On Tuesday, the House Homeland Security Committee held a hearing to discuss China's surveillance of Cuba.
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00:01The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will come to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee in recess at any point.
00:09Today's hearing continues the important oversight work we began in February by taking a closer look at the Chinese Communist Party's growing footprint in Cuba and the implications for U.S. homeland security.
00:20With Beijing ramping up its economic, military, and intelligence operations just 90 miles from our coastline, this is no longer a distant challenge.
00:27It's an immediate concern for the security of the American people.
00:31The United States must urgently understand the full extent of this threat, ensure that the Department of Homeland Security and its interagency partners are equipped to address it,
00:42and take a hard look at our broader strategic partner throughout the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere.
00:49I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement.
00:54Good morning.
00:55Today, the subcommittee convenes to examine an alarming threat developing just 90 miles off our coast.
01:01Mounting evidence suggests that the Chinese Communist Party is expanding its strategic partnership with the totalitarian communist regime in Cuba
01:07to build advanced surveillance infrastructure capable of targeting the United States.
01:13This collaboration represents one of the most brazen intelligence operations ever attempted near the American mainland
01:19and places our military operations, commercial activity, and communication squarely in the crosshairs of a hostile foreign power.
01:28Recent satellite imagery and open-source analysis suggest the presence of several Chinese-funded signals and intelligence facilities across Cuba.
01:36The possibility that these sites are capable of monitoring U.S. military operations, commercial shipping, space launches, and sensitive communications is deeply troubling.
01:45Southeastern United States is home to some of the most critical assets in our nation's security infrastructure.
01:51From the Space Launch Center at Cape Canaveral to the headquarters of U.S. Southern Command in Miami,
01:56this region plays a critical role in our defense posture.
02:00This region includes my own district, which has long been on the front lines of threats emerging from the Cuban regime.
02:05If the Chinese government is, in fact, leveraging a growing partnership with Cuba to collect intelligence on our activities,
02:12that is a threat that we can no longer ignore.
02:15Cuban's government has a long history of working with foreign adversaries to undermine the United States.
02:21What we are potentially witnessing today is a new and dangerous phase of that cooperation that is fueled by Havana's economic desperation
02:28and Beijing's strategic ambition.
02:31Cuban regime remains a state sponsor of terrorism, harbors fugitives from the U.S. justice system,
02:37and relentlessly suppresses the rights of its own people.
02:40Its growing reliance on foreign authoritarian powers like China only adds to the danger.
02:46Over the past several months, I've taken steps to raise alarms about the malign activities of the communist government of Cuba.
02:52In March, I sent a letter to the Department of Homeland Security questing an investigation into individuals in the United States
02:58suspected of links to Cuban intelligence and the Communist Party.
03:02These networks have long operated on U.S. soil and may now be intersecting with China's activities in the region.
03:09Shortly after, in April, I sent a letter to the Department of Treasury calling for a full suspension of U.S.-Cuba travel and remittances,
03:17with appropriate humanitarian exceptions.
03:19We should not be funding a regime that turns around and opens its doors to our greatest adversaries.
03:25If reports of rising Chinese activity in Cuba are accurate, then it is no longer just a diplomatic issue.
03:31It is a direct security risk to the American people.
03:35This hearing is the first step in understanding the scope of this threat.
03:38Today, our witnesses will help us assess the potential scale of the threat
03:42and what measures the federal government should take to stay ahead of it.
03:46We need to be clear-eyed about the risks and both swift and unified in our response.
03:51The United States cannot afford to overlook the possibility that a hostile foreign power
03:55is working hand-in-hand with a communist dictatorship in Cuba
04:00to employ advanced surveillance capabilities on our doorstep.
04:03It is our responsibility to ensure that the homeland remains secure,
04:08and not just from what we can see, but from what may be gathering just out of sight.
04:14I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee.
04:16I look forward to a productive discussion on how the United States can counter the Chinese Communist Party
04:22and their suspected surveillance efforts in Cuba
04:25and prevent our adversaries from gaining a strategic foothold so close to our homeland.
04:30I now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from New Jersey,
04:37Ms. McIver, for her opening statement.
04:39Good morning. Thank you, Chair.
04:41Thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.
04:44The threats posed by the People's Republic of China towards the United States require serious attention,
04:51as China works aggressively to gain a foothold within the Caribbean.
04:54In Cuba, China has provided almost $8 billion in monetary incentives over the past 20 years,
05:02seeking to strengthen ties with the country just 90 miles from U.S. shores.
05:08China has invested heavily in Cuba's infrastructure, technology, communications, and biotechnology.
05:15Within the transportation and marine time sectors,
05:17Cuba has benefited from China's partnership by gaining security equipment for airports, seaports, and customs facilities.
05:26New Tech Company, a Chinese state-owned company,
05:32has provided inspection technology to be installed throughout much of Cuba's transportation networks.
05:37The Department of Homeland Security has assessed that New Tech screening systems likely have deficiencies in detection capabilities,
05:47and China have—I'm sorry, excuse me.
