On Wednesday, the Senate Armed Services Committee came together to discuss the United States Strategic Command And Space Command.
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NewsTranscript
00:00:00subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of the United States Strategic Command
00:00:06and the United States Space Command. I want to begin by thanking our witnesses,
00:00:11General Cotton from STRATCOM and General Whiting from SPACECOM. General Cotton, this is likely one
00:00:17of the last times you'll be speaking before our committee. You have always been open and
00:00:24forthright with this committee, and I want to thank you for your service and dedication as
00:00:30you approach your final year as commander of STRATCOM. Today we face a threat environment
00:00:37more dangerous than we've seen since the Second World War. For the first time in history,
00:00:42the United States faces two adversary nuclear powers in Russia and China. Russia has nearly
00:00:50completed modernizing its nuclear triad and continues to expand and improve their tactical
00:00:57nuclear forces. China, meanwhile, which used to be considered a lesser included case, is expanding
00:01:05its own arsenal at a breathtaking pace. China now has more ICBM launchers than the United States
00:01:14and is expected at least to triple its stockpile by 2035. I would also note that China has outpaced
00:01:24every previous estimate that we've made. General Cotton, as you well know, this is an extremely
00:01:31important time for STRATCOM. Each leg of our triad is undergoing a generational modernization.
00:01:39This includes the Columbia-class submarine to replace the Ohio-class, the B-21 bomber to
00:01:46replace the B-1 and B-2 bombers, and the Sentinel ICBM to replace the Minuteman III.
00:01:55Given the ages of the legacy programs, it is essential that these modernization efforts be
00:02:01prioritized and properly resourced to ensure we have capabilities fielded in time to meet the
00:02:09growing threat. While it is the responsibility of the services to get these programs back on schedule,
00:02:17it is STRATCOM who must mitigate risk associated with any delays. I look forward to hearing more
00:02:25in the closed session about your plans to do so. Additionally, the nuclear-armed sea-launched
00:02:32cruise missile, or SLCCM, remains a critical program to deter our adversaries from believing
00:02:38they can use tactical nuclear weapons. I look forward to hearing from you, General Cotton,
00:02:44on your work with the Navy on SLCCM. I would be remiss if I did not also underscore the importance
00:02:51of NC3, what Senator King and I refer to as the fourth leg of the triad. NC3 underpins all aspects
00:03:01of nuclear deterrence. General Cotton, I appreciate the focus that you have given NC3 modernization
00:03:09during your time in command, and I will be eager to receive an update on the implementation of the
00:03:16NC3 roadmap. General Whiting, the space domain is now, as you point out in your opening statement,
00:03:24a highly contested strategic environment. China and Russia possess growing counterspace capabilities
00:03:33that hold U.S. space assets at risk. Russia is developing the capability to place a nuclear
00:03:41weapon on orbit, while China is investing in maneuverable satellites that could target
00:03:48our satellites. And these are just the threats that we can discuss in this open setting.
00:03:56While I look forward to a more robust discussion on how we need to address these threats in a
00:04:01classified session, I'm eager to hear from you during this open session on your priority years
00:04:08for fiscal year 2026 and how we can leverage emerging technologies to field more dynamic
00:04:18space-based systems. I am also eager to hear an update on how SpaceCom is working with the other
00:04:25combatant commands, the services, and the intelligence community to ensure that we are
00:04:32developing the right capabilities, sharing information with warfighters in real time,
00:04:39and that the services and interagency partners are integrated appropriately.
00:04:46I will make one final point before I turn it over to Senator King for his opening statement.
00:04:52Both of your combatant commands rely on access to critical electromagnetic spectrum
00:04:59to carry out your missions. As we know, there are efforts underway to force DOD to vacate portions
00:05:08of those spectrum bands. Such an outcome would be detrimental to U.S. national security
00:05:16and result in significant costs as various DOD equities are forced to invest the resources
00:05:24to redesign, procure, and field new systems to operate in different spectrum bands,
00:05:33if that is even feasible. General Whiting and General Cotton, I look forward to hearing
00:05:40from both of you on the importance of spectrum to your missions. Before any decisions are made
00:05:47on whether to auction off DOD spectrum, the American people deserve to understand the risks
00:05:55there would be to national security. Again, thank you both for appearing before us today.
00:06:01I look forward to hearing your testimony. Senator King, you are recognized.
00:06:06Thank you, Senator Fischer. I want to first thank both of you for your service and for the
00:06:13incredible work that you've done both in managing the assets that are in your purview, but also in
00:06:20thinking about how to move forward. This is a posture hearing. It's really a status report.
00:06:26It's a combination of a status report, where are we now, but where do we need to be?
00:06:31And what do we need in the way of resources in order to get there? General Cotton, deterrence
00:06:37is the keystone of our entire defense strategy. We often forget that. We get lost in counting
00:06:43tanks or airplanes or Navy ships, but the whole idea of all of these resources is that they'd
00:06:48never be used, that they'd be such a terrifying prospect for a potential adversary that they
00:06:55will never be used. And in fact, deterrence has worked in the nuclear area for 75, 80 years.
00:07:01So that's really what we need to talk about today. And modernizing the triad, which we're in the
00:07:06middle of right now, is an expensive proposition. But to shortchange that process, in my view,
00:07:13would be disastrously short-sighted. So I hope to hear where we are on modernization with the
00:07:22parts of the triad, but also where we need to be, what necessary authorities there are that we need
00:07:28to be talking about, and also necessary funding. I refer to nuclear modernization as the pig in
00:07:35the budgetary python. It is a, unfortunately, just by history, we're having to do all three legs at
00:07:43once. And that is a very expensive proposition, but it's something that we have to do in order to
00:07:48maintain the deterrence strategy that's protected this country for so long. In terms of the space
00:07:55assets, of course, it's no news to anybody that space was an uncontested domain 20 years ago.
00:08:0210 years ago it began to be contested, and today it's highly contested. So, General, we've really
00:08:08got to be understanding the status, where we are, particularly when we're talking about a potential
00:08:14conflict with China, which would involve the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and naval power,
00:08:20and how that would be subject to space assets, and how we can protect ourselves in a time of
00:08:27potential conflict. Of course, we all hope that conflict can be avoided. That brings me back to
00:08:32deterrence. So, I think the important message that I have is that decisions we make here today,
00:08:39and over the next six months, will have profound impacts in the future. And that's what's so
00:08:46important about what we're talking about today. I can think of no two more important people right
00:08:51now in thinking about how to posture this country in order to maintain deterrence and the security
00:08:57of the American people. So, I thank you for being here. I look forward to your questions, and now I
00:09:01think it's time to turn it over to the Chair. Okay. Thank you, Senator King. We are joined today by
00:09:10Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed, and I would ask each of them to give an opening statement
00:09:15if they so desire at this time. Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to thank
00:09:21the Chair and Senator King for working together as a team for years on this
00:09:31topic. And I think it should be clear to people listening that there's no space between them.
