For educational purposes
One of the great battlefield innovations developed by the United States armed forces in its effort to defeat a skilled and often elusive enemy in Vietnam was air cavalry--light infantry deployed by helicopters.
Always outnumbered, and fighting in a totally hostile environment, American soldiers had to rely on technology and new techniques to contain the enemy.
The highly mobile helicopter troops who formed the Air Cavalry used quick-response techniques to counter the huge odds against which they fought daily.
As a concept, air cavalry was innovative. As executed by air cavalry units, it was phenomenal, and the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam was the quintessential air cavalry organization.
Its prominent and evolving role began in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, and one of its greatest achievements came at Khe Sanh in 1968.
One of the great battlefield innovations developed by the United States armed forces in its effort to defeat a skilled and often elusive enemy in Vietnam was air cavalry--light infantry deployed by helicopters.
Always outnumbered, and fighting in a totally hostile environment, American soldiers had to rely on technology and new techniques to contain the enemy.
The highly mobile helicopter troops who formed the Air Cavalry used quick-response techniques to counter the huge odds against which they fought daily.
As a concept, air cavalry was innovative. As executed by air cavalry units, it was phenomenal, and the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam was the quintessential air cavalry organization.
Its prominent and evolving role began in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, and one of its greatest achievements came at Khe Sanh in 1968.
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02:00And it's the story of rifle platoons,
02:04of flight crews who hovered into thousands of hostile landing zones,
02:08braving enemy fire and unforgiving terrain,
02:11and of the small infantry units that they inserted
02:13to flush out and engage the enemy in battle.
02:16It's the story of a unique group of men who fought hard to defend South Vietnam against communist aggression
02:23and who, in the process, helped to validate the effectiveness of the very first air mobile ground division in the world.
02:31It is the story of the Air Cavalry in Vietnam.
02:34On October 14th, 1964, the U.S. Army launched a massive war game known as Air Assault II.
02:47The maneuver was a final test for the 11th Air Assault Division,
02:51an experimental unit created to evaluate the concept of Army air mobility.
02:57The first phase of the exercise called for finding, fixing, and destroying mock guerrilla elements dispersed over 6,000 square miles of terrain.
03:08Scout pilots from the division's air cavalry squadron conducted low-level reconnaissance in Bell OH-13 Sioux helicopters,
03:17scouring the countryside from just above the treetops.
03:20In a remarkably short time, the guerrillas revealed their positions and the scouts radioed for reinforcements.
03:28With word that enemy forces had been cited,
03:31skytroopers from the division piled aboard a group of Bell UH-1 Iroquois,
03:35more commonly known as Hueys.
03:38In a matter of minutes, the massive flight of choppers was lifting off the ground
03:42and maneuvering into tight formations for a dramatic airborne assault.
03:50The concept of an air-mobile fighting force had a long history in the U.S. military.
03:57Following the Second World War, military planners realized that parachutes and gliders
04:02were costly and extremely inefficient solutions to battlefield mobility.
04:09During the Korean War, American commanders learned that difficult terrain
04:14and a numerically superior enemy could offset the qualitative superiority of U.S. troops
04:20and firepower.
04:24Hundreds of studies were conducted throughout the 50s and early 60s
04:28in an attempt to integrate helicopters into the combat and support functions of the Army.
04:36The culmination of these efforts was Air Assault II,
04:40and it turned out to be a resounding success.
04:43In the first phase of the test, ground-based artillery and heavily armed Hueys
04:51paved the way for the insertion of ground forces.
04:56The guerrilla force never stood a chance against such an onslaught.
05:01For a solid month, similar maneuvers were conducted against even larger conventional forces.
05:12Regardless of the tactical situation, the division repeatedly proved that it could seek out,
05:18fix, and destroy the enemy with devastating regularity.
05:21The Air Cavalry Squadron, which performed reconnaissance and security for the division,
05:29proved to be crucial to the force's overall success.
05:38In less than a year, the Experimental 11th Air Assault Division
05:42had assumed the name of the Army's famed 1st Cavalry Division
05:46and had received orders to deploy to Southeast Asia.
05:52Its mission?
05:54Avert a major crisis that was developing in South Vietnam.
06:01During the summer of 1964,
06:04the Communist government of North Vietnam
06:05began deploying regular Army units toward South Vietnam.
06:10The troops were being sent to bolster the Viet Cong,
06:13who were waging a Communist war of insurgency
06:15against the South Vietnamese government.
06:18In July of 65,
06:19as the 1st Cavalry Division prepared to ship out,
06:22another full regiment of the North Vietnamese Army
06:25had completed infiltration training
06:27and was preparing to head southward.
06:31The troops traveled on foot,
06:33carrying large quantities of food, weapons, and supplies
06:36across hundreds of miles of mountainous jungle terrain.
06:41The infiltration route crossed from North Vietnam
06:43into neighboring Laos,
06:45moved southward,
06:46and ultimately ended up in eastern Cambodia,
06:49southeastern Laos,
06:50or the Pleiku province of South Vietnam.
06:55A steady stream of men and supplies
06:58continued to pour into the region throughout the war.
07:00Large jungle bases were created
07:03where food and equipment could be stockpiled,
07:06medical care could be administered,
07:08battle plans could be devised and even rehearsed,
07:11and weapons could be cleaned and prepared for battle.
07:13During the fall of 65,
07:21a full division of North Vietnamese troops
07:23staging from these bases
07:24launched a major offensive
07:26against South Vietnamese and U.S. installations
07:29in an area known as the Central Highlands.
07:32The objective of the offensive
07:34was to rejuvenate the Communist insurgency
07:37with a major victory.
07:38Ultimately, the Communists hoped to capture
07:41a provincial capital,
07:43destroy a large South Vietnamese force,
07:46and even split the country in two
07:47from the Cambodian border
07:49out to the South China Sea.
07:56The 1st Cavalry Division
07:58arrived in Vietnam
07:59during the fall of 1965.
08:02By early October,
08:04the force had set up a base camp
08:05near the city of An Khe
08:07in the Central Highlands.
08:09Initially,
08:09the division defended
08:10Special Forces camps
08:12in the Highlands
08:12against a series of NVA assaults.
08:15By late October,
08:17the force had become embroiled
08:18in a series of violent skirmishes
08:20that came to be known
08:21as the Battle of the Aya Drang.
08:25Realizing that thousands of NVA
08:27and Viet Cong troops
08:28were mounting a massive campaign,
08:30the division launched
08:32an unlimited offensive
08:33to search out,
08:34fix, and destroy
08:35enemy forces
08:36throughout the Central Highlands.
08:41During the campaign,
08:42and in hundreds
08:43of similar operations
08:44that followed,
08:45the force relied heavily
08:47on the unique capabilities
08:48of the 1st Squadron
08:49of the 9th Cavalry,
08:51the division's
08:52Air Cavalry Squadron.