05:51The Department of Homeland Security has assessed that New Tech screening systems likely have deficiencies in detection capabilities,
05:58and that China could potentially access the systems remotely to gather intelligence on shipping, manifest, and passenger information.
06:09In 2021, Cuba signed onto China's Belt and Roll Initiative,
06:14and now China is further developing sites in Cuba to collect intelligence on the United States
06:21through monitoring of ship movements, emails, phone calls, and radio and satellite transmissions.
06:29The knowledge of these sites is not new,
06:32as U.S. security officials have confirmed awareness of their existence since at least the first Trump administration.
06:40The United States and our partners face tremendous challenges in responding to China's aggression.
06:45A solid partnership among the United States and Latin America allies aids in advancing U.S. interests in the region
06:54and strengthening our national security.
06:57Unfortunately, the Trump administration is actively undermining those efforts.
07:02By suspending foreign aid and dismantling USAID,
07:06the Trump administration has weakened our national security,
07:09allowing China to apply influence within Latin America without competition.
07:15In year 2023, USAID dedicated $1.8 billion in funding to the Western Hemisphere,
07:24including funding to support independent Cuban media organizations providing objective, uncensored journalism.
07:31The dismantling of foreign aid programs benefits authoritarian governments like the Cuban regime
07:38by undermining groups working to advance human rights and democratic ideals.
07:44To make matters worse, President Trump has ceded significant power to an unelected billionaire in Elon Musk,
07:52whose deep ties with the PRC are cause for great concern.
07:58I am glad there is bipartisan agreement on the need to counter China's aggressive activities in Cuba and Latin America.
08:05That said, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in speaking out about how the Trump administration
08:12is actively undermining efforts to counter the PRC and advance U.S. interests around the globe.
08:19Thank you again for our witnesses joining us today.
08:22With that, I yield back.
08:23Thank you to the ranking member.
08:24Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
08:29I am pleased to hold a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this critical topic.
08:34I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hand.
08:40Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Committee on Homeland Security
08:44of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
08:47so help ye God?
08:49Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative.
08:52Thank you, and please be seated.
08:54I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
08:56Dr. Ryan Berg is the Director of the Americas Program and the Head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative
09:03at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
09:06Dr. Berg specializes in U.S.-Latin American relations, strategic competition, defense policy,
09:12and transnational organized crime.
09:14Previously, he was a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute
09:18and a visiting fellow at Oxford's Changing Character of War Program.
09:22He holds a doctor of philosophy and a master of philosophy in political science,
09:26a master of science in global governance from Oxford,
09:29as well as a bachelor of arts in government and theology from Georgetown.
09:33Andres Martinez Fernandez is the Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America
09:38with the Heritage Foundation's Allison Center for the National Security.
09:42In this role, he leads the Heritage Foundation's work on U.S. policy towards Latin America,
09:47conducting research and engaging audiences on topics such as economic development,
09:51foreign aid, transnational organized crime, and the malign activities of the communist China
09:56and other extra-regional actors.
09:59Before joining Heritage, Andres was a leading analyst at a leading global market intelligence firm
10:05where he advised top executives from multinational companies on political and macroeconomic risks in Latin America.
10:11He received his master's degree in Latin American Studies and International Economics
10:16from John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,
10:19and his bachelor's degree is in history from Florida International University,
10:24a university which I represent.
10:26Leland Lazarus serves as Associate Director of National Security
10:29at Florida International University's Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy.
10:33He's an expert on China-Latin American relations
10:36and manages a team of researchers and interns
10:38that collect data and analysis on U.S. national security
10:42and governance in Latin America and the Caribbean.
10:45From 2021 to 2022, Leland served as a Special Assistant
10:48and Speech Writer to the Commander of U.S. Southern Command.
10:52Before that, Leland was a State Department Foreign Service Officer
10:56serving as Deputy Public Affairs Officer
10:58at the U.S. Embassy Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean.
11:02Consular Officer at the U.S. Consul General in Shenyang, China
11:07and Pickering Fellow at U.S. Embassy Beijing
11:09and at the China Desk in D.C.
11:12Fluent in both Mandarin and Spanish,
11:14he holds a Master of Arts in U.S.-China Foreign Policy
11:17from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
11:20and a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Brown University.
11:24I want to thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here today.
11:27I now recognize Dr. Berg for five minutes
11:29to summarize his opening statements.
11:31Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
11:34Ranking Member McIver,
11:35distinguished members of the subcommittee.
11:37I'm honored to share my views with you
11:39on this important topic this morning.
11:41A mere 90 miles off our shores,
11:43the United States' most formidable 21st century competitor,
11:46the People's Republic of China,
11:48has found fertile soil to deploy its arsenal of espionage,
11:51digital surveillance and maritime competition.
11:54In many ways, a moribund socialist system in Havana
11:58is Beijing's perfect partner for threatening U.S. homeland,
12:01especially as a response to U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific.
12:05Mr. Chairman, I'm going to focus my oral testimony
12:07on China's signals intelligence capabilities
12:09while recognizing that the relationship between Beijing and Havana
12:12runs much deeper.
