On Wednesday, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing to receive testimony on the United States Cyber Command, one of the commands of the Department of Defense.
Fuel your success with Forbes. Gain unlimited access to premium journalism, including breaking news, groundbreaking in-depth reported stories, daily digests and more. Plus, members get a front-row seat at members-only events with leading thinkers and doers, access to premium video that can help you get ahead, an ad-light experience, early access to select products including NFT drops and more:
https://account.forbes.com/membership/?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=display&utm_campaign=growth_non-sub_paid_subscribe_ytdescript
Stay Connected
Forbes on Facebook: http://fb.com/forbes
Forbes Video on Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/forbes
Forbes Video on Instagram: http://instagram.com/forbes
More From Forbes: http://forbes.com
Fuel your success with Forbes. Gain unlimited access to premium journalism, including breaking news, groundbreaking in-depth reported stories, daily digests and more. Plus, members get a front-row seat at members-only events with leading thinkers and doers, access to premium video that can help you get ahead, an ad-light experience, early access to select products including NFT drops and more:
https://account.forbes.com/membership/?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=display&utm_campaign=growth_non-sub_paid_subscribe_ytdescript
Stay Connected
Forbes on Facebook: http://fb.com/forbes
Forbes Video on Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/forbes
Forbes Video on Instagram: http://instagram.com/forbes
More From Forbes: http://forbes.com
Category
🗞
NewsTranscript
00:00Good afternoon. I'd like to express my gratitude to Lieutenant General Hartman for his attendance
00:06at today's hearing. Before I proceed any further, I want to acknowledge the incredible momentum
00:12set by General Hawk in the strategic transformation needed to meet the evolving threats of today
00:18and the emerging challenges of tomorrow in cyberspace. General Hawk was a strong leader
00:24with a deep knowledge of the art and science of cyber warfare hard-earned over three decades of
00:30service to our country. Men and women capable of leading the National Security Agency and the
00:36United States Cyber Command are in short supply. Such leaders require years of experience to develop
00:44with deliberate and dedicated career focus. To put it more directly, we do not have enough of these
00:51types of leaders and a loss of any one of them without strong justification is disappointing.
00:58The departure of General Hawk is a loss for our nation but will be a tremendous gain for any
01:04private or public entity where he decides to lend his expertise and leadership. I wish him godspeed.
01:13That said, as our adversaries watch this hearing, it will be clear
01:19that no matter the scenario, our cyber mission forces are ready. Lieutenant General Hartman's
01:26presence is more than just an annual congressional activity. His presence is more than just a general
01:34annual congressional activity. It shows the strength and resiliency of the cyber mission force.
01:40It is a testament to how much this command has matured since its inception in 2009 and the steadfast
01:49nature of our military, civilian and uniformed, to step up and fight when the nation needs them.
01:58It also reflects the absolute importance of the dual hat arrangement. In the face of unexpected change,
02:04there remains tight integration of cyber and intelligence operations thanks to alignment under a single
02:11leader. Such an arrangement remains paramount in future decisions of General Hawk's formal successor.
02:21I have had the pleasure of working with Lieutenant General Hartman in his prior role as Deputy Commander of
02:26the United States Cyber Command and I am confident in his ability to lead these organizations through this
02:31transition, maintaining the combat capability of a force that operates in an environment of constant change.
02:39He is one of the few with a strong understanding of this domain built over decades of experience.
02:46The importance of the cyber domain cannot be overstated. Our adversaries understand the dynamic and
02:52permeable nature of cyberspace and have clearly demonstrated their intent to exploit it to their advantage.
03:00General Hartman, as we discussed in detail during our closed session, the threats our nation faces in
03:07the cyber domain have only intensified since we last convened for an update from Cybercom a year ago.
03:15The detection of additional Chinese advanced persistent threat groups throughout the past year has
03:20reinforced both the determination of our adversaries to own this domain and their technical capability to do so.
03:29With the release of the Chinese Generative Artificial Intelligence Large Language Model or DeepSeq R1 earlier this year,
03:37competitive advantage will now be measured in weeks and months, not years.
03:46Our cyber mission force must be ready with training, technology, and operational structure to deter and defend against this new reality.
03:53I have been encouraged by the work the command has conducted on Cybercom 2.0 in collaboration with the
04:00services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy. I want to hear what policy changes are needed to
04:07realize the vision behind this effort. And while I understand the implementation plan has not
04:12been delivered to Congress, our adversaries are not waiting for our process to conclude.