08:55The squadron was made up
08:57of three Air Cavalry troops,
08:59each of which
09:00had its own
09:00Scout Platoon,
09:02Aerial Weapons Platoon,
09:03and Rifle Platoon.
09:05Pilots from the Scout Platoon
09:07formed the tip
09:07of the squadron's spear,
09:09conducting low-level
09:10reconnaissance
09:11and light observation
09:12helicopters.
09:14In low-thread environments,
09:16the Scouts operated
09:17in pairs known
09:18as white teams.
09:20One pilot flew
09:21just a few feet
09:21above the ground
09:22or trees
09:23to conduct
09:23close-in reconnaissance,
09:25while another
09:26flew slightly higher
09:27to provide cover,
09:28radio relay,
09:29and navigation.
09:31Each morning,
09:32white teams launched
09:33just before dawn
09:34on first-light missions
09:35to search for snipers,
09:37sappers,
09:37and other enemy forces
09:38setting up positions
09:39around the perimeter
09:40of Anke.
09:42Throughout the day,
09:43multiple Scout teams
09:44scoured more than
09:452,500 square miles
09:47of the Central Highlands
09:48for signs of enemy activity.
09:51A red team
09:53of two armed Hueys
09:54from the squadron's
09:55aerial weapons platoon
09:56often escorted
09:57the Scouts
09:57into high-thread areas.
10:00The gunships
10:00were armed
10:01with up to 48
10:022.75-inch rockets,
10:04four side-mounted
10:05miniguns,
10:06and two door gunners.
10:10The combination
10:11of a red team's
10:12gunship
10:12and a white team's
10:13scout
10:14resulted in a pink team,
10:16the most prevalent
10:17and effective
10:18tactical combination
10:19of the squadron.
10:21Together,
10:22these hunter-killer teams
10:23bravely penetrated
10:25deep into enemy territory,
10:27probing for enemy forces
10:28and looking to start a fight.
10:32Our mission
10:33as the cavalry troop
10:34within the cavalry squadron
10:36in the 1st Cavalry Division
10:37was the eyes and ears
10:38of the commander.
10:39Find the enemy,
10:40locate him,
10:41fix him,
10:42either destroy him
10:42with what we had on board,
10:44to bring an artillery in
10:45or bring an air force in
10:46to develop the situation.
10:48And that was really key
10:48to our mission
10:49was to find the enemy
10:50and develop the situation
10:52so that the commander
10:53could then do
10:54what he wanted to
10:55with the enemy,
10:55ignore him,
10:56suppress him,
10:57kill him,
10:57pile on with air assault troops
10:59and then to try
11:01and fix the enemy
11:02and win that part
11:03of the fight
11:03for that part
11:03of the battlefield.
11:06Scout pilots
11:07were the critical link
11:08in the air cavalry's mission.
11:10While many people
11:11couldn't believe
11:12that someone
11:12was actually willing
11:13to assume
11:14such a perilous role,
11:16most scouts
11:16took tremendous pride
11:17in their work,
11:18developing incredible skills,
11:20ingenious tactics
11:21and perhaps even
11:22a sixth sense
11:23for locating the enemy.
11:26They flew right
11:27above the treetops
11:28and they would look down
11:30into the jungle
11:31and be like deer hunters
11:33tracking people down,
11:36looking for indications
11:36of footprints along the road
11:39or a stream,
11:40branches being broken,
11:41fresh foliage being bent over
11:43from loads
11:43or bicycle tracks
11:45on the dirt
11:46from guys
11:47having bicycles
11:47with rice
11:49or ammunition
11:50or rockets on board.
11:51They just had
11:52an amazing knack
11:53for telling you
11:54what was there
11:55or what might not be there
11:56and something as small
11:57as a smoke fire
11:58or a cigarette smoke
11:59sometime
11:59and a steel morning air,
12:01some guys could smell
12:02cigarette smoke
12:03in campfires
12:03and that would help us
12:05to try and track them down.
12:07That's what the scouts did
12:07and the scouts
12:08tracked down the enemy.
12:11The NVA in Viet Cong
12:13quickly learned
12:13not to fire
12:14on the vulnerable scouts
12:15unless they were prepared
12:16to confront the wrath
12:17of a much larger force.
12:19As a result,
12:20scout crews
12:21often resorted
12:21to reconnaissance by fire,
12:23hovering in
12:24just above
12:25suspected enemy positions
12:26and spraying the area
12:27with bursts of gunfire.
12:30If an enemy force
12:31broke cover
12:32and began firing,
12:33a gunship
12:34immediately dove in
12:35to deliver
12:35a massive barrage
12:37of rockets
12:37and minigun fire.
12:40Once they shot back,
12:41you had them.
12:42You found them
12:43and you fixed them,
12:44but fixing only
12:45for a few seconds
12:46because as soon
12:46as they shot,
12:47usually they would move away
12:48or go in the bunkers.
12:49So the scout
12:50would often come back
12:51into the area
12:52and try and upset them,
12:54get them mad,
12:55or get them
12:56to do something unexpected,
12:57something they didn't
12:58want to do.
12:59And what they never
13:00wanted to do
13:01was to stay in one place
13:02so we could put rockets
13:03on them
13:04and put artillery on them
13:05and then put
13:06airstrikes on them.
13:08To prevent the NVA
13:09and VC
13:09from breaking contact
13:11and fleeing
13:11into the jungle,
13:12the gunships
13:13made repeated
13:14low-level firing passes
13:15over the area.
13:17Timing was critical.
13:19If the division
13:20could commit airstrikes,
13:21artillery strikes,
13:22and ultimately
13:23ground troops rapidly,
13:25they could force
13:25the elusive communists
13:27into an unplanned battle,
13:29a situation
13:29that NVA commanders
13:31feared the most.
13:32If additional firepower
13:34or ground forces
13:35were delayed
13:35even by a few minutes,
13:37the enemy force
13:38often vanished
13:39without a trace
13:40and the opportunity
13:41to engage
13:42was lost.
13:43In these situations,
13:45the Pink Team
13:45and indeed
13:46the entire division
13:47relied heavily
13:48on a third component
13:49of the Air Cavalry Troop,
13:51the bold and courageous
13:52men of the Rifle Platoon.
13:54Aero-Rifle Platoons
14:03or Blue Teams
14:04were the Air Cavalry's
14:06link to the ground.
14:07Each platoon
14:08was equipped
14:09with several Huey lift ships,
14:11also known as slicks,
14:12which were used
14:13to rapidly insert
14:14small, lightly-armed
14:16rifle squads
14:16near suspected enemy positions.
14:18Their mission
14:22was to locate,
14:23flush out,
14:24and engage
14:24enemy troops
14:25until reinforcements
14:26could be brought in
14:27to develop the battle.
14:29Every insertion
14:31was filled
14:31with uncertainty
14:32and danger.