12:13I know my colleagues on this panel will cover other aspects
12:16of the relationship, maritime, telecommunications, and so on,
12:20which I'm happy, of course, to discuss in our question period.
12:23When Soviet influence diminished on the island
12:25following the end of the Cold War,
12:27eyes, ears, and antennas stayed.
12:29In many ways, China filled the void.
12:32On June 8, 2023,
12:33the Wall Street Journal first reported
12:35that Cuba hosted secret Chinese spy bases
12:37in return for billions of dollars for the Cuban regime.
12:40That same day, the Biden administration's Defense Department
12:43denied the Wall Street Journal's reporting,
12:45characterizing the report as, quote, inaccurate.
12:48Three days later, however,
12:49the NSC spokesperson, John Kirby,
12:51reversed course and admitted to China's spy bases in Cuba,
12:54but said that its presence had existed since 2019
12:57under the first Trump administration,
12:59implying that the Biden admin had inherited this challenge.
13:02Around the same time, reports surfaced
13:04that China was pursuing the construction
13:06of a military training base in Cuba.
13:08The CSIS then published a groundbreaking report
13:12called Secret Signals,
13:14Decoding China's Intelligence Activities in Cuba.
13:16The CSIS team scoured the island
13:18using commercially available satellite imagery,
13:21identifying four likely sites
13:22for signals intelligence collection in that process.
13:26This was followed by a Wall Street Journal exclusive,
13:28confirming its earlier reporting on the spy stations.
13:32CSIS published another updated set of images
13:34in December 2024,
13:35and has tracked China's progress at these four sites.
13:39As part of this hearing, Mr. Chairman,
13:41we're pleased to release some updated imagery,
13:44and I think we have a slideshow here for you to see.
13:47As you can see on this first slide, Mr. Chairman,
13:49CSIS positively identified about four specific facilities
13:52as highly likely sites supporting Chinese intelligence operations
13:55targeting the U.S.
13:56Three of these sites,
13:58Bejucal, Guajai, and Calabasar,
14:01are located around Havana.
14:03The fourth site, El Salau,
14:04is a previously unreported facility
14:06located on the opposite side of the island,
14:08just east of Santiago de Cuba.
14:10In response to reporting on the Cuba-China-SIGINT nexus,
14:14high-level Cuban Communist Party officials
14:15either outright denied any relationship
14:17or attempted to disarm our criticism with humor.
14:21To coincide with this hearing, Mr. Chairman,
14:23we have some updated imagery that we can show you.
14:26Next slide, please.
14:28After the publication of our initial reports,
14:31construction progress at El Salau,
14:32the site by Santiago de Cuba,
14:35seems to have ceased,
14:36according to the image captures dated April 18, 2025.
14:39If you can go to the next slide, please.
14:40The CDAA site appears to have been abandoned for the moment
14:44as evidenced by hitherto well-trimmed and graded areas
14:47being taken over by grass.
14:50On the next slide,
14:52the PRC appears to be enhancing its SIGINT
14:54at a previously identified facility at Bejucal.
14:58And on the next slide,
14:59you can see an antenna field
15:02from the original CSIS image captures.
15:05And on our last slide, Mr. Chairman,
15:08you can see the latest CSIS image captures
15:10shows those antennas have been removed
15:11to make way for a large CDAA site,
15:15very similar to the one
15:16that was originally visible at El Salau.
15:19The Bejucal facility is very, very active,
15:21as evidenced by multiple image captures in this process.
15:25So as you can see, Mr. Chairman,
15:26our adversaries are at our doorstep.
15:28I want to use the rest of the time remaining
15:30to mention some brief recommendations
15:32for the committee to consider.
15:34First, I think classified briefing
15:36to every member of Congress should be given,
15:38given the significance of these developments
15:41to U.S. national security.
15:43Second, the U.S. should consider
15:45strategic declassification of images in its possession,
15:48given that El Salau appears to have been abandoned
15:50after the CSIS publication of its report.
15:53We may reasonably believe that transparency efforts
15:56and public criticism
15:57do have the potential to derail
15:59some of the PRC's ambitions.
16:01Third, develop and articulate red lines.
16:04It may be difficult to displace
16:06some of these existing facilities from the island,
16:08but the United States should be crystal clear
16:10that the permanent installation
16:11of offensive military capabilities in Cuba
16:13or the basing of PLA combat assets
16:15would be seen as a significant escalation
16:18and a red line for the United States.
16:20An inability to deter SIGINT facilities
16:22should not be interpreted by Havana
16:24as a green light for China.
16:26Fourth, I think we need to harden
16:28sensitive infrastructure
16:29against SIGINT collection by China.
16:31The CISA should spearhead an effort
16:33to review which companies and facilities in the area
16:35are most vulnerable
16:36to intelligence-gathering operations.
16:39And lastly, Mr. Chairman,
16:40I think we need to enlist neighbors and allies.
16:42These facilities do not just snoop on the United States.
16:45CDAAs collect information omnidirectionally,
16:47meaning that other countries in the Caribbean,
16:49including those that Secretary of State Marco Rubio met
16:52on his recent successful trip to the Caribbean,
16:55are also implicated.