00:09:38They are approaching this in a bipartisan manner. They understand how important it is, and yes,
00:09:44Senator King is correct. We're talking about preventing. We're talking about being strong
00:09:49enough to prevent a nuclear war, and nothing could be more important. And yes, it is going to be
00:09:56expensive, but there's no question about it. We're going to have to spend the money as wisely and
00:10:04efficiently as we can to get the job done. I want to thank Senator Cotton for his service. I wish him
00:10:09well as he prepares to transition into private life, and thank you, General Whiting, for being
00:10:16here. I'm going to put my statement in the record and just say that today I hope to understand
00:10:28how you're managing the risk of critical military capabilities that are both too old and too few
00:10:35to truly meet the threats of today, much less those of tomorrow. Secondly, how to understand better
00:10:42the roles of your commands evolving as the new administration develops updated strategies and
00:10:48guidance, and then hear your thoughts on areas where you believe this committee can help improve
00:10:55the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent and space posture. With that, I will ask unanimous
00:11:01consent to include my statement in the record and yield back. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you,
00:11:07Madam Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
00:11:14Welcome, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. I want to commend General Cotton for
00:11:20his 39 years of service to the country and to the Air Force, and I wish you and your wife,
00:11:26Marsha, the very best in your retirement. General Whiting, thank you for joining us this morning.
00:11:32Also, General Cotton, there are reports that indicate that the administration is considering
00:11:39removing the dual-hatted role the commander of U.S.-European command currently holds
00:11:45as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR. The SACEUR position was created in part
00:11:51to ensure that our nuclear weapons, and hence our nuclear umbrella provided to our NATO allies
00:11:56under Article V, was always kept under the control of the United States. Indeed, the release codes
00:12:03for our nuclear weapons, which are carried by NATO planes, come from the President through SACEUR to
00:12:09unlock the weapons. If the U.S. walks away from this position, we are lessening the protection of
00:12:14our extended nuclear deterrent to our allies, and I believe we are harming U.S. national security
00:12:20and global security. For over six decades, the U.S. nuclear umbrella has provided an ironclad
00:12:27guarantee to deter the Soviet Union and Russia, and it has been successful. I'm also concerned
00:12:33about the signal it may send to our Asian allies, especially South Korea, who also relies on the
00:12:39credibility of our nuclear umbrella. These are difficult issues, and I hope in the course of
00:12:45the questioning we can get more details from you about that. Again, thank you, Madam Chairman.
00:12:52Thank you, Senator Reid. And now I'd like to have our opening statements from the panel.
00:12:57General Cotton, would you go first, please?
00:13:00Good morning, Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, Chairman Wicker, and Ranking Member Reid,
00:13:06and distinguished members of this committee. It is an honor for Sergeant Major Kramer and I to be
00:13:12here alongside General Whiting and Chief Master Sergeant Simmons, and a privilege to continue
00:13:18representing the service members, civilians, and families of United States Strategic Command.
00:13:24I would like to thank this committee and Congress for its continued support
00:13:27in providing us with the resources required to execute our assigned missions.
00:13:32Above all else, I extend my gratitude to the American people for their endurance support
00:13:38of the military. In my third and final year serving as STRATCOM commander, it has been the
00:13:45most rewarding experience of my 39-year career. I have submitted my 2025 posture statement for the
00:13:52record. I'll begin by assuring you that the nation's nuclear forces, which are foundational
00:13:58to our national security, are safe, secure, effective, and credible. As I speak, STRATCOM
00:14:04and its components are deterring our adversaries and stand ready to respond decisively, whether
00:14:10underground, in the air, or beneath the seas, should deterrence fail. And our mission has never been
00:14:18more important. Today, the United States, its allies, and partners are confronted with a deteriorating
00:14:23security environment. The Chinese Communist Party is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces into a
00:14:29fully functional triad, with more than 600 nuclear warheads and counting.
00:14:35Russia has modernized a majority of its nuclear arsenal. North Korea continues to unlawful with
00:14:42its unlawful and destabilizing programs in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
00:14:47missiles. And Iran continues to pursue uranium enrichment. Additionally, the tools of war are
00:14:54changing, from novel missile systems to counter U.S. space capabilities, from cyber attacks
00:15:03against critical infrastructure, to competition in the electromagnetic spectrum. These are rapidly
00:15:10developing threat vectors across multiple domains and regions, to include the Arctic.
00:15:16To effectively deter adversaries across the spectrum of threats requires sustained legacy
00:15:22triad systems and urgently completing the multi-generational, decades-long modernization
00:15:30of all three legs of the nuclear deterrent and its critical NC3 systems.
00:15:40No portfolio is in need of recapitalization more than a nuclear portfolio, and a modernization
00:15:47I'm advocating for requires continued, uninterrupted funding and an industrial base
00:15:52capable of steady and continuous production. Commitment to modernization will ensure that U.S.
00:16:00strategic weapons continue to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, and allow us to
00:16:07achieve national objectives if deterrence fails. Thank you again for your support and focus on our
00:16:13mission, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, General Cotton. General
00:16:19Whiting. Chairwoman Fisher and Ranking Member King, Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed,
00:16:25and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your support and the opportunity to represent
00:16:30the warfighters of U.S. Space Command. It's truly an honor to testify alongside my friend,
00:16:34General Cotton, once again, and to discuss our vital role in achieving peace through strength.
00:16:40At U.S. Space Command, our guiding principle is clear. To secure peace, we must be well-prepared
00:16:46for conflict in space, and if deterrence fails, we will fight and win. U.S. Space Command is
00:16:51upholding this principle in the face of operational threats, which continue to expand at a
00:16:56breathtaking pace, and which are being fielded deliberately to challenge the United States,
00:17:02the American way of life, and hold the joint force at risk. These novel and unprecedented
00:17:07developments include China's robust counter-space weapons and space-enabled kill chains,
00:17:13Russia's reported pursuit of an on-orbit nuclear anti-satellite weapon, and wide-ranging ballistic,
00:17:19cruise, and hypersonic missile threats. Despite the growing threats, the United States maintains
00:17:25advantages in space thanks to the unified mission focus of our superb joint warfighters,
00:17:32our unmatched commercial space sector, and our expansive and more empowered alliances and
00:17:38partnerships. Our foremost advantage, and the cornerstone of U.S. Space Command,
00:17:44are our officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel. No other nation can match our team's understanding
00:17:50of the complexities of space and the requirements to effectively operate in the most challenging
00:17:56area of responsibility. Our military has the best-trained, most capable space warfighting
00:18:01force in the world, and they stand dedicated to fight for America. Since my last testimony,
00:18:07U.S. Space Command published our new campaign plan, integrating and synchronizing the command's
00:18:12operations, activities, and investments with the joint force and the interagency,
00:18:17leaving no doubts to our opponents that we are stronger, more capable, and ready to counter
00:18:22any threat. Over the past year, U.S. Space Command's commercial integration cell grew to
00:18:2817 commercial mission partners, enhancing our threat information sharing at classified levels
00:18:34and improving our crisis action planning. We also expanded multinational force Operation
00:18:40Olympic Defender to seven nations with the addition of Germany, France, and New Zealand.