04:19I look forward to hearing more from you about the efforts underway to implement Cybercom 2.0
04:25and how you intend to make sure the force is maturing to conduct persistent engagement in this competitive environment.
04:33I will now recognize Ranking Member Reed from the full committee at Senator Rosen's request for opening remarks.
04:44Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Rosen.
04:48I just want to take a moment to recognize General Hawke for his 35 years of dedicated service to this country
04:57and to the United States Air Force. His sudden and inexplicable firing is disrespectful to his service,
05:05but also disrespectful to every military member in or out of uniform and an indication that their
05:13service and sacrifice is in no way respected by this administration.
05:18The callous nature of the decision, the result of a meeting with a partisan conspiracy theorist,
05:25not on any kind of informed or experienced judgment, puts our security at grave risk and cannot be
05:34tolerated or continued. We salute a dedicated American for his service and sacrifice and his family for
05:44standing with him and wish him well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
05:49Senator Rosen. Ranking Member Rosen.
05:52Yes. Thank you, Chair Rounds and thank you, Chair Rounds and Ranking Member Reed.
05:58Of course, this is such an important hearing and I appreciate, General Hartman, our meetings that we had
06:06yesterday and your team, all of your service, your commitment to the mission and on the success,
06:14because that means that we're all kept safe. And you're also here on very short notice, as we've all been
06:22talking about and we appreciate that as well. And so I look forward to continuing our conversations and
06:30our continued partnership to ensure that success. And like my colleagues, I want to begin by addressing
06:35a matter of significant concern. The sudden and inexplicable firing of General Hawk, a trusted and
06:42dedicated Air Force officer for over 34 years, a true patriot. His abrupt and unjustified removal was
06:50conducted in the dead of night, with absolutely no consultation with Congress, the full committee,
06:56or this subcommittee. And according to press reports, it was at the request of a private individual
07:04outside of the government, outside the chain of command, who has a long record of peddling in
07:10vicious, vicious conspiracy theories. This action compromises cyber comms and the NSA ability to keep
07:18Americans safe. The United States faces major cyber threats from foreign adversaries, China, Russia,
07:25Iran, near daily cyber attacks and our critical infrastructure. And at the same time, we are
07:32engaged in ongoing operations against multiple threats across the globe, from Russian aggression
07:38against Ukraine, to Iranian-backed proxies in the Middle East and North Africa. Given the dangers facing
07:44the U.S. and our troops, it is inexplicable and unconscionable that the President would, at the mere
07:50request of an online provocateur, remove the leader of cyber comm, completely without cause, and in doing
07:57so, risk undermining vital intelligence operations. Moreover, General Hawk has been a trusted leader.
08:05His experience and expertise have been crucial in guiding and shaping the efforts of U.S. Cyber Command
08:10and our overall national defense posture. At a time when our adversaries are constantly evolving
08:17their cyber capabilities, whether it's from state actors like Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea,
08:22or non-state actors with nefarious intent. Leadership continuity and clear vision are more critical
08:29than ever. Cyber security and cyber operations are not and cannot be a partisan issue. It is a national
08:38security imperative. And the threat environment, as we all know, continues to intensify every single day.
08:46We must maintain experienced leadership to counter the ever-evolving cyber challenges facing our
08:51country. As members of this committee and the full committee, we must demand clarity from the
08:57administration about the rationale for this decision. And we must not rest until we have answers and
09:03accountability from both President Trump and Secretary Hegseth. This afternoon, though, our focus will be on
09:10our nation's cyber capabilities and how Congress can help support the critical work that cybercom personnel
09:16do every single day. I might say 24 hours a day, 24-7, 365. And so I look forward to hearing from General
09:26Hartman and to discussing how we can meet our nation's challenge. And today, in the future, and over the
09:33course of this Congress, again, I know how much, General Hartman, you are invested in the mission
09:38of cybercom, how much you know about it, your experience, your expertise, and how invested you
09:46are in the ongoing success in combating cyber threats going forward. And I do look forward to working with
09:53you on that. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Rosen. And with that, Lieutenant
09:58General Hartman, welcome. Thank you for your service. We thank your family as well for their
10:03sacrifice. And there's a lot of things that you literally don't get an opportunity to share with
10:09the American public because of the type of responsibilities that you have. But today,
10:13you have an opportunity to share with the American people and with this committee a little bit about
10:18what you are doing. And we welcome your opening remarks at this time, sir.