16:57With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield
16:58and I look forward to the committee's questions.
17:00Thank you, Dr. Berg.
17:01And I recognize Mr. Martinez-Fernandez
17:03for five minutes to summarize his opening statements.
17:08Thank you, Chairman Jimenez
17:10and REC Member McIver.
17:11I appreciate the invitation
17:13and apologize for my tardiness.
17:15My name is Andres Martinez.
17:16I run the Latin America portfolio,
17:18the Heritage Foundation.
17:21And since its inception,
17:23the Cuban dictatorship has repeatedly proven itself
17:26to be a willing partner
17:27and staging ground for anti-American
17:29extra-hemispheric powers.
17:31Today, Havana offers itself as a partner
17:34for a new patron, the Chinese Communist Party.
17:37Reporting by CSIS and other organizations
17:39have once again unmasked the malign nature
17:42of the Beijing-Havana nexus,
17:44particularly the growing footprint
17:46of Chinese intelligence-gathering facilities in Cuba.
17:49China's accelerating espionage partnership with Cuba
17:53poses a major threat for U.S. and hemispheric security,
17:57bringing together Beijing's resources and technology
18:00with Havana's troubling capacity
18:02to penetrate U.S. agencies and security institutions.
18:06The growth of China's spying footprint in Cuba
18:09is also indicative of Beijing's broader malign presence
18:12in the Americas.
18:13While economic engagement has led the way
18:16for China's advance in much of Latin America
18:18and the Caribbean,
18:19Beijing's influence has spread quickly
18:22into the political, clandestine, and military spheres.
18:26China's broader influence has also allowed it
18:29to expand its regional intelligence-gathering capacities
18:33beyond Cuba, including in democratic nations.
18:36Indeed, Beijing has even secured
18:38unusually sprawling embassies in the Caribbean,
18:40such as in Antigua and Bahamas and beyond,
18:44with sites that are widely considered
18:46to be active intelligence centers for China.
18:49In Argentina and elsewhere in South America,
18:52Beijing has also established
18:54deep space monitoring facilities
18:56with worrying military implications.
18:59China's strategic focus around dual use
19:01and critical infrastructure in the Americas
19:04highlights the intrinsic military and security nature
19:07of China's hemispheric encroachment.
19:12Chinese infrastructure projects
19:13across Latin America and the Caribbean
19:15offer Beijing crucial vectors
19:17for espionage and disruptive operations
19:20in and around the U.S.
19:23Control over ports and other infrastructure
19:25can even be leveraged to impede
19:27the movement of U.S. warships,
19:29military resources,
19:31or directly target U.S. assets
19:33and supply chains.
19:34Beijing's inroads in the Caribbean
19:37may be the most concerning aspect
19:39of its hemispheric encroachment.
19:41Geographic proximity to the United States
19:44and around crucial U.S. maritime routes
19:46make the Caribbean of outside strategic importance
19:50for the United States.
19:51China appears to recognize
19:53this strategic importance
19:54given the relative attention
19:55and engagement Beijing has given to the region,
19:58both economically and politically.
20:00As with Pacific Island nations,
20:02Beijing seeks to consolidate its influence
20:05over strategically important island chains
20:07in the Caribbean.
20:09The end goal of this effort
20:10is apparently counterbalancing
20:12the U.S. presence in Asia
20:14and empowering China
20:16to destabilize the U.S.
20:17through asymmetric means.
20:19As Beijing grows increasingly belligerent
20:22against Taiwan
20:23and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific,
20:25the U.S. must assume
20:26that China will operationalize
20:28its presence and influence
20:30in Latin America and the Caribbean
20:31against the United States.
20:34China's gains in the Caribbean and beyond
20:36pose an urgent challenge
20:37for U.S. national security.
20:39The Trump administration
20:40has clearly moved to confront
20:42the hemispheric vulnerability
20:43posed by China
20:44and its partnership
20:45with the communist dictatorship in Cuba,
20:49among other actors.
20:50Confronting these threats
20:52requires rallying pressure
20:54against Beijing and Havana
20:55while bolstering partnerships
20:57with regional democracies
20:59across economic, political,
21:01and security spheres.
21:03The United States
21:03should bolster its security cooperation
21:05and capacities in particular
21:07within Latin America
21:08and the Caribbean,
21:09prioritizing initiatives
21:11that mitigate risks
21:12posed to vital infrastructure
21:14and other vulnerabilities.
21:16At the same time,
21:17the U.S. should leverage
21:18its underappreciated territorial presence
21:20in the Caribbean.
21:22U.S. territories,
21:23particularly including Puerto Rico,
21:25can be better used
21:26to counterbalance
21:27Chinese and Cuban
21:29malign activities
21:30in the Caribbean
21:31and across Latin America.
21:33Bolstering the U.S. Coast Guard
21:35presence capacities
21:37in Puerto Rico, for example,
21:39will support U.S. security
21:40in the broader Caribbean region
21:42amid these growing threats.
