(Adnkronos) - Nel nuovo episodio di "Minds On", la direttrice di Aspenia dialoga con Giorgio Rutelli e Rosario Cerra sulle questioni globali più importanti: quali effetti avranno le elezioni americane sull'Europa, quando (e come) si arriverà a un cessate il fuoco in Ucraina, e le conseguenze del conflitto tra Israele, Hamas ed Hezbollah sugli equilibri non solo del Medio Oriente.
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00:00Welcome back to MindsOn, the series produced and created by ADN Kronos together with Centro Economia Digitale.
00:13I am Giorgio Rutelli and with us today, as always, is Rosario Cerra, President of Centro Economia Digitale.
00:20The guest of the day is Marta Dassù, Senior Advisor of Aspen and Director of Aspenia,
00:27of which we have here the last issue dedicated to Europe, Europe alone.
00:33The Union of Discontent is also the title of her editorial of this issue.
00:42But today, with Marta Dassù, we will talk above all about the upcoming US elections
00:49and also about the effects that these elections will have on the relationship between the United States and Europe,
00:55but also on the balance between the great world powers and, in particular, on Ukraine and the Middle East.
01:04I leave the floor to Rosario for the first question.
01:07Let's talk immediately about the US elections.
01:10The numbers are very close between the two contenders.
01:14Now we are close, just a few hours left.
01:17What are the characteristics that are not yet out of the two contenders?
01:25That is, in the context of the polls that are being conducted,
01:28what do you think are the characteristics of Trump and the Democratic candidate that could lead them to win?
01:39First of all, thank you, Giorgio, thank you, Rosario, for this invitation, which I am very pleased about.
01:45Not even a month is left until the US elections, as you rightly remember,
01:52and it really is one of the most difficult elections to predict.
01:57That is, those who say, I know that Trump will win, I know that Kamala Harris will win, are actually bluffing.
02:04It is impossible to have a certain prediction, because, as we know very well,
02:10the popular vote, where Harris is in the lead, matters very little.
02:14Among other things, Harris has an advantage that is less than that of Hillary Clinton in 2016,
02:20who instead lost the elections.
02:22The margins count in the famous seven-state imbalance, so it is really difficult to make this prediction.
02:29There could be what is generally defined as the surprise of October, or the final surprise.
02:36That is, there are unexpected events that could change the game, and this is a fact.
02:43What could come out, can come out only from the Harris side.
02:48Basically, Trump is not a novelty.
02:51We know who Trump is, we know almost everything, it's almost boring.
02:55The real question about Trump is whether his second term will be so different from the first.
03:01There is a whole school of thought, according to which Trump, in the end,
03:06has been bound by the so-called deep state, by the bureaucracy, by the adults in the room in his first term,
03:14and this time, instead, he will give us a hard time, let's say.
03:18According to that famous study of the Heritage Foundation Project 2025,
03:24Trump would be intending to dismiss much of the bureaucracy, replacing it with loyalists.
03:32So Trump, the only question is whether he will be more or less similar to his original predecessor.
03:40Harris, on the other hand, is a much more mysterious object.
03:45What could come out and is coming out is, in short, his possibility of being a president.
03:53Let's say that when he was Vice President of Biden, he was actually a fairly opaque figure,
04:00according to the ideologists, also because he was deliberately held in an opaque role
04:06and because vice presidents always count quite little.
04:10In short, what has come out is that he is a tough guy, he is doing a good election campaign,
04:16he is trying to move to the center.
04:19I would say that what is coming out is that he is less unsuitable for the role than one would think
04:28in July last year, when Biden was forced by another woman, by Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House,
04:35to throw the sponge and give way to the candidate's shed.
04:40So, for now, it's a positive surprise.
04:44We don't know, because, I repeat, there are unexpected events.
04:49Trump has promised that terrible things will come out about Harris in the last three weeks, we'll see.
04:56Let's talk about foreign policy and how this can change depending on the outcome of the elections.
05:04On paper, in theory, if Kamala Harris were to win, there could be some continuity with the Biden presidency.
05:14But there are also those who say that something is changing,
05:18that there is a generational change in American politics.
