For educational purposes
The conflict in Vietnam was often referred to as the Helicopter War. The helicopter played all sorts of roles during the Vietnam War, from transport and search-rescue to MEDEVAC and heavily armed gunships.
Certainly, it was here that helicopters became most useful, but not only in what has previously been considered their only role as a transport vehicle.
Before Vietnam, the helicopter was valued for its ability to evacuate wounded soldiers from trouble, but virtually ignored was its capabilities as an offensive weapon.
The long war in Southeast Asia would see that change dramatically. Now they were developed into specialist fighting machines, carrying cannons and rockets.
The conflict in Vietnam was often referred to as the Helicopter War. The helicopter played all sorts of roles during the Vietnam War, from transport and search-rescue to MEDEVAC and heavily armed gunships.
Certainly, it was here that helicopters became most useful, but not only in what has previously been considered their only role as a transport vehicle.
Before Vietnam, the helicopter was valued for its ability to evacuate wounded soldiers from trouble, but virtually ignored was its capabilities as an offensive weapon.
The long war in Southeast Asia would see that change dramatically. Now they were developed into specialist fighting machines, carrying cannons and rockets.
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LearningTranscript
00:00Transcribed by —
00:30Transcribed by —
01:00That time was before the Vietnam War.
01:04This is the story of how men and machinery adapted to the peculiar needs of unconventional warfare
01:10to produce a most unusual and deadly weapon system, the helicopter gunship.
01:15It is the story of how the missions of these gunships expanded from one of softening a landing zone in preparation of an infantry assault
01:29to one of entirely eliminating enemy resistance from the air.
01:35And it is the story of how, in less than a decade,
01:38the theory of armed helicopters moved from rudimentary makeshift designs
01:43to one of the most advanced and potent weapon systems of the day, the Huey Cobra.
01:48In December of 1961, the U.S. began deploying its first Army aviation units to South Vietnam.
02:06These units were sent to bolster South Vietnamese forces
02:10who were struggling to combat a communist war of insurgency mounted by Viet Cong guerrillas.
02:15The flight crews of these early forces were equipped with dozens of Piasecki H-21 Shawnee transport helicopters,
02:24also known as workhorses.
02:25Their mission was to ferry South Vietnamese troops into battle.
02:33The idea was to offset the guerrillas' ability to exploit the jungle environment with great skill,
02:39to freely wage a widespread campaign of terror in remote, difficult terrain
02:44by rapidly inserting troops into areas of recent Viet Cong activity.
02:51This relatively new approach to battle seemed promising.
02:54However, the Viet Cong quickly realized that the large, slow-moving, and unarmed transports
03:00were extremely vulnerable to ground fire.
03:03The downing of several Shawnees rapidly led to the employment of fighter escorts for the transports.
03:10However, the mismatch in airspeed often left the vulnerable transport crews uncovered
03:15at the worst possible moments of an operation.
03:18As a result, the U.S. Army began exploring the concept of armed helicopters
03:23with great interest in mid-1962.
03:29During the mid-1950s, a small group of pioneering Army aviators
03:34conducted a series of crude experiments with armed helicopters.
03:39Scrounging scrap materials from service junkyards,
03:42they improvised various combinations of rockets and machine guns
03:46in the face of outright ridicule and opposition.
03:52At the same time, they began developing tactics with the idea that, in time,
03:57the technology of helicopter armament would catch up to the theory.
04:01By mid-1957, the men had successfully armed several helicopters
04:09with a variety of unlikely weapons,
04:11and had formed a sky-calf platoon,
04:14which became notorious for dramatic demonstrations of reconnaissance by fire.
04:19Building on these pioneering efforts,
04:21the Army formed the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company
04:25and deployed it to Vietnam in mid-1962.
04:30The company was equipped with 15 A-model Bell UH-1s,
04:35otherwise known as Hueys.
04:38Each Huey had a pair of .30-caliber machine guns
04:40mounted on the landing skids.
04:43Ammunition for the guns was fed through a pair of holes
04:45cut in the cabin floor.
04:47This simple fixed-gun system required the pilot to maneuver the aircraft
04:52in order to place fire on target.
04:55The most lethal aspect of these early gunships
04:57was the addition of 16 2.75-inch folding-fin rockets.
05:05While the A-model Hueys represented dramatic new force in Army weaponry,
05:10they merely represented the first step
05:12in a rapid evolution process
05:14that would produce some of the most potent weapon systems of all time.
05:23In less than six months,
05:26the UTT began receiving more powerful B-model Hueys.
05:30The most dramatic modification to these new gunships
05:34was the addition of a factory-installed M60 flex gun system.
05:38Two 7.62-millimeter machine guns were mounted on mechanical arms
05:43that stuck out from the Hueys' fuselage.
05:48Flexible ammunition chutes fed thousands of rounds
05:51to all four guns from inside the aircraft's cabin.
05:55The system was controlled remotely by the co-pilot,
05:57who sat in the front left seat.
05:59The guns were electronically linked to a pistol grip sight
06:03that dropped down from the ceiling.
06:05As the co-pilot tracked targets with the sight,
06:08the guns instantaneously responded,
06:11traversing 70 degrees right and left and up and down.
06:17In the short span of several months,
06:19the Huey was transformed from a common utility helicopter
06:23to a lethal attacking force.
06:29The timing couldn't have been better
06:31for the American transport crews
06:33and their Vietnamese Army cargo.
06:35As the U.S. advisory and support roles expanded rapidly,
06:40the Viet Cong increased the scope and intensity
06:42of their operations
06:44and developed sophisticated tactics
06:46for countering threats posed by air mobile forces.
06:49Each day, gunships from the provisional UTT helicopter
06:53company set out from Tansunut Air Base
06:55on the outskirts of Saigon
06:56to support the day's operations.
07:00Throughout the day, the teams would join up
07:02with transportation companies throughout the country
07:05as they prepared for an airborne assault.
07:10The test unit had a dual mission
07:12during these early operations.
07:14While they were fighting a real war
07:16and providing cover for the transports,
07:18their performance was scrutinized
07:20to evaluate the armed helicopter
07:22in the escort role.
07:25While not clearly defined,
07:27gunship crews quickly realized
07:29that the escort mission broke down
07:30into three critical phases.