21:45U.S. territories
21:46can also be used
21:47as force multipliers
21:49in bolstering broader
21:50U.S. economic engagement
21:52in Latin America
21:53and the Caribbean
21:53through targeted measures
21:55that offset regional dependence
21:57on China.
21:59Thank you very much
22:00for the time
22:01and I look forward
22:02to your questions.
22:03Thank you,
22:04Mr. Martinez-Fernandez.
22:05Now I recognize
22:06Mr. Lazarus
22:07for five minutes
22:07to summarize
22:08his opening statements.
22:11Chairman Jimenez,
22:14Ranking Member MacGyver,
22:15and distinguished members
22:16of the subcommittee,
22:17thank you for the privilege
22:19to speak today.
22:21My name is Leland Lazarus.
22:22I'm the Associate Director
22:23of Florida International University's
22:25Gordon Institute
22:25for Public Policy
22:26and non-resident fellow
22:28at the Atlantic Council's
22:29Global China Hub.
22:31I come to you today
22:32not just as a researcher,
22:34but as someone
22:35who has observed
22:36this threat evolve firsthand.
22:39First from my time
22:40as a Fulbright scholar,
22:42studying the Chinese diaspora
22:43in Panama,
22:45to serving as a State Department
22:46Foreign Service officer
22:47in China and the Caribbean,
22:49to serving as a special assistant
22:51and speech writer
22:52to two combatant commanders
22:53at U.S. Southern Command.
22:56So let me be clear.
22:58Cuba is not just an outpost
23:00of Chinese influence.
23:02It's a strategic beachhead.
23:05As my colleagues have said
23:07time and time again,
23:07just 90 miles off Florida,
23:10where I live,
23:10where I reside,
23:12the Chinese Communist Party
23:13is executing
23:13a 21st century playbook
23:15of espionage,
23:17port infrastructure,
23:18space surveillance,
23:19and digital authoritarianism.
23:22And Havana
23:22is the perfect laboratory
23:24for China.
23:26China has built
23:27signals intelligence outposts
23:28aimed at Florida,
23:30as the CSIS report
23:31has shown,
23:32but it has also installed
23:34airport scanners
23:35and surveillance equipment
23:36using Chinese firms
23:37like Nuke Tech,
23:38as ranking member
23:39MacGyver had mentioned.
23:41It's a state-owned company
23:42sanctioned by the U.S.
23:44for ties
23:44to the Chinese military.
23:46Nuke Tech systems
23:47are deployed
23:48across Cuban airports,
23:50seaports,
23:50and customs facilities,
23:52giving Beijing
23:53privileged access
23:54to sensitive data flows
23:56right on our doorstep.
23:59But what's happening
24:00in Cuba
24:00is just one chapter
24:02in a much larger story.
24:05Next week,
24:06on May 13th,
24:08Beijing will host
24:09the China SEALAC Summit,
24:11with nearly every country
24:12in Latin America
24:13and the Caribbean
24:14represented in Beijing.
24:16It's a reminder
24:17that China
24:17has a long-term strategy
24:19for this hemisphere,
24:20built on patient investment,
24:22diplomatic cultivation,
24:24and evolving security ties.
24:27The U.S.,
24:28unfortunately,
24:28by contrast,
24:30still too often operates
24:31from a crisis-to-crisis mindset
24:32in this region,
24:33and has yet to provide
24:35an affirmative,
24:36long-term agenda
24:37for the region at large.
24:39The Chinese military
24:41and military scholars
24:42call countries like Cuba
24:45strategic support points
24:46or jianle zhidian
24:48in Mandarin
24:48to sustain
24:50their far-seas
24:51naval posture.
24:53They don't need
24:54permanent bases.
24:55They need leverage.
24:57And Cuba gives them
24:58exactly that.
25:00It's close,
25:01politically reliable,
25:02and already outfitted
25:03with Chinese tech.
25:05When the U.S.
25:06sends warships
25:07through the Taiwan Straits,
25:09Chinese academics
25:10now reply
25:11with references
25:12to their own right
25:13to operate near Florida.
25:15That's strategic reciprocity,
25:17Beijing-style.
25:19You touch our waters,
25:20we have the right
25:20to touch yours.
25:23China also aspires
25:24to build its
25:25Cetian space program
25:27to expand its global
25:28space domain awareness.
25:30But space is also crucial
25:32for signals intelligence,
25:34and Cuba is a prime location
25:36for China to target
25:37the U.S.
25:39That's why we
25:40at Florida International
25:41University
25:41has created
25:43the Chinese Activities
25:44in Latin America dashboard
25:45in order to track
25:47and expose
25:47China's moves
25:48in almost real time.
25:50It maps everything,
25:52and I mean everything,
25:53from dual-use ports
25:55and signals intelligence
25:56listening stations
25:57to companies
25:58like Nuke Tech
25:59that quietly expand
26:00China's operational footprint
26:02across the region.
26:03Our dashboard
26:05that we built
26:05is really built
26:06for you all,
26:07U.S. policymakers,
26:09to make the best decisions
26:10about our greatest
26:12strategic competitor.
26:14But it's also a warning.