10:23Good afternoon, Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Rosen. Thank you for your unwavering support
10:32and for the honor of representing U.S. Cyber Command today. I'm here to discuss the evolving strategic
10:38landscape and our approach as we look forward to 2026. Cybercom's mission is straightforward.
10:45We defend the nation from cyber threats. We protect the Department of Defense's networks,
10:52and we support the joint force. We are dedicated to ensuring the department's mission advantage
10:58and providing options across the conflict continuum to the President, the Secretary of Defense,
11:04and the American people. Achieving our assigned objectives in the mission set forth by the
11:09President of Peace Through Strength requires a force equipped with a strong warrior ethos
11:14and the lethality necessary to meet our national objectives. Deterrence is essential to our strategy.
11:21In cyberspace, we're focused on maintaining a credible capability that dissuades adversaries
11:26from targeting our critical infrastructure. Cyberspace is a rapidly evolving domain influenced by
11:32technological advancements, which necessitates a close partnership with industry. As the environment
11:38changes, Cybercom will adapt by swiftly developing and deploying new capabilities. Our commitment is to
11:45lead from the front, staying ahead of threats through a proactive and agile approach.
11:53Our people are our greatest asset. Capturing our ethos, we win with people.
11:59The dedicated professionals of Cybercom are at the forefront, defending networks,
12:03and countering threats every day. Their innovation and perseverance are essential to maintaining our
12:09nation's advantage in cyberspace. But we're not alone in the fight. Our allies and partners are
12:15crucial components of our collective defense. Key collaborations like our partnership with the
12:20National Security Agency enhance our nation's security by creating a unified effort that surpasses the
12:26capabilities of our adversaries. Moving forward in 2026, our focus is not only on maintaining readiness,
12:34but also elevating the level of mastery within our cyber forces. Our initiative, Cybercom 2.0, seeks to
12:41overmatch our adversaries' quantity with the quality of our people, capabilities, and operations. Modernizing
12:49our force design and rapidly integrating new technologies are vital components of our strategy.
12:55Here, partnership with industry and academia become indispensable, enabling us to stay at the
13:02forefront of cyber security advancements. Our adversaries are persistent and they are sophisticated.
13:08State-sponsored cyber actors from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia pose significant threats to our
13:14critical infrastructure and military systems. China is the most persistent threat, while Russia has gained
13:20significant capabilities through their ongoing operations. To counter these threats, Cybercom develops
13:27robust deterrent strategies, ensuring that any attempt to undermine our security will face an
13:33overwhelming response. An essential part of our future strategy includes the accelerated integration of
13:39artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence offers unparalleled speed and precision in cyberspace
13:46operations, making it a key enabler for anticipating and countering emerging threats. By expanding AI across
13:53our operations, we will strengthen our deterrence posture and maintain superiority in the cyber domain.
14:00True excellence in AI requires a world-class workforce. Through initiatives like Cybercom 2.0,
14:07Cybercom will continue to collaborate with the department to develop, pilot, and implement new tools and
14:12opportunities to invest in our workforce. A world-class workforce requires world-class training, facilities,
14:20and capabilities to excel and thrive. With the support and assistance we receive from the department
14:26and from congress, Cybercom is well positioned to achieve these world-class results. Our work is far from
14:33finished, but with your continued partnership, I'm confident we will succeed in defending our nation.
14:38Cybercom is prepared to rise to the challenge, outpacing our adversaries, securing our interests,
14:45and protecting our future. Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
14:50Thank you, General Hartman. I'll begin. In the wake of the various persistent cyber threats originating from
14:56the People's Republic of China over the last two years, it is my firm conclusion that the importance of the
15:04dual hat is as important today as it has ever been. Given these events, how has the dual hat arrangement
15:12between U.S. Cybercom and NSA evolved to address the emerging threats from our adversaries?
15:19Senator, thank you for your question. The relationship between Cybercom and NSA continues to evolve
15:27so that we really achieve two key objectives. All right, the first is that we see and understand what
15:34our adversary is doing. The second piece of that is that we enable Cybercom or other elements of the U.S.
15:42government in order to operate, in order to defend our critical infrastructure, our key networks,
15:48and the Department of Defense Information Network. The ability for us to execute those operations,
15:57clearly understanding that we have to act, but that we also have to protect things like intelligent
16:03sources and methods, is fundamentally important to the dual hat. From my standpoint, and Senator,
16:11I've been sitting on the campus of the National Security Agency and Cybercom for most of the last 15 years.
