Manhattan Project as well.
10:33With good news from the Eastern Front and the Germans bogged down in Soviet territory,
10:38Roosevelt could devote greater resources to the secret program.
10:43In the United States, the best American and Western scientists were working to build the bomb.
10:49In Russia, nearly all of the scientific and economic resources were still fully engaged in the war against Germany.
11:01Only a few dozen physicists were involved in nuclear research,
11:05and they were in desperate need of laboratories, equipment, and funding.
11:10But they did have one advantage.
11:13Russian intelligence was operating at full strength, day and night.
11:19Moscow, the spring of 1943.
11:25Late one night, two senior NKVD officers hurried to the office of Pavel Fytin,
11:31the head of Russian intelligence.
11:35Leonid Kavassnikov was in charge of technical and scientific intelligence.
11:40Gaikovak Kimyan, former head of the Soviet spy station in New York,
11:44had recently returned from the States.
11:46They worked out a plan for a top-secret operation to get classified information
11:53on the development of the atomic bomb in the West.
11:58The operation was codenamed Enormous.
12:02Its priorities were to identify the main bomb research centers in the States,
12:07get the names of the atomic researchers,
12:09and find out who among them were communist sympathizers.
12:13In the darkest days of World War II,
12:19many Western scientists believed that the fate of the world depended on the situation on the Eastern Front.
12:25It made sense, they reasoned, to help the Russians.
12:29There were several key espionage agents for the Soviets who focused on the atomic energy issues.
12:38In England, for example, there was Klaus Fuchs,
12:40German-born physicist, communist,
12:43a devoted, ideologically committed individual
12:46who went to work in the midst of the,
12:49in the very bowels of the atomic energy project in England
12:52and gave the Soviets probably more important information than any other agent.
13:01Fuchs made the first move
13:02and contacted Soviet intelligence on his own
13:06when he came to the Soviet embassy in London
13:08and offered his services.
13:12He believed that socialism would bring Western people freedom,
13:15equality,
13:16and fraternity.
13:21Klaus Fuchs, codenamed Charles,
13:24became the first key atomic spy for the Soviets.
13:27He was followed by others.
13:31Another British agent whom we
13:33encountered in the course of our research
13:36into the KGB archives
13:38for our book, The Haunted Wood,
13:40was named Eric.
13:41We never found out, even in the Soviet files,
13:43they were very protective of his name.
13:45He was apparently a very effective researcher
13:48because he not only gave them British information,
13:51but he passed along the information
13:52that came from Washington or from Ottawa
13:54or from other sources of information
13:58based on the atomic project.
14:02Like Klaus Fuchs,
14:03Jorick refused to take any money for his services.
14:06He was an idealist who believed in the communist cause.
14:11NKBD agent Vladimir Barkovsky
14:13was Jorick's London handler.
14:19British counterintelligence never discovered his identity.
14:22He was a very brave man.
14:27During the worst raids on London,
14:29the bombs falling,
14:30the anti-aircraft guns blazing,
14:32I went to our appointed meeting place
14:34because I had to go.
14:35I am a Soviet intelligence officer.
14:38But why did he come?
14:41He could have been safe with everyone else,
14:44hiding in the underground shelters.
14:46In August 1943,
14:51Churchill and Roosevelt met with Mackenzie King
14:53in Quebec, Canada for secret discussions.
14:56Churchill agreed to put his British nuclear research
14:59under American control.
15:02The nuclear program was straining
15:03and already overstretched British war budget.
15:06In England,
15:08the program was also vulnerable
15:10to air attacks and German espionage.
15:17Churchill's crucial decision
15:19significantly boosted Allied nuclear efforts.
15:21By the end of 1943,
15:26leading British nuclear scientists
15:28were arriving in the United States.
15:31Agent Charles,
15:33Klaus Fuchs,
15:34was among them.
15:35His Soviet handlers eagerly reestablished contact with him.
15:40In the United States,
15:41Fuchs met his new handler,
15:43Harry Gold,
15:44who was an American of Russian descent.
15:46Their first meeting took place in February 1944,
15:51New York,
15:51at the corner of 59th Street
15:53and Lexington Avenue.
15:56A lean man with a green tennis ball
15:58in his right hand
15:59was approached by a short, stout man
16:02wearing leather gloves
16:03and carrying a green-covered book.
16:06The man with the ball was Klaus Fuchs.
16:09The other was Harry Gold.
16:12Gold said the code words,
16:14Do you know the fastest way to Central Station?
16:17Fuchs answered,
16:18Your best bet would be to take a cab.
16:23Contact was established.
16:29Little did Fuchs know
16:30that he was one of the final links
16:32in an elaborate Soviet atomic spy ring in the U.S.