05:24So, once Biden and his Secretary of State, perhaps Antony Blinken, come out on stage,
05:31the approach towards Europe and the rest of the world will change,
05:37regardless of who will be the democratic leader of the White House.
05:41Obviously, Trump is the unpredictable one, he is the one who makes bilateral deals.
05:47The deal maker.
05:49Exactly. The Art of the Deal, his fantastic book,
05:52in which he explains that you have to beat the opponent first and then, at that point, get to the table.
05:58What do you see in this scenario of foreign policy in the coming months?
06:04I agree with you that it is a generational change, not for Trump.
06:09Trump is unpredictable, so we'll see how he will manage his second presidency.
06:16He has already announced some things.
06:19He says he will make an agreement with Putin on Ukraine even before taking office.
06:25This is quite paradoxical to say.
06:28It is clear that he will be even closer, let's say, than Biden was to Netanyahu
06:35and he will try to relaunch his old idea of an axis between the Gulf monarchies and Israel
06:41as the pin of a new regional axis.
06:44And then he hates it, so to speak, Europe hates it.
06:48He doesn't like the whole aspect of process, of political integration,
06:54of the bureaucratic weighting. He hates, in particular, Germany.
06:58He considers it more or less an adversarial country
07:02and so it is possible that he will impose tariffs again also on Europe.
07:07Kamala Harris will be different from Biden, I believe,
07:12apart from the fact that Biden's foreign policy is not producing great results.
07:19We see it in the Middle East in particular.
07:22But it is really a new generation, you rightly said.
07:25It is a generation in some way post-Atlantic in the traditional sense.
07:31Biden is perhaps the last of the Atlantic presidents, the last of the Wilsonians,
07:38that is, of the Americans who believe that America has this role to play
07:43in the world in defense of democracy.
07:46Biden saw the world as divided into authoritarian regimes and democracies,
07:53with America leading the vessel to defend the free world
07:59from the challenge of authoritarian powers.
08:02Kamala Harris has a different view of the world.
08:05In my opinion, she is more like Obama.
08:08A bit of restraint, a bit of receding of the United States,
08:12and certainly a turn towards Asia, which is the main systemic rival for both.
08:21It is certainly a more detached relationship from Europe,
08:25even if Harris also believes in the value of alliances
08:30and even if his probable National Security Advisor, Phil Gordon,
08:36is part of a school of thought and has a curriculum from Clintonian to Obamaian
08:42and now to Harris' advisor.
08:44So there is certainly some element of continuity,
08:48but with very important psychological nuances to consider.
08:56You were talking about the situation between the United States and China
09:01as a strategic competition.
09:04This strategic competition is increasing,
09:06especially on the technological side, technological innovation on the commercial side.
09:11How do you see the relationship after the elections,
09:14almost regardless of who wins, between China and the United States?
09:19Is it possible a de-escalation or will there be a strategy
09:23that will intensify this competition?
09:27I would say two things here.
09:29Both, the possible future presidents, will be falcons on China,
09:36in the sense that for today's America, China is the only real rival competitor,
09:42and this will remain true.
09:44Both will make China a decisive pillar of their own foreign policy
09:52and will act through export controls, through tariffs.
09:57We need to see to what extent.
10:00And finally, I would say that a de-escalation, a reduction of tensions,
10:06is already underway, in fact.
10:08It is already underway because even President Biden,
10:12who has continued Trump's policy on China,
10:17has decided that what we defined at the beginning as decoupling,
10:23between the two economies, is too expensive, even for America.
10:27So it is a strategy of economic containment,
10:31of containment of the descent of China, more measured, more gradual,
10:35through controls, technological export, as you rightly mentioned.
10:41The real problem is, in fact, a bit for us.
10:44Europe is in the middle of this new competition
10:50played on technological dominance,
10:53a kind of new Cold War on the generis.
10:56And for Europe, the reduction of risks towards China
11:01is very expensive and very tiring.
11:05Fundamentally, it is a problem, first of all, German,
11:09in the sense that for a country like Germany,
11:12losing the Chinese market or sacrificing it is very expensive.
11:17It is one of the pillars of economic development
11:20and we are still part of the German value chain,
11:25so it is not indifferent, certainly not even for us.
11:29And for Europe as a whole, the Chinese solar panels,
11:33the Chinese technology, are essential for the energy transition
11:39at this time.