00:18:46This growth further strengthens partnerships and enables our allies to share the burden of
00:18:51collective space security. That said, these advantages and our ability to deter potential
00:18:57adversaries cannot be taken for granted. Deterrence in space is consistent with other domains.
00:19:04It requires a keen understanding and clear communication of what we are deterring against,
00:19:09credible acknowledged capabilities to impose costs on those who attack us,
00:19:14and resilient architectures to dissuade attack by making any effort futile.
00:19:19Accordingly, U.S. Space Command is fully integrated into and contributing to the Department of
00:19:25Defense's implementation of the President's Executive Order to establish a Golden Dome for
00:19:30American Missile Defense Shield. U.S. Space Command appreciates Congress's significant support
00:19:39of numerous critical space superiority programs in the recent FY25 appropriations law. Looking
00:19:45forward to FY26 and beyond, U.S. Space Command requires stable funding, as well as effective
00:19:51and efficient acquisition programs delivering advanced space capabilities to enable a balanced
00:19:58space deterrence force structure. Most pressing are the delivery of integrated space fires,
00:20:03enhanced battle space awareness, and integrated command and control capabilities to achieve space
00:20:09superiority to defend the homeland and protect and enable the joint force. The Unified Command
00:20:14Plan directs U.S. Space Command to protect and defend U.S. and, as directed, allied and commercial
00:20:20space capabilities through necessary offensive and defensive space operations. Like other combatant
00:20:26commands, we require combat-credible kinetic and non-kinetic means to deter and counter adversary
00:20:32actions. By investing in space superiority capabilities, we send a clear message. The
00:20:37United States has the advantage, and we remain committed that space will be safe, secure,
00:20:43and stable. We are ready to repel all challengers, and any attempt to turn space into a battlefield
00:20:48will fail. Although many challenges lie ahead, the future of space holds tremendous promise for
00:20:54America if we actively and thoughtfully protect it. I am grateful for Congress's support to U.S.
00:20:59Space Command and continued investment to advance America's strength in space. Your continued backing
00:21:05not only ensures that U.S. Space Command protects our interests in space today, but also protects
00:21:10that future which is coming. Madam Chairwoman, I have submitted my posture statement for the
00:21:15record, and I look forward to your and the Subcommittee's questions.
00:21:18Thank you, General Whiting. We'll begin with five-minute rounds of questions. I strongly
00:21:25believe that the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission's 2023 report should be required
00:21:32reading for everybody in the Department of Defense. It clearly articulates the threats that we face,
00:21:39and it rightfully concludes that we are woefully underprepared. Based on the recommendations of
00:21:47that report, last year's NDAA directed the Department to develop a deterrent strategy
00:21:53that would pace this projected threat. This strategy must also include an assessment of
00:21:59the amount and type of nuclear weapons and delivery systems necessary to implement that strategy.
00:22:06General Cotton, can you tell me how the development of this strategy is coming along?
00:22:13Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. If you recall, when I first took over as a commander of U.S.
00:22:21Strategic Command, one of the first things we did was we instituted a nuclear recapitalization and
00:22:27transition cross-functional team to do exactly that, because one of the things we wanted to
00:22:31assure ourselves was did we have the capacity and capability and posture correct. That was in
00:22:37alignment with the study and the Commission's report, and it pretty much mirrored everything
00:22:43that was said in the Commission. Since that time, what we have done has looked at the options that
00:22:50are available on all three legs of the triad. We're currently sufficient, currently, but in
00:22:57order to maintain sufficiency as we continue to have legacy systems online before the new systems
00:23:04come on board, there are some options within all three legs of the triad to increase capacity and
00:23:12capability. General Cotton, you recently said that the Air Force should procure at least 145
00:23:19B-21 bombers. From your position as STRATCOM commander, can you share with us why you assess
00:23:26that that should be the new procurement floor? Yes, Senator. When we first looked at the numbers
00:23:37of what would be required for the next generation of bombers to replace the B-1 and the B-2,
00:23:45that was a different geopolitical environment. We actually started a study in 2020 to ensure
00:23:51that our numbers were correct in regards to what we wanted to see the B-21 fleet look like.
00:23:58At that point, the conversation from the department would be a minimum of 100 B-21s
00:24:05should be procured as we looked to see what the environment brought to bear.
00:24:10The other number that we would always talk about would be the 145 number, which would bring the
00:24:16total of the bomber force for the United States and allies, because the bomber force represents
00:24:22all the bombers for the Western world, would be about 220. That would include the B-20 ones,
00:24:32as well as the modified B-52J models that would come out. Thank you. General, as you know,
00:24:38this committee on a bipartisan basis strongly supports SLCCM, the Nuclear Armed Sea Launch
00:24:47Cruise Missile. A program of record was included in our FY24 NDAA. In your view,
00:24:57as STRATCOM commander, will SLCCM address a capability gap? It will, ma'am. What it does
00:25:04for us is twofold. It gives the president a broader range of options, and I think that is
00:25:12my role and my job as a combatant commander is to present a broad range of capability and options
00:25:19for the president. It also provides not only as it's a regional tool that can be used as well.
00:25:29So we can actually benefit from our geographic combatant commanders, which they support the
00:25:37idea of SLCCM as well, because from a regional perspective, it can hold adversaries at risk.
00:25:42And yes or no, do you see opportunities to speed up that program?
00:25:48I would hope so, Madam Chairwoman, and the reason is I know that there's a program of record that
00:25:53has been established in the Department of the Navy. I would love to see some acceleration from
00:26:00that team to see what we can do to get the assets a little quicker and move to the left.
00:26:05General Whiting, I want to get one question in for you at this point as well. Every service relies
00:26:12on your assets that are based in space. I don't think that gets enough attention.
00:26:19Are you coordinating with the other combatant commands and also with services,
00:26:25with the intelligence community, to make sure that these assets under your command
00:26:32are going to be integrated appropriately? Madam Chairwoman, absolutely. In fact,
00:26:37I have a liaison element that I have assigned to each of the other combatant commands. So there's
00:26:41a liaison element from U.S. Space Command that sits inside of U.S. STRATCOM, as well as all the
00:26:46other combatant commands to persistently do that type of coordination to make sure that our
00:26:50operational plans are advancing together, that our real-time operations are considering each
00:26:55other's capabilities. We do that with our intelligence community as well, primarily
00:27:00through the National Reconnaissance Office. Again, we have an exchange of liaison officers
00:27:04and operational centers that work together. And then with the services, as a joint headquarters,
00:27:08I have not only components from each of the services assigned to me, but I have personnel
00:27:13from all of those services, which keep us tightly linked with their future plans as well.
00:27:18Thank you. Senator King.