26:16China's not just coming
26:17to Latin America
26:18and the Caribbean.
26:19It's already here,
26:20and it's here to stay.
26:23Members of the subcommittee,
26:24we cannot win
26:25a global competition
26:26with China
26:27if we lose sight
26:28of our own hemisphere.
26:31Strategic neglect
26:31is not just danger,
26:33it is a gift
26:34we give to Beijing.
26:36We must meet
26:37this challenge together
26:38with our allies
26:39and partners
26:40to make America
26:41and the Americas
26:43safer, stronger,
26:44and more prosperous.
26:46Thank you,
26:47and I look forward
26:47to your questions.
26:49Thank you, Mr. Lazarus.
26:50Members will be recognized
26:51by order of seniority
26:53for their five minutes
26:53of questioning,
26:54and I'll recognize myself
26:55for five minutes
26:56of questioning.
26:56I'll start out
26:57with a comment
26:58in that the United States
27:00for far too long,
27:01both Republican
27:03and Democrat administrations
27:05have not paid
27:06close enough attention
27:07to what's happening
27:08in our own hemisphere,
27:09and it's allowed China
27:11to make the inroads
27:12that it has,
27:13and now we're just
27:14waking up to the fact.
27:15And so this hearing
27:17is part of that
27:18to try to awaken
27:19the American people
27:20and the administration
27:21to the fact
27:22that we need
27:23to pay close attention
27:25to what's happening
27:26in our own neighborhood.
27:27And so with that,
27:31this is an open question.
27:33It's my estimation
27:35that the Cuban regime
27:36itself is actually
27:37and it's one of the most
27:37weakest positions
27:38that it has been
27:39in the past 60 years.
27:41Do you share,
27:42do any of you share
27:43that opinion,
27:43or do you disagree
27:45with that opinion?
27:45I'll start with you,
27:46Mr. Dr. Berg.
27:49Thanks for the question,
27:50Chairman.
27:50I do share that opinion.
27:51I think the Cuban regime
27:52is incredibly weak
27:53at this point in time,
27:54and we've seen that
27:57not just in protests
27:58from the island,
27:59but in rolling blackouts
28:00that occur seemingly
28:01on a monthly basis,
28:02sometimes weekly basis.
28:04Mr. Chairman.
28:05Mr. Fernandez.
28:07Mr. Fernandez.
28:09Yes, I agree.
28:10I think economically,
28:11politically as well,
28:12the Cuban regime
28:13is in a period
28:14of vulnerability.
28:16I think also
28:17increasingly hemispheric
28:20as well as U.S.
28:22political consensus
28:23is moving.
28:24towards a recognition
28:25of the malign nature
28:27of the Cuban dictatorship
28:28as past attempts,
28:31however,
28:33poorly conceived
28:34at engagement
28:35as we have seen
28:37from the U.S.,
28:39have fallen flatly
28:40and been rebuffed,
28:42and the Cuban dictatorship
28:43has at the same time,
28:46again,
28:46as we have discussed,
28:48acted as an active partner
28:50for enemies
28:52of the United States
28:52within our hemisphere.
28:53Mr. Lazarus,
28:54do you share that opinion
28:55that the Cuban regime
28:56is at one of the weakest points
28:57in the last 60 years?
28:58Sir, I'd absolutely agree.
29:00Inflation is over 30%
29:02for the Cuban regime.
29:04There's been an increased
29:05outflow of refugees
29:09coming out of Cuba,
29:10and there's been an increase
29:12in Cuban officials
29:13traveling to Beijing
29:14trying to get more investment.
29:15I understand that now China
29:17is Cuba's either largest
29:19or second largest
29:19trading partner,
29:21accounting for roughly 30%
29:22of Cuba's imports and exports.
29:24So I think that Cuba's
29:27decreasing economic situation
29:29is allowing it to become
29:30even more and more
29:31dependent economically,
29:32increasingly security
29:34and political standpoint
29:34on China.
29:35I'd like to discuss
29:36with the three of you offline
29:38and how we can accelerate
29:39Cuba's dictatorship,
29:41their demise,
29:42so we can turn Cuba
29:43from a platform
29:45and a base for China
29:46and make it actually
29:48a friend of the United States.
29:49And I think we're close to that.
29:50I also think that Cuba
29:52is the head of the snake
29:53when we talk about
29:54all the unrest
29:55that's happening
29:56in our hemisphere
29:57in Venezuela,
29:57Nicaragua.
29:58Cuba's the head of the snake.
30:00And we need to do
30:01everything in our power
30:01to set the Cuban people free
30:03but also turn Cuba
30:04from an enemy
30:05into a friend.
30:06Now, let's talk about Cuba
30:07and the threat
30:08and the Chinese threat
30:09in Cuba.
30:11The Russians have been
30:12operating there for years,
30:14decades.
30:15Are the Chinese
30:16supplanting the Russians
30:17or are they adding
30:18to the Russian threat?
30:22I'm happy to take that,
30:23Mr. Chairman.
30:24I think that they are
30:25both supplanting
30:26but also adding to.