11:40So we need to value the security imperatives,
11:45we increase our autonomy from Chinese dependencies
11:50and the imperatives of the energy transition,
11:52which we want to do more quickly.
11:55In any case, I believe that the problem for Europe
11:58is that it is not equipped,
12:00neither in the case of a victory of Trump
12:03nor in the case of a victory of Harris.
12:05Both will force Europe to make choices,
12:10to become more autonomous or, in any case,
12:13more heavy on the security level.
12:16Europe has finally understood that it has a big problem
12:20like a house, which is technological delay,
12:23but as for the operational answers to be given,
12:27things remain very difficult.
12:29There, in the number of Aspenia,
12:31we are talking about the main conclusions of the Draghi relationship.
12:35I fear that they will remain largely in the drawer.
12:39There are investments of around 800 billion dollars per year
12:44in this famous technological and energy transition
12:48and, as we know very well, there is a clash in Europe
12:52between tax conservators and countries more willing to spend
12:58for new priorities, for defence, for technology, etc.
13:01So, a very complicated moment opens up in Europe.
13:06My impression is that we arrive on November 5th
13:09and that we have waited so long, quite unprepared.
13:14On November 5th, it is a date that Zelensky also marked on the calendar
13:19because, obviously, we know some things.
13:22Black summer.
13:23Exactly.
13:24We know that, in theory, in Ukraine,
13:27new weapons, missiles, will arrive by the end of the year,
13:30which, so far, have not been able to arrive.
13:33But we also know that the American Congress,
13:36already now, already in recent months,
13:38has extended the OK to the new financial and military support to Ukraine.
13:46So, going back to talk about the consequences
13:49that these elections may have on the support to Ukraine,
13:52there is in the air, perhaps, the possibility of a ceasefire in 2025,
13:58also due to the fact that the United States
14:02could still limit a further support to Ukraine.
14:07Europe, obviously, is in trouble because Europe does not have many of those weapons.
14:12I mean, it does not have many,
14:13regardless of the internal political debate.
14:16The truth is that many European countries do not have weapons to send to Kiev
14:21for defense or for possible counterattack in Russian territory.
14:25And so, there is a change in the coming months,
14:30in your opinion, of approach also by Zelensky.
14:34Will there be a ceasefire, perhaps freezing the current situation
14:39and then negotiating security conditions with the United States,
14:43as happened, for example, after the Second World War?
14:46Or, in your opinion, will he continue to push forward the bar,
14:52hoping to reach an even greater advantage?
14:56I believe that Zelensky, and he also says it,
14:59is now aware that he must reach some kind of conclusion
15:06of this phase of the war, let's put it this way,
15:09within the first months of 2025.
15:13Of course, now his so-called plan for victory
15:17clearly has parts that are not acceptable.
15:21But the whole international debate is a bit about this,
15:25that is, how to reach a ceasefire
15:29that provides for a territorial loss of Ukraine,
15:33that is, no one is more deluded that Ukraine
15:37can recover the famous borders of 1991.
15:42It would be a kind of conclusion of the historical war
15:45between Russia and Finland, for example,
15:47a territorial loss that today we can estimate
15:51around 18%, in exchange for the fact that Western Ukraine,
15:57Ukraine that will be on our side, let's put it this way,
16:01and out of the orbit of the influence of Russia,
16:04will have sufficient security guarantees,
16:07because the whole problem of Ukraine is to avoid
16:10that after a temporary stop, and after a regrouping
16:14of the Russian forces and so on, it starts all over again.
16:17After all, it is a war that started in 2014,
16:21not only in 2022.
16:23Now, what guarantees can Zelensky really have
16:27on the security level?
16:28The main guarantee would be, of course,
16:31access to NATO, which would constitute
16:34a real deterrent for Russia.
16:37But, as we know very well, there is hesitation on this,
16:40not only on the part of some European countries,
16:43but also on the part of the United States itself.
16:46In fact, even Harris, interviewed the other day
16:50for the umpteenth time, has the direct question.
16:55Is she in favor of Ukraine's entry into NATO?
16:58Has she responded?
17:00If and when the conditions will exist,
17:03I will take the problem into consideration.