07:35During the initial, or en route, phase,
07:38the entire flight remained
07:39at a relatively safe altitude,
07:41roughly 2,000 feet.
07:43If enemy ground fire was spotted,
07:45the gunships could break off
07:47from the formation to attack.
07:48However, the heavily laden gunships
07:51could rarely overtake the air mobile force
07:53once they broke off.
07:57During the approach phase,
07:59a reconnaissance element
08:00of two to four armed helicopters
08:02preceded the flight by one to five minutes
08:05to evaluate the situation up ahead.
08:07The remaining escorts usually flanked
08:12the transports in a trail formation.
08:15If additional armed ships were available,
08:17they flew behind the transports
08:19to engage any enemy threats
08:20directly under the flight.
08:22As the gunships approached the LZ,
08:24the pilots scanned the terrain
08:26for potential enemy threats,
08:28poised to fire at the first sign of trouble.
08:31Behind them, a crew chief
08:33and an additional door gunner
08:34ensured that no enemy fire
08:36emerged from the sides
08:37or soft underbelly
08:39of the vulnerable flight.
08:42Initially, gunship crews
08:43were restricted from firing
08:45unless the flight
08:46had clearly been fired upon.
08:48While the restriction was intended
08:50to prevent accidental civilian casualties,
08:52it also posed an enormous threat
08:54for the airborne force.
08:56The Viet Cong often waited
08:58until the vulnerable lift ships
09:00were actually in the LZ
09:01before opening fire.
09:04By February of 1963,
09:06the rules had been modified
09:07to allow for fire
09:08when an enemy threat
09:09had clearly been identified.
09:11This subtle distinction
09:13allowed gun crews
09:14to probe potential enemy positions
09:16with rockets and gun runs
09:18before insurgent forces struck.
09:22It was during the third
09:23and final stage of troop insertion,
09:26the landing zone phase,
09:27that armed helicopters proved
09:29to be most valuable.
09:31Once on the ground,
09:32the transport crews
09:33became sitting ducks.
09:35Difficult terrain frequently slowed
09:37the disembarking of troops.
09:39In the Delta,
09:40water was often chest deep,
09:42and the ships had to hover
09:43with their skids
09:44just beneath the water.
09:46The ground troops
09:46had to concentrate
09:47on getting out of the choppers
09:49and into safer positions
09:50around the LZ.
09:52Enemy gunners could tear
09:53into the entire force
09:54at any moment.
09:55Throughout the critical moments
09:58in the LZ,
09:59the crews of the armed helicopters
10:01circled the area,
10:02anxiously monitoring radio traffic
10:04and scanning the tree lines
10:06for signs of trouble.
10:07Frequently,
10:08the transports would report
10:09taking enemy fire
10:10before the gunship crews
10:11could see it.
10:13Once a Viet Cong gun position
10:14was pinpointed,
10:15the gunships immediately rolled in
10:17to lay down suppressive fire.
10:19While many had questioned
10:24the potential vulnerability
10:25of armed helicopters in combat,
10:28few could have appreciated
10:29the sight of a Huey
10:30thundering to the earth
10:31with four machine guns blazing
10:33and a rapid succession
10:34of rockets streaking to the ground.
10:37The armed helicopters
10:38of the UTT
10:39proved to be highly effective
10:40in reducing both the amount
10:42and accuracy of enemy fire
10:44placed on transports.
10:45Although Viet Cong attacks
10:48on unarmed helicopters
10:49continued to mount,
10:51the number of successful strikes
10:52against escorted aircraft
10:54dropped dramatically.
10:56Throughout the early 1960s,
10:58U.S. air mobile assistance
11:00to South Vietnam
11:01continued to expand
11:02and became a key factor
11:04in the government's ability
11:05to combat communist insurgency.
11:08The advent of the armed helicopter
11:12came to play a critical role
11:14in the success
11:14of these early air mobile operations.
11:17However, by mid-1965,
11:20despite a large commitment
11:22of U.S. air mobile resources,
11:24the situation in South Vietnam
11:25continued to deteriorate.
11:32In the fall of 1965,
11:35the United States began committing
11:37large ground forces
11:38to Vietnam
11:39in an attempt to stem
11:40the tide of communist warfare.
11:43By then,
11:44hundreds of Hueys
11:44had replaced the H-21s
11:46in the troop transport role,
11:48and the concept of air mobility
11:50had come to dominate
11:51the mode of battle in Vietnam.
11:54It was during this period
11:55that the missions
11:56of armed helicopters
11:57began to expand dramatically
11:59beyond the escort role.
12:02The combination of thousands
12:04of U.S. combat forces
12:06and hundreds of Hueys
12:07led to massive air assaults
12:09in which U.S. ground troops
12:10took on the role
12:11of tracking down
12:12and engaging enemy forces.
12:16During larger operations,
12:18multiple gun platoons,
12:19each containing
12:20as many as eight gunships,
12:22escorted flights
12:23of unarmed Hueys,
12:24or SLICs,
12:25into areas of suspected
12:27Viet Cong activity.
12:28Air Force fighters
12:32normally prepped
12:33the landing zone
12:34in advance of the flight
12:35with a variety
12:36of bombs and rockets.
12:38As soon as the Air Force
12:39had peeled off,
12:40several gunship teams
12:41would roll into the LZ
12:42to further soften up the area.
12:47As opposed to the early days
12:49when gun crews
12:49were restricted from firing
12:51until fired upon,
12:53these advanced elements
12:54usually emptied
12:55their ammunition
12:56in and around the LZ
12:57in hopes of preventing
12:58an ambush.
13:04As the SLICs came in to land,
13:07additional gunship teams
13:08circled in racetrack patterns
13:10on both sides of the flight
13:11to ensure that
13:13the vulnerable transports
13:14were not assaulted
13:15while in the LZ.
13:20While these tactics
13:22were similar to those
13:23employed by the UTT,
13:24the greatest difference
13:26began to unfold
13:27after the SLICs
13:28departed the LZ.
13:32Early on,
13:33gunships were generally
13:34limited to firing
13:35one minute before
13:36the transports had landed
13:37and one minute
13:38after the last departed.
13:48Initially,
13:49fire support for troops
13:50on the ground
13:51was to be provided
13:52by less vulnerable
13:53fighter aircraft.