16:17I've continued to see this partnership evolve, and our ability to execute increasingly more precise operations
16:27is fundamentally because the dual hat allows me, in my current capacity, to move with the speed and agility
16:35and unity of effort that is required, but it also forces leaders across the organization to collaborate,
16:43to do the hard work, and to provide the best options for the national security of the country.
16:49That's what I believe is the importance of the dual hat, and that is really where I believe we've evolved to.
16:54Mr. Recognizing that this is an open setting and we can't get into specifics, I think another item,
17:00not only the dual hat has been successful, but also the NSPM 13, which was incorporated under President
17:09Trump in his first term, I believe has been very successful in the process, the determining of when
17:16you can do your offensive cyber operations in an efficient manner, and making sure that all parties
17:21involved are appropriately apprised, but there is a decision process in place. Can you talk a little
17:29bit about the successes in terms of just the magnitude of the successes that you have seen achieved since the
17:36creation of the National Security Policy Memorandum 13 by President Trump in his first term?
17:42Thank you Senator Rounds for the question. NSPM 13 is a repeatable, sustainable, agile process
17:50that is recognized across the Department of Defense and across the interagency that allows us to move at
17:58the speed and agility that's required based on our intelligence, based on operational requirements,
18:06and it has increased our ability to execute cyber operations tenfold.
18:11Excellent. Thank you. This is just to give the American public some sense of what happens
18:15when you do the dual hat, and you also have the ability to make the decisions and move quickly,
18:20how quickly we can actually accommodate our need for offensive cyber operations, and I thank you for
18:26that information. Lieutenant General Hartman, in the command's testimony last year, General Hawke
18:33previewed the CyberCom 2.0 initiative to focus on delivering a bold step forward in the future of
18:40the Cyber Mission Force. What is the status of this effort, and what are the major recommendations of
18:45this plan? Chairman Rounds, thanks for the question. As you're well aware, one of the impetus for CyberCom 2.0
18:55was section 1533 of last year's National Defense Authorization Act. Based on that, we put together
19:02a planning team and really studied hundreds of different references over the last year and studied
19:10different force presentation models. We briefed the recommendations of CyberCom 2.0 to the last
19:19administration and the Secretary of Defense approved it. We briefed this to the new Secretary of Defense
19:26who asked us to work the implementation strategy that we were previously working on a six-month timeline
19:35down to 45 days. And so we brought a operational planning team together, or really what we call
19:41a cross-functional team. And over the last 45 days, we've submitted a series of recommendations
19:48that we have concurrence generally from across the services and across the department, which honestly
19:54is pretty extraordinary in a 45-day time period for us to get that level of consensus. Those recommendations
20:00are really built around how do we improve talent management in the force, how do we improve advanced
20:09training in the force, and how do we improve our ability to innovate and bring new capabilities to the
20:17force at the scale and speed that we need to to compete with our adversaries. You know, that seems
20:23relatively simple. It's about 80 pages. We've delivered it to the department. The department is
20:28going through a very reasonable process, and we're pending the results of that feedback from the department,
20:35Chairman. Thank you, General. Ranking Member Rosen. Well, thank you. I want to talk a little bit,
20:43maybe, about policy challenges. So as we continue to evolve and develop our cyber capabilities to
20:51address the emerging threats, it's clear that there's a number of challenges, both within the
20:56Department of Defense and across agencies that can impede everybody's progress. And so I'd like to ask you
21:03about these obstacles and how they impact Cybercom's efforts to stay ahead of the growing cyber threat
21:08landscape. And so we know that you have many challenges. But based on Cybercom's plan for
21:16development, could you speak to some of the key policy obstacles that remain challenges for your
21:21operations, both within the Department of Defense and in the broader interagency context? Senator Rosen,
21:28thanks. Thanks for the question. First, I just want to highlight that I think we have made significant
21:35progress. You know, one of the things we have discussed previously is the ability for us to support
21:42critical infrastructure that is off Dodon, but critical to the department's mission. We do appreciate the
21:49support from Congress in giving us the federal labs authority that has allowed us to execute
21:57cooperative research agreements. I know that we've talked about Guam being a key component of this, and
22:03you know, I'm happy to report that we have executed six different craters over the last six months with
22:10a number of very important critical infrastructure organizations in Guam. And, you know, our assessment
22:18is we have reduced the threat that those organizations face by about 25 percent. And so that has been really
22:25key for us. We continue to work to better integrate the reserve component into our operations to help
22:35secure critical infrastructure. And it is an area where, you know, we think we need both
22:43an improvement from a policy standpoint, but we also need improvement from an appropriation standpoint.