17:05That is, she has not responded fundamentally.
17:07And so we enter the field of bilateral security guarantees,
17:12rather.
17:13The problem, however, must be seen in historical terms
17:18a bit like what was set for Germany,
17:21divided at the time.
17:23That is, a divided Germany, of which we guaranteed
17:27the western part, in that case, up to the entry of Germany,
17:31although divided in NATO in 1954.
17:36And it must be said, it must be added,
17:39that the territorial loss of Ukraine
17:42could not be formally recognized
17:45on the international level.
17:47There we enter those ambiguous cases of international politics,
17:51the two Koreas, for example.
17:53That is, those ceasefires in which you do not recognize
17:57the dividing line, because it would be recognizing
18:00an annexation by force.
18:02On the other hand, I will finish here.
18:04Zelensky can no longer count so easily
18:07on military aid, as I said,
18:11nor on economic aid,
18:13especially from the United States.
18:16The Congress has made a crazy effort
18:18to approve 50 billion dollars the other time
18:22and the Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson,
18:25said the other day that there is no longer any appetite,
18:28in quotation marks, no desire to spend
18:30a lot of money yet.
18:32And then there is an internal opinion in Ukraine
18:34that is beginning to consider the need
18:37for a ceasefire.
18:39There is a high degree of reluctance
18:41to the mandatory lever,
18:43the law that was introduced by Zelensky.
18:46In short, things are becoming difficult.
18:49Zelensky is opposing
18:52what is a war of attrition
18:55with small territorial advantages of Russia,
18:58the ability to strike ammunition depots,
19:02military targets in Russia, in Crimea,
19:06he made the advance of Kursk.
19:09However, in short, this line,
19:11compensating the losses in Ukraine
19:14by hitting Russia,
19:16is not, in the end, supported by NATO countries,
19:19as can be seen from the backwardness
19:22to allow long-range weapons
19:26to hit Russia in depth.
19:28So it is a delicate game.
19:30I am quite convinced that in the first months of 2025
19:33we will go towards this type of compromise.
19:39Let's take a global leap.
19:43Let's think about the fact that the world
19:45is really becoming structurally multipolar.
19:48Russia, which is allied with China,
19:51more and more closely,
19:53Iran, which enters the BRICS,
19:55perhaps also Turkey.
19:57The question is,
19:59liberal democracies
20:02still have an attractive capacity
20:05as regards, for example,
20:08Africa, Asia, South America.
20:12Can we still be a beacon
20:15for some nations,
20:17on which there is this dynamic
20:20of attraction and confrontation
20:23between the bloc of autocracies
20:26and liberal democracies?
20:28Well, this is a very important question,
20:31very interesting.
20:33More than a multipolar world,
20:36which is clearly multipolar,
20:38there are various poles,
20:40there are two great powers
20:42and more powers than the others,
20:44the United States and China.
20:46There is a revisionist power,
20:48the East, which is Russia,
20:50which insinuates itself in the spaces
20:52and creates problems.
20:54And there is a quantity
20:56of middle powers
20:58that do not ally
21:00on either side.
21:02The compact of the BRICS
21:06would not give much weight,
21:08because if we remove China,
21:10which was the protagonist
21:12of the rise of the rest of the world,
21:14with an extraordinary history
21:16and the expectations
21:18regarding India,
21:20and if we remove the energy wealth
21:22of Saudi Arabia,
21:24for the rest they are countries
21:26with fairly poor economies,
21:28from Argentina
21:30to Brazil
21:32and Iran.
21:34So I would not say
21:36that there is such a cohesive bloc.
21:38They also have different agendas.
21:40In the end, Russia aims
21:42at a recognition
21:44by the United States
21:46of its security needs,
21:48a new IALTA
21:50that it has not obtained,
21:52but it is fundamentally
21:54a country that breaks the rules
21:56and breaks the balance
21:58and wants
22:00to make
22:02an action of disturbance,
22:04especially in its neighbor
22:06but also in the Middle East.
22:08China still needs
22:10the opening of the world economy.
22:12The economic recovery of China
22:14was drawn by the West.
22:16It was a success story
22:18of the institutions
22:20led by the West.