00:27:20Thank you, Madam Chair. A couple of preliminary questions about staff. Both of you mentioned in
00:27:24your testimony that you rely upon not only military personnel, but civilians. My question
00:27:30to each of you is, are you under any orders or have orders come down or have you already started
00:27:37to implement, or has somebody started to implement, reductions in force, firings,
00:27:44people who have taken the, I call it the early retirement option? General Cotton,
00:27:51what's the status of your civilian workforce? Well, our civilian workforce, we're about 65%
00:27:57civilian in the headquarters, but that doesn't account for the 41,000 that make up the
00:28:02componencies that work under my charge. Right now, Senator, very small amount of folks that took
00:28:11the early retirement activities, but the option for them to do so still exists. But right now,
00:28:18we're not seeing an effect. The numbers are pretty small.
00:28:22And no firings? We have not fired anyone.
00:28:26Are you under any orders to reduce that staff by a certain percentage?
00:28:31We're looking for the efficiencies piece, but right now it's all voluntary. And like I said,
00:28:36from our perspective, from STRATCOM, the numbers have been very, very small.
00:28:40And are you subject to a hiring freeze? I am.
00:28:43So those people who are leaving, you're not allowed to replace, is that correct?
00:28:47Well, we have an opportunity to get a waiver approved because of our mission set.
00:28:56And if there's a requirement for us to do a waiver to see if we can get someone through
00:29:01the hiring freeze, we can process that. General Blank, same set of questions.
00:29:07Senator, my answers were almost identical to General Cotton's. About 60% of my headquarter
00:29:13staff is government civilians. We've had a small number who have volunteered for
00:29:17the deferred retirement program. We are under no orders to fire anyone.
00:29:24We are aware that we're looking at, need to look for efficiencies, as General Cotton
00:29:29discussed. We also are under a hiring freeze and we have the opportunity for critical positions to
00:29:35ask for exemptions to that. Thank you.
00:29:39General Whiting, I was interested, you mentioned the, I think it's called the Artemis Accord,
00:29:43which is clearly based upon allies. I'm concerned that we seem to be in a process of alienating our
00:29:51allies. Talk to me about the importance of the Artemis Accord in order to carry out your mission.
00:29:58Senator, the Artemis Accords are overseen by NASA and the Department of State. And that's a civil
00:30:05exploratory set of agreements about shared principles in space between countries.
00:30:11On the military side, I have a named operation called Operation Olympic Defender,
00:30:16which includes seven countries, which is the United States, plus the Five Eyes Nations,
00:30:22Germany and France, where we cooperate in space together to understand what's happening there.
00:30:28And again, we're showing...
00:30:30Those relationships with other countries are important to the execution of your mission,
00:30:34is that correct?
00:30:35They are, Senator.
00:30:38A question I haven't been able to get a clear answer on is,
00:30:42what's the concept of the Golden Dome? In other words, would it be
00:30:461,000 THAAD batteries or is it conventional missile defense? Is it directed energy? What's
00:30:53the underlying concept of Golden Dome other than to protect the homeland, which is certainly a
00:30:58worthy goal?
00:31:00Senator, the department right now has been going through a series of meetings and working groups
00:31:05to define what that architecture will look like. But in the executive order, it lays out that
00:31:09the president's asking the department to develop a series of capabilities that will protect against
00:31:14these new modernized threats like hypersonics, maneuvering vehicles that put the homeland at
00:31:22risk. So I think it'll be a layered system that will have to account for
00:31:26all of those threats at multiple phases of the life cycle of a missile.
00:31:29Well, that's the mission, I understand. So I take it we're some distance away from the
00:31:34operational concepts of what it will consist of. A very specific question.
00:31:42Both of you rely heavily on Kwajalein Atoll for training and testing purposes. My understanding
00:31:51is the infrastructure there is woefully inadequate. Can you speak to an effort to try to
00:31:58upgrade that infrastructure so that that atoll can continue to be an important part of our
00:32:04strategic deterrence initiative?
00:32:07Senator, Kwajalein Atoll is very important for our space mission. I visited there
00:32:13last summer. There's five sensors there that support our mission. We have advocated with
00:32:19the Department of the Army for investments there to make sure that the infrastructure
00:32:23can support those missions. And in fact, my combatant command is in the process right now
00:32:28of defining exactly what the support requirements are that we need there so we can put those into
00:32:33our next O plan to make sure the Army understands exactly what requirements we need. But that is a
00:32:39very important location for us. If you can just keep the committee informed of that, of what the
00:32:44need is, whether it's authorities or funding, it could be an important part of our ongoing
00:32:49deliberations. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds,
00:32:53you are recognized. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, General Whiting and General Cotton,
00:32:59I want to thank you both for your service to our country and for the role that you play in
00:33:03keeping our country safe. General Whiting, I'll begin with you. And I'm going to have the same
00:33:09question for General Cotton as well. But how important is it that the use of the electromagnetic
00:33:18spectrum in particular areas of the lower 3 gigahertz band and the 7 to 8 gigahertz band of
00:33:24the spectrum be maintained by the Department of Defense? I've asked this of over 24 separate
00:33:31uniformed officers over the last two years, and the answer has been consistent. But I wanted to
00:33:37hear it from both of you again today in terms of the need to have that access for the defense of
00:33:42our country. Would you, General Whiting, explain at least or confirm clearly the need for the
00:33:49Department of Defense to maintain its ability to use that unimpeded in that particular range
00:33:55of the spectrum, please? Senator, thank you for the question. I totally agree that those two
00:34:01bands are very important to our mission, in fact vital. The lower 3 or that 3 gigahertz region is
00:34:06an area where we have radars and sensors which allow us to detect, track, and engage targets
00:34:13through all weather. And we have a number of capabilities there like the SPY-1 and SPY-6
00:34:18radars, which are on Navy ships that can support our mission. The long-range detection radar in
00:34:23Alaska, which is critical for missile defense, the space fence, and the future deep space advanced
00:34:29radar concept. And then in the higher bands that you discussed, the 7 and 8 gigahertz, that's vital
00:34:34for SATCOM and special missions that we execute there. And we could not do our global wideband
00:34:42satellite communication mission without that spectrum, sir. Thank you, General Whiting.
00:34:48General Cotton, same questions. Senator, I would echo exactly what my dear friend said in regards
00:34:56to the lower bands. If we lose the ability for early detection, that takes away decision space
00:35:05for decision leaders and decision makers in regards to being able to execute operational
00:35:13plans. So when we talk about what it affects in regards to ISR, it's going to be incredibly
00:35:20important. In the higher bands, you know, part of my UCP is global reach through global strike.
00:35:29The bomber force, as an example, has the ability to traverse all over the world.
00:35:35SATCOM communications are going to be vital for those weapon systems today and in the future.
00:35:42Thank you, General. Also, General Cotton, you've mentioned it a little bit already,
00:35:46but with the B-21, there's a discussion about, you know, we're acquiring 100 of them currently.