14:35Landing zones
14:36or LZs
14:37were often
14:37nothing more
14:38than small clearings
14:39in the jungle.
14:40Merely bringing
14:41a chopper
14:41into low hover
14:42in the rough,
14:43unforgiving terrain
14:44of the Highlands
14:45taxed even
14:46the most accomplished
14:47flight crews.
14:49To make matters worse,
14:50enemy forces
14:51frequently booby-trapped
14:53potential LZs
14:54or established ambushes
14:56in the dense jungle perimeter.
15:00Each second
15:01spent in an LZ
15:02dramatically increased
15:04the crew's chances
15:05of being struck
15:06by enemy fire.
15:10The large,
15:11slow Hueys
15:12were prized
15:13targets
15:13for the NVA
15:14in Viet Cong.
15:18Operating far
15:19from the support
15:20of friendly forces,
15:21the men
15:22of the small
15:22rifle platoons
15:23forged intense bonds
15:25of trust
15:26and friendship
15:27in a common fight
15:28to stay alive.
15:31Each man's performance,
15:32from the pilot
15:33of a single ship
15:34to the individual
15:35infantrymen,
15:36was critical
15:37to the success
15:37and survival
15:38of the entire team.
15:41Troop insertion
15:41was a daily
15:43occurrence
15:44for the Cav troops.
15:46They could be
15:47as many
15:47as 15 insertions
15:49in one day.
15:51That's bad enough
15:52on the flight crews
15:54because that means
15:56that's 15 times
15:57that you're exposed
15:58to enemy ground fire,
15:59but it's even more
16:00traumatic
16:00for the foot soldier
16:02because he goes in
16:04on the troop transport.
16:05He's inserted.
16:06He may be in there
16:07for 30 minutes.
16:07He may be in there
16:08for 10 minutes
16:09and he gets back
16:10on the aircraft
16:11and he says,
16:12I survived that one.
16:13How many more of these
16:14do we have to do today?
16:15So it was a constant
16:16movement of putting
16:18guys on the ground.
16:19We had to continually
16:20develop the situation
16:22of where the enemy was,
16:23build up an intelligence
16:24database,
16:25so to speak.
16:26Despite the intensity
16:28of rifle platoon missions,
16:30most of the men
16:31in these units
16:32learned to function
16:33even in the most
16:34terrifying situation
16:35because they repeatedly
16:37confronted unknown dangers
16:39each and every day.
16:41Fatigue became
16:41one of the greatest threats
16:43to lift ship crews
16:44and to squadron pilots
16:46overall.
16:47The constant vibration,
16:49deafening noise
16:50and intense concentration
16:51associated with
16:52helicopter operations
16:53led the army
16:54to restrict pilots
16:55to four hours
16:56of flight time per day.
16:58Air cavalry pilots,
16:59however,
17:00often flew for six,
17:01eight and even
17:03twelve hours at a time
17:04in their relentless
17:06pursuit of enemy forces.
17:13Blue teams normally
17:14operated with the scouts
17:16and gunships
17:17of a pink team
17:17and what became known
17:19as a purple team.
17:21During a typical operation,
17:22a rifle platoon
17:23flew to a forward
17:24logger area
17:25while a pink team
17:26conducted reconnaissance
17:27nearby.
17:31Staging from logger sites
17:33deep in enemy territory,
17:34while dangerous,
17:35increased the likelihood
17:36that the Blues
17:37could reach and engage
17:38the NVA and Viet Cong
17:40before they evaded
17:42the scouts
17:42and the gunships.
17:46While loggered,
17:47the rifle squad
17:48or other friendly forces
17:50in the area
17:50established a defensive perimeter
17:52around the vulnerable
17:53lift ships.
17:54others in the platoon
17:56dug foxholes
17:57for cover
17:57in the event
17:58of sniper fire,
17:59a mortar attack,
18:00or even larger
18:01enemy assaults.
18:03Throughout the day,
18:04the men waited.
18:05It could take minutes
18:06or hours,
18:07but invariably,
18:09the pink teams
18:09would uncover
18:10something on the ground
18:11that required
18:12the insertion
18:13of the Blues.
18:13The sound of artillery
18:19or airstrikes nearby
18:20often meant
18:21that enemy forces
18:22had been spotted
18:23and that the area
18:25was being prepped
18:25for an insertion.
18:29Once the decision
18:30had been made
18:31to commit the Blues,
18:32every second counted.
18:34The rifle squads
18:35rushed to take their places
18:36aboard the Slicks.
18:37Every man knew
18:38which Huey
18:39he was assigned to,
18:40the exact position
18:41he would take
18:41on entering the aircraft
18:43and upon landing,
18:45how and when
18:45he would exit
18:46to provide
18:46maximum dispersion
18:48in the LZ.
18:53The flight crews
18:54were equally well-coordinated.
18:56Each crew knew
18:57when they were
18:58to lift off,
18:58the type of formation
18:59they were to fly in,
19:01their exact position
19:02in that formation,
19:03and how, when,
19:04and where
19:05they were to set down
19:06in the LZ.
19:11weather, time of day,
19:15terrain,
19:15and the location
19:16of enemy threats
19:17were critical factors
19:18during an insertion.
19:20The Slicks counted
19:21on up-to-the-minute recon
19:22from the Pink team,
19:24adjusting their formation
19:25in insertion strategy
19:26in flight as necessary.
19:30Initially,
19:31the LZ landing zone
19:32would be selected
19:35by the scout platoon leader.
19:37He would go down
19:38and make a reconnaissance
19:40sometimes at a hover
19:41to confirm
19:42that there was
19:43no punchy stakes
19:44in the area,
19:45there was no trip lines
19:46to go to mines
19:47or any other enemy activity.
19:50So I would normally
19:51go in next
19:52with the gunship
19:53as a lead
19:54and do reconnaissance
19:55by fire.
19:57The door gunners
19:58would be looking
20:00left and right
20:00as we made
20:01that final straight-in pass,
20:03scanning the tree lines
20:04on their side
20:05and firing in there
20:06to see if they could
20:07draw a fire.
20:09And then if we had
20:09the mixed quad-60s
20:12mounted on the side,
20:13we could rotate those
20:14straight down
20:15and elevate a little bit,
20:16not far enough
20:17to hit the blades,
20:18hopefully,
20:19left and right,
20:20and then the rockets
20:21would be firing.
20:22And you'd normally
20:23just make one pass
20:24to see if you drew
20:25any fire.
20:26And there would be
20:27two guys
20:28in that lead.
20:30In my case,
20:31it would be myself
20:31and then my wingman.
20:33And my wingman's job
20:34was to protect my butt.
20:36If there was any fire
20:37that came on up
20:38and we didn't see it,
20:40he would see it
20:41and immediately
20:42put suppressive fire on it
20:43and tell us
20:44to break right
20:44or break left.