13:54However,
13:55Viet Cong ambushes
13:56became a significant problem.
13:59Many units were locked
14:00in bitter firefights
14:01from the moment
14:02they dispersed
14:02into the LZ.
14:04As a result,
14:05additional gunship teams
14:06generally remained
14:07on station
14:08to provide close support.
14:11During this new
14:12and unusual form
14:13of combat,
14:14gunship crews
14:15often engaged enemy troops
14:16just meters
14:17from friendly positions
14:18in a frantic attempt
14:19to prevent disaster.
14:21It was an organized,
14:30hectic,
14:31chaotic place.
14:32It's the best I can say
14:33if we're really involved.
14:35You might be taking fire
14:36or you're the person
14:38or people that you were
14:39supporting might be
14:40taking fire.
14:41The crew chief and gunner
14:42both had machine guns.
14:44Both on the bungee cord
14:45and both could suspend
14:47themselves out of the door
14:50of the aircraft
14:50and they would generally
14:51mark a target
14:52if they saw it
14:53with smoke grenade
14:55but they would keep
14:56a target suppressed
14:59with their machine gun fire.
15:01The crew chief
15:01and gunner
15:03had a tendency
15:04to fire awful close
15:06to the back
15:06of the pilot
15:07or the co-pilot,
15:08generally the co-pilot
15:09and you might find
15:10one of the shell clippings
15:11going down your back
15:14and that can give you
15:16a little consternation also
15:17thinking that you're hit
15:19and it's only a shell,
15:21expended shell
15:21coming out of the crew chief's gun.
15:29The extremely close range
15:31of suppressive fire
15:32from gunships
15:33often meant the difference
15:34between life and death
15:35for entire platoons.
15:39Viet Cong
15:40and North Vietnamese troops
15:41frequently established
15:42multiple well-concealed
15:44gun emplacements
15:45around likely
15:46Allied insertion points.
15:50Deadly crossfire
15:51from unknown positions
15:52pinned many units down
15:54before they could even
15:55establish a defensive perimeter.
16:01During these desperate situations,
16:03multiple teams
16:05of armed helicopters
16:06took turns
16:07making firing passes
16:08to maintain pressure
16:09on enemy gunners.
16:10Normally,
16:11as one crew rolled in,
16:13another followed
16:14slightly behind
16:14and above
16:15to put suppressive fire
16:16beneath the lead ship
16:18as it broke away
16:18from the target.
16:20Enemy gunners
16:21quickly realized
16:22that once a gunship
16:23made its break,
16:24it had little capability
16:25to defend against fire
16:26from below or behind.
16:31Though the heavily laden
16:32gunships were not
16:33especially maneuverable,
16:35many pilots develop
16:36risky but effective tactics
16:37to avoid lethal ground fire.
16:41Our biggest deterrent,
16:43not to get shot,
16:44I guess,
16:45was to fly low.
16:46In other words,
16:46you put your skids
16:47in the trees.
16:48And when you did that,
16:49you were there
16:51and gone so quickly
16:52that it was hard
16:53to draw a bead on you
16:55and shoot you.
16:56The most dangerous altitude
16:57was somewhere around
16:582,000 feet
16:59because now you're
17:00in view of everything
17:02but you're still
17:03within small-armed range.
17:04So we flew all the time
17:05just right over the treetops,
17:07I mean right in the treetops
17:08sometimes.
17:09It wasn't unusual
17:09to come out
17:10and pick branches
17:11out of your skids.
17:13You were that low.
17:14One of the greatest dangers
17:20of low-altitude flight
17:22was the potential
17:22for target fixation.
17:30Some pilots
17:31became so focused
17:32on the urgency
17:33of placing fire accurately
17:35that they lost track
17:37of altitude
17:38and ground obstacles
17:39and ran into trees
17:40or even straight into the ground
17:42during firing runs.
17:44As a last resort,
17:52some gunship crews
17:54even risked
17:55their own lives
17:55to extract wounded
17:57or overwhelmed troops
17:58once their ammunition stores
18:00had run dry.
18:09The unique ability
18:10of gunships
18:11to provide close support
18:13rapidly expanded
18:14to include assistance
18:16for conventional ground units.
18:18Allied forces patrolling
18:20for Viet Cong
18:21and North Vietnamese troops
18:22never knew
18:23when they would stumble
18:24into a major firefight.
18:27When heavy contact
18:28was made,
18:29ground units
18:30increasingly counted
18:31on available gunships
18:33to provide suppressive fire
18:34and to bolster
18:35the ground assault.
18:36the gunships essentially
18:38became an extension of
18:40and even replaced
18:41tube artillery support.
18:43Fire was generally controlled
18:45in the same manner
18:46as ground artillery
18:47with a forward observer
18:49marking positions
18:50with colored smoke
18:51and adjusting fire
18:53as necessary.
18:54We would have a reference.
18:56If we didn't have
18:57a reference from smoke
18:59then it may be
19:00a bend in the river
19:02or a certain pine tree
19:03in the middle of a field
19:04to the left 500 yard
19:06or whatever it is.
19:07But we used
19:08whatever was available
19:09as a reference point
19:10and from the reference point
19:11then you try to identify
19:12where the enemy was
19:14and then you would
19:16attack that position.
19:19Providing close support
19:21for troops in contact
19:22was one of the most
19:23challenging missions
19:24for gunship crews.
19:26Ground forces
19:27were often located
19:28in mountainous terrain
19:29and were concealed
19:30by dense jungle foliage.
19:33To make matters worse
19:34spontaneous firefights
19:36often took place
19:37at extremely close range.
19:38Gunship crews
19:45had to be extremely careful
19:47in placing fire.
19:50The pinpoint accuracy
19:51of machine guns
19:52was often preferred
19:53over rockets and grenades
19:55which could burst
19:56in the trees
19:57and lead to friendly casualties.
20:01The door gunner
20:02emerged as one
20:03of the greatest assets
20:05for troops
20:05locked in close battle.
20:08When rockets were employed
20:10many pilots
20:11tried to approach
20:12in as steep a dive
20:13as the Huey would allow
20:14to prevent rounds
20:15from scattering
20:16throughout the area.
20:28The timely
20:29and powerful support
20:31of armed helicopters
20:32became a critical component
20:33of ground operations
20:35in Vietnam.