22:48So we're able to better leverage the reserve component force in order to support some of these critical mission sets.
22:56So could you elaborate a little further maybe with the primary sticking points that would hinder that
23:02coordination, effectiveness, expansion of our cyber capabilities? And are you taking some steps there?
23:08Or how can we help as we begin to think about what those policy and appropriations needs might be?
23:14Senator Rosen, thanks for the question. I think on the defense of critical infrastructure, there continues to be
23:21a key role that a number of different organizations will take. And I don't believe the department will
23:26necessarily be the lead. But, you know, there are recommendations that that we will bring to the
23:32committee to how we might better work with organizations like the Department of Homeland Security,
23:40certainly organizations like the National Guard Bureau. And we do believe that there are some
23:46policy recommendations that will work through the process that will be beneficial. I didn't talk
23:52about the United States Coast Guard. The United States Coast Guard has been a key partnership over the
23:57last 12 months. We have signed a memorandum of understanding with the Coast Guard. And so as the Coast Guard
24:04executes operations under DHS authorities, we do have the ability to support their operations in a case
24:11where they have an authority but they don't have the capacity. And certainly as we look at the security
24:17of port facilities, critical infrastructure that supports port facilities, that is, we think, a very
24:24important MOU. At the same time, if we have a cyber comm mission, we're operating on a facility that is
24:34specifically suited to the expertise the Coast Guard brings, they also have the ability to reinforce our
24:40operations. And so I do think we've made progress. I think there are additional policy recommendations.
24:46Senator, I look forward to working with the committee in order to provide those recommendations.
24:50Thank you. I want to talk a little bit about cyber workforce because you can't do any of this
24:57without maintaining a robust cyber workforce. Our defense posture depends on it. We have to be sure
25:05that they're capable, that they're equipped, that they're trained. Like you're talking about, these are
25:10our challenges to constantly be training, working on the mission because the threats are ever evolving.
25:16The cyber domain is incredibly dynamic and mastery, achieving mastery is just crucial and it isn't done
25:24overnight. So what steps are you taking in cyber comm to make sure that we're keeping our personnel ahead of
25:31the curve? And talk to me about the workforce cuts and the hiring freeze and how that's impacting your ability to
25:40to meet the mission. Senator Rosen, thanks. First of all, I would like to highlight that over the last year,
25:50we've had a number of things that have significantly impacted how we're managing, particularly our civilian workforce.
25:56The first is the cyber accepted service. The ability to hire under CES has reduced the lag time by 45%,
26:10really from over a year to less than six months now, in order to bring civilian personnel on board.
26:18That has been impactful. We went through a transition from what we call a combatant command support agency,
26:23from the Department of the Air Force to the Department of the Army. I'm in the Army,
26:27but I'm not saying one is better than the other. But the transition did provide a little bit of friction
26:34as we work from one service to the other. We transitioned to the Army last June and that has
26:41improved sort of a repeatable process to bring the civilians on board. And then there have been things
26:48like the 4092 authorizations from Congress that have been important and allowed us to hire really,
26:54really high-end talent. So I think we are on a glide path. The current hiring freeze has impacted our
27:02ability to bring new hires into the force and we'll continue to work with the department on the way ahead
27:08for that. We have, however, not been impacted by any cuts. We have been able to go back to the department
27:17and get an exemption. It is important because, as I think you're aware, Senator, we're only a little
27:24over 50 percent manned with our civilian force, but it's because those authorizations have all come
27:29really in the last year and a half. So we do think it's important to get the civilian hiring freeze moved,
27:34and we do think it's important to be able to rapidly bring talent into the force. Thank you.
27:38General, I have just one other question. In early 2024, Congress received a briefing on the command's
27:48AI roadmap as required by the fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. Given the release
27:55of the Chinese generative AI model, DeepSeq R1, what steps has the command taken to accelerate delivery of
28:03the capabilities and milestones in this roadmap and what is needed to make certain that we will be
28:10successful in this acceleration? Chairman Rounds, thanks so much for the question. And so over a year ago,
28:20we produced, again, based on a congressional requirement, so thanks, our AI roadmap that laid out a plan for
28:28the next five years. Very close partnership with NSA and their artificial intelligence experts. And a little
28:41over a year ago, we decided that we had a really good plan from a staff standpoint, but where CyberCom could
28:49add value was in operationalizing these capabilities. So we took the majority of the staff portion of that AI
28:57task force, and we moved it to the CyberNational Mission Force. We went out and hired some additional AI talent,
29:05really focused on 90-day pilot projects that we could evaluate, and if successful, we could scale across
29:12the force. And if they weren't successful or didn't meet a need, that we would then focus our efforts
29:21elsewhere. And so over the last 12 months, we have executed artificial intelligence pilots
29:30to secure the Dodon, right? This is at the edge of the Dodon network. This is across network devices,
29:39and it's at our endpoints. It has been very successful, and it is where we're moving to in the future.