16:38The ring was controlled
16:40out of the Soviet consulate
16:41here in Manhattan near Central Park.
16:46Three key handlers operated out of this building
16:51with the codenames Twain,
16:54Alexei,
16:56and Kalistrat.
16:59Overseeing the operation
17:01was the new deputy resident
17:02of the Soviet station in New York,
17:05Leonid Kvasnikov.
17:07Moscow sent him here
17:08on a special mission.
17:11We were more than loaded with work.
17:16We were overwhelmed.
17:18We all had to find ways
17:20to meet our American friends
17:22several times a day.
17:24Very tricky.
17:25I, too,
17:27was handling several people.
17:29In my case,
17:30it was particularly difficult,
17:32sometimes impossible,
17:33to arrange meetings.
17:34I was constantly under surveillance.
17:39Sometimes I had to meet my contacts
17:42while shopping with my wife
17:43or while at the movies.
17:46Meanwhile, in Moscow,
17:48Stalin was becoming increasingly concerned
17:50about the slow pace
17:52of Russian nuclear research.
17:53After Beria reported
17:56on yet another American success,
17:58Stalin summoned his top scientists
18:00to the Kremlin.
18:02He wanted results,
18:04not excuses.
18:09A leading Russian physicist,
18:12Akademiyan Yofei,
18:14told Stalin,
18:15the task is very difficult.
18:17Yes, we know now
18:18that we can solve the problem
18:19of the nuclear bomb,
18:21but we don't have a scientific base
18:23and all our best scientists
18:24are engaged in solving
18:26current military challenges.
18:30Stalin cut him short.
18:32No doubt it would be easier
18:34without the war,
18:35but scientists should not be wimps.
18:38Nuclear deterrence
18:39is the only thing to save us.
18:44Pressured by Stalin,
18:46Beria in turn pushed Kvasnikov
18:48to expand his American atomic spy ring.
18:53Until very recently,
18:55we have been unaware
18:56that there was an even more important
18:58Soviet spy at Los Alamos.
19:01The youngest major spy
19:03in modern history.
19:05He was one of the most brilliant physicists
19:07that the United States
19:08has ever produced.
19:10His family had been born in Russia,
19:13but he himself had been born
19:15in the United States.
19:16He went up to Harvard University
19:19at the age of only 15.
19:21He graduated as a physics major
19:24at the age of only 18.
19:27He was immediately recruited
19:29to Los Alamos.
19:32His name was Theodore Hall.
19:35For over 50 years,
19:36only a handful of people
19:37in the Russian secret service
19:39knew that in 1944,
19:42Hall had become the second key atomic spy
19:44in Los Alamos.
19:46He operated under the codename Mlad,
19:48an old Russian word for youth.
19:52Hall was a driven, committed communist
19:54who believed the Soviet Union
19:57was the utopia
19:58that Stalin and his aides
20:01liked to paint it
20:01for their acolytes
20:02outside the Soviet Union.
20:04At one point in his life,
20:06along with a friend
20:06who was also a communist,
20:07wandered the streets of New York
20:09looking for a Soviet agent.
20:11Went into the Soviet consulate.
20:12Finally, one of the Soviet
20:14who was an intelligence operative
20:16interviewed him
20:16and he was able to make contact
20:18with the key Soviet operatives
20:19on this project
20:20and he proceeded to pass to them
20:22amazing material
20:23that he brought from Los Alamos.
20:28The Russian spymasters decided
20:30that it would be best
20:31to meet Klaus Fuchs
20:32and Theodore Hall
20:33somewhere near Los Alamos.
20:36Harry Gold usually met Fuchs
20:37in Albuquerque or Santa Fe.
20:40Hall's handler was Loner Cohen.
20:42She usually met Hall in Santa Fe.
20:45Loner Cohen and her husband Morris
20:47were the all-American spy couple.
20:51Morris Cohen had been recruited
20:52by Soviet intelligence
20:54back in 1937 in Spain.
20:57Later, he drew his wife Loner
20:59into his spying activities.
21:03In 1945, Loner went to Santa Fe
21:06for a special meeting
21:08with Theodore Hall.
21:09When there was a very dramatic episode,
21:14according to the understanding
21:18with our people,
21:21she was to go to the university town
21:24to meet a young fellow.
21:28That is from whom she was
21:30to get the material.
21:31See?
21:32She went three weeks in a row.
21:36He didn't show up.
21:38However, she thought
21:40that she would go one more time.
21:42So she went the fourth time,
21:45and from his dress,
21:47the materials he carried,
21:49she understood
21:50that was the one she wanted.
21:52They met,
21:54and he gave her the material.