20:38Cube artillery
20:39was often out of range
20:41or couldn't be fired
20:42because of the close proximity
20:43of friendly positions
20:44to the enemy forces.
20:48Air force fighters
20:49were often unavailable
20:51or were delayed
20:51in arriving on station.
20:54For infantrymen
20:55the gunship
20:56became a lifeline.
20:57The ground troops
21:04were really appreciative
21:06and it could not have been
21:08a better rapport
21:08than they had
21:09with the armed helicopter
21:11platoons
21:12and with aviation
21:13in general
21:13because they realized
21:15that so many times
21:16an armed gunship
21:18if they were under attack
21:20may be the only thing
21:21that could get to them
21:21to hopefully suppress
21:24the enemy guns
21:25that were firing on them.
21:26Even after a massive
21:33gunship assault
21:34ground forces
21:35frequently faced
21:36intense opposition
21:37from hidden gun emplacements.
21:40To escape
21:40the intense barrage
21:42from above
21:42enemy troops
21:43frequently sought refuge
21:45in underground tunnels
21:46and bunkers.
21:47The tunnels
21:48were a major factor
21:49in the communists' ability
21:50to survive bombing attacks
21:52to appear
21:53and disappear
21:54at will
21:54and to ambush
21:56unsuspecting
21:57allied troops.
21:58While gunships
21:59could do significant damage
22:01to such structures
22:02the grim task
22:03of clearing
22:03and destroying
22:04these fortifications
22:05could only be achieved
22:07by daring men
22:08on the ground.
22:10Throughout these
22:10dangerous operations
22:11gunships usually
22:13remained nearby
22:14in case significant
22:15opposition reemerged.
22:16many communist troops
22:21remained in their fortifications
22:22and fought to the death
22:24rather than surrender.
22:25perhaps the most unusual
22:38but potent
22:39armed helicopters
22:40developed during
22:41the Vietnam War
22:42were a series
22:43of armed
22:44CH-47 Chinooks
22:46known as
22:46Go-Go Birds.
22:48Three of these
22:49massive gunships
22:50were tested
22:50by the 1st Cavalry Division
22:52in 1966
22:53under an effort
22:54to find a suitable
22:56follow-on
22:56to the Huey.
23:00Each Go-Go
23:01could be configured
23:02with a wide variety
23:03of powerful weapon systems.
23:06The primary armament
23:07consisted of a
23:0840mm grenade launcher
23:09located in a turret
23:11under the nose
23:12a pair of
23:1320mm cannon
23:14mounted on stub wings
23:15and either
23:16two 19-shot rocket pods
23:19or two miniguns
23:20that could fire
23:21up to 3,000 rounds
23:22a minute.
23:24Five crew-served
23:25.50 caliber machine guns
23:26were also positioned
23:28throughout the aircraft.
23:37A number of Chinooks
23:39were also employed
23:40as ad hoc bombers
23:41during the war
23:42to destroy
23:43underground fortifications
23:44and tunnel systems.
23:46During these operations
23:4755-gallon drums
23:49of tear gas
23:50were rolled out
23:51the back of the Chinook
23:52to drive the Viet Cong
23:53above ground.
23:55Napalm
23:56was also rigged
23:57and dropped
23:57in the same manner
23:58on targets
23:59that resisted
24:00all other attempts
24:01to drive enemy forces out.
24:03A single Chinook
24:04could drop
24:05as much as
24:05two and a half tons
24:06of napalm
24:07on a single target.
24:08The go-go bird
24:16however
24:16generally performed
24:17more traditional
24:18close support missions
24:20for troops in contact.
24:22While far from graceful
24:23or maneuverable
24:24they had a tremendous
24:25morale effect
24:26on the infantry
24:27who often
24:28specifically called
24:29for go-go gun support.
24:34From the infantrymen's
24:35point of view
24:36when a go-go appeared
24:38enemy forces
24:39quickly disappeared.
24:43Crews of these aircraft
24:45performed
24:45incredibly heroic missions
24:47to prove
24:47the gunship's worth
24:48in combat.
24:50The mix of weapons
24:51the heavy volume
24:52of firepower
24:53and incredible endurance
24:55allowed the go-go's
24:56to neutralize
24:57every enemy position
24:59attacked
24:59during the evaluation period.
25:05Ultimately
25:05the program
25:06was canceled
25:07because Chinooks
25:08were desperately needed
25:09for air transport
25:10and because a new
25:12purpose-built
25:13attack helicopter
25:14was on its way
25:15to Vietnam.
25:18While the concept
25:19of these super gunships
25:21would be debated
25:22for years
25:22few infantrymen
25:24who received support
25:25from the go-go bird
25:26would ever forget it.
25:28initially
25:35most gunship missions
25:37focused on
25:37escorting
25:38air mobile forces
25:39or providing
25:40close support
25:41for troops
25:42on the ground.
25:43However
25:43as the war progressed
25:45a wide variety
25:46of reconnaissance
25:47security
25:48and attack missions
25:49evolved
25:50in response
25:51to widespread
25:51Viet Cong threats
25:53throughout
25:53South Vietnam.
25:54In the southern part
26:02of the country
26:03Army gun platoons
26:04and a Navy helicopter
26:05attack squadron
26:06known as the Sea Wolves
26:08operated in and around
26:10Saigon
26:11and throughout the Mekong Delta.
26:12One of the primary missions
26:15of these units
26:15was to provide
26:16reconnaissance
26:17and fire support
26:18for Navy SEALs
26:19and river patrol boats
26:21as they attempted
26:21to stop the flow
26:23of Viet Cong supplies
26:24entering the country
26:25by water.
26:27Other missions
26:28included armed escort
26:29for Allied ships
26:30navigating the dangerous
26:31waterways
26:32leading to the ports
26:33of Saigon.
26:35Much of the time
26:36however
26:36the fire teams
26:37scoured hundreds
26:38of square miles
26:39throughout the Delta
26:40searching for ambush sites
26:42and general targets
26:43of opportunity.
26:49Surprisingly
26:49the Viet Cong
26:50operated extensively
26:52throughout the region
26:53and could conceal
26:54themselves extremely well
26:56in the dense grasses
26:57and nip-a-palm
26:58of the marshy wetlands.