00:35:54The number has been debated. Should it be 145? Should it be more than that? And I've appreciated
00:35:58your indication that you've come around to approximately 145. Can we talk a little bit
00:36:03about, I mean, this is the next gen. This is the sixth generation aircraft, this platform that's
00:36:10there. Can you talk a little bit in this open discussion, but I think the American public need
00:36:14to understand just what a platform this is and what it is capable of doing, and once again, in
00:36:22this unclassified environment. Yeah, thank you for that, Senator. You know, when we talk
00:36:27about stealth, there's actually only two platforms on the face of the earth that has
00:36:33all stealth capability, and that is the current B-2 Spirit and its next generation of replacement,
00:36:40the B-21. There is no other all-aspect stealth aircraft on the face of the planet. The B-2 is
00:36:48the only one, and the B-21 just will dwarf its capabilities with advanced technologies that it has.
00:36:56It will be the predominant bomber for the United States Air Force moving forward as we move to a
00:37:02two bomber fleet, which will only be the B-21 and, you know, the B-52 and the
00:37:10modified version of that, the B-52J. So it's incredibly important. It's incredibly lethal
00:37:16with a stand-in and stand-out capability. So that's why I'm a big proponent on constant production
00:37:25that's far exceeds 100 to the 145 number to get us about 220 with those two platforms.
00:37:31I noted that you've had a view that indicated the need to accelerate the B-21 production.
00:37:38Can you explain just a little bit about why we need to accelerate that production?
00:37:44Sir, as we start to see the legacy systems start to divest that the fleet has with the Air Force
00:37:51fleet, the B-1s and the B-2s in particular, I want to make sure that we don't see a large bathtub
00:37:59in the ability of operational platforms that are available to be used.
00:38:05We've worn our current weapons platforms out.
00:38:09We do.
00:38:09Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
00:38:12Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Reed, you are recognized.
00:38:16Thank you, Madam Chairman. General Cotton has indicated in my opening remarks there is an
00:38:21issue regarding the separation of the dual padding of the U.S.-European commander and SACEUR.
00:38:28What's your military opinion on the effects this could have, possibly weakening the extended
00:38:34deterrence of your force, affecting your force structure in other ways, and also the potential
00:38:41to accelerate nuclear proliferation? I would note that the front page of Wall Street Journal has
00:38:47an article titled, Worry Your Eyes, Own Nuclear Force. Could you comment, please?
00:38:55Thank you, Rankin, Member Reed. I think, you know, the relationship that I have as far as my
00:39:01operational plans with General Cavoli, both as the UCOM commander and as SACEUR, you know,
00:39:10to your point in your opening, is incredibly important in the execution of operational plans
00:39:18for me, even in STRATCOM. As you know, I have a relationship with the United Kingdom. I have a
00:39:27relationship with SACEUR in the relationship of what the DCA aircraft bring to bear to be able to
00:39:37hold the adversary at risk. And that is done through the lens of currently General Cavoli
00:39:44with the SACEUR hat. That would change a little bit if that commander was not a U.S. commander in
00:39:51the relationship that I would have. Now, the relationship that I have with my allies and
00:39:56partners, especially my European allies and partners, is still steadfast, whether it be
00:40:01with the United Kingdom, whether it be with France, or whether it be with the other NATO nations.
00:40:10Thank you. General Cotton, one other question. The Air Force has proposed a reorganization,
00:40:16which I understand has been put on hold until the new Secretary is confirmed, that would cede
00:40:22much of the operational control of heavy bombers away from Air Force Global Strike Command to new
00:40:28composite wings out of Air Combat Command. In response to this, Section 1631 of the 2025 NDA
00:40:36stopped this until a report is submitted. It's not yet been received. How concerned
00:40:43are you about this reorganization impacting your nuclear deterrence mission?
00:40:51Senator Reid, today I have one belly button in the Department of the Air Force that presents
00:40:59two legs at a triad and 68 percent of the NC3 capability to me as my component, and that is
00:41:06the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. So, as a four-star, the commander of Air Force
00:41:12Global Strike Command has oversight and has the subject matter experts in the nuclear deterrent
00:41:21field, and he owns the bomber leg as well as the ICBM leg. You know, all I ask the United States Air
00:41:29Force is to ensure that when I have force presentation that I can still look to one person
00:41:34that can give me the answers to readiness, give me the answers to where we are acquisition strategies,
00:41:41gives me the answers to where we are on, you know, manpower and help that they might need.
00:41:46Today I only have to look to Barksdale Air Force Base and talk to the commander of Global Strike
00:41:52to get that answer. Thank you. General Whiting, are you concerned about becoming overly reliant
00:42:00upon commercial providers for too many of the department's missions into space?
00:42:05Do we draw a line? Do we ensure that there's a competitive situation?
00:42:11Senator Reid, I think the principle we need to apply is balance. For those things that we can go
00:42:19to commercial industry for, we should absolutely leverage that. U.S. commercial space industry is
00:42:23a massive advantage for this nation, and it's an advantage that's widened over the last several
00:42:27years, and I think will continue to widen. But there are certain missions where we absolutely
00:42:32need to design and build for ourselves our own capabilities. For example, the space capabilities
00:42:38we provide to support General Cotton for nuclear command and control for SATCOM, those are not
00:42:44capabilities that are easily replicable in the commercial market, so we need to design those
00:42:50for purpose-built reasons so we can assure to General Cotton, to the secretary, and to the
00:42:53president that they can talk to their nuclear forces when required. So I think it's a matter
00:42:57of balance, and we need to apply that lens to each mission, sir. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
00:43:02Thank you for your service. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, Senator Reid. Senator
00:43:07Tupperville, you are recognized. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning, men. General Cotton,
00:43:14thank you for your service. 39 years. I retired after 40 years of coaching. After the first week,
00:43:20I was sitting around the house reading the paper, drinking coffee, and my wife said,
00:43:23you ain't been here in 40 years to get you a damn job. So here I am today. So don't think
00:43:27you're going to go home and fish and play golf. But thank you for your service. General, in 2024,
00:43:34the Navy eliminated the lead Columbia-cast submarine. It said it couldn't be delivered
00:43:39for 12 to 16 months late. GOA also reported that late delivery of the lead submarine could jeopardize
00:43:47its planned availability for Operation 2030 and delays to the class could impact planned transition
00:43:52from Ohio-class submarines. If Columbia-class submarines are not available, General,
00:43:57what plans have we taken in that regard to fill the gap? Thank you for that question,
00:44:04Senator Tupperville. And you're right. Right now, we're anticipating a 12 to 16-month delay
00:44:10for the first Columbia class. What's going to be incredibly important, and I say this constantly,
00:44:15is how do we continue to fortify our legacy systems until we do that? So what the Navy is
00:44:22doing is a project called PYRA. And that's the Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availabilities. That's
00:44:29what that acronym stands for, in which they will look at up to five boats and figure out which of
00:44:36the five boats they might be able to modernize or do some extended life work to, to make it so we
00:44:45don't lose anything from our legacy systems to counter the delay and create a bathtub in our
00:44:52capabilities on the submarine force. What's the cost? That cost has got to be astronomical, though,
00:44:58if we're running late and we have to fill in a gap with that. Have we looked at that? Do we have the
00:45:03funding? Well, I don't have the numbers before me in regards of what the Navy is doing for the cost
00:45:14of PYRA. I can get that to you. We can probably talk about that, and I'll have it by closed
00:45:18session. But I think bottom line in that regard, we need to ensure that we keep that capability
00:45:30alive and well, right? I need to make sure that the tubes that are available on the SSBNs remain
00:45:36the tubes that are available on SSBNs, even if there's a slip to the new system that's supposed
00:45:41to replace it. So I'm trying to make it so we prevent a catastrophic failure in regards of
00:45:47creating a bathtub in all three legs of the triad to ensure that doesn't happen.