20:45And then we would
20:46reevaluate,
20:48could we go back in
20:48and destroy the target,
20:50the enemy,
20:51or should we move
20:52the ships coming
20:53into another landing zone?
20:55So then the sequence
21:02would roll in
21:03and we would go
21:03into a daisy chain
21:04on both sides.
21:06Two ships on one side,
21:08two ships on the other side,
21:09and if we had
21:10any other guns,
21:11they'd be flying
21:12outside that perimeter
21:13to see if there was
21:14any movement
21:14of the enemy
21:15coming out of that area
21:16or, more dangerously,
21:18any enemy forces
21:19coming in.
21:20And then we,
21:21the guns,
21:21and the scouts
21:22would remain
21:23circling that area,
21:25continuing making passes,
21:27and if they made contact,
21:29they immediately
21:29gave radio contact
21:31with us
21:31through smoke.
21:32From the smoke,
21:33they'd give us
21:34the direction
21:34of the enemy,
21:36and then we'd roll in
21:37and fire our rockets
21:38or machine guns.
21:40Now, when I say
21:40we fired rockets
21:41or machine guns,
21:42we would never
21:43start firing
21:43until we were
21:44within 700 meters.
21:46A rocket,
21:46by nature,
21:47was never designed
21:48to be used
21:50for close air support,
21:51but we did that
21:52because we had
21:53the confidence
21:54in our people,
21:55and we knew
21:55exactly how close
21:56we could get
21:57on occasions
21:58that we fired
21:58within 20 meters
21:59of our soldiers.
22:08Within seconds
22:09of touching down
22:10in the LZ,
22:11the slicks
22:11were lifting off again
22:12to avoid taking fire
22:14from enemy forces
22:14in the immediate area.
22:15The flight crews
22:17usually headed
22:17to the nearest
22:18refueling area
22:19where they rapidly
22:20prepared their ships
22:21for a return flight
22:22to extract
22:23the rifle squads.
22:28In many instances,
22:30the Blues
22:31were in contact
22:31from the minute
22:32they set down
22:33in the LZ.
22:34In others,
22:35they met
22:35with absolutely
22:36no resistance.
22:38Even when
22:38no contact
22:39was made,
22:40the troops
22:40still performed
22:41a critical mission
22:42for the division
22:42as they searched
22:43for signs
22:44of enemy activity.
22:45NVA and
22:50Viet Cong troops
22:51were lightly equipped
22:52so that they could
22:53move more quickly.
22:55To support
22:55offensive campaigns,
22:57the Communists
22:58stashed weapons,
22:59ammunition,
23:00and other supplies
23:00ahead of time
23:01in hamlets,
23:02tunnels,
23:03or along jungle trails.
23:04The troops
23:10of the rifle platoon
23:11generally probed
23:12these same areas
23:13in an attempt
23:14to locate enemy troops
23:15or to develop
23:16intelligence
23:17about recent activity.
23:19As a result,
23:20they often uncovered
23:21enemy staging areas,
23:22supply stores,
23:23and weapons caches.
23:24When significant
23:28finds were made,
23:30additional ground
23:31units were inserted
23:32to provide security
23:33and to expand
23:34the search.
23:36At times,
23:37it was clear
23:38that enemy forces
23:39had been present
23:39just minutes
23:40before the platoon's
23:41arrival.
23:42developing intelligence
23:48was a critical
23:49component
23:50of the rifle platoon's
23:51mission.
23:52Hamlets,
23:52bunkers,
23:53and the surrounding
23:54terrain
23:54were thoroughly searched
23:55for maps,
23:56battle plans,
23:57or any other documents
23:59that might provide
24:00an indication
24:00of enemy strength
24:02and objectives.
24:08Captured
24:09North Vietnamese
24:09and Viet Cong troops
24:11provided some
24:12of the most
24:12valuable information.
24:16When possible,
24:18prisoners were
24:18immediately interrogated
24:20regarding the position,
24:21strength,
24:21and movement
24:22of other forces
24:23in the area.
24:27Periodically,
24:28the Blues uncovered
24:29large weapons caches
24:31containing hundreds
24:32of rifles,
24:33machine guns,
24:34rockets,
24:34and grenades.
24:36The cache sites
24:37were often positioned
24:38near enemy objectives
24:39or staging areas,
24:40providing the division
24:42with intelligence
24:43on impending offensives.
24:47Other important finds
24:48included hidden food stores,
24:50some of which
24:51contained enough rice
24:52to feed hundreds
24:53of troops for days.
24:55Once hidden provisions
24:56had been discovered,
24:57the Blues generally
24:58continued to search
24:59the immediate area,
25:00while other elements
25:01of the division
25:02recovered or destroyed
25:03the supplies.
25:04When no contact
25:09could be established,
25:10the rifle squads
25:11notified the lift ships
25:13of their position
25:13and requested extraction
25:15from the area.
25:16If the patrol
25:17had traveled far
25:18or if they needed
25:19to be extracted quickly
25:20to follow up
25:21on new leads,
25:22a makeshift LZ
25:23was carved out
25:24by the nearest
25:24available clearing.
25:28By the end of 1965,
25:31the 1st Cavalry Division
25:32had succeeded
25:33in shutting down
25:34the NVA's offensive
25:35in the Highlands
25:36and validating
25:37the concept
25:38of an air mobile division
25:39in combat.
25:41The Air Cavalry Squadron
25:42proved to be
25:43a critical factor
25:44in the division's operations.
25:46The success
25:47of the squadron
25:48eventually led
25:49to the creation
25:49of other Air Cavalry units,
25:51which were incorporated
25:52into the operations
25:53of existing U.S. divisions.
25:56Despite the squadron's
25:58initial accomplishments,
25:59their role in the war
26:00had only just begun.
26:03For nearly six more years,
26:05the world's first
26:06Air Cavalry unit
26:07would relentlessly pursue
26:09NVA and Viet Cong forces
26:11throughout the Highlands
26:12of Vietnam and beyond.
26:19Air Cavalry Recony
26:21reconnaissance missions
26:22were inherently unpredictable.
26:24Every man in the squadron
26:25knew that they could stumble
26:26into a major battle
26:28at any time.
26:29That, in fact,
26:30was their goal.
26:31On March 30, 1966,
26:34that's exactly what happened
26:35as the 1st of the 9th
26:37returned to patrol
26:38the western edges
26:39of the Central Highlands.
26:41We were back
26:42in the area working,
26:44trying to develop
26:45some additional indications,
26:48intelligence-wise,
26:49about enemy movements
26:50coming in,
26:50because they were always
26:51coming across
26:52that Cambodia border.
26:54No matter what
26:55the State Department said,
26:56the Secretary of Defense
26:57or President Johnson said,
26:58it was a major staging area
27:01on the other side
27:02of that Cambodia border.