21:56Unknown to Soviet intelligence,
22:00new top security measures
22:02on the Manhattan Project
22:04included potential searches
22:05of anybody leaving
22:07the vicinity of Los Alamos.
22:10At the train station,
22:11Loner Cohen had to act quickly
22:13to escape and secure the papers.
22:17In the station's toilet,
22:18she quickly put Hall's papers
22:20in the bottom of a box of tissue.
22:22Back at the train door,
22:26Loner asked one of the policemen
22:27to hold the tissues
22:29while she searched in her bag
22:30for her ticket.
22:33Then she pretended to sneeze,
22:35and the policeman returned
22:37the box to her.
22:40Loner boarded the train
22:41with a box and the hidden papers
22:43back in her hands.
22:48Loner returned safely to New York.
22:51Theodore Hall's report was saved,
22:54and the Soviet spy network
22:56narrowly missed being exposed.
23:02The Manhattan Project
23:03was the most extensive secret operation
23:06in American history.
23:08In the race to build the bomb,
23:10it was of the utmost importance
23:11to protect the nuclear breakthroughs
23:13from German spies.
23:16But by now,
23:16the Americans were suspecting
23:18another danger,
23:19this time from their communist ally,
23:22the Soviet Union.
23:25Ironically,
23:25it was a dedicated
23:26anti-communist Russian,
23:28Boris Paj,
23:29who headed security
23:30at Los Alamos.
23:32Boris Paj
23:33was the son
23:34of the patriarch
23:35of the Russian Orthodox Church
23:37in America,
23:38a church that was banned
23:39in the Soviet Union.
23:43Paj knew better than most
23:45the cruel realities
23:46of the communist regime.
23:49He had a deep suspicion
23:50of scientists
23:51thought to be leftist sympathizers,
23:54like Robert Oppenheimer.
23:56Paj tried to block
23:57Oppenheimer's appointment
23:58as scientific director
24:00at Los Alamos.
24:01General Groves,
24:03commander of the Manhattan Project,
24:05dismissed Paj's concerns.
24:07Groves noted
24:08that security measures
24:09in Los Alamos
24:10were unprecedented in scope.
24:12scientists working
24:17in different departments
24:18were prohibited
24:19from communicating
24:20with one another
24:21without Groves' special permission.
24:24All telephone conversations
24:26in Los Alamos
24:27were monitored
24:28and all correspondence
24:29was thoroughly reviewed.
24:36Special passes
24:37were required
24:38to enter the facility
24:39and the surrounding area.
24:43The scientists
24:43and their families
24:44were periodically shadowed
24:46and photographed
24:47both inside
24:48and outside the facility.
24:53All those working
24:54in Los Alamos
24:55were allowed
24:56to leave town
24:57only once a month.
25:00Employees returning
25:01from vacation
25:02had to report
25:03all their contacts
25:04to a security agent.
25:09But even these
25:10draconian precautions
25:11could not keep
25:12the Soviets out.
25:18Finally,
25:19another extremely
25:20valuable find
25:20emerged for
25:22the Soviets
25:23in the person
25:23of a young machinist
25:25named David Greenglass
25:26who was also
25:27a communist.
25:28David Greenglass's
25:29brother-in-law,
25:30Julius Rosenberg,
25:32essentially talked
25:32to David's wife,
25:33Ruth,
25:34who told them
25:35that David was working
25:36on this top-secret project.
25:38Julius Rosenberg
25:40was a Soviet agent.
25:42Before he recruited
25:43Greenglass, however,
25:44he had no connection
25:45with the nuclear world.
25:48They used Ruth Greenglass.
25:50She basically
25:51was also very much
25:53on the far left,
25:54agreed with them
25:55that it would be helpful
25:55if David cooperated,
25:57persuaded her husband
25:58to cooperate,
25:59and so Greenglass
26:01brought out designs
26:02of the atomic bomb's
26:03lens mold
26:04and other information.
26:05He was not a technically
26:06trained figure
26:08in the sciences,
26:09but he could provide
26:11what machinists
26:12can provide,
26:13namely the materials
26:14that he was working on,
26:15and it was extremely valuable.
26:18The veteran Soviet agent
26:20Harry Gold,
26:21Klaus Fuchs's handler,
26:23added Greenglass
26:23to his list of agents.
26:26Gold's trips to Albuquerque
26:28to meet Fuchs
26:29now yielded a bonus,
26:30the files from Greenglass.
26:32The Russian spymasters
26:35were also security conscious.
26:38They kept their scientists
26:39isolated.
26:42Fuchs, Greenglass,
26:43and Hall
26:43didn't know
26:44of each other's
26:45spying activities.
26:47If one was caught,
26:48the others
26:49couldn't be exposed.
26:53The system worked well
26:54as the Soviet atomic
26:55spy ring expanded.