00:45:53Thank you. And again, thank you for your service. General Whiting,
00:45:58U.S. Space Command's role in missile defense planning and operational support for Guam.
00:46:06How critical is that? And obviously you've been given that task, and where do we stand on that?
00:46:14Senator, Guam is a vital location for many of our national defense needs, including for space. And
00:46:21through our joint functional component command for integrated missile defense, we do provide that
00:46:26planning and operational support that you highlight. And we are regularly working with
00:46:31INDOPACOM, as well as the Missile Defense Agency, the Army, and the Navy to develop that architecture
00:46:39that is being delivered to defend Guam against the missile threats we now see primarily from China.
00:46:45Yeah, thank you. We're doing a lot of work in Guam. Obviously, the Aegis system being put on
00:46:49the island, its first line of defense. Let me ask you, too, about the Golden Dome. The President
00:46:54gave us, obviously, that referendum that he wants to protect our country with some kind of Golden
00:47:01Dome. Do you have a certain group that works with that within Space Command, or is the entire Space
00:47:08Command working on this together? How does that work? Sir, it's a whole-of-command effort supporting
00:47:14a whole-of-Department-of-Defense effort. And so, certainly within my command, that subordinate
00:47:20command, the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, has a leading role,
00:47:24as well as my J-8 resourcing and requirements division. In fact, that J-8 division, we have
00:47:32partnered with NORTHCOM and General Gio there to co-write a requirements document for the Golden
00:47:38Dome for America, and we will be delivering that over the next few months to the Department of
00:47:43Defense. Thank you. Just recently, President Trump put me on the Board of Visitors for
00:47:48Air Force Academy. I look forward to coming out and visiting with you all and possibly
00:47:51seeing some of your work. So, thank both of you for your service. Thank you, General.
00:47:55Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Senator Tupperville. Senator Cotton, you are recognized.
00:48:00General Whiting, I want to return to Senator Reid's line of questioning about commercial
00:48:05space launch and any kind of risk it might pose us. You called the commercial space industry a,
00:48:11quote, massive advantage. I assume you're saying it's a massive advantage against our
00:48:16chief adversaries in this domain, China and Russia? That's correct, Senator.
00:48:21Can you give us a sense of scale of how big the advantage – well, first off, commercial space
00:48:25launch. To be precise here, we're talking about ULA, the United Launch Alliance, and SpaceX,
00:48:30correct? That has been the providers and now Blue Origin has recently demonstrated New Glenn. Yes,
00:48:36sir. So, can you give us a sense of scale of just how massive an advantage we have
00:48:42over, say, China because of ULA and SpaceX? Yes, Senator. And while I don't have the numbers,
00:48:49I can qualitatively describe those. If you go back probably five to ten years,
00:48:54the number of launches we were executing compared to those in China or Russia
00:48:58looked very similar. But over time, the U.S. has massively increased the number of launches,
00:49:03and that equates to what we call mass to orbit. So, that means we're able to put
00:49:08more satellites on orbit, whether for commercial or government purposes, and those are getting
00:49:12cheaper and cheaper per pound, which also gives us more opportunities to leverage space for
00:49:18various missions. So, you said five to ten years ago we had roughly equal space launch capacity
00:49:23as China and Russia, but now we've substantially exceeded them, right? Correct. Yes, Senator.
00:49:28What's been the driver over the last five to ten years of that substantial increase?
00:49:31Is it ULA or is it SpaceX? Predominantly SpaceX. Yes, sir. So, if it wasn't for SpaceX,
00:49:37we might be in a position where we still are at near equivalence to China and Russia in space
00:49:41launch. They certainly have been innovative and rapidly changed that market. Yes, sir.
00:49:46Thank you. General Cotton, you've testified in the past, as have your predecessors, that
00:49:53China has undertaken a breathtaking buildup of its nuclear arsenal. It used to have what is
00:49:58called minimal deterrence, a nuclear arsenal just sufficient for a second strike. Obviously,
00:50:05now it's moving on to first strike capabilities, whatever its rhetoric is. I think the department
00:50:10estimates that it's doubled its nuclear arsenal since Xi Jinping took power. It projects it's to
00:50:15double again by the end of this decade and maybe even double again by the middle of the next
00:50:20decade. Could you explain the kind of advantage this might provide China, not just in the nuclear
00:50:27balance of power, but also in a conventional conflict, say, if China decided to go for the
00:50:32jugular in Taiwan? Thank you, Senator Cotton. Nice seeing you. I think, you know, when we put
00:50:40in perspective where we were just, you know, left of probably 2018 and we saw it as a nascent threat
00:50:47and the breakout that my predecessor announced, you're right. What it does in changing the
00:50:55calculus in our strategy is now we must be prepared for two nuclear peers instead of one.
00:51:04I would garner to say, Senator, included in that is two nuclear peers that have a transactional
00:51:11relationship that has blossomed over the last couple of years as well. So as we look at the
00:51:18capabilities that we're seeing on all three legs, you're absolutely right. You know, having an H6N
00:51:25with long-range strike capability is not a regional hegemon weapon system. You know, having
00:51:32land-based ICBMs is not a regional hegemon weapon system. Building out their submarine
00:51:42forces and having hypersonic weapons that are dual-use capable and fobbed is not necessarily
00:51:48seen as a regional hegemon weapon system. So it makes us look at things a little differently
00:51:56and our strategy has changed to compensate for that.
00:52:00Thank you. I'll close on a couple points. I've made them before. You've agreed with them before.
00:52:08I'd love to hear your agreement one more time. Some people say about our nuclear weapons
00:52:13that we spend way too much money on weapons we never use. I respond to them that we actually
00:52:17don't spend that much money on them. We may be spending some money modernizing them now
00:52:21compared to our total defense expenditures, but more importantly,
00:52:24we have used our nuclear weapons every single day going back 80 years this August to prevent
00:52:32the kind of war that the world saw twice in 20 years. Do you agree with that, General Cotton?
00:52:40I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
00:52:42Thank you. I want to finally add my note of agreement with our fantastic chairwoman,
00:52:48Senator Fischer, on what she said about the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile,
00:52:52also known as SLCCM-N, the program held on by a thread throughout the Biden era,
00:53:00thanks to congressional support. I'm glad that you acknowledge how important it is
00:53:04and that if anything, we need to do everything possible to accelerate that capability.
00:53:08Thank you, gentlemen.
00:53:11Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly, you are recognized.