22:22Today, the West
22:24reacts by closing
22:26a little with economic nationalism,
22:28industrial policy,
22:30export restrictions,
22:32but China does not need this.
22:34It wants an order
22:36less dominated by the United States,
22:38but it knows it can count
22:40on a long-term recovery.
22:42It thinks that America
22:44– and it has been thinking about it
22:46since 2008, since the financial crisis –
22:48has entered a phase
22:50of almost unstoppable decline
22:52and thinks that China
22:54has all the time
22:56in front of it
22:58to be able to make
23:00this famous recovery,
23:02to return to its original weight
23:04and to collapse on
23:06the so-called dry of humiliation
23:08until the Chinese revolution,
23:10according to them.
23:12Now, in all this,
23:14that is, having said that I do not see
23:16two cohesive blocks,
23:18that I believe that
23:20America is stronger than China
23:22and so on,
23:24I would also like to add
23:26that liberal democracies
23:28do maintain a force of attraction
23:30for the simple reason
23:32that you just have to look.
23:34Where do people actually want to emigrate?
23:36I do not think
23:38that there are a lot of people
23:40who go in a convincing way
23:42towards authoritarian regimes,
23:44from Iran to Russia.
23:46Where do we actually want to study?
23:48It seems to me that
23:50the study destinations
23:52are more or less
23:54always those.
23:56So, if we measure the capacity
23:58of attraction on these parameters,
24:00in my opinion,
24:02the old West, let's say,
24:04still has a capacity
24:06of attraction.
24:08If we measure it instead
24:10on the ability to shape
24:12international relations,
24:14it is a capacity reduced
24:16by the fact that there are
24:18all these countries
24:20which allow,
24:22for example,
24:24the illusion of sanctions.
24:26There are a number of countries
24:28that could be called
24:30the connecting countries
24:32or the middle powers
24:34which in fact
24:36prevent the sanctions
24:38from being effective
24:40because then China and Russia
24:42manage through channels
24:44like Malaysia on the one hand
24:46or Mexico on the other
24:48to export their goods
24:50or defend themselves from the sanctions.
24:52So, I would put it
24:54on two distinct levels
24:56but I would remain convinced
24:58that liberal democracy
25:00is still, as Winston Churchill said,
25:02the least worse
25:04of the political systems
25:06we have experienced so far.
25:10The last question is on a very current issue
25:12the Middle East, Israel,
25:14the war
25:16between Israel, Hezbollah and Hamas,
25:18the role of Iran,
25:20but I would like you to focus
25:22on the issue
25:24of Israel's relationship
25:26with the West.
25:28Israel's relationship with Iran
25:30has decided to do everything
25:32to reduce
25:34the Iranian proxies
25:36in the region at all costs.
25:38These days there is a tension
25:40with the West and the United Nations
25:42for Israel's actions
25:44especially towards
25:46UNIFIL and what is happening
25:48in the line that divides the two countries,
25:50Lebanon and Israel.
25:52Do you think Netanyahu
25:54will not stop
25:56any kind of Western pressure
25:58because he has this goal
26:00and must reach it as soon as possible?
26:02Will the relations between Israel
26:04and a part of the Western world
26:06that is currently in great difficulty
26:08be able to be restored
26:10with Netanyahu in power
26:12or will Netanyahu's successor
26:14be needed to bring back
26:16a dialogue between Tel Aviv
26:18and Jerusalem
26:20and the Western world
26:22that is currently
26:24in great difficulty
26:26to manage this relationship?
26:28Yes, it's a very difficult question
26:30because you have a scenario
26:32that somehow
26:34changes under our eyes.
26:36For example,
26:38the Lebanese northern front
26:40Netanyahu on that
26:42had until the incidents
26:44or the attacks
26:46wanted or not wanted,
26:48that is, the ongoing inquiry
26:50against UNIFIL,
26:52Netanyahu had much more support
26:54on the northern front because
26:56actually for any country
26:58to have a paramilitary militia
27:00like Hezbollah full of missiles
27:02given by Iran
27:04that shoots from October 8th
27:06onwards, thousands of these missiles
27:08and forces 60,000
27:10Israeli citizens to leave
27:12villages in the north,
27:14is unacceptable for any
27:16government in the world, I believe.