26:57At the beginning of 1945,
27:05Soviet intelligence
27:06in Canada
27:07recruited several
27:08more scientists.
27:11However,
27:12the arrival
27:12of an experimental physicist,
27:14Alan May,
27:15was the greatest
27:16of all Russian successes
27:17in Canada.
27:20Alan May had worked
27:22on development
27:22of the bomb
27:23in Britain.
27:23There he had been
27:27recruited to the
27:27Soviet cause.
27:30In Canada,
27:31he was given
27:31a near-impossible task
27:33to obtain samples
27:36of uranium-235.
27:38Uranium-235
27:40was the radioactive material
27:46necessary to make
27:47the atom bomb.
27:48Every aspect
27:52of uranium mining,
27:53production,
27:54and storage
27:55was heavily guarded.
27:57One day,
27:58Alan May asked
28:00to see his handler.
28:03They met
28:04in Montreal.
28:07May held up
28:07a small glass tube.
28:12The Soviet agent
28:13asked what it was.
28:16May told him,
28:16it's uranium-235.
28:20The agent knew
28:21that no matter what,
28:23he had to deliver
28:24the tube
28:25to Moscow.
28:27The fragile test tube
28:28was sewn
28:29into a special belt.
28:31A Russian courier,
28:32Colonel Motin,
28:33tied the belt
28:33around his bare waist
28:35and covered it
28:36with his shirt.
28:39Then he flew
28:40to the Soviet Union.
28:41in Moscow,
28:47a car was waiting
28:48for Colonel Motin
28:50on the airfield.
28:51In the car
28:52was none other
28:52than Lavrenti Beria.
28:55He took the tube
28:56and dismissed
28:57the courier.
29:00Till the day he died,
29:02Colonel Motin
29:03suffered from
29:03radioactive burns.
29:05In May 1945,
29:10Germany surrendered.
29:13Their race
29:14for the bomb
29:14was over.
29:16Allied scientists
29:17were relieved.
29:18But in the Far East,
29:19the war with Japan
29:20was grinding on
29:21and tensions
29:22were rising
29:23between Stalin
29:24and his
29:24Western allies.
29:25Soon after
29:36the collapse
29:36of Germany,
29:37Soviet agent
29:38Lona Cohen
29:39went to Santa Fe
29:40for another meeting
29:41with Los Alamos
29:42physicist
29:42and Soviet spy
29:43Theodore Hall.
29:46The American scientists
29:48were completing
29:48preparations
29:49for the explosion
29:50of the first
29:51atomic bomb.
29:53This time,
29:54Hall gave her
29:54detailed information
29:55about the finished
29:57bomb.
29:58He also told her
29:59that the first
30:00ever detonation
30:01of an atom bomb
30:02would take place
30:03on July 16th
30:04in the desert
30:05at Alamogordo.
30:08He added ominously
30:10that if the tests
30:11were successful,
30:12atomic bombs
30:13might be dropped
30:14on Japan.
30:18After Lona Cohen
30:20returned to New York,
30:21the other Soviet
30:22handler, Harry Gold,
30:23went to Albuquerque
30:25to meet
30:25Los Alamos physicist
30:26Klaus Fuchs
30:27and technician
30:28David Greenglass.
30:38Gold forwarded
30:39their reports
30:40to Leonid Kovashnikov.
30:43Comparing the three reports
30:44convinced Kovashnikov
30:46of the accuracy
30:47of the accuracy
30:47of his information.
30:49Now it was
30:50only a matter
30:51of time
30:51before the atomic genie
30:53was let out
30:54of the bottle.
30:57On July 16th,
30:591945,
31:01just as Theodore Hall
31:02had reported,
31:03the United States
31:04successfully tested
31:05the atomic bomb.
31:06for the three leaders
31:14who met at Potsdam
31:16and for all mankind,
31:18the world
31:18was a different place.
31:20Stalin wondered
31:30if the United States
31:31would drop the bomb
31:32on Japan
31:33and if they did,
31:35what the results
31:36would be.
31:38August 6th, 1945,
31:41squadron leader
31:42Colonel Paul Tibbetts
31:43flew a modified
31:44B-29 bomber,
31:46the Enola Gay,
31:47over Japan.
31:49At 8.15 a.m.,
31:50the bombardier
31:51released an atom bomb
31:53nicknamed Little Boy
31:54on Hiroshima.
31:56The 9,000-pound weapon
31:57destroyed the city,
31:59killed 78,000 people,
32:01and injured
32:01another 69,000.
32:10Three days later,
32:11a second bomb,
32:12Fat Man,
32:13was dropped
32:13on Nagasaki
32:14with almost equally
32:16horrific results.