27:01Extensive tunnel networks
27:02were even created
27:03to provide shelter
27:04from Allied airstrikes.
27:06Gunships were especially
27:07prone to ground fire
27:09in these flat
27:10open areas.
27:12Many crewmen
27:13were shot
27:14in the legs
27:14or even up
27:15through the seat
27:16as they made
27:16low firing runs.
27:18The unrestricted visibility
27:20and potent accuracy
27:21of door gunners
27:22was critical
27:23to defense
27:24against enemy ground fire.
27:27The Viet Cong
27:28who generally
27:29associated all gunships
27:31with the original
27:31Utility Tactical
27:33Transport Company
27:34despised the powerful
27:35gunships
27:36and often tried
27:37to lure them
27:38into deadly traps.
27:40On several occasions
27:41the Viet Cong
27:42would come up
27:43on our frequencies
27:44and say
27:44ah, you know
27:45American UTT
27:47we see you
27:48here's where
27:50here's where we are
27:51come see
27:52if you can
27:53get us
27:54or sometimes
27:55not tell us
27:55who they were
27:56but saying
27:57they were
27:57a Vietnamese
27:58compound
28:00in distress
28:01and needed help
28:02and would you
28:03come to these
28:03coordinates.
28:04We were always
28:05very leery
28:05because if we
28:06responded
28:08they usually
28:08had 50s
28:09or some type
28:10of air defense gun
28:11set up
28:12in those areas.
28:13while various
28:15configurations
28:16of armed Hueys
28:17were effectively
28:18used in a variety
28:19of missions
28:20throughout the war
28:21one particular
28:22breed of gunship
28:23stood apart
28:23from all the rest
28:24the gunships
28:26of the aerial
28:26rocket artillery
28:27more commonly
28:29known as the
28:30ARA.
28:32Most gunships
28:34primarily provided
28:35light fire support
28:36rather than
28:36artillery type force.
28:39The ARA
28:40by contrast
28:41was organized
28:42and employed
28:43as artillery.
28:46Each gunship
28:47carried a devastating
28:48load of 48 rockets.
28:51To the troops
28:51on the ground
28:52this potent
28:53configuration
28:54was known
28:55as the Hog.
28:59ARA support
29:00was frequently
29:00called in
29:01by forward
29:02artillery observers
29:03when ground
29:04based artillery
29:05proved insufficient
29:06for the task
29:07at hand.
29:09This innovative
29:10force provided
29:11ground units
29:12with an incredible
29:13capability
29:14to quickly
29:15and accurately
29:16place tremendous
29:17firepower
29:18on enemy positions.
29:19When you have
29:22a regular
29:23gunship
29:23you know
29:24you're limited
29:24to your rocket
29:25your 2.75s
29:27you only have
29:2814 of them
29:29when you bring
29:30your hog in
29:31you're really
29:32going to do
29:33some damage
29:33to somebody
29:34with 48 rockets
29:37and so
29:37it's sort of like
29:39if you get
29:39an emplacement
29:40or if you got
29:41something heavy
29:42that you want
29:42to tear up
29:43in that sense
29:44you bring a hog in.
29:45because ARA
29:49gunships
29:50generally served
29:51as an extension
29:52of a ground
29:52artillery force
29:53the fire teams
29:55received all
29:56of their directions
29:56from the forward
29:57ground observer.
29:59The crews
29:59normally worked
30:00in teams
30:00and took turns
30:02rotating over
30:03targets
30:03to maintain
30:04constant pressure
30:05on the enemy.
30:06The ARA
30:07was never intended
30:08to replace
30:08ground artillery
30:09but the careful
30:10allocation
30:11and precise timing
30:12of this force
30:13in combat
30:14provided incredible
30:15volumes of fire
30:17in places
30:17and times
30:18when no other
30:19support was available.
30:21During larger
30:22offensive operations
30:23the ARA
30:25remained on the ground
30:26a short distance
30:27from ground forces
30:28but kept one section
30:30of gunships
30:31on a two minute
30:31alert status.
30:33When the call
30:33for fire support
30:34went out
30:35the section
30:36was airborne
30:37within two minutes
30:38and heading
30:38for the target.
30:40Once the first section
30:41had departed
30:42a second
30:42and a third section
30:44entered five minute
30:45and two minute
30:45alert status.
30:47As the crews
30:48expended their rockets
30:49they would return
30:50to base
30:51hot rearm
30:52and begin
30:53the cycle again.
30:55In this manner
30:55a continuous
30:56barrage of artillery
30:58could remain
30:58on target
30:59for as long
31:00as needed.
31:02In the Delta
31:03ARA crews
31:05were often sent in
31:06to destroy
31:06well hidden
31:07enemy bunker complexes.
31:10The structures
31:10were fortified
31:11with layers
31:11of mud
31:12and logs
31:13and were
31:13virtually impervious
31:14to standoff
31:15attacks.
31:17The hogs
31:17however
31:17could dive in
31:19extremely close
31:20to these fortifications
31:21and rapidly
31:22place dozens
31:22of rockets
31:23with pinpoint
31:24accuracy.
31:26All gunship
31:27crews had to be
31:28extremely careful
31:29when firing rockets
31:30at low level.
31:32Mud from the
31:32blasts
31:33could easily
31:34knock out
31:34the Huey's windshield
31:35or chin bubble
31:36or worse
31:37flying debris
31:39could damage
31:39the rotors
31:40and bring
31:40the entire
31:41crew down.
31:43The creation
31:44of an aerial
31:45artillery force
31:46proved to be
31:47one of the most
31:48significant
31:48tactical developments
31:49of the war.
31:51The ability
31:51of these crews
31:52to get extremely
31:53close to forward
31:55positions
31:55and to actually
31:56see and respond
31:58to the situation
31:58on the ground
31:59helped to offset
32:01communist guerrilla
32:01tactics
32:02and save
32:03the lives
32:04of countless
32:05Allied infantrymen.
32:09Initially
32:09the opportunity
32:10to fly
32:11heavily armed
32:12choppers
32:12was an intense
32:13and thrilling
32:14adventure
32:15for most
32:15gunship pilots.
32:17Some pilots
32:18were fresh
32:18out of flight school
32:19had spent
32:20up to nine months
32:21in training
32:22and were elated
32:23to be practicing
32:24their new profession
32:25even if it was
32:26in Vietnam.
