During a Senate Commerce Committee hearing on Wednesday, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) asked FAA officials about the hotline between the Pentagon and DCA control tower that has been inoperable since 2022.
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00:00Thank you, Ms. Baker. I appreciate that.
00:03All right, I'm going to start with questions for Mr. McIntosh.
00:08On April 25th, for the first time since the January 28 mid-air collision,
00:13the Army resumed flying in the National Capital Region.
00:17Less than a week later, air traffic control had to command two commercial aircraft on final approach
00:22to abort their landing at DCA due to an Army Black Hawk on an apparent training mission
00:29at the Pentagon, having wandered far too close to the commercial aircraft flight path.
00:35Shortly thereafter, and just 10 days after having resumed limited flight in the National Capital Region,
00:44the Army Aviation Brigade suspended operations in the DC area.
00:49Mr. McIntosh, I've been told that prior to the Army Aviation Brigade's decision to suspend operations
00:55on May 5th, the FAA was preparing to suspend the letter of agreement between the Army and the FAA
01:02that gives the Army the ability to operate the DC airspace without having to first ask for FAA clearance
01:10for each flight.
01:11Was the FAA prepared to suspend the letter of agreement?
01:15And if so, what was concerning enough to justify such a decision?
01:19Thank you for the question, Senator Cruz.
01:21Like yourself, we were extremely troubled by the incident that occurred, especially in light of DCA
01:29and the events that led up to the accident.
01:34To be quite honest with you, we were ready to deploy any option available that we could use
01:39or that we felt was necessary to bring safety measures and better behaviors from the DOD in this instance.
01:46To answer your question, we were ready to do any option available to include what you just spoke to,
01:51which was removing the ability to fly.
01:55So just to be clear, does that mean the FAA did actually draft an order suspending the Army's ability to fly in the DC area?
02:03I'm not 100% aware if we drafted an order, sir, but we did have discussions if that was an option that we wanted to pursue.
02:09I do know that the DOD came back and suspended operations on their own based on that event, so we're still working with DOD to improve that process.
02:22Well, I commend your vigilance in protecting the flying public, particularly in and around DCA, given the horrific accident that occurred earlier this year.
02:33Is it true that the hotline, the direct line between the Pentagon air traffic control and the DCA tower, has been inoperable since March of 2022?
02:43Yes, sir, that is correct.
02:45Who maintains that hotline?
02:50I believe the DOD maintains that hotline, but I think the next question would be, why were we not aware of it and insist upon it being fixed?
03:00I didn't have that written down, but it's a good one.
03:02Well, so we take safety responsibilities extremely seriously in the FAA, and those were the questions we were asking.
03:12And we were not aware, but we became aware after that event.
03:16And now that we became aware of that event, we're insisting upon that line to be fixed before we resume any operations out of the Pentagon.
03:24Do you have a timeline for when that line will be operational?
03:26To be honest with you, Senator, I would expect the DOD to expedite that timeline so they can begin their operations.
03:33And while Army flights were ongoing, if the hotline was not operational, how did controllers communicate?
03:43That's a great question, Senator.
03:45We still have landline abilities.
03:47We can make phone calls from the helipad to the operation where the supervisor or even the controller in charge can answer.
03:54So we're aware of the activity.
03:56And if there was a departure clearance needed, we'd be able to relay it via that mechanism.
04:03Is it also true that the air traffic control positions for local traffic and helicopters were combined early, just as they were on the day of the mid-air collision?
04:13Yes, sir, it was.
04:13Let me say the developments at DCA and its airspace are extremely concerning.
04:21And together with Senators Cantwell, Duckworth, and Moran, this committee remains laser-focused on monitoring a safe return to operations at DCA
04:32and making sure all users in the airspace are operating responsibly.
04:38Let's turn to Newark.
04:39Newark International Airport has been beset by delays after the radar system malfunctioned,
04:46leaving controllers unable to see or communicate with aircraft in their sector for approximately 90 seconds.
04:52What broke down, and how did the system become this deteriorated in the first place?
04:57Thank you, Senator.
04:59To answer your question, we were obviously very concerned about the disruptions that occurred in Newark airspace as well,
05:06for the 90 seconds that it occurred.
05:09When we did our investigation, what we found out was our telecommunication provider
05:15that provides network lines into that area, there's two lines, Senator, that provide data and transmission feeds.
05:24The primary line that came in failed.
05:26We have a secondary redundant line that provides the radar transmissions and our voice capabilities,
05:32and that redundant line is supposed to assume that load, and it's supposed to be instantaneous,
05:38where if we were to have a fiber cut of a line or a copper cut of a line, something along those regards,
05:45then that redundant line is supposed to kick in.
05:47When we lost that first line, the second line did not kick in like it was designed to do.
05:54That's what caused the disruption.
05:56The disruption was for 90 seconds.
05:59The aircraft...
06:00I'm an air traffic controller by trade, so I'm just going to talk like an air traffic controller if that's okay.
06:06Air traffic controllers provide positive separation between aircraft.
06:09That is what we do.
06:11And what I mean by that is we never point aircraft head-on at the same altitude.
06:14We ensure we have appropriate levels of separation.
06:16In the event that we have something like a Nordo aircraft that has a stuck mic that could jam up the frequencies,
06:24or if we have something like that.
06:25So we didn't have a loss of separation based on some of our procedures that we have installed
06:29and the techniques that we use as controllers.
06:31I do want to highlight that.
06:33But 90 seconds is a long time for an air traffic controller.
06:36So although we have contingencies in place that we use to make sure that we keep aircraft safe,
06:44it is a long disruption for a radar screen to go blank or not to be able to talk to aircraft.
06:49So that was something that we wanted to take a look at,
06:52and we have put in corrective measures since that happened to ensure that those redundancies are better for that airspace.
06:59We have this system across the United States feeding radar data like this where we have a line and a redundant line,
07:05and we haven't had a failure like this to this degree in my memory.
07:10So we had to put together, along with the local vendor that was responsible for the telecommunications,
07:14to provide a more resistant or a better contingency to ensure that if it ever happened again,
07:21that we feel good about those processes.
07:24We were able to implement a new contingency, and we are working with a telco provider,
07:29along with Secretary Duffy's leadership, to actually bring in a third line of redundancy into that area
07:33to prevent this from happening again.
07:34So when the system was down, what was the degree of danger the flying public faced?
07:42The real danger of the flying public would be is if our techniques weren't good,
07:46if our controllers didn't put aircraft on positive vectors,
07:50if we couldn't quick look or talk to an aircraft via another way,
07:53because we have the ability to go via emergency frequencies.
07:57We can use PET 2000s that are at our disposal at some of our remote towers.
08:00If all those fail at the same time, then we would have to assure that the aircraft follow what they're supposed to do,
08:07which is lost comm procedures, where they could go into holding or they could go back to the return frequencies.
08:12But if all those start failing all at one time, then all of a sudden the danger of the flying public is,
08:17then all of a sudden you're going to have to rely on the pilots to do what they do,
08:21which is rely on their TCAS systems on board, which is their traffic collision systems.
08:26So I guess what I'm trying to get at is during those 90 seconds,
08:29was there a significantly heightened danger to the flying public?
08:32I don't believe there was a heightened significant danger to the flying public.
08:37But with that being said, from where I sit, we want to remove all risk to the flying public.
08:41And that is what's concerning to me, is how do we remove any bit of that risk?
08:45And we need to make sure our contingencies are better placed.