32:1740,000 dead,
32:1825,000 injured.
32:24Japan capitulated.
32:30For the first time,
32:31Stalin understood
32:32the horror and power
32:34of this new weapon.
32:35He was convinced
32:36that given a sufficient
32:37quantity of nuclear bombs,
32:39the United States
32:40would use them
32:41to do away
32:42with the Soviet Union.
32:48extremely fearful
32:49of American intentions,
32:50Stalin pulled out
32:52all stops
32:52to catch up
32:53with the Americans
32:54and become
32:55a nuclear power.
33:03By 1945,
33:05Lavrenti Beria
33:06was under enormous pressure
33:08to produce an atomic bomb.
33:10His normal methods
33:11were the whip
33:12and the gulag.
33:14Already thousands
33:14of workers,
33:15in reality,
33:16slave laborers,
33:17were dying
33:18from cold,
33:19hunger,
33:19and savage treatment.
33:21But Beria's brutal methods
33:23couldn't be applied
33:24to the complex problems
33:25of nuclear physics.
33:27So Beria built
33:29Arzamas-16,
33:31400 kilometers
33:32from Moscow.
33:34Arzamas-16
33:34was never marked
33:36on any map.
33:37It was a self-contained city
33:39hemmed in
33:39by barbed wire
33:40and patrolled
33:41by guards
33:42with machine guns
33:4324 hours a day.
33:46Life inside the compound
33:47was a paradise
33:48compared to conditions
33:50elsewhere
33:50in the war-ravaged country.
33:53The atomic scientists
33:55and technicians
33:55had at their disposal
33:57such rarities
33:58as sausages,
33:59eggs,
34:00and butter.
34:01But Beria made it clear
34:03that failure
34:04would be dealt with severely.
34:06For the top scientists,
34:08the choice was stark,
34:09succeed or die.
34:12Beria made two lists
34:13with the names
34:14of leading scientists
34:15and engineers.
34:16One of them listed awards
34:18to each of them
34:19if they succeeded.
34:20The other provided
34:21harsh punishments,
34:22including execution,
34:24if they failed.
34:25But the scientists
34:27had one advantage.
34:30Secret information
34:31from the successful
34:32American program.
34:34Beria was especially
34:36security conscious
34:37about this
34:37intelligence information.
34:40Only two Soviet scientists
34:42had access to it.
34:44Igor Kurchatov
34:45and his brother Boris.
34:46Well, my head
34:50was always busy
34:51with the atomic bomb.
34:53Igor Kurchatov
34:54asked specific questions
34:56which I answered.
34:57He used to tell me
34:58how the work
34:59was going on,
35:00what problems
35:01they had,
35:02letting me know
35:02what additional information
35:03on these problems
35:04they needed.
35:06We passed on
35:06these requests
35:07to our stations
35:08overseas.
35:09Following Beria's orders,
35:14Igor Kurchatov
35:15passed the American
35:16discoveries
35:16to his nuclear scientists
35:18working on different
35:19aspects of the project
35:21in Arzamas-16.
35:23But they were told
35:24that the information
35:25was the work
35:25of Kurchatov
35:26and an unknown group
35:27of Soviet scientists
35:29conducting research
35:30in a top-secret
35:31nuclear laboratory
35:32tucked away
35:33beyond the Ural Mountains.
35:35Kurchatov's own
35:36handwritten notes
35:37revealed the crucial
35:38importance
35:39of the intelligence
35:40from the West.
35:41He wrote,
35:42My analysis
35:42of the documents
35:43proved their utmost
35:45unprecedented significance
35:46to our state
35:47and to our science.
35:52Stalin realized
35:54early on
35:54that the bomb
35:55was useless
35:55without the capability
35:57to deliver it.
35:58At that time,
35:59the Soviet Union
36:00didn't have
36:01a long-range bomber
36:02and designing one
36:03would take years.
36:06To save time,
36:07Stalin's agents
36:08were ordered
36:09to steal the blueprints
36:10and technical specs
36:11for America's
36:12long-range bomber,
36:13the B-29.
36:17Mikhail Goshkov,
36:19a Soviet agent
36:19then based in Italy,
36:21was assigned to the case.
36:25Technical documentation
36:26for the B-29
36:27became a priority.
36:30We started searching
36:31for it.
36:33It is not simple,
36:35you know.
36:36You can't just put an ad
36:38into a newspaper.
36:44Goshkov was able
36:45to recruit an Italian
36:46whose brother worked
36:48at one of the B-29
36:49assembly lines
36:50in Brazil.
36:52The Italian was sent
36:53to Brazil
36:54to Brazil
36:54with a large sum
36:55of money.
36:58Two months later,
36:58Goshkov received
37:00a telegram
37:00from Brazil.