32:28However
32:28in time
32:29the strains
32:30of combat flying
32:31often began
32:32to affect
32:32even the most
32:33enthusiastic aviators.
32:37Once you
32:38were in country
32:39and flying
32:40for a little while
32:41you began
32:42to feel
32:45the war.
32:46You see
32:47your buddies
32:47die
32:48you see
32:49aircraft shot
32:50down
32:50you receive
32:52bullets yourself
32:53not to your
32:54body
32:54but to the
32:55aircraft
32:56and you're
32:58wondering
32:59about these
33:01mixed emotions
33:01here I am
33:02enjoying
33:03what I'm
33:03doing
33:04and I'm
33:05in a war
33:05and that's
33:06not natural
33:07in that sense
33:08and so it gives you
33:09a lot of time
33:11to search
33:13yourself.
33:13throughout the
33:23Vietnam War
33:24armed helicopters
33:25served as one
33:26of the most
33:27effective defensive
33:28measures against
33:29deadly mortar
33:29and rocket
33:30attacks launched
33:31by the Viet Cong.
33:33Some of the
33:33most notable
33:34fire support
33:35was provided
33:35by the famed
33:36Razorback Gun
33:37Platoon
33:37which served
33:39as the palace
33:39guards
33:40for the capital
33:40city of Saigon.
33:42The crews
33:43of this
33:43platoon
33:44remained
33:44in a constant
33:45state
33:46of battle
33:46readiness
33:46for much
33:47of the war.
33:50We would have
33:51one crew
33:52sleeping by
33:54the aircraft
33:54and on
33:55immediate
33:55notice
33:56if they
33:57got incoming
33:58mortars
33:59at night
34:00or such.
34:01Then we had
34:01another crew
34:02that was on
34:0230 minute
34:02standby
34:03and then a
34:04third crew
34:04that was
34:04on an
34:05hour
34:05standby.
34:06If they
34:06started getting
34:07attacks in the
34:08local area
34:09around Saigon
34:09or they
34:10started
34:10mortaring
34:10Saigon
34:11we would
34:12immediately
34:12go out
34:12and try
34:13to silence
34:13these mortars.
34:15On January
34:1631st
34:171967
34:18the capabilities
34:19of the
34:20Razorbacks
34:20and other
34:21gun platoons
34:22located near
34:23Saigon
34:23were put
34:24to the test
34:25when communist
34:25forces launched
34:26their massive
34:27Tet Offensive.
34:2935 enemy
34:30battalions
34:31marched
34:31on the capital
34:32attacking
34:33various military
34:34and civilian
34:35facilities.
34:37Viet Cong
34:37commandos
34:38even penetrated
34:39the U.S.
34:40embassy
34:40compound.
34:44Allied forces
34:45engaged
34:46the communists
34:47in dozens
34:47of fierce
34:48battles.
34:49Firefights
34:50erupted
34:50along numerous
34:51streets
34:51and alleyways.
34:53In these
34:53tight quarters
34:54armed helicopters
34:55repeatedly
34:56demonstrated
34:56their unique
34:57ability
34:58to provide
34:58extremely close
34:59support
35:00by placing
35:01suppressive
35:01rounds
35:02within meters
35:03of friendly
35:03positions.
35:05Throughout
35:05the offensive
35:06gunships
35:07patrolled
35:07the skies
35:08over Saigon
35:09searching
35:10for signs
35:10of enemy
35:11activity
35:11and responding
35:12to calls
35:13for help.
35:17Some of
35:18the most
35:18significant
35:19fighting
35:19took place
35:20at Townsend
35:21Air Base
35:21located just
35:22outside the
35:23city.
35:24More than
35:24700 communist
35:25soldiers
35:26launched
35:26an all-out
35:27attack
35:27to take
35:28the airfield
35:29which also
35:30served as
35:30a major
35:31U.S.
35:31command center.
35:33The communists
35:33breached
35:34the base's
35:35perimeter
35:35without firing
35:36a shot
35:36and came
35:37within a
35:38thousand feet
35:38of the
35:38runways
35:39before they
35:40were halted
35:40in eight
35:41hours of
35:41bloody
35:42hand-to-hand
35:42combat.
35:46Within three
35:47minutes of the
35:47alert that
35:48Tonsenut was
35:49under attack
35:49two razorback
35:51fireteams
35:51were airborne
35:52in attacking
35:53the enemy.
35:54In one
35:55instance
35:55a ground
35:56patrol of
35:5730 men
35:57ran head-on
35:58into a
35:59350-man
36:00attack force.
36:01Gunships
36:02immediately
36:02responded
36:03and managed
36:04to save
36:05the patrol
36:05by placing
36:06a barrage
36:06of rockets
36:07in the
36:07middle
36:07of the
36:08enemy's
36:08position.
36:09More than
36:10200 enemy
36:10troops were
36:11killed
36:11during the
36:12engagement
36:12most by
36:14the lethal
36:14fire of
36:15the gunships.
36:20The quick
36:21reaction of
36:22the armed
36:22helicopters
36:23undoubtedly
36:23saved
36:24Tonsenut
36:25from serious
36:25danger of
36:26being overrun.
36:27During the
36:28initial hours
36:29of the attack
36:29the gunships
36:31were the only
36:31aircraft that
36:32could get
36:33airborne.
36:35While the
36:36scope of the
36:36Tet Offensive
36:37was shocking
36:37it actually
36:39amounted to
36:39a large-scale
36:40military defeat
36:41for the
36:42communists.
36:43The Viet Cong
36:44and the North
36:44Vietnamese Army
36:45lost some
36:4645,000 men
36:47in battles
36:48across the
36:49country.
36:50Gunship crews
36:51repeatedly played
36:52a major role
36:52in the
36:53communist defeat
36:54and prevented
36:55countless
36:55civilian and
36:56military casualties
36:57in the
36:58process.
37:01In spite of
37:07the impressive
37:08record of
37:08early-armed
37:09Hueys, the
37:10aircraft was
37:11never intended
37:12for the
37:12gunship role.
37:14As a result,
37:15it suffered
37:15from many
37:16deficiencies.
