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  • 4/23/2025
🎙️ Is Trump ready to walk away from the Ukraine conflict?
In this urgent edition of CrossTalk Bullhorns, host Peter Lavelle is joined by George Szamuely and Mark Sleboda to explore critical questions shaping the global stage:

🔹 What does “walking away” from Ukraine really mean?
🔹 Will Europe be forced to pick up the slack? 🇪🇺
🔹 Is Trump truly disinterested in confronting Tehran — or is that temporary?
🔹 Can the U.S. ever take “yes” for an answer when it comes to diplomacy?

⚠️ The clock is ticking, and the world is watching closely.

🧠 Insightful, sharp, and never off-topic — this is CrossTalk at its finest.
📢 Like, Comment, and Subscribe for more unfiltered geopolitical discussion.

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Transcript
00:00Welcome to Crosstalk Bullhorns, where all things are considered. I'm Peter Lavelle.
00:18Is Trump really prepared to walk away from the Ukraine conflict? What does walking away
00:23actually mean? Does it mean Europe will pick up the slack? We're told Trump isn't interested
00:28in attacking Iran, at least for now. Will the U.S. finally take yes for an answer?
00:33To discuss these issues and more, I'm joined by my guest, George Samueli in Budapest. He's a
00:37podcast for The Gaggle, which can be found on YouTube and Locals. And here in Moscow,
00:42we have Mark Slobodan. He's an international relations and security analyst. All right,
00:46gentlemen, Crosstalk rules in effect. That means you can jump anytime you want,
00:49and I always appreciate it. All right, let's start out with Mark here in Moscow.
00:53Last week was tumultuous, because we got a lot of different messages from a lot of different
00:58characters. But Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, kind of put it all in relief for us.
01:05Essentially, in so many words, claiming that the U.S., Donald Trump, may throw in the towel. Those
01:12are my words, but that's what it sounded like to me. What was your take on this? Oh, and by the way,
01:17gentlemen, we'll find out in a few days. Go ahead, Mark. Yeah. So we've been talking about this as
01:24maybe a preferred Trump option to not being able to agree to Russia's terms for some time. And we
01:33questioned whether Trump would have, you know, the political will and the political capital to
01:40expend because doubtless he would be extremely castigated for it on both sides of the Atlantic
01:47if he does so. But Rubio's words about time for the U.S. to move on, right? If an agreement isn't
01:55reached in a few days and the U.S. has other priorities, I don't I don't think anyone else is
02:00reading it significantly differently. And there was some colorful language added to it that Trump would
02:08say, oh, you people are horrible and awful and throwing up his his arms, right, as a as a result
02:15of this. And, you know, whatever his interpretation that that's fine. Russia's happy to let him pose
02:20like this. The question is, this is would would be such a good outcome for Russia. I find it hard to
02:29believe that he'll be able to walk away without at least throw at least throwing some sanctions Russia's
02:35way. Now, perhaps there'll be token sanctions, but there has to be some type of punishment or
02:41Well, yeah. So you're saying is that I'll throw this to George right now, going back to the metaphor,
02:49throwing in the towel, but Russia will even have to pay for that. But it will be quite token. I mean,
02:55what else can you actually do when it comes to the area of sanctions? I mean, it just looks like a
03:00rhetorical way to get out of a mess that he claimed that he could solve and he can't. And because for
03:07all of his bluster, he seems unable to bend the will of the Europeans. So I mean, it's Trump is
03:15looking at a lose, lose, lose situation here, George. No, I agree with you, Peter. And I think
03:21it's a it is a very difficult situation for Trump, because he did make all sorts of promises. Okay,
03:29he said 24 hours, nobody took him seriously. Nobody even took him seriously that he would get it done
03:35before he became president, or he would get it done within the first 100 days. And people are willing
03:40to cut him some slack. But he's not making any progress. And that's the the problem. I mean, he tried to do
03:47it via these interim ceasefires, ceasefire, a 30 day ceasefire, overall, then the 30 day ceasefire in
03:58the Black Sea, 30 day ceasefire on the energy infrastructure, none of that is working. And, and so
04:06he really is running out of options. The problem for him is, as Marcus pointed out, is that if he does
04:15walk away, he will obviously come in for a lot of attack from from Democrats and from Republicans,
04:22but he will also be seen to be presiding over an American defeat. And that, I think, would be very
04:30irksome. Well, can we can we just flip that? I'll throw it to Mark now. The perception of a Russian win,