27:04A pink team working the area
27:06had fired on suspected
27:08enemy positions,
27:09but was unable
27:10to draw return fire.
27:12Air Force fighters
27:13conducted low-level bombing runs,
27:15but also received nothing
27:16in return.
27:18Suspecting that a well-trained
27:19enemy element
27:20was in the vicinity,
27:21Squadron Command
27:22ordered a rifle platoon in
27:24to develop the situation
27:25on the ground.
27:27Captain Dave Allen,
27:28commander of the Squadron's
27:29air weapons platoon,
27:31requested additional airstrikes
27:32in response to concerns
27:34about enemy threats
27:35in the area.
27:38Fearing that further delay
27:39could result in a lost opportunity
27:41to engage the enemy,
27:43the request was denied
27:44and the decision was made
27:45to insert the blues.
27:47Captain Allen and his pilot,
27:48Dave Fields,
27:49led the gunships
27:50of the weapons platoon
27:51as they escorted
27:52the lift ships
27:53into the area.
27:55I think all of us,
27:57and even more so
27:58in retrospect,
27:58as you remember
27:59these things,
28:00you had this uneasy feeling
28:02that this was not going
28:04to be a normal-type mission.
28:07We went out there,
28:08we put the infantry
28:09on the ground
28:09the same way we did
28:10other insertions,
28:11as the scouts made
28:11the low-level recon,
28:12picked up the landing zone.
28:15The lift boats
28:16started coming in
28:17on a long final
28:17either in trail
28:19or in a staggered formation,
28:21preceded by the guns.
28:23We reconned by fire
28:24and I will be damned
28:25we didn't draw
28:26a bit of fire
28:27out of that landing zone.
28:37Satisfied that an insertion
28:38could be made safely,
28:39the gunships
28:40escorted the slicks
28:41into the landing zone.
28:43Within seconds,
28:45the ships were touching down
28:46and the troopers
28:47were fanning out
28:48across the LZ.
28:50Circling above,
28:51the gunships
28:52continued to monitor
28:53the platoon's progress,
28:55ready to lay down
28:56a barrage of suppressive fire
28:57at the first sign
28:58of trouble.
29:00Moments later,
29:01the slicks were lifting off again
29:03and the platoon was left
29:05to scour the area
29:06for signs of enemy activity.
29:10Ten minutes had gone by
29:12and the guys on the ground
29:13said,
29:13we've got a prisoner,
29:15NVA prisoner.
29:17Yes,
29:18the NVA prisoner tells us
29:19that there are
29:19a thousand soldiers
29:20who are surrounded.
29:23Decision was made
29:24to get her ass
29:24out of there.
29:26Lift ships have gone
29:27in the wrong direction,
29:28gunships are down
29:29to half their load,
29:30no artillery is capable
29:32to get in there,
29:34air force is not available
29:35and it turned into
29:38a major battle
29:40in which we lost
29:42people and aircraft.
29:45You get down to the point
29:46that in a matter of
29:4830 to 45 minutes
29:50it was all over.
29:52We lost a lift ship
29:53in the LZ,
29:55was shot down
29:56and crashed
29:57right in front of me.
29:59Another lift ship
30:00took off,
30:01had the control
30:02shot out both pilots.
30:03One was blinded,
30:04the other one
30:05was hit in the shoulders
30:07and the arms
30:08and was incapacitated.
30:10Crew chief was able
30:11to fly the aircraft
30:12back about 10 or 15 miles
30:14with no hydraulics,
30:16no flying experience.
30:17A young soldier
30:18just in the heat of battle
30:20knew what he had to do
30:21and pulled back
30:23the incapacitated pilot,
30:25got in the seat
30:26and flew the aircraft.
30:26I lost two gunships.
30:30We recovered
30:30our own crews.
30:32We lost
30:33an additional lift ship
30:34trying to get out
30:35the remaining guys
30:36and the word was
30:38just cut our losses,
30:40lick our wounds
30:41and wait until
30:42we get some reinforcements
30:43to come in here.
30:44The last runs
30:46with our gunships
30:47was no ammunition.
30:49We had sea ration cans
30:51full of food.
30:52We had submachine guns.
30:56I had a submachine gun
30:59in my lap.
31:00I had a .38 caliber
31:01strapped to my waist
31:03and on our last two passes
31:05that's what we used.
31:06We were throwing sea ration
31:07cans out the window
31:09at the enemy.
31:11I had an M5 system
31:12on the front of the aircraft,
31:14the only one in the troop.
31:15Carried 150 rounds in that
31:17was rapidly expended
31:20and you knew
31:22that your ass
31:22was hanging out
31:23on a limb,
31:24that you were going
31:24to get shot down
31:25and you saw guys
31:26in front of you
31:26just got aircraft
31:27completely blow on up
31:28and people's bodies
31:29being thrown out
31:30of the thing.
31:31But you also knew
31:32that you were being paid
31:34to provide that organization
31:36with firepower
31:39and when they crashed
31:41it was your responsibility
31:42to the last moment
31:45to do the best
31:45you could
31:46to get them out of there
31:47and we all did.
31:49We were terrified.
31:51I can remember
31:52when that thing
31:52started to unfold
31:53and we had no more
31:54ammunition
31:55and I turned to Dave
31:57and I said
31:57get out your .38
31:58I got mine on my side
32:00and sea rations
32:01were going back in
32:02and he said
32:03is anybody going
32:04to follow us?
32:05And I said
32:05Dave I don't give a damn
32:06it's you and I
32:07but those guys
32:08are going to follow us
32:09I know it
32:09so I get on the radio
32:10and call
32:10and even to this day
32:12I can hear my voice
32:13which is several
32:14octaves higher
32:15it sounded as if
32:17I had cotton
32:17in my mouth
32:18and all I got
32:19in return
32:20was Roger Red
32:21we're behind you
32:22and they went
32:24right on in there
32:24and took their licks
32:25but there were
32:26decisions made
32:27in that
32:28as to
32:28do we go back in
32:30do we put
32:31ourselves on the line
32:32and there are no heroes
32:35in situations like that
32:37you react
32:38because of your training
32:39and we were
32:40a well trained unit.