29:45We have integrated large language models into our hunt forward kits. We have integrated large language
29:53models into our offensive capabilities. We have partnered very closely with DARPA under Project
29:59Constellation and continue to transition capabilities mostly based on artificial intelligence
30:06intelligence to the force. Additionally, Senator, we have and will continue to work with the department
30:12on long-term resourcing that ensures we maintain advantage over China and any other adversary.
30:22I will say, you know, we were all, you know, paid close attention to and were alarmed by the DeepSeq model,
30:28all right? But the United States of America builds the best software in the world,
30:32all right? And we believe working with private industry, working across the government,
30:38that unique advantage in building the best software in the world will allow us to stay ahead of the
30:43Chinese. Thank you, General. Ranking Member Rosen. Thank you. I want to build a little bit on Senator
30:49Round's AI question because we look to the future of cyber security. How else do we need, besides artificial
30:57intelligence, how do we need to adapt our training and development pipeline to ensure that our
31:04human workforce achieves mastery in the cyber domain? And additionally, with the increasing
31:10demands on our personnel and the nature of the cyber operations, how else can we perhaps leverage
31:16industry or commercial training opportunities to supplement the more specific on-net training that
31:22takes place in a classified environment? Senator, thanks for the question. You know,
31:28we've talked about CyberComm 2.0 and one of the big ideas in CyberComm 2.0 is advanced training,
31:36all right? And right now, CyberComm is very fortunate and the services have done a very good job
31:42in order to present a C2 force. And so the first time in the history of the command over the last year,
31:49right? We've reached C2, which means manned 80% in the aggregate and trained to 70%. But as we look at
31:56things like artificial intelligence and cloud computing and data scientists and other advanced
32:05capabilities, we do think that the model we've laid out in CyberComm 2.0 is really where we need to go.
32:12And it's my role with service like authorities and as a joint force trainer to take service members and
32:21civilians that are presented to us by the services and take them from that basic level and make them
32:27masters, okay? And that is masters in data science, that's masters in cloud computing, that's masters in
32:33artificial intelligence. And then immediately take those lessons and feed them back,
32:39not only into the training base from the services, but also into our operational organization. That is
32:45really the best way that we think we can get after the training part of this. We're also working very
32:52closely with private industry. The CRADA authority that the committee has given us also allows us to
33:00execute craters with private industry. And we continue to work very closely with UARCs and FFRDCs, who
33:09provide us access to really high-end, really responsive talent, particularly as it relates to artificial
33:16intelligence and machine learning. Thank you.
33:19And I do believe we have another member that is just arriving. And I would simply ask, Senator King,
33:29are you ready with questions? I'm always ready.
33:34All right. I kind of thought he would be.
33:36I knew how he was going to answer that. He's always ready.
33:38Thank you very much, General, for being here today. I take it my colleagues have talked,
33:44I'm sorry, I was at a hearing upstairs in the Intelligence Committee. And it was an open hearing,
33:49so I can't even tell you about it. But in any case,
33:53I understand that my colleagues have talked a lot about the firing of General Hawk and
33:57how unfortunate that was. So I don't need to plow that ground.
34:00One of the issues that I'm principally concerned with in cyber is that we have no deterrent.
34:09Our strategy in all of our other military and national security approaches is based upon deterrence,
34:18except in cyber, where we continually are attacked, as we were Salt Typhoon, for example.
34:25Going all the way back to Sony, nothing ever happens to the adversary.
34:30And my belief is that until we start to impose costs, and they understand that there will be costs,
34:36these attacks are going to continue. They're cheap, and there's really no consequences.
34:42If you're sitting in the Kremlin, and somebody said, let's interfere with the next election in the
34:47United States, your answer would be, why not? It's not going to really cost us anything,
34:52and they don't respond. We're not at any risk.
34:55Do you agree with me that we need to have a more stronger,
35:01retaliatory capacity, number one, and demonstrate the will to use it?
35:07Otherwise, these attacks are simply going to continue.