04:37that's the problem. Yeah, I don't actually think we we need to worry about that. Because the Western
04:44media will never acknowledge that, right? Even when when, you know, the Kiev regime's NATO planned
04:51offensive was decisively defeated at the first defensive line in the summer of 2023, in South
04:59Ukraine, it was never it was the offensive failed, not that Russia utterly crushed the offensive. So
05:07whatever happens, it will be the media will declare it's Trump's fault. It's this fault. It's that
05:14fault. It's Biden's fault for not providing enough weapons fast enough. They will never, ever give
05:21credit to the Russian military and to the Russian political leadership for achieving victory that I have
05:28no doubt it will never become a concern. Well, I mean, in my introduction, I mentioned,
05:34well, Europe pick up the slack, George. I mean, I think rhetorically, they'll have some kind of
05:40satisfaction. But their ability to influence events on the ground in Ukraine are about zero. Go ahead,
05:47George. They are about zero. I mean, there is some thinking in Europe that maybe what they can do
05:54is rely wholly on drones, you know, that just drone warfare. So that, you know, we don't need
06:01all the other heavy weaponry. We can just rely on drones. I think it is ridiculous. I think initially,
06:09there'll be a lot of hot air from Europe. Yeah, yeah, sure. We can take up the slack. We're going
06:13to do it. You know, we are steadfast. But I think they will realize that there's just simply no way
06:18that they can continue with it. Yeah, but, you know, George, but this would, but what would make
06:24them, what will make them happy if this scenario plays out is that Trump loses. That's enough for
06:30them. That's enough for them, I think. Okay, what, what this means for NATO. Well, Mark, what does that
06:36mean for NATO? I mean, this is the first real test of NATO, and it acquits itself pretty badly because
06:43the the alliance is fragmenting. Well, it has to be said that this is the Western leadership's fault,
06:51right? NATO did not have to get involved in this, right? Even if the plan was expansion of NATO to
06:58include Ukraine, and of course, Moldova and Georgia, eventually, NATO, it's NATO's leadership is NATO's
07:05Secretary General that repeatedly put themselves at the forefront of this right alongside the US
07:13president, and said that a defeat for the Kiev regime in Ukraine would be a defeat for NATO.
07:20They said that, right? Russian side never, you know, said that, you know, at least at the, you know,
07:25the presidential level, something like that. So it is it is going to be very hard. And there is a degree
07:31of fracturization in NATO, right? We see Hungary and Slovakia are the first and most obvious dissenters.
07:40But there are others, right? You know, there's other dividing lines rather than just support.
07:44There's also the continued British and France, you know, political theater fantasy of sending
07:52a paltry number of their own troops as human trip wires, which the Russian former president and prime
08:02minister and now still, you know, important figure on the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev,
08:07point out that it will simply benefit the coffin production industry in the European Union if any
08:15European troops, you know, whether they're wearing a NATO hat, a British hat, a French hat, whatever hat
08:21they're wearing that they'll find in Ukraine if they send them there. So yes, NATO's credibility
08:27is going to be challenged. NATO's cohesion is going to be challenged going forward.
08:33The transatlantic relationship is damaged as a result of the split between Europe and the United
08:41States on the issue of how to proceed with a or not with a diplomatic settlement in Ukraine.
08:48I don't expect NATO to fall apart in a year or two, but I think we're going to see significant
08:54erosion and damage of the alliance. There's no question. But the alliance has no one to blame
09:00but themselves. Exactly. You know, George, the is there a potential scenario where Trump does a
09:10reverse and discontinues Biden's policy? Is that is that feasible? Is that possible?
09:15I think it is possible. I mean, there's obviously a balance of forces.
09:19Well, I mean, the reason why I'm asking you is that, you know, there've been meetings and
09:23telephone calls and everything and all good, this warm talk about bilateral relations, but
09:28that the Biden policy is essentially still in play. The Biden policy is the same. And really,
09:33there's clearly a split within the administration. And Trump did this deliberately that he put a
09:39number of people on one side and a number of people on the other side. So you've got the Marco
09:43Rubio and Sebastian Gorka, all the various neocon hawks within the administration. And there are also
09:53the sort of the J.D. Vance, Tulsi Gabbards, and evidently Steve Witkoff on the other side.