32:41fire support
32:44from the gunship
32:45succeeded
32:45in keeping pressure
32:46off the beleaguered
32:47rifle platoon
32:48and prevented
32:48a major disaster
32:49additional elements
32:51were eventually
32:52brought in
32:52to relieve the force
32:53but by the following
32:55morning
32:55the battle
32:55was clearly over
32:56in a pattern
32:58that became
32:58all too familiar
32:59the North Vietnamese
33:00had broken contact
33:02and retreated
33:03during the night
33:03by early 1966
33:06the NVA
33:07had felt the barbs
33:08of the air cavalry
33:09enough times
33:10to learn
33:11that scouts
33:12gunships
33:12and rifle platoons
33:13were just the tip
33:15of the iceberg
33:15if any one
33:17of these elements
33:18compromised
33:18an NVA position
33:19they realized
33:20that an avalanche
33:21of troops
33:22would soon be
33:23piled into the area
33:24to engage them
33:25in battle
33:25an intensive search
33:28was mounted
33:29for enemy combat
33:30elements
33:30but virtually
33:31none could be found
33:32some light resistance
33:34was encountered
33:35however it was evident
33:36that the main body
33:37of the force
33:38was probably miles
33:39from the area
33:40and had likely
33:40crossed back
33:41into Cambodia
33:42well beyond
33:43the reach
33:43of U.S. forces
33:44the cavalry troopers
33:46had undoubtedly
33:47inflicted heavy damage
33:48on the NVA
33:49some have estimated
33:51that hundreds
33:51of enemy troops
33:52were killed
33:52or wounded
33:53however the exact
33:54number of enemy
33:56casualties in this
33:57and many other
33:58engagements
33:58would never be known
33:59NVA and Viet Cong
34:01forces regularly
34:02took enormous risks
34:04to sanitize battle areas
34:06as they withdrew
34:07removing most
34:08of their dead
34:08and wounded
34:09and any weapons
34:10or supplies
34:11before U.S. troops
34:12could arrive
34:13some of these risks
34:15were taken out of
34:15respect for the dead
34:16and a desire
34:17to save the wounded
34:18others were taken
34:20as part of a well
34:21orchestrated plan
34:22to erode political
34:23support for the war
34:24effort
34:24by eliminating evidence
34:26from successful
34:27allied operations
34:28the march 30th battle
34:33was largely
34:33the result of chance
34:35or what was typically
34:36known in the air
34:37cavalry squadron
34:38as a meeting engagement
34:40rather than an
34:41outright enemy ambush
34:42the NVA and Viet Cong
34:44knew that cavalry units
34:45were always out
34:46looking for them
34:47the communists
34:48made every effort
34:49to conceal their positions
34:50and to maintain
34:52strict fire discipline
34:53at the same time
34:55they were always prepared
34:56to unleash a powerful
34:57attack against the cavalry
34:58if discovered
34:59the men of the rifle
35:02platoons often paid
35:03most dearly for this
35:04most of their casualties
35:06were taken
35:07during the last
35:08critical moments
35:09of an insertion
35:09as the slicks
35:10were touching down
35:11when the enemy
35:12became certain
35:13that their positions
35:14were in jeopardy
35:15however
35:20without the troopers
35:21courageous efforts
35:21to develop the situation
35:23on the ground
35:24many large NVA operations
35:26may have remained
35:27unchallenged
35:28and resulted
35:29in even greater losses
35:30for U.S. and allied forces
35:31throughout Vietnam
35:32in 1968
35:42the strength
35:43of the air cavalry's
35:44hunter-killer teams
35:45was dramatically increased
35:47with the arrival
35:48of the Bell
35:49AH-1 Huey Cobra
35:51the Cobra
35:52which rapidly replaced
35:53the cavalry's
35:54modified Huey gunships
35:55was the world's
35:57first helicopter
35:58designed specifically
35:59for armed combat
36:00these powerful
36:02highly maneuverable
36:03attack birds
36:04could carry up to
36:0552 rockets
36:06in side-mounted pods
36:07and were equipped
36:08with a rotating
36:09chin turret
36:10that housed
36:11a combination
36:11of grenade launchers
36:13and miniguns
36:13a two-man team
36:15operated the gunship
36:16in a unique arrangement
36:17that placed a gunner
36:19in the nose of the aircraft
36:20and a pilot
36:21slightly above
36:22and behind him
36:23to increase
36:24combat visibility
36:25the hunter-killers
36:28were further strengthened
36:29by the arrival
36:30of the Hughes
36:31OH-6 Cayuse
36:32a light observation helicopter
36:34more commonly known
36:35as the Loach
36:36this small
36:37fast
36:38and nimble aircraft
36:39replaced
36:40the outdated
36:40and vulnerable
36:41Sioux Scout
36:42as the cavalry's
36:43primary reconnaissance vehicle
36:45the Loach
36:48was armed
36:48with a minigun
36:49which the pilot
36:50fired from the left
36:51side of the aircraft
36:52and a 60 caliber
36:53machine gun
36:54which was fired
36:55by a door gunner
36:56in the rear
36:56next to the Huey
36:59the Loach
36:59became the most
37:00widely used
37:01helicopter
37:01of the Vietnam War
37:03and proved
37:04to be an invaluable
37:05addition
37:05to the air cavalry's fleet
37:07despite the introduction
37:11of new
37:11and improved aircraft
37:12the strategies
37:13and organization
37:14of the squadron
37:15essentially remained
37:16unchanged
37:17from the experimental days
37:18of the 11th Air Assault Division
37:20in fact
37:21scout pilots
37:23used the fast
37:24and agile Loach
37:25to probe even closer
37:26to suspected
37:27North Vietnamese
37:28and Viet Cong positions
37:29as a general rule
37:33if a new scout
37:34lasted for a couple
37:35of months
37:35he would be able
37:37to survive
37:37even the most
37:38hair-raising encounters
37:39still the chances
37:44remained high
37:45that he would
37:45eventually
37:46be brought down
37:47some of the terms
37:51we had back then
37:52was
37:52we go fishing
37:53we go fishing
37:55with three people
37:55and three people
37:56were in a Loach
37:57and these guys
37:59you know
38:00did some tremendous
38:01things
38:02but we went fishing
38:02with people
38:03to prevent
38:05the loss
38:05of a Loach
38:06the squadron
38:07developed sophisticated
38:08and extremely precise tactics
38:10for employing
38:11the Cobra's
38:11potent new weapon systems
38:13flying roughly
38:14a thousand feet above
38:16but slightly behind
38:17the Loach
38:17the Cobra's flight team
38:19watched and waited
38:20poised to strike
38:22at the first sign
38:23of trouble
38:23if the scout pilot
38:25decided it was time
38:26to pull power
38:27and get out of there
38:28very quickly
38:28the front seater
38:30or the x-rays
38:31we called him
38:31his job
38:32with the minigun
38:33was to have his hand
38:35on the action bar
38:36and the turret
38:37so if the Loach
38:39took fire
38:39he could have
38:40minigun rounds
38:42down around
38:43the Loach
38:44behind him
38:44preferably
38:45not in front of him
38:46within about 15 seconds
38:4810 to 15 seconds
38:49and we practiced that
38:50if you couldn't do it
38:52and you got all flustered