00:53:14Thank you, Madam Chair. General Cotton, General Whiting, thank you for being here. I want to
00:53:20first touch on Golden Dome, and then I want to save some time for SLCCM-N.
00:53:27Agree, nuclear deterrence keeps us safe. And General Cotton, you mentioned two nuclear peers.
00:53:38One of my biggest concerns is the third one, which is the DPRK. And I think it's fair to say that
00:53:49most of the time, we, with our nuclear peers, we're dealing with rational actors. We hope that's
00:53:56the case. That's the thing that part of nuclear deterrence, that they will act rationally. Not
00:54:04so sure that's the case with the DPRK. And they are building more nuclear weapons. They're working
00:54:13on other systems to deliver them. And they can now range into the United States. I believe that's
00:54:20our view as a nation. So can you talk a little bit about Golden Dome? And my concern with this
00:54:30is it could potentially, even though I am not against the idea of a system that can protect
00:54:36the entire United States from incoming ballistic missiles, nuclear armed. At the same time, this
00:54:45could accelerate a growing number. Our adversary's response to having a missile defense system could
00:54:54be to build more nuclear weapons. And if one or two get through, that is too many. Right now, we
00:55:02do have a defensive system to protect us from a rogue actor in launching one ICBM. And my
00:55:11understanding is, and if you could share a little bit, General Cotton, about how effective that
00:55:15system is with the interceptors we have in Alaska and in California. So could you provide an estimate
00:55:24of how much this would cost and what enhanced capability we would get out of this? And do you
00:55:30feel we could build a system that is not penetrable? Well, thank you, Senator Kelly. I don't want to
00:55:40get out of my lane because NORTHCOM, General Gio is the one that's undertaking that role. My
00:55:46responsibility from Golden Dome is twofold in accordance to the EO. And mine is to make sure
00:55:52that I can assure that a second strike capability for the United States remains. And how do we
00:55:58ensure that? As far as the reliability of the ground-based interceptors piece, once again,
00:56:08I don't own that platform. That platform belongs to NORTHCOM, and that's probably best for
00:56:12General Gio to answer that. I do believe, and we heard my colleague talk about the layered
00:56:18approach that is kind of the essence of Golden Dome for America. I think that's the answer and
00:56:25the key on how that system can be deliverable moving forward. All right, and thank you.
00:56:33Thank you, General. I do agree. I think it's something we need to look into, and we need to
00:56:39look at a cost-benefit analysis of this and also consider how it would potentially change the
00:56:48nuclear deterrence posture of not only us but China and Russia. On SLICOM, and I know it was
00:56:56brought up here also, General, if – one of my concerns here is – one of the things that makes
00:57:05us stand out is our submarine force, especially the attack submarines, are incredibly effective
00:57:12to integrate a tactical nuclear missile into a Virginia-class sub would take
00:57:22modifications that are significant. And you'd have to put the security system
00:57:28that we have in effect for nuclear weapons. And my problem, I think, that I have with this is,
00:57:39in the Western Pacific, this is a capability. Our attack submarine force is incredibly capable,
00:57:49and I think this would be somewhat disruptive. I think that needs to be a consideration
00:57:54before we go down the road of significant modifications to these systems. If you could
00:57:59just comment briefly on that. Well, Senator, I think from my perspective,
00:58:04a lot of those are TTPs that the Department of the Navy had, and I think they need to
00:58:10pull those out of the – out of the cupboard and look to see what those TTPs were when we had TLAM
00:58:16ends. I don't know if it would be disruptive, especially now that what we're seeing,
00:58:21especially in the Indo-Pacom Theater, in regards to our allies and partners' ability of letting us
00:58:28have dual-use nuclear-capable things arrive on their shores. The fact that I can now have B-52s
00:58:37fly into Japan, where I didn't before, and on the Korean Peninsula, I think there's work to be done,
00:58:46but I think it can be accomplished. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
00:58:51Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Banks, you are recognized.
00:58:58Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to both of you for being here today. General Cotton,
00:59:05thank you for your service. You're a hero. What you've done over the last three years is
00:59:09remarkable, and it's been an honor to work with you on the House Armed Services Committee and now
00:59:14again on the Senate Armed Services Committee. As we've talked about before, SLICOMEN is meant to
00:59:19deter China and will be launched from attacked submarines. SLICOMEN is needed to help address
00:59:24capability and escalation management gaps stemming from the rapid growth of China and
00:59:29Russia's theater-range nuclear systems. General, do you agree with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
00:59:36that validated the need for SLICOMENs, and if so, what does this need to still stand?
00:59:44I do agree, Senator, and thank you for the comments that you made.
00:59:50What was said in 2018 still holds true today, I think even more so. It's what I had when I talk
00:59:57about being able to give a geographic combatant commander the ability to also hold an adversary
01:00:05in their region at risk, you can now see that what you're seeing in this weapon system is more than
01:00:13just a strategic weapon, it is now can be a regional weapon and regional deterrence as well
01:00:20for my fellow combatant commanders that hold the regions of responsibility.
01:00:27And what do we need to do to remain committed to it?
01:00:31The program of record has been established, we just need to make sure we continue to pump the
01:00:36well to ensure that they move out, and as the chairwoman said, if we can get things to the left,
01:00:45I would gladly accept being able to get the articles quicker than later.
01:00:51Got it. Fiscal year 2024, NDAA directed the Navy and the NNSA to develop and deploy an operational
01:00:57SLICOMEN no later than 2034. Do you believe that we should still have SLICOMEN no later than 2034?
01:01:06I would love to move that to the left, Senator.
01:01:07Got it. General Whiting, the president's executive order to establish the Golden Dome
01:01:13for America stresses the need for both weapons to shoot down enemy missiles and the satellites
01:01:18to track them. The EO called for the, quote, acceleration of the deployment of the hypersonic
01:01:26and ballistic tracking sensor layer. If we're going to have an effective Golden Dome for the
01:01:31U.S. homeland, how important is it that we expand our fleet of ballistic and hypersonic missile
01:01:35tracking satellites and space-based sensors? Thank you for the question, Senator. For the
01:01:39modern threats that we need to track, we will only be able to do that from space, and we need to be
01:01:44able to maintain custody of those threats, not only when they're in the boost phase, when the
01:01:48rockets are burning very hot and we can track them with our infrared satellites, but then also when
01:01:53they're coasting so that we can, again, maintain custody to engage at the various layers. So it's
01:01:58absolutely vital, Senator. And do you agree with President Trump that we need to
01:02:01rapidly accelerate HBTSS so that we can have the sensors in space that we need to target
01:02:06incoming threats? I do, Senator. Those threats are real today. Those more advanced threats in our
01:02:12current systems are optimized against traditional ballistic missiles, not against the variants that
01:02:16we're seeing fielded today. And General Cotton, China leads the world in hypersonics and has
01:02:21hundreds of long-range hypersonic missiles. As you know, China shocked the world four years ago
01:02:27when its hypersonic vehicle orbited the entire Earth before landing. The U.S. has still not
01:02:32fielded a functional hypersonic weapon. Naval Surface Warfare Senator Crane is a proven leader
01:02:38in hypersonics, as you and I have talked about many times before. How important is increased
01:02:42investment in hypersonics if we're going to regain our military edge over China?