09:59So when Trump is kind of does is doing this deliberately, kind of, you know, you've got this
10:04and this depends on which way I'm going to go. At the moment, he seems to be siding with the
10:09Steve Witkoff's, the J.D. Vance's and the Tulsi Gabbard. He could easily flip and decide to go with
10:15the horse. After all, what is Sebastian Gorka doing there? I mean, he's still there. And Trump's policy
10:21doesn't seem to be reflecting Gorka's worldview. So I assume Gorka is there should suddenly Trump
10:27decide to flip and pursue the Biden policy and then some and the escalation of the Biden policy.
10:33And, you know, he's got a team in place like like Rubio, but like presumably Pete Hexer and then
10:40and then, you know, the rabid Gorka. So Trump could easily do it. The one thing I would say also about
10:45NATO is that if it does happen, complete defeat for Ukraine and Russia reveals, it's not going to be
10:53a bad news for NATO because NATO will then mobilize and say, oh, we have an enemy. We have this is an
10:59existential moment for NATO. We need to fight and mobilize. We have to. Yeah, but you have to
11:05wonder, George. In order to to ward off Russia. Yeah, but you have to look at electoral politics. I
11:14mean, the people that have been pushing greater NATO expansion, demonizing Russia, they're losing
11:20elections. They're losing popularity. I mean, I think five years from now, we will hardly remember these
11:27political figures because disaster will be all written attached to their name, but it's hard
11:33to know because you've got now Friedrich Merz. Oh, well, I'm agreeing with you that you have the
11:37institution. It has a reason to. Oh, great. We have a reason to exist now. Mark having spending
11:44hundreds of billions of euros on this. That's, you know, that's the the the cost to have this kind
11:51of slogan. And I don't think that it's going to be very popular. I don't think electoral electorally
11:56it's popular. Well, that's the problem, of course, both both at the state level and at the EU
12:02technocratic level is, you know, famously the democracy deficit in the EU, that there is a
12:08remove from this foreign policy and Jabil political agenda and and what the people want. So while there
12:15may be consequences for some politicians in some countries, the managed democratic systems. Right.
12:23And the bureaucracies may shield others. May shield. All right. Gentlemen, I have to jump in here.
12:29We have to go to a hard break. And after that hard break, we'll continue our discussion on some real
12:32news. Stay with our team.
12:38Welcome back to Crosstalk Bullhorns, where all things are considered. I'm Peter Lovell.
12:42Well, remind you, we're discussing some real news. George, let me kick it off with you.
12:46The other big geopolitical news event has been what's going on, the parlay with the United States
12:55and Iran. And I have to admit to both of you, I'm a bit surprised, OK, and happily surprised,
13:01at least, that they're they're negotiating about talks to how to formulate talks, OK, and technical
13:09talks, which seems to me. Now, I could be wrong about this, George. You and I have talked about
13:14this on our podcast, but it seems like the JCPOA is alive, but in a different form, under a different
13:21name, with different people. Am I wrong? No, I don't think you are. I think there's clearly
13:26serious negotiations taking place. In other words, that both sides are engaged in serious talks. It's
13:34not just pro forma as a preliminary for launching attacks. And the Iranians seem to be fairly positive,
13:44you know, fairly optimistic about the progress. I mean, if you're moving on now to the technical
13:51aspects of the discussions, then obviously they're making progress. And then next Saturday,
13:57there's going to be another meeting with between Witkoff and the Iranian foreign minister. So, so far,
14:04it's clear that they're making progress. The problem with Trump always is, which way is he going to go?
14:13Which way does he fall? Clearly, and this goes back to this New York Times article from a few days ago,
14:23in which it's outlined that there's clearly people within the administration who wanted to join Israel
14:29in a massive bombing attack on Iran. Netanyahu seemed to be under the impression that Trump was
14:36going to sign off on this. And instead, Netanyahu was told when he was summoned to Washington that,
14:43no, we're not going to do this. Instead, we're going to engage in negotiations. But presumably,
14:48the characters who are still in the administration and who want to bomb Iran are still there. And
14:55therefore, they are still waiting and saying, oh, no, look, look, these talks have failed.