35:15Senator, thanks for your question. It's good to see you again.
35:17Yes, sir.
35:20So, Senator, we certainly agree that we need to continue to improve
35:27our capability in order to deter and respond to attacks. You know, I will tell you that
35:35from our standpoint, you know, there is certain activity that adversaries, to include China,
35:41will always continue to conduct, and we have got to focus on the most credible capabilities
35:48to deter operations that significantly impact the national security. Just like you, I am aware of
35:56SALT Typhoon and Volt Typhoon, and while we're certainly concerned about that, and we will certainly
36:02develop a broad range of options to deal with that, I will tell you that the fact that
36:07we are able to see and observe that activity, and we are able to work with industry partners
36:14in order to build defenses against that activity, is something that provides us some advantage
36:21vis-Ã -vis adversaries like the Chinese. And I assure you, we are dedicated to developing options in
36:26order to counter that, and I would be more than happy to work with your staff in a different setting
36:31to provide you some details.
36:32Well, I understand that you have capacity, and you have capabilities. We demonstrated
36:36that in 2018 with the hunt forward, defend forward that General Nakasone initiated.
36:42So I understand we have the capacity. My problem is we don't have a doctrine.
36:46We don't have a... Deterrence doesn't work unless the other side knows about it.
36:50Dr. Strangelove, why didn't you tell us about the doomsday machine? Well, the premier likes surprises.
36:57A deterrent isn't a deterrent. It takes two things, three things. Capacity, which we have,
37:03will, which we apparently don't have, and knowledge of the adversary, that we have those two things,
37:10and that they are being held at risk. So I'm not questioning the capabilities. What I'm questioning
37:16is, here we are with Salt Typhoon, you know, two or three, six months ago. Nothing's happened. No response.
37:23No, you know, like I said, we haven't even responded to the Sony attack, and that was
37:2810 or 15 years ago. There's never a price to be paid by our adversaries. And until we develop that
37:35theory, it seems to, the concept of deterrence, and let them know that they're at risk, they're
37:41going to keep doing what they're doing. I understand defending and working with our private sector
37:46partners. That's all good. But you can't patch your way out of this. There's got to be, I believe,
37:53a credible deterrent that the adversaries understand that if they attack us in cyberspace,
38:00they will pay a price. It doesn't necessarily have to be in cyberspace. It may be some other kind of
38:05harm that puts them at risk. But the point is, until we start to develop that doctrine
38:14and let our adversaries know, you know, it's just going to keep happening.
38:22So, Senator, acknowledge your concern. Again, look forward to working with the committee,
38:28with the department. And I do think we could provide you some more information in a closed session.
38:33Well, I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
38:36Thank you, Senator King. I do have one last question for you, General.
38:41And then I will allow Ranking Member Rosen a final question as well.
38:47Last year, the Defense Science Board briefed Congress on the status of the Joint Cyber Warfighting
38:52Architecture, or JCWA. How is this command addressing the Defense Science Board's concerns about
38:59excessive bureaucracy and lengthy acquisition timelines that prevent cutting-edge cyber technologies from
39:06being integrated into the Joint Cyber Warfighting architecture before they become obsolete?
39:14Chairman Rounds, thanks for your question. In the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,
39:21Cybercom was given a number of things. We put it under the banner of service-like
39:26authorities. One of those was acquisition authorities. The other piece was enhanced budget control.
39:33And under those authorities, we have consolidated our efforts as it relates to
39:40JICWA. And we are fielding relevant, agile, and not obsolete capabilities that are positioning us to
39:50execute our UCP mission to defend the nation, as well as to support key geographic commanders like
39:57Admiral Paparo and Indopaycom. And we have a plan. We have a plan to take the six programs that are part of
40:03JICWA that have currently been developed by the services, and to bring those underneath our program
40:10executive office, really focused on offensive, defensive, and enterprise-level operations.
40:16And it's working, Senator. And look forward to providing you and the committee additional updates on that.
40:22Excellent. Senator Rosen.
40:24Thank you. I actually have a compound last question. So I want a clarification on some terms that we use
40:32on about the PRC. So could you explain for the layman what living off the land tactics are and why it's
40:39important from a cyber defense perspective? And the compound part of the question is, and finally,
40:46what do you really want us to know that we haven't asked you today? We know you've had just a short
40:50time to prepare for this, but maybe we'll give you that final word there too.