27:18And on this, in fact, Israel
27:20has been forgotten.
27:22Not only Netanyahu has recovered
27:24his internal consensus that
27:26seemed to have fallen free,
27:28he takes care of the first
27:30party in the country again.
27:32There is a story of coming back,
27:34of political return
27:36quite clamorous
27:38in which Netanyahu
27:40like Trump on the other hand
27:42is a kind of, is a particular specialist.
27:44The relations are very difficult
27:46in the sense that
27:48America cannot really
27:50influence Netanyahu's choices.
27:52You have exactly that
27:54situation in which the state
27:56that once we defined as a client
27:58according to its rules,
28:00I don't see
28:02a succession
28:04to Netanyahu
28:06and I don't even see how
28:08an America in electoral campaign
28:10can
28:12leave Israel.
28:14The decision
28:16yesterday was to give
28:18Israel a new
28:20defense system from the possible
28:22Iranian response to the
28:24response that Israel
28:26intends to give to the missile
28:28attack
28:30last week by
28:32Iran. So
28:34the reason why the policy
28:36of the United States has little relevance
28:38is that the defense of Israel
28:40is a priority.
28:42It will remain as it is
28:44even with Kamala Harris
28:46I believe.
28:48So the type of
28:50conditioning that can be exercised
28:52on Israel is minimal.
28:54Europe does not exist.
28:56Sincerely I find that for an area
28:58that for us is so geographically
29:00close and vital,
29:02the fact that Europe cannot
29:04express a position that is
29:06one is really clamorous.
29:08I don't know if you are
29:10younger than me but you will remember
29:12when Europe
29:14made its anti-robot
29:16declarations, the Venice
29:18Declaration of 1980,
29:20the Quartet on Peace
29:22Agreements, up to
29:24the Lebanon crisis management
29:26in 2006 with the choice of
29:28UNIFIL. At that time
29:30something still mattered.
29:32Now it really matters very little,
29:34a little because it is divided
29:36and a little because it is
29:38distracted both from Ukraine
29:40and from its internal problems.
29:42So it is a scenario in which
29:44when we talk about the West
29:46and Israel we are talking
29:48about America.
29:50Europe is really marginal.
29:52By the way, let's say,
29:54Ursula von der Leyen and Borrell
29:56are the two most important
29:58peaks in Europe, with a voice
30:00in the chapter on foreign policy.
30:02On Israel they have two very
30:04distant positions.
30:06Yes, it is a topic on which
30:08the European Commission is
30:10the same institution as the European Commission.
30:12So let's imagine between the 27.
30:14And then the future set-up,
30:16now we are talking about the number
30:18of meetings of the European Commission
30:20on foreign policy,
30:22it is all shifted to the East.
30:24Of course, with the Baltics,
30:26with much more importance
30:28Kayakallas, Andrius Cubilius
30:30in defense.
30:32It is a set-up that gravitates
30:34towards the cruciality of the East
30:36because we will have a long-term
30:38problem of deterrence
30:40towards Russia,
30:42which will have to be more part
30:44of a European commitment
30:46that is not exclusively American.
30:48But the Middle East is
30:50actually very important for us
30:52because America,
30:54which has become
30:56a primary producer
30:58in the energy field,
31:00no longer needs
31:02the Middle East from that point of view
31:04but sees it in a strategic sense.
31:06In other words, the Middle East
31:08sees it as an essential
31:10link to the Indo-Pacific theater
31:12that really interests it.
31:14We are more exposed,
31:16we have a very relevant part
31:18of international trade
31:20that passes through Suez,
31:22we have a considerable
31:24energy dependence,
31:26we export in the Gulf countries
31:28a considerable amount
31:30of things that interest us.
31:32In short, I want to say
31:34that in the face of all this,
31:36we are unable to express
31:38a unitary position
31:40that weighs very little.
31:42On the other hand, we have
31:44an increase in anti-Semitism in Europe,
31:46a very worrying problem,
31:48and we have a threat
31:50to terrorism
31:52linked to tensions
31:54that is just as worrying.
31:56Thank you Marta Dassou,
31:58thank you Rosario Serra
32:00for joining us today on Mindzone
32:02and we look forward to seeing you
32:04in the next interviews.
32:06Thank you all.