15:00There's no point in continuing this. Iran is really, really dangerous. We need to pursue this.
15:05So that's why the question is, as you asked initially, will the United States now take yes for
15:12an answer? A deal is to be made. A deal is to be had here.
15:15Well, there's certainly a deal is to be made. But Mark, Mark, will Trump do it?
15:20Will he do it? That's right. Will he do it? Well, Mark, I mean, a cynic, and the three of us are
15:25cynics on this program. That's why we're here. I tried negotiations. We went through the meeting with
15:32them. We had technical talk. I went the extra mile. That's that's a possibility as well. You know what
15:37I'm getting at, Mark? Yeah, I mean, it is a possibility. But I'm not surprised that the way things
15:44have turned out that that both sides are, however, you know, pretends at a degree of
15:49remove or talking during the Biden administration, we were a lot closer to war with Iran multiple
15:56times. And even the Biden administration walked back from it and actually arranged pantomime
16:04missile strikes, strikes on both sides, right? Political military theater to to save face and
16:12avoid it. Right now, Iran doesn't want a war with the United States because Russia, with its new
16:19strategic partnership, is going about building Iran a powerful conventional deterrent against attack on
16:28Iran, air defense and electronic war force. So they won't need a nuclear system. But it will take a few
16:34years to build the US. Meanwhile, Trump wants to pivot to Asia. And the US is facing a critical
16:40shortage of air defense missiles and long range strike missiles, which Trump administration is wasting
16:47even more of than they already wasted in Ukraine playing whack-a-mole against the Houthis in Yemen.
16:54So they don't have the capability to defend both Israel and the network of US military bases in the
17:02Middle East from Iran's long range missile and drone capability. So both sides have a reason, you know,
17:09to avoid the conflict. It's more about assaging Trump's ego, because this is going to be JCPOA 2.0,
17:18where Trump will say it's much tougher than what Obama negotiated. And the Iranians will say,
17:23this is much better for us than what the JCPOA is. The problem is Israel. Israel is now talking
17:32about making their own limited strike on Iran, even if the US, that's an obvious attempt once again by
17:39Netanyahu to draw both sides into war. And this parallels the situation that the US has with the EU
17:47in Ukraine. The EU wants to drag the US into direct war against Russia in Ukraine. Israel wants to draw
17:56the US into direct war with Iran. And Trump has got to keep both of his vassals slash allies who are
18:04attempting to wag the dog at bay. You know, and George, it seems again, it all boils down to
18:12Trump's vanity is ego. I mean, he wants a win. He wants a win. So I mean, I, I have my doubts that
18:20Marco Rubio speaks for him at all on anything. Okay. I mean, I think, again, it's a mystery to me why
18:27he's even there. Um, um, just to, uh, as a, uh, pole vault to the presidency. I mean, that's all it's
18:34all about to me, his foreign policy, uh, experiences, uh, nothing to write home about,
18:39but Trump really wants a win. And I think, you know, when we look back at the, uh, the JCPOA,
18:46you know, and, and I was a big supporter of a big critic of the, of the Obama administration,
18:51but I thought that was a win for him and be fair. It was a win. Um, that's the only way he's going to
18:56get out of this box here. Um, because there was, it was something that it wasn't strong bipartisan,
19:04but it was, um, what, what it was believed to be. And one of the reasons why I liked it is that it was
19:10a segue to work on other prop quote unquote problems. Okay. This Trump needs this. He needs
19:17this right now. When, if we look at where Trump's wins in the world, the trade war isn't going very
19:23well. Oh, you get my point, George. No, I think that this would indeed be a win for Trump. And of
19:29course, people are going to point out, Oh, but this is exactly the same as the JCPOA. You walked
19:33away from it in 2018. Now you're signing something that's exactly the same. It doesn't matter. He's
19:39got a win. He's got an agreement. Everybody's happy that popping champagne corks. And, and therefore
19:45this kind of, this quibbling won't matter because you've got a deal. Now the Democrats are not in a
19:51good position to attack Trump if he signs the JCPOA, because after all, it's their deal. It's
19:56their, you know, the, it's their leader who had, uh, signed the original. Now the Republicans will be
20:02the ones who are very upset about it, all the Tom Cartons and Ted Cruz's, but they can't really go
20:08too much against Trump because Trump is the leader of the party. He's beloved by the essentially the
20:15new Republican base. So if they have any hopes for 2028, then they're going to antagonize Trump's
20:22base. And no Republican, and no Republican is going to win the white house, uh, uh, based on the Iran
20:29policy. It's just, it just, it's just not there. You know, uh, Mark, um, Netanyahu really wanted this.