37:02It read,
37:03coming home,
37:04meet me at the port.
37:09Soon I saw my agent
37:10carrying a heavy case.
37:12I asked him,
37:13what's in it?
37:14Bricks?
37:16He said,
37:16no,
37:17it is all
37:18that you asked
37:18me to bring.
37:22A talented
37:23Russian designer,
37:24Andrei Tupolev,
37:26was put in charge
37:27of the bomber's
37:27construction.
37:29Tupolev argued
37:30for a variation
37:31in the design,
37:32but Stalin
37:32would not listen.
37:34He wanted
37:34an exact copy
37:35of the B-29.
37:38Tupolev responded
37:39with a bitter joke
37:41that could easily
37:41have cost him
37:42his life.
37:43He asked,
37:44should we paint
37:44American stars
37:45on the wings too?
37:48Soon the Russian
37:49T-4,
37:50an exact replica
37:51of the B-29,
37:52was flying.
37:55Now Stalin
37:55had his delivery
37:56problem solved,
37:57but the bomb itself
37:58was not yet ready.
38:01While the Soviets
38:01were forging ahead
38:03with their research,
38:04they still needed
38:04key components
38:05to make their bomb.
38:08Earlier,
38:09in the spring of 1946,
38:11Klaus Fuchs
38:11had returned to Britain
38:13from Los Alamos.
38:15He was given
38:16a senior position
38:17at the British
38:18Nuclear Center
38:19at Harwell.
38:21Intelligence agent
38:22Alexander Feklysov
38:24was sent to Britain
38:25as his handler.
38:28I went to the meeting,
38:30always carefully checking
38:32to see if I was followed.
38:34First,
38:35I walked alone.
38:37Then my comrade
38:39picked me up in his car.
38:40We checked again.
38:42Then my comrade
38:43followed me
38:44and eventually gave me
38:45the signal
38:46that I was clean.
38:51Their first meeting
38:52took place in a pub.
38:54They continued
38:55their talk
38:56in the street.
38:57I asked Fuchs
39:02if he had brought
39:03any materials.
39:04He answered,
39:05yes.
39:06I've got what
39:07your comrades need.
39:09And he passed me
39:09the documents.
39:11I'll tell you straight out.
39:13Fuchs gave us
39:14detailed materials
39:15on the development
39:15of both the uranium
39:16and the plutonium bomb.
39:19Theoretical materials.
39:22Its explosive mechanism.
39:24Everything we needed.
39:25The Soviet Union
39:29had the complete plans
39:31of the first atomic bomb.
39:34And so,
39:35the first Soviet atomic bomb
39:37was an exact copy
39:39of the first American atomic bomb.
39:44The first Soviet nuclear test
39:47was set for August 29, 1949.
39:49Two or three days
39:55before the test,
39:56Lavrenti Beria
39:57came to inspect
39:57the testing grounds.
40:00He came into my
40:01automatic control center.
40:03I showed him
40:03the programming device
40:04in action.
40:05Multicolor lamps
40:06sparkling beautifully
40:07and so on.
40:08He said,
40:09I will watch from here.
40:12I was horrified.
40:14The situation was tense.
40:17Our first atomic explosion.
40:20I'm responsible
40:20for the launch.
40:23I had to be totally focused
40:24and here,
40:25sitting behind my back,
40:27was the nation's
40:27number one hangman.
40:28When an excited Beria
40:50woke Stalin up
40:51at his dacha
40:51in the middle of the night
40:53to report that the test
40:54had been a success,
40:56Stalin answered sleepily
40:57that he already knew
40:58and hung up.
41:03The test of the Soviet
41:04atomic bomb
41:05was a triumph
41:06for both Soviet science
41:08and Soviet intelligence.
41:11But at the height
41:12of their success,
41:13the atomic spies
41:14were in even greater danger.
41:21Western experts knew
41:22the Russians would eventually
41:24build their own atomic bomb.
41:25most felt
41:27that the Soviet Union,
41:28devastated by years
41:30of bloody war,
41:31would need at least
41:31a decade to do it.
41:37But early in September 1949,
41:39U.S. intelligence
41:40discovered traces
41:41of an atomic explosion.
41:46Air samples taken over the Pacific
41:48revealed radioactive residues.
41:50The Soviet detonation
41:52of an atomic device
41:54was a shock
41:54to the United States.
41:56By now,
41:57Western counterintelligence agencies
41:59knew the Soviets
42:00had operated espionage rings
42:02in the States.
42:06The first major breakthrough
42:07in terms of their recognition
42:09that they were dealing
42:10with a very organized
42:11and very extensive spy ring
42:13came, of course,
42:14through the defection
42:15and the statements
42:16of the FBI
42:17of Elizabeth Bentley
42:18in 1945.