40:55Hey, thanks, Senator Rosen. So living off the land, you know, really describes when an adversary gains
41:03access to your network and then uses legitimate user credentials and legitimate user behavior
41:12in order to live in your network in a way that makes it really hard to detect them using,
41:19you know, a standard antivirus or alert-based program. Thank you. Secretly living in the basement,
41:27I suppose, then, right? Right. And so it just, it makes it really difficult because it's, you know,
41:33it's the behavior that you've got to detect. But look, we do know how to do that. We have gained a
41:41significant amount of knowledge. Artificial intelligence is going to help us. Working with
41:46private industry is going to help us. And we're dedicated to continue to get after that problem.
41:52Thank you. And then I have, I think Senator King had one more question. I didn't. I apologize,
42:00Senator. I didn't, I didn't ask the, I didn't answer the second part of her question. Go ahead.
42:05And, and so I think the, the thing that I would most like the committee to, to, to take away is
42:12Congress and the department have given us authorities. All right. They've given us service-like
42:17authorities. They've given us control of the resources that apply to the COF-1. So the cyber
42:24mission force and the headquarters that employ them. We've been given acquisition authorities.
42:31We've been given joint force trainer authorities. And all those things are enabling us to evolve the
42:37command in a way that better enables us to compete with China or any other adversary. Adversary.
42:44It is working. Okay. There are things that slow down the process. Continuing resolutions slow down
42:51the process. Hiring freezes slow down the process. Transitions between one combatant command support
42:58agency and the other slow down the process. But we have a plan. We're executing it. And it's all about
43:05the ecosystem that we have to build that provides precise intelligence to really smart capability
43:12developers that then field it to a force that has been trained and operationally aligned to receive
43:18that capability. All right. We're doing it with DARPA. We're doing it with the S&T community. We're doing
43:24it with the, the communities across our services that have significant investments
43:30in cyber capabilities. And we're doing it based on operational requirements of geographic combatant
43:36commanders like Indo-Pacom and based on cybercom requirements to defend the nation. And so that's
43:42really the message I have here. Those authorities, those resources, they're relatively new. But they are
43:49allowing us to really increase our ability to really get after all the things that we've talked about here.
43:55Thank you. Senator King.
44:01I realize this isn't exactly in your lane, but it's certainly close. You talked in your prior answer
44:06about the work with the private sector and alerting them to the threats and to what was going on. And
44:14that's very important. But the principal agency that actually has performed that function as an interface
44:19between the federal government and the private sector was CISA or is CISA. And my concern is that
44:26we've seen reports of cuts at CISA up to 90%. I believe 40% may be the latest number. And I think
44:34they've eliminated the office that interfaced with state election officials that enabled them to share
44:40threat data and information and protections with state election officials to keep our elections safe
44:46and secure. I just am puzzled at a time of heightened cyber threat that we're essentially unilaterally
44:58disarming one of the most important tools that we have to protect ourselves in cyberspace. Do you have
45:05any views on the dismantling of CISA? Senator King, thanks for the question.
45:12To be honest, I do not understand what the actual decisions are for any, you know, reduction or
45:21reorganization as it relates to CISA. You know, I will tell you that we continue to talk to CISA leadership
45:27and we continue to share information with CISA leadership as it relates to threats that are relevant
45:33to their mission for defenses in the United States. Mr. Chairman, I realize that, again, this isn't his
45:39lane, but this subcommittee is dealing with the issue of cyber and CISA is one of our most important
45:45tools to deal with that. And they've been very effective. And having worked with some members of
45:52the private sector that have worked with CISA, they, it took years to build a trusting relationship
45:58between this government agency and these companies, as well as the state election officials. I remember
46:05when that initiative first started and those state election officials were very reluctant
46:10to interface with this federal agency, but they became very, I wouldn't say dependent, but they became
46:16very engaged with CISA in the last several elections. And to basically dismantle that capability, I think,
46:26is very dangerous for national security at a time of heightened cyber attack. We're under attack
46:32right now. And to be unilaterally disarming and disabling what amounts to a carrier fleet,
46:40I think is very damaging to the security of the country. Thank you.
46:44I think your concern is noted, Senator. With that, I want to thank General Hartman
46:49for coming in on short notice and participating in this subcommittee hearing. This does conclude the
46:57open portion of today's cyber security subcommittee hearing. I'd like to once again thank our witnesses,
47:03Lieutenant General Hartman, for his testimony. For the information of members, questions for the
47:09record will be due to the committee within two business days of the conclusion of the hearing.
47:13And with that, Senator, any final remarks?