20:37He wanted it very badly. I don't think he was summoned to the white house. I think he
20:41desperately wanted to get Trump's ear because I personally think that because of what's going on
20:47in Gaza, he needs an, uh, a diversion to finish up business there. I think that's something. And
20:53plus all of his legal woes, um, Trump is working for legacy. That's what he's all about. It's legacy
21:00right now. Netanyahu is fighting for survival. Go ahead, Mark.
21:04Yeah. I think Trump is no more interested in fighting a war with Iran in the Middle East
21:11than he is in fighting a war, uh, uh, with, uh, Russia in Ukraine, right? He wants to avoid
21:19both conflicts. Um, what, what is more interesting to me is that Iran, before going into these indirect
21:28talks with the U S and Iman, they had a meeting with Russian and Chinese officials and coming out
21:36before going into the second round, again, the Iranian foreign minister Raji came to Moscow and
21:43spoke with at least Lavrov, potentially Putin. And Russia is once again offering, well, if you want to
21:50deal on the nuclear issue with Iran, we can become involved in the talks as a, a, you know, a facilitator
21:58of nuclear inspections, uh, control of nuclear enrichment and the like. And we see this again
22:05and again and again, if we take a big picture view over the last few years, every time the U S tries to
22:13focus to surge against either Russia militarily or with sanctions against China with tariffs
22:21or, uh, against Iran, it's left having to deal with the other two at the same time and weakening
22:28their position against the other two. This is the strength of not just the Russian Chinese bilateral
22:35relationship, but increasingly the Russian Chinese Iranian tripartite, which is styming
22:43U S attempts to go after any one of the three for, uh, want of weakening its position too much
22:50against the other two. Yeah. And that's wonderfully put because George, that was the, I have argued,
22:57uh, uh, for a very long time that the, uh, NATO's, uh, uh, Ukraine proxy war against Russia was to knock
23:05Russia out, uh, uh, off the pedestal as a, a means to start focusing attention primarily on China,
23:11the famous pivot. But Mark has characterized it just perfectly. The more you go after one of the
23:16three, the more they coalesce and they can push back and maybe hopefully, you know, if that's the
23:22lesson that Donald Trump learns, maybe he'll be less, uh, um, uh, prone to going to war. That would
23:28be a good thing. Okay. George. I don't know. I think it would be a good thing. I really don't think
23:33that Trump is a wartime president. I don't think that's the way he thinks. I just don't think this,
23:39uh, is, uh, it's all interesting to him. Yeah, I mean, he's a businessman. He's really,
23:44but that's a, that's a really good, George is right. And that's, I mean, that's the key here.
23:51You know, he wants America when he says America great again, he doesn't mean it in any military
23:55great power sense, but that America will be the sort of the, the factory of the world,
24:01the industrial, uh, powerhouse of the world that that's his goal. And before we go, gentlemen,
24:06before we go, I want to, uh, ask you real briefly is that, are we learning that there a Trump isn't
24:13so easily talked into things real quick, Mark? Uh, yeah, I just disagree. I mean, I, unless you
24:19consider that the people in Yemen and Gaza don't count as people, Trump is not a peacemaker. He's
24:25waging war. We just don't call it war. Yeah. I think we've all, we've all agreed that that's
24:31a different, that's Israel. That is, that is Israel's war. It's not Trump's war. That's how he looks at it.
24:35All right, gentlemen, it always gets to a heated point as we end. Okay. I want to thank my guests
24:40in Budapest and here in Moscow. And of course, I want to thank our viewers for watching us here,
24:44RT. See you next time. Remember crosstalk rules.

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