37:17In 1968,
37:18the capability
37:19of gunship
37:20crews would
37:21forever change
37:22with the
37:22introduction of
37:23the world's
37:24first purpose-built
37:25attack helicopter,
37:26the Bell
37:27AH-1 Huey Cobra.
37:29A two-man
37:31team operated
37:32the Cobra
37:33in a unique
37:34arrangement that
37:34placed a gunner
37:35in the nose
37:36of the aircraft
37:37and the pilot
37:38slightly above
37:39and behind him
37:40to increase
37:40combat visibility.
37:42The gunner
37:43controlled weapon
37:44systems mounted
37:45in a movable
37:45chin turret
37:46under the nose.
37:48The pilot
37:48flew the aircraft
37:49and controlled
37:50any weapons
37:51that were mounted
37:51on a pair
37:52of stub wings.
37:54The heart
37:55of the Cobra
37:55was the rotor,
37:56engine,
37:56and drive system
37:57of the old Huey,
37:58but the rest
37:59was a revolution.
38:01Design work
38:02began in early
38:031965 as a company
38:05funded Bell venture
38:06to replace the Huey.
38:08Incredibly,
38:09by August of 1967,
38:12the first Cobras
38:12were arriving
38:13in Vietnam.
38:19These powerful
38:21attack birds
38:22carried up to
38:2252 rockets
38:23in side-mounted pods
38:25and could be armed
38:26with various configurations
38:28of miniguns,
38:2940-millimeter grenade
38:30launchers,
38:31and even
38:3120-millimeter cannons.
38:35The Cobras'
38:36most significant
38:37advantages
38:38were realized
38:39in the original
38:39mission of
38:40armed helicopters,
38:41providing escort
38:42support for
38:43air mobile operations.
38:45Heavily laden
38:46Huey gunships
38:47struggled to keep pace
38:48with the lighter
38:49unarmed slicks.
38:51The Cobras,
38:52however,
38:52could literally
38:53fly circles
38:54around troop transports.
38:55They had a cruising
38:56speed of 160 miles
38:58per hour
38:59compared to 90
39:00for the older
39:00Hueys.
39:01Such speed
39:02allowed Cobra crews
39:03a tremendous amount
39:04of flexibility
39:05in conducting
39:06reconnaissance
39:07and responding
39:08to enemy threats
39:09during an insertion.
39:10This, in turn,
39:11resulted in greater
39:12security for the
39:13entire force.
39:14while the Cobra's
39:21speed,
39:22maneuverability,
39:23and armament
39:24were assets
39:24to the escort mission,
39:26these same
39:26characteristics
39:27initiated a new
39:28era for
39:29armed helicopters.
39:31For the first time,
39:33significant
39:33surprise attacks
39:34on ground targets
39:35became possible.
39:36To American forces,
39:46the Cobra
39:47became known
39:47as the Snake.
39:49With the Viet Cong,
39:51it was the
39:51Whispering Death.
39:53Diving in
39:53from altitude,
39:54the Cobra
39:55could reach speeds
39:56in excess
39:56of 200 miles
39:57an hour.
39:58Such speed,
39:59combined with
40:00the fact that
40:00the fuselage
40:01was only 36 inches
40:02wide,
40:03precluded enemy
40:04forces from
40:05even seeing
40:05incoming attacks.
40:06let alone
40:07defending against
40:08them.
40:09Enemy forces
40:10quickly learned
40:10that firing
40:11on a Cobra
40:12merely exposed
40:13one's position
40:14and generally
40:15resulted in a
40:16devastating barrage
40:17of machine gun
40:18and rocket fire.
40:23The Cobra's
40:24unique tandem
40:25configuration
40:26required tremendous
40:27teamwork to operate.
40:31Crews had to
40:32perform as
40:33an integrated unit
40:34and came to
40:35depend heavily
40:35on one another
40:36in combat.
40:41Many teams
40:41stayed together
40:42for months
40:43on end.
40:47Crews generally
40:48and fire teams
40:49generally want to
40:50stay together
40:50for some period
40:51of time because
40:51you get used to
40:52working with each
40:53other and you
40:55can anticipate
40:55what your other
40:57crew is going to
40:57do or what the
40:59other, the man
41:00in your cockpit
41:00is going to do
41:01and it's especially
41:02important if you
41:03get into, say,
41:04an unexpected
41:04situation, you
41:07start taking fire
41:08from a certain
41:08direction, you
41:10know who's
41:11supposed to do
41:12what, who's
41:12going to go in
41:12after the guy,
41:13who's going to
41:13come around and
41:14cover, or whether
41:15you're both going
41:16to engage the
41:16target at the
41:17same time.
41:17If necessary, the
41:21crew of a single
41:21Cobra could engage
41:23multiple targets
41:23simultaneously.
41:25Such teamwork was
41:26an important aspect
41:27of day combat
41:28missions, but it
41:29became absolutely
41:30imperative at night.
41:35Cobra teams
41:36frequently flew at
41:37night to deny the
41:38guerrillas the
41:38ability to freely
41:39operate under cover
41:40of darkness.
41:41One of the more
41:43unusual missions
41:44involved support
41:45for firefly
41:46operations.
41:51Fireflies were
41:52Hueys that had
41:53been modified to
41:54carry a set of
41:54C-123 landing
41:56lights in the
41:57door.
41:58During a typical
41:59mission, a
41:59firefly would set
42:01out for a likely
42:01area of enemy
42:02activity.
42:06Once a Cobra
42:07or other fire
42:08support arrived on
42:09station, the
42:10firefly began
42:11illuminating the
42:12terrain below with
42:13the searchlights.
42:15If a target was
42:15identified, the
42:17firefly tried to
42:18fix the enemy with
42:19light until a Cobra
42:20could roll in to
42:21fire.
42:25Night missions
42:26were generally
42:27hazardous for all
42:28helicopter crews,
42:30but low-level
42:30firing runs at
42:31night were perhaps
42:32the most dangerous
42:33missions of all.
42:37At night, we have
42:39a problem with
42:40target fixation.
42:41the man in the back
42:42would go into a run
42:43and start, say,
42:45shooting.
42:46You get so fixated
42:47on the target, you
42:48lose sense of where
42:49you actually are,
42:50what altitude, what
42:51speed, and everything
42:52else.
42:53The front-seater also
42:54has to pay attention
42:55to the altitude.