42:21Elizabeth Bentley
42:22was one of the most
42:23important couriers
42:24in the Soviet network
42:25in the early 1940s.
42:28She revealed a great deal
42:29about their espionage techniques.
42:32Even more crucial evidence
42:34of Soviet espionage
42:35came in September 1945.
42:38A Russian military intelligence
42:40cipher clerk
42:41based in the Canadian capital
42:43of Ottawa
42:43defected with piles
42:45of incriminating documents.
42:47Igor Guschenko
42:49incriminated Alan May
42:50and 13 other Soviet spies
42:52who had operated in Canada.
42:54On March 4, 1946,
42:56May was arrested in England
42:58and sentenced
42:58to 10 years in prison.
43:01Then Klaus Fuchs,
43:03second in command
43:03of the British nuclear facility
43:05at Harwell,
43:06came under suspicion.
43:08His telephone number
43:09had been discovered
43:10in a notebook
43:11found on one
43:12of the Soviet spies
43:13arrested in Canada.
43:15But counterintelligence
43:16had no proof
43:17and still no clue
43:20that the Canadian spies
43:21were just one link
43:22in a massive
43:23North American spy ring
43:24based in the States.
43:26That break came
43:27with Operation Venona.
43:32Venona was an American
43:34counterintelligence operation
43:35to decipher
43:36secret Soviet message traffic
43:38in the 1940s.
43:40released by the National Security Agency
43:42in 1996,
43:44Venona confirmed
43:45long-suspected fears
43:47about Soviet spying,
43:49such as the involvement
43:50of Alger Hiss,
43:51a U.S. State Department official
43:53infamously linked
43:54to another Soviet sympathizer,
43:56Whitaker Chambers.
43:58In the last year of the war,
44:00American intelligence
44:01obtained 1,500 pages
44:03of the NKVD secret code books.
44:06The codes were used
44:07for messages sent to Moscow
44:08by Soviet spies
44:10from all over the world.
44:12In 1948,
44:14a brilliant American cryptologist,
44:16Meredith Gardner,
44:18succeeded in breaking
44:19the Russian code.
44:20In the years that followed,
44:22over 2,000 Soviet telegrams
44:24were decrypted.
44:27In 1949,
44:28the code of one
44:29especially important telegram
44:31was broken.
44:32It contained hints
44:34about Klaus Fuchs.
44:40The deputy director
44:41of the center
44:42at Harwell
44:42came to me
44:43and said,
44:45Klaus,
44:45tell us what they say
44:47is wrong
44:47and we will all
44:48back you up.
44:49For me,
44:50it was a shock.
44:51I had betrayed them,
44:53my own colleagues.
44:55Morally,
44:55I was not ready for it.
44:56In 1950,
45:03a renowned British detective,
45:05William Scardin,
45:06began a psychological game
45:08with Fuchs.
45:10Over a period of months,
45:12he engaged Fuchs
45:13in discussions
45:14about morality
45:15and virtues,
45:16chipping away
45:16at his defenses.
45:19Finally,
45:19Fuchs confessed
45:20to spying for the Soviets.
45:22In April 1951,
45:24he was arrested
45:25and sentenced
45:26to 14 years in prison.
45:28If he'd been tried
45:29in America,
45:30he would have been sent
45:31to the electric chair.
45:34Klaus Fuchs
45:34told his interrogators
45:36about the American
45:37who was his handler.
45:39The FBI
45:40already suspected
45:41Harry Gold
45:42and had questioned
45:43him several times.
45:45Gold steadfastly
45:46maintained his innocence.
45:48Then the FBI
45:49found a map
45:50of Santa Fe
45:50in his apartment.
45:52Shown pictures
45:53of Gold,
45:53Fuchs confirmed
45:54that indeed
45:55Gold was his handler.
45:58Gold was promptly
45:58arrested
45:59and sentenced
46:00to 30 years
46:01in prison.
46:02Harry Gold
46:03revealed the identity
46:04of another Soviet agent,
46:06David Greenglass.
46:07Operation Venona
46:08confirmed his name.
46:10In return for freedom
46:11for his wife
46:12and a plea bargain
46:13for himself,
46:14Greenglass implicated
46:15Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.
46:17In the most famous
46:19of the American spy trials,
46:20Julius and Ethel
46:21Rosenberg were found
46:23guilty of treason,
46:24though, like Algier Hiss,
46:26they protested
46:26their innocence
46:27to the end.
46:29The Rosenbergs
46:31were executed
46:31in 1953.
46:35Even then,
46:36the full story
46:37of Soviet espionage
46:38was not known.