38:53in the front seat
38:53and you couldn't put
38:54steel on target
38:55in less than 15 seconds
38:56you didn't fly anymore
38:57in the front seat
38:57because you couldn't
38:58support the Loach
38:58now as the aircraft commander
39:00then while you're doing that
39:02you're moving the aircraft
39:04in to get a line
39:05so you can shoot rockets
39:06because it may be
39:08he stumbled upon
39:08the lead of a company
39:10size force
39:11one or two hundred people
39:12maybe a regiment
39:13you don't really know
39:14so you want to be able
39:15to put rockets down
39:16around him
39:17in case he's flying
39:17in the wrong direction
39:18if he's flying
39:19in the wrong direction
39:20into more enemy troops
39:21and their fire discipline
39:22is controlled
39:23where now they can
39:24shoot at any helicopter
39:25because they've
39:26exposed themselves
39:27then you want to be able
39:28to put rockets down
39:29around him
39:30behind him
39:30or in front of him
39:32maybe
39:32and in less than
39:34thirty seconds
39:34you want rockets
39:35impacting around the Loach
39:37to help suppress the fire
39:38so he can get out of there
39:39and you're hoping
39:41you're rolling the dice
39:41will that Loach
39:42get out of there
39:42without getting hit
39:43or getting shot down
39:44despite the intense
39:46and even heroic
39:47attempts of gunship crews
39:49to prevent scout losses
39:50there was often
39:51nothing that could be done
39:52scout crews suffered
39:54some of the highest
39:55casualty rates
39:56of any U.S. servicemen
39:57over 650 Loaches alone
40:00were shot down
40:01more than 22%
40:03of all U.S. helicopters
40:04lost in combat
40:05losing a scout crew
40:12was perhaps
40:13the worst fear
40:14of a gunship pilot
40:15flying in the air
40:16cavalry squadron
40:17the crews
40:18of the hunter-killer teams
40:20often forged
40:20intense bonds
40:21as they confronted
40:22danger and even death
40:24on a daily basis
40:25on August 9th
40:281969
40:29a Pink Team
40:31was sent to investigate
40:32a large enemy store
40:34of rice
40:34for a potential airstrike
40:36as was often the case
40:38however
40:38they uncovered
40:39something far greater
40:40in the process
40:41Captain Joe Bowen
40:43was commanding
40:44the Pink Team's
40:44Cobra gunship
40:45as it flew cover
40:46for the scout below
40:47we got up there
40:49at about 8.15
40:50the morning
40:51Steve Young
40:52which was 1.2
40:52I'd flown with Steve
40:54quite a bit
40:54and scouts with him
40:56as an observer
40:56with him
40:57and he's checking
40:59out the rice
41:00and it's a lot of rice
41:02and yes
41:03it's good for an airstrike
41:04waiting for the fighters
41:05to get on station
41:06and the fighters
41:06are a little late
41:07so we started
41:09going back west
41:10he said he thought
41:11he saw some activity
41:12recent activity
41:13about 2 kilometers
41:14to the west
41:14of where the rice was
41:15so we headed back west
41:17I was again
41:18about 1,000 feet
41:19behind him
41:19and above him
41:21and he was going
41:22about 100 miles an hour
41:23to get to this other area
41:25he saw
41:26recent activity
41:26and all of a sudden
41:29all around him
41:29both sides of him
41:30it was just flashes
41:32muzzle flashes
41:33and he got off
41:34one call
41:35one two
41:37taking fire
41:37going down
41:38going down
41:38and he immediately
41:41tumbled
41:42and blew up
41:43and I'm right behind him
41:45just couldn't believe
41:46that it happened
41:46called a mayday
41:48down
41:49down bird
41:49I'm going down
41:51the front seat
41:52Gene Olsen
41:53who was killed
41:54a little later on
41:54in January
41:55he's putting minigun
41:56fire down around him
41:57but we can see
41:58where he's at
41:58because he's a ball of fire
41:59where he went in
42:00I'm putting rockets down
42:02and flechettes down
42:03around the enemy
42:04and it wasn't
42:05normal for us
42:06we didn't see
42:07maybe 15-20 people
42:08at one time
42:09if we saw that many
42:10people in the open
42:11it was a big event
42:12we may have seen
42:1315-20 people
42:13three or four times
42:14during the day
42:15but we never saw
42:16a big company
42:17size unit
42:18and this was
42:19the biggest
42:19I'd ever seen
42:20these were hundreds
42:21of people
42:22and they came out
42:22of the tree line
42:23shooting
42:24they'd been exposed
42:26and they started
42:27shooting
42:27and I made it down
42:29don't know how
42:30and came on down
42:31around him
42:32and our job
42:32was to
42:33find the enemy
42:35and fix him
42:36but our job
42:36to ourselves
42:37was to
42:38take care of each other
42:39and
42:40we tried that
42:42for Steve
42:43and his crew
42:45they were killed
42:48and
42:49we would risk
42:51everything
42:51to try and recover
42:52our friends
42:53but we didn't know
42:54if everybody was dead
42:55the force is inbound
42:57their enemy around
42:57they're shooting
42:59and I'm hovering around
43:00and they're scared
43:01they look like
43:02brand new uniforms
43:03fresh troops
43:04so
43:04that battle calculus
43:06you're thinking about
43:06fresh troops
43:07scared
43:08just been
43:08constricted
43:10or whatever
43:10they're shooting
43:11but they're shooting
43:12aiming to the left
43:13and you're in front of them
43:13so they're not good shots
43:14so they're probably
43:16more scared than we are
43:17and Gene and I
43:18we're just
43:19we're terrified ourselves
43:21and
43:22I thought I was
43:24taking a couple of hits
43:24and Gene was talking about
43:26it was my knees
43:26bouncing
43:27inside the crew compartment
43:29I was so afraid
43:30my knees were banging
43:31back and forth
43:31I got to hover down
43:33around him
43:33and
43:34could look down
43:35and could see
43:36Steve and
43:38Steve are at the front seat
43:39the left observer
43:40still in their seats
43:41burning
43:41could not see the door gunner
43:43and weren't sure
43:45if the door gunner
43:46had been thrown out
43:47before an impact or not
43:48so because we had
43:50a down third
43:51and potentially
43:52one of our soldiers
43:53one of our
43:54Cav troopers
43:55on the ground
43:55alive
43:56the full force
43:58of the rescue
43:59and take care of your own
44:00was in process
44:01there was an unspoken bond
44:03in the cavalry squadron
44:05that if you went down
44:06no matter what happened
44:07someone would always
44:08come for you
44:09within minutes
44:10of Captain Bowen's call
44:12slicks from the squadron's
44:13rifle platoon
44:14had lifted off
44:15and were en route
44:16to the downed scout
44:17at the same time
44:20gunships from the
44:21weapons platoon
44:22were racing in
44:23to provide fire support
44:24and up to an additional
44:26battalion of the
44:27division's infantry
44:28were being airlifted
44:29into the area
44:29despite the potential
44:34danger on the ground
44:35the rifle platoon
44:36was inserted
44:37to secure a landing zone