30:27There's still a residual
30:28Russian presence
30:29of course in Cuba.
30:30We saw last year
30:32at the tail end
30:33of the Biden administration
30:34how the Russians
30:35sailed a vessel
30:36through the Florida Strait,
30:38ported both in Cuba
30:39and in Havana.
30:41Importantly,
30:41before porting in Cuba,
30:43displayed one of its
30:44Zircon hypersonic missiles
30:45in the Atlantic.
30:47But I would say
30:48in terms of the presence,
30:49Mr. Chairman,
30:49the Chinese have supplanted them
30:50in terms of the more
30:51important partner.
30:52And quite literally,
30:53some of these sites
30:54that we've showed
30:54were former Russian sites
30:56that are now occupied,
30:57we believe,
30:57by the Chinese.
30:59And they've added
30:59to the capabilities
31:00and the more modern
31:01infrastructure,
31:02et cetera.
31:03That's great.
31:04Okay.
31:04And so,
31:05you know,
31:05maybe some of my colleagues
31:06would be surprised
31:08to know that not only
31:09is it Russia and China
31:10but also Iran
31:11is here
31:12and North Korea
31:14is also here.
31:14and so we need
31:16to also stand up
31:16to those threats.
31:18The training range
31:20that's just
31:20outside of Florida.
31:22It's the largest
31:22training range
31:23that we have.
31:24It's only the only
31:24training range
31:25that actually
31:26can simulate
31:27battle
31:28in the Taiwan Straits.
31:30What kind of a threat
31:32do these facilities
31:33pose
31:34to those ranges
31:36and what kind
31:37of intelligence
31:38could the Chinese
31:38get from
31:39surveying
31:41those ranges
31:42in relation
31:43to our tactics,
31:44et cetera,
31:45of how we may
31:47operate
31:47in the Taiwan Straits?
31:49Mr. Chairman,
31:50the first slide
31:51that I showed
31:51in my presentation
31:53showed just
31:53the number
31:54of facilities
31:55in your home state
31:55that are within,
31:56easily within range
31:57of these facilities.
31:59To my understanding
32:00that military communications
32:01is, of course,
32:02encrypted
32:02and protected
32:03in certain ways.
32:04But if it's scooped
32:05up by some
32:06of this equipment,
32:07then it is available
32:08for the Chinese
32:09to try to crack
32:09that communication.
32:12And so that's why
32:12one of my recommendations
32:13is doing an exercise
32:15to harden facilities
32:16and figure out
32:16what our vulnerabilities
32:17are so that we can
32:19make sure that we
32:19protect those
32:21very vulnerable secrets,
32:23both on the commercial
32:23side and on the military
32:24side, Mr. Chairman.
32:25My five minutes are up
32:27and I recognize
32:27the ranking member,
32:28the gentleman from New Jersey,
32:29Mrs. McIver,
32:30for five minutes.
32:31Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
32:32Mr. Lazarus,
32:34thank you once again
32:36for joining us today.
32:37In your testimony,
32:38you discussed how
32:39China will be hosting
32:40a summit with Latin America
32:42and Caribbean states
32:43next week.
32:45China and Cuba
32:46also both belong
32:47to the BRICS group,
32:49along with Brazil,
32:50Russia, India,
32:51and a total of 23 countries.
32:54BRICS has become
32:55a serious political force
32:57as the nations
32:58belonging to BRICS
32:59now account for
33:00almost 30%
33:01of the world's
33:02GDP,
33:0340% of the oil production
33:05in almost half
33:06the world's population.
33:08We have seen
33:08what Trump's
33:09repeated tariff threats
33:10are doing to the economy,
33:12both at home
33:13and globally,
33:14while eroding trust
33:16in the U.S. dollar.
33:17Trump's foreign policies
33:19are only making groups
33:20like the BRICS
33:21more powerful
33:22as our geopolitical rivals
33:24work to fill the void
33:25that President Trump
33:26has created
33:27with this
33:28America Last policies.
33:29Mr. Lazarus,
33:31as America recedes
33:32from the world stage,
33:34how are BRICS
33:35and other multinational groups
33:37exerting power
33:38and influence?
33:40Well, Ranking Member,
33:41thank you so much
33:42for the question.
33:43You're absolutely right.
33:44I mean, Brazil,
33:45Russia, India,
33:46China, South Africa,
33:47when taken together,
33:48they represent
33:49more than 30%
33:50of global GDP,
33:52and they've really been
33:53using this multilateral
33:55institution
33:55in order to create
33:57alternative financial institutions
33:59to the Western-built ones
34:01built right after World War II.
34:03So you think
34:04the New Development Bank
34:05or the BRICS Bank
34:07that could fund
34:08various projects
34:09in the developing world.
34:11There's talk about
34:12them creating
34:13a BRICS currency
34:14that could mean
34:15that they can settle
34:16trade accounts
34:18not using the U.S. dollar,
34:19which could potentially
34:20weaken the U.S. dollar's
34:22dominance in the globe.
34:23But it goes to
34:25a larger narrative
34:28that the Chinese
34:28and our other adversaries
34:31try to use
34:32in the Global South,
34:32which is that
34:33the United States
34:34doesn't necessarily care
34:35about the Global South.