42:57If he thinks something
42:58is going wrong, either
42:59talk to the man.
43:00If he doesn't have
43:01time to talk, just get
43:01on the controls and
43:02start an immediate
43:03pull-out.
43:05One night, I had to
43:06pull out of a dive at
43:08night, and we went
43:08through the treetops.
43:09You could hear them
43:10snapping, cracking,
43:11banging as we pulled
43:13out.
43:15Many crews were
43:16unable to recover
43:17from target fixation
43:18and were lost as they
43:20crashed into trees or
43:21steep hillsides.
43:22However, night
43:23illumination and
43:24strike missions proved
43:25to be extremely
43:26effective and a good
43:28tactic for taking back
43:29the night from
43:30communist guerrillas.
43:31As a result, many
43:33more night observation
43:34systems were tested
43:35and employed in
43:36conjunction with
43:37gunship crews
43:38throughout the war.
43:48While the Huey Cobra
43:50was one of the most
43:50potent offensive
43:51innovations of the
43:52Vietnam War, it also
43:54emerged as the
43:55premier defender of
43:57ground forces.
43:58During the later
43:59stages of the
44:00conflict, numerous
44:01firebases and other
44:02remote compounds
44:03became the target of
44:04massive communist
44:05assaults.
44:10When this occurred,
44:11the rapid response
44:12of Cobra fireteams
44:14was often the only
44:15thing that prevented
44:16friendly positions
44:17from being overrun.
44:19In some instances,
44:20fireteams continually
44:22rotated in every
44:23five to ten minutes
44:24over a 24-hour
44:25period just to allow
44:27enough time for
44:28Allied troops to be
44:29extracted from the
44:30area.
44:31The one thing that
44:32fireteams feared most
44:33was having a position
44:35overrun while they
44:36were trying to defend
44:37it.
44:38The crews could
44:39usually see the men
44:40on the ground.
44:41In some units,
44:42they even knew who
44:43they were.
44:44The temptation to
44:46immediately unleash
44:47the full fury of the
44:48Cobra was hard to
44:49resist.
44:49initially, you really want
44:55to help the troops on
44:56the ground because
44:56that's your job.
44:58But you have to
44:59restrain yourself and
45:01you have to find out
45:02exactly where they are
45:03and when he starts
45:04adjusting you in close,
45:05he may give you a big
45:07jump.
45:07You just take a little
45:08one and you just
45:09gradually work yourself
45:11in because you don't
45:12want to hit the troops
45:12on the ground.
45:13Cobra fireteams carried
45:19a variety of weapon
45:20systems and had to
45:21carefully evaluate the
45:23situation on the ground
45:24before making a selection
45:25and firing.
45:26The Cobra was a much
45:28more stable and accurate
45:30firing platform than
45:31the old Huey gunships.
45:33Both crew members also
45:34had excellent visibility
45:35which allowed them to
45:36place fire at incredibly
45:38close range.
45:44The minigun itself,
45:46we fired probably,
45:47in some cases,
45:48three to five meters
45:49out from friendlies
45:50and, of course,
45:50were engaging from
45:52relatively low altitudes.
45:54The 40 millimeter
45:55had a little bit bigger
45:58bursting radius
45:58and you also could
45:59get tree bursts
46:00so you had to use
46:01that a little bit
46:01further out.
46:03The rockets themselves
46:04had even a larger
46:05bursting radius.
46:06Even though we did
46:07fire within five to
46:09ten meters of friendlies
46:10at some time,
46:11we had to be careful
46:12and we had to usually
46:13warn the ground troops
46:14and when they called
46:15us in that close,
46:17they didn't care about
46:19getting a little
46:19shrapnel over their
46:20head because things
46:21were in a bind
46:22and they needed as much
46:24close, very close
46:25support as they could.
46:28The close support
46:29provided by Cobra fire
46:31teams was often
46:32the decisive factor
46:33in driving back
46:34enemy assaults
46:36and prevented
46:36countless allied
46:37casualties.
46:44Never was such a
46:46flexible, responsive
46:47and accurate form
46:49of fire support
46:50needed more
46:51than in Vietnam
46:52where there were
46:53no boundaries
46:54and there were
46:54no rules.
46:57Allied forces
46:57could stumble
46:58into a major battle
46:59at any time
47:00and in any place.
47:02The gunship crews
47:03became the infantry's
47:05lifeline.
47:07Our relationship
47:08with the ground troops
47:10was just a camaraderie
47:11that there's no way
47:12to explain it.
47:13It was just
47:14mutual admiration
47:16compared to those
47:19grunts on the ground.
47:21We had it easy
47:22because we went
47:24back at night
47:24and we cubbyed up
47:26so to speak.
47:27We left those ground
47:28troops out there
47:28in the mud
47:29and they didn't know
47:31if they were going
47:31to live through the night
47:32or not
47:32and hoping we'd be
47:33back tomorrow
47:34and at certain times
47:37we would come back
47:38and there would be
47:39where they'd been
47:40attacked the night
47:40before
47:41and dead bodies
47:42laying all over
47:43the edge
47:44of the Constantine
47:44perimeters
47:45and this type of thing.
47:47So, you know,
47:48my hat's off
47:48to those guys
47:49and the rapport
47:51that we had
47:52there's just no way
47:52to explain it.
48:02Throughout the Vietnam War
48:04gunship crews
48:05fought hard
48:06to defend
48:07their comrades
48:07and indeed
48:08all of South Vietnam
48:09against communist aggression.
48:12Their revolutionary
48:13capabilities emerged
48:14at a critical time
48:15in a war
48:16that demanded
48:17new and innovative
48:18approaches to combat.
48:20The introduction
48:21of the Huey Cobra
48:22capped an incredible effort
48:24to meet those demands
48:25and marked the dawn
48:27of an entirely new
48:29and potent breed
48:30of aircraft
48:31the attack helicopter.
48:33In the end
48:34the impact
48:35of gunship missions
48:37in Vietnam
48:37clearly validated
48:39the concept
48:40of armed helicopters
48:41and reshaped
48:43the face
48:43of air
48:44and ground warfare
48:45forever.
49:01saying,
49:17They don't know
49:18how shit
49:19is going to have
49:19in the want
49:20to have
49:20now.