44:38near the crash site
44:40initially the rifle platoon
44:45and two platoons of infantry
44:46from a quick reaction force
44:48encountered light resistance
44:50in and around the LZ
44:51as they were attempting
44:53to secure the area
44:54another infantry company
44:55was inserted
44:56to support those
44:57already on the ground
44:58almost immediately
45:02a heavy firefight
45:03broke out
45:04and the entire force
45:05was pinned down
45:06as the fight intensified
45:08the men were forced
45:09to set up defensive
45:10positions around the LZ
45:11throughout the morning
45:13additional reinforcements
45:14arrived in an attempt
45:15to expand the defensive
45:16perimeter
45:17until a full infantry
45:19battalion had become
45:20engaged in the battle
45:21it soon became apparent
45:24that the enemy force
45:25was much larger
45:26than anyone had expected
45:27realizing that his troops
45:29were over committed
45:30and that they were being
45:31overwhelmed
45:32the battalion commander
45:33requested that the entire force
45:35be extracted from the area
45:36ultimately the troops
45:39had to wait
45:40until last light
45:41before they could be
45:42pulled to safety
45:43at least four Americans
45:45were killed
45:45and twenty were wounded
45:47during the engagement
45:48however while the damage
45:50inflicted on the cavalry
45:51was significant
45:52the overall situation
45:53could have been much worse
45:55because of the battle
46:00American commanders
46:01were alerted to the fact
46:02that at least an entire
46:03NVA regiment
46:04had crossed the Cambodian border
46:06and was preparing
46:07for a major offensive
46:08the following night
46:10a series of massive attacks
46:12were launched
46:13against allied installations
46:14nearby
46:15until the cavalry's engagement
46:19few knew
46:20that an enemy force
46:21of that size
46:22was operating
46:23anywhere near the area
46:24let alone
46:25that one was mounting
46:26a large scale offensive
46:28while the battle
46:32itself was not
46:33characteristic
46:33of most cavalry
46:34operations
46:35many critical elements
46:36of the incident
46:37were
46:37the scout crew's
46:39courageous
46:40and skillful attempts
46:41to locate the enemy
46:42prompted the entire
46:43engagement
46:44the willingness
46:45of squadron troopers
46:46to risk everything
46:47to recover down comrades
46:49developed the situation
46:50on the ground
46:51the speed
46:52and flexibility
46:53of the entire force
46:54in responding
46:55to changing conditions
46:56produced an all-out battle
46:58with the NVA
46:59in the end
47:02the squadron's
47:03initial contact
47:04provided allied forces
47:06with enough warning
47:07to prepare
47:07for the enemy's offensive
47:08possibly preventing
47:10a major disaster
47:11disaster
47:11in saving dozens
47:12if not hundreds
47:14of lives
47:14throughout most
47:21of the Vietnam War
47:22allied forces
47:24were prohibited
47:24from striking enemy
47:25sanctuaries
47:26located in Laos
47:27and Cambodia
47:28the restrictions
47:29were especially
47:30frustrating
47:31for the troops
47:32of the 1st Cavalry Division
47:33who routinely
47:34engaged North Vietnamese
47:36and Viet Cong troops
47:37during offensives
47:38launched from these areas
47:39on May 1st 1970
47:44the frustration
47:45ended
47:46at least temporarily
47:47as the division
47:48launched a massive
47:49incursion into Cambodia
47:50in conjunction
47:51with the South Vietnamese
47:53army
47:53throughout the
47:55two-month campaign
47:57the division's
47:58air cavalry squadron
47:59proved once again
48:00to be a critical
48:01component of successful
48:02air mobile operations
48:04from escorting
48:05a massive flight
48:06of slicks
48:07into a secured
48:07landing zone
48:08to performing
48:10intensive aerial
48:11and ground reconnaissance
48:12the squadron
48:13became the workhorse
48:14of the entire campaign
48:16the assault
48:19was designed
48:20to take the fight
48:20to the enemy
48:21by defeating
48:22the communists
48:22in their own backyard
48:23the targets
48:25were the hidden
48:25base camps
48:26and supply stores
48:27that had plagued
48:28U.S. and allied forces
48:29since the early 1960s
48:31key to the entire operation
48:36was the speed
48:37flexibility
48:38and element of surprise
48:39inherent in an air mobile
48:41fighting force overall
48:42and in the air cavalry's
48:44tactics in particular
48:45the assault
48:48was a dramatic success
48:49perhaps the greatest
48:53discovery of the campaign
48:54was an area that came
48:55to be known
48:55as the city
48:56air cavalry
48:58reconnaissance
48:59had uncovered
48:59a well-developed
49:01enemy planning
49:01training
49:02and storage area
49:03that spanned
49:04more than three
49:05square kilometers
49:06further probing
49:09uncovered
49:09more than
49:10180 storage bunkers
49:1218 mess halls
49:13classrooms
49:14a firing range
49:16and even a small
49:17animal farm
49:17while NVA forces
49:19had evacuated
49:20the site
49:21captured supply records
49:23and other intelligence
49:24indicated that the area
49:25had served
49:26as a well-organized
49:27storage depot
49:28and training facility
49:29for replacement troops
49:30being sent
49:31from North Vietnam
49:32supplies captured
49:39from this cash site alone
49:40included more than
49:411,500 infantry
49:42and anti-aircraft guns
49:442 million rounds
49:45of ammunition
49:4658,000 pounds
49:48of plastic explosives
49:4922 cases
49:50of anti-personnel mines
49:52thousands of grenades
49:54and mortars
49:54and nearly 30 tons
49:56of rice
49:57the move into Cambodia
50:03exceeded all expectations
50:05and proved to be
50:06one of the most
50:07successful operations
50:08in the history
50:09of the 1st Cavalry Division
50:11while controversial
50:12many argued
50:14that such an offensive
50:15should have been
50:15mounted much sooner
50:16if allied forces
50:18had been able
50:19to prevent the communists
50:20from amassing troops
50:21and supplies
50:22just outside
50:23of South Vietnam
50:24it is possible
50:25that the outcome
50:26of the war
50:26would have been
50:27very different
50:28throughout the Cambodian campaign
50:36and the entire
50:37Vietnam War
50:38the 1st Cavalry Division
50:40repeatedly demonstrated
50:41the potency
50:42of air mobility
50:43redefining the capabilities
50:45of conventional ground forces
50:47forever
50:47however
50:49the division's
50:50extraordinary success
50:51may never have been
50:52possible
50:53without the scouts
50:54the gunships
50:55and the rifle platoons
50:56of the division's
50:57Air Cavalry Squadron
50:58it was their
51:00courageous attempts
51:01to seek out
51:02and engage the enemy
51:03that enabled
51:04the notion
51:04of an air mobile division
51:06to be taken
51:06from concept
51:07to reality
51:08in the jungles
51:10and marshlands
51:11of South Vietnam
51:12South Vietnam
51:23South Vietnam
51:25and tacky