01:02:47Senator, it's very important, and the work that I've seen done by Crane has been
01:02:52extraordinary for the Department of the Navy. I think investments, but actually production
01:03:02and getting them to the warfighters so they can be implemented and put in our arsenal.
01:03:06Got it. And finally, while we're replacing most of our nuclear arsenal in the next decade or two,
01:03:12we're keeping the B-52 bombers around well into mid-century. How critical is a B-52 program if
01:03:19we're going to keep those planes in the skies for decades to come?
01:03:23Incredible, important for us, sir. As I mentioned, Senator, we're going to move to a two-platform
01:03:32bomber force for the United States of America. It will be the B-21 and the B-52J.
01:03:39It is incredibly important that we get those 75 birds and modify them
01:03:45with their replacement of their engines, their radars, and their-
01:03:49I got 10 seconds. Can you talk about the advantages of the new B-52 engines over the old
01:03:54engines? Yes. The Rolls-Royce engines
01:03:57that are right there and they're being worked in Indiana gives us about an incredible increase in
01:04:04range, in speed, and durability. Thank you. My time has expired.
01:04:12Thank you, Senator Banks. Senator King and I would like a second round before we head to classified.
01:04:19And I'd like to follow up on some of Senator Banks' comments about Golden Dome and space-based
01:04:28sensors. General Whiting, what would be the impacts to the mission effectiveness of SpaceCom
01:04:36were the government to auction off spectrum currently utilized by the department?
01:04:41Could Golden Dome even take place? Ma'am, we could not execute Golden Dome without
01:04:47full access to those two spectrums that we discussed earlier, the lower three and then
01:04:52the seven and eight gigahertz. We use that lower three band, again, through so many of our radars
01:04:56to be able to track from the ground. And then the seven and eight gigahertz band is so important for
01:05:02our communications and other special missions, can only see those requirements getting bigger
01:05:08for those spectrums as Golden Dome delivers. And if it was auctioned off and if it was vacated
01:05:16by the department, what's the time frame? Not to mention the cost. What is the time frame
01:05:24in research development for those new sensors to be even located in another spectrum that wouldn't
01:05:33have the capability that the current spectrum has to even accomplish that? 10 years? 20 years?
01:05:42Madam Chairwoman, I don't have a timeline because I think our focus has been not on vacating that,
01:05:47but figuring out if there's a way to share that spectrum through dynamic spectrum sharing. And
01:05:53I understand there's technologies there that may make that available. The department has
01:05:57done some studies on that and laid out a series of conditions that would need to be met if dynamic
01:06:03spectrum sharing can occur. And I endorse that those conditions must be met if we're going to
01:06:09figure out a way to share that spectrum with commercial industry. Can dynamic sharing take
01:06:14place now? Ma'am, I am told the technology is close to being ready. I don't know if it is actually
01:06:22ready today, but we would want to verify that. We would need to test. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely.
01:06:26And General Cotton, same question to you. If the government were to auction off spectrum
01:06:31currently utilized by the department, how would STRATCOM's mission effectiveness be impacted?
01:06:37It would be impacted, Madam Chair, because of what would happen is to the point that was made
01:06:44by General Whiting, you know, we count on understanding what the threat looks like,
01:06:50being able to see that threat before it actually comes. We call that left of launch type of
01:06:55activities, as well as what we're talking about in the higher bands on what is the capacity and
01:07:01capability of my three legs to be able to utilize STRATCOM, et cetera. It would absolutely affect
01:07:10us. Thank you, sir. Senator King. Two things. I just wanted to follow up on the discussion of
01:07:17hypersonics. I believe that we have missed two critical strategic technologies and are
01:07:24woefully behind hypersonics and directed energy. These are things that we should have seen coming
01:07:31and now we're playing catch up. I just want to emphasize, not only do we need a hypersonic weapon
01:07:38for deterrent possibilities, but we need hypersonic defense. Those aircraft carriers in the
01:07:44Pacific are sitting ducks for hypersonic missiles coming at them 4 or 5,000 miles an hour, 100 feet
01:07:52above the surface of the ocean. So hypersonic defense is something that I think we need to
01:07:58invest in as well as the development of a hypersonic offensive capacity in order, again, to
01:08:04provide a deterrent. General Cotton, would you agree? I do agree with that statement, Senator.
01:08:11The other thing that I wanted to mention, it's sort of become conventional wisdom here that we're
01:08:15going from one near-peer adversary to two. I believe we're going from one near-peer adversary
01:08:24to three and a half because of the, as I think you touched upon this, the growing cooperation
01:08:31between China and Russia. And then you put in Iran, which has also become a contributor to
01:08:38Russia's war machine, as well as North Korea, which is also contributing to Russia's efforts in
01:08:44Ukraine. So I think we need to think strategically, not two near-peer adversaries, but the potential
01:08:53of two near-peer adversaries who are working together. And that creates its own strategic
01:08:59challenges. General Cotton, what are your thoughts on that? Senator, you're absolutely right. And that's
01:09:04what we're actually doing at STRATCOM today. When we look at, and you're right, I call them
01:09:10third-party influencers. And what I mean by that, and to your point, I would add one
01:09:17that I think is a little different nuance. That is the new relationship that we're
01:09:23seeing that's happening between Russia and the DPRK. So we're talking about DPRK, we're talking
01:09:31about Iran, we're talking about China, as well as the Russian Federation. And I think we have to assume
01:09:37that in a time of serious conflict, it wouldn't be just with one or the other. It could well and
01:09:44probably would involve all four of those powers that you've mentioned. That's why I call them the
01:09:48third-party influencers, because what they could do is they could be a distraction for the main
01:09:52effort that could be, you know, that could be launched by any one of those that we had mentioned.
01:09:57General Whiting, your thoughts on that new strategic reality?
01:10:01Senator, we watch those same four countries that General Cotton just mentioned and their bilateral
01:10:05bilateral relationships with each other. And we see increasingly that space is becoming an area
01:10:10where countries with more sophisticated space knowledge like Russia or China appear to be
01:10:16willing to trade off that space knowledge for something that they want in return, whether
01:10:21that's armaments or some other political agreement. So we're very concerned with that
01:10:27and watching how they're cooperating on space. I just think that this new relationship needs to
01:10:32be part of our strategic thinking going forward to inform things like the Nuclear Posture Review
01:10:37and also the Fundamental Defense Strategy. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you again for
01:10:42your service, and I appreciate having been able to work with you. You're still at it. He's the
01:10:48guy that's leaving. We're going to miss you, General. Thank you. We haven't for a while yet.
01:10:54With that, we will adjourn the open session of this hearing and reconvene down in classified
01:11:01in order to have our classified briefing from you, gentlemen.
01:11:04Thank you very much. This section of the hearing is closed.