46:39In 1955,
46:44Khrushchev ordered
46:45the KGB
46:45to destroy
46:46part of its archives,
46:48including all the materials
46:49of Operation Enormos.
46:51But surprisingly,
46:52the KGB disobeyed.
46:54Intelligence officers
46:56hid the files
46:56of Enormos
46:57in a cell
46:58of this KGB prison,
47:00Le Fortovo.
47:02For decades,
47:03the files
47:03were kept hidden here.
47:04These are the original
47:10files of Operation Enormos.
47:20Russian super-spy
47:21Pavel Tsutoplatov
47:23was one of
47:23Beiria's top men
47:25within the Soviet
47:25intelligence network.
47:27In the mid-1990s,
47:29he made a startling claim.
47:30He announced
47:31that the head
47:32of the Manhattan Project,
47:33Robert Oppenheimer,
47:34and one of his
47:35leading scientists,
47:36Enrico Fermi,
47:37had supplied
47:38top-secret information
47:40to the Russians.
47:43The spy apparatus
47:44in Moscow
47:45are looking for anything
47:46they can get their hands on
47:47that has to do
47:48with the American
47:49atomic bomb effort,
47:51including tidbits
47:52that real Soviet spies
47:54are picking up
47:56from unwitting
47:58physicists
47:59and other scientists
48:01in Los Alamos.
48:02So if they're sitting around
48:03having a cup of coffee
48:04and they say something,
48:06it's possible
48:07that one of the
48:09committed Soviet spies,
48:13such as Klaus Fuchs,
48:14will overhear something
48:16or even be told directly
48:18by his colleague Fermi
48:19or his colleague Oppenheimer.
48:22And he will put that
48:23into the report
48:24that eventually gets back
48:25to Moscow.
48:26and Moscow then
48:29puts Fermi
48:30and Oppenheimer
48:31down as people
48:33who've provided information,
48:34but they didn't provide
48:35information as spies.
48:38They provided information
48:39that a colleague
48:40has picked up.
48:43Fenona provided evidence
48:44that there were
48:45other Soviet spies
48:46associated with
48:47the nuclear project.
48:49However,
48:50some of them
48:51were never revealed.
48:53The stakes were
48:56the future of the world
48:57and for many
48:59of the young communists
49:00who accepted
49:01at face value
49:03the images
49:04of the Soviet Union
49:05put forward
49:06by Stalin's own
49:06propaganda people,
49:08to be a communist
49:09and a democrat,
49:10small d,
49:11were not necessarily
49:12in conflict.
49:13But above all else,
49:14they were anti-fascists,
49:15they were romantic,
49:16they were romantic idealists,
49:17and there was
49:18this blind fate
49:19that led them
49:20down the road
49:20to profound betrayal.
49:23While the Soviet
49:25atomic spies
49:26are still reviled
49:27as traitors
49:28in the West,
49:28they are revered
49:30in Russia.
49:33Here in Russia,
49:34these people
49:35are considered heroes.
49:37They helped
49:38to establish
49:38the nuclear balance.
49:40And after all,
49:41it prevented
49:42a nuclear disaster.
49:43One thing is clear,
49:47these men and women
49:48had a profound effect
49:49on modern history,
49:51and they showed
49:51that no secret
49:52is impenetrable.
49:59One of the greatest
50:00Soviet intelligence
50:01successes,
50:02indeed one of the greatest
50:03intelligence successes
50:04of all time,
50:06was the penetration
50:08by Soviet intelligence
50:09of the top secret
50:11atomic laboratory
50:12at Los Alamos.
50:13The world
50:15had entered
50:16the nuclear era.
50:17For years,
50:18superpower rivalry
50:19and mutual deterrence
50:21had maintained
50:22an uneasy nuclear peace.
50:25But the atomic genie
50:26could not be put
50:27back in the bottle.
50:29Over the years,
50:30many countries
50:31have joined
50:31the nuclear club.
50:32Britain,
50:33France,
50:33China,
50:34Israel,
50:35India,
50:35and Pakistan.
50:37In the new millennium,
50:38these countries,
50:39like the United States,
50:41will have to guard
50:41their own technology.
50:44As long as some nations
50:45have the bomb
50:46and others do not,
50:47the hunt for atomic secrets
50:48is destined to continue.
50:50you?
50:51No,
50:51I don't know what the hell
50:54is going to be
50:56in the new millennium
50:58but they will not be
50:59in the new millennium.
51:00Before the release,
51:01a single millennium
51:02has been on the new millennium
51:02and will have to be
51:04in the new millennium,
51:04and shows up
51:05the new millennium
51:06and can make
51:07that support
51:09the new millennium
51:10that they are
51:11in the new millennium,
51:11which will have to support
51:12the 2nd millennium.