34:36All they care about
34:37is realist ideology,
34:42especially in this region
34:44in Latin America
34:45and the Caribbean.
34:46There is this narrative
34:47that the Chinese
34:48try to say,
34:49which is that
34:49the United States
34:50only wants to
34:51impose the Monroe Doctrine 2.0.
34:53And I am concerned
34:56that certain things,
35:00certain policies
35:02could really allow
35:04the Chinese
35:05to continue to spread
35:06that narrative
35:06in Latin America
35:08and the Caribbean.
35:09Thank you for that.
35:10Just a follow-up.
35:12In your opinion,
35:13do you think China
35:14ultimately stands
35:15to benefit from
35:16the pause in foreign aid
35:17underneath
35:18the Trump administration?
35:19Well, we're seeing already
35:22on a global scale
35:24that China has already
35:27stepped up
35:27its foreign aid
35:28in countries like
35:29Cambodia, Nepal.
35:31As I mentioned,
35:32next week,
35:33they're going to be hosting
35:34the fourth ministerial
35:36of the China-CELAC summit.
35:38And I expect that
35:40after that summit,
35:43there's going to be
35:44a joint action plan
35:45between China
35:45and CELAC
35:46on China increasing
35:47exports of renewable energy
35:50and electric vehicles
35:51and solar panels.
35:54And again,
35:55it's another way
35:55for China
35:56to project itself
35:57as a reliable partner
35:59at a time
36:00where other countries
36:02are perceiving
36:03potentially the U.S.
36:04is tariffing
36:06other countries.
36:09And it's also
36:11a way for China
36:12to project itself
36:12as the defender
36:13of globalization
36:14and free trade
36:16going forward.
36:16That is a concern.
36:18Thank you so much,
36:19Mr. Lazarus.
36:20With that,
36:20I yield back.
36:21Chairman.
36:23Yields,
36:25I now recognize
36:26the gentleman
36:26from Arizona,
36:27Mr. Crane,
36:28for five minutes.
36:31Thank you guys
36:32for coming today
36:32to talk about this
36:33very, very important topic.
36:36So just to get this straight,
36:40we have the Chinese
36:41partnering with Cuba,
36:44both communist countries
36:46and Cuba's roughly 90 miles
36:49from the United States.
36:51Are we able to discern
36:52through the satellite imagery,
36:54human intel,
36:55and signal intel
36:56what the capabilities
36:57of this technology
36:58located on Cuba,
37:00the island of Cuba?
37:01Dr. Berg?
37:03Chairman,
37:04we're able to speculate
37:05about it,
37:06but again,
37:06this was discovered
37:07using commercially available
37:09satellite technology
37:10that we have
37:11the capability of using.
37:12I'm sure,
37:13and this is why
37:14I recommended
37:14a classified briefing
37:15for you all.
37:16On the high side,
37:18my guess is that
37:18there's a lot more
37:19analysis available
37:20on capabilities
37:21and vulnerabilities.
37:23Do we have the ability
37:24to jam and block
37:25the surveillance technologies
37:27located on the island
37:29of Cuba?
37:29Dr. Berg?
37:30Congressman,
37:33it's my understanding
37:34that we do have
37:36some of that capability.
37:37I'm not sure
37:37if it is being deployed,
37:39and also,
37:40as I mentioned,
37:40some of the communications
37:41that are sensitive
37:42in nature
37:43are also encrypted,
37:45but I'm happy
37:45to talk to you
37:46sort of offline
37:47or answer questions
37:48further after this hearing
37:49about those types
37:50of capabilities.
37:51Mr. Lazarus,
37:52you mentioned
37:53that the Chinese
37:54could use these bases
37:55to project
37:56digital authoritarianism.
37:58I believe that was
37:59the word you used.
37:59Can you expand on that?
38:02Absolutely, Congressman.
38:04Well, first and foremost,
38:06Huawei and ZTE
38:07provide the digital backbone
38:08for Etexa,
38:11the Cuban telecommunications company.
38:14We saw in July of 2021
38:17when there was
38:17the large, massive protests
38:20in Cuba
38:21against the regime
38:22that the regime
38:23was able to really
38:24shut down
38:25the protesters'
38:27communications
38:27so that they couldn't
38:28necessarily collaborate
38:29with each other
38:30as easily
38:31as they otherwise would.
38:33And our assessment
38:35was that
38:35they were able
38:36to rely on
38:37the technology
38:38of Huawei
38:38and ZTE
38:39in order to
38:40shut that down.
38:42There's also,
38:43again,
38:44the idea
38:44of Nuketek
38:46being in various
38:48seaports,
38:49airports
38:50in Cuba.
38:52And Nuketek
38:53is a state-owned enterprise.
38:56It is a subsidiary
38:57of Xinhua University's
39:01Tongfang,
39:03which China's
39:05national nuclear corporation
39:07has a 21% stake
39:08in Nuketek.
39:10and it provides
39:13all kinds of
39:14port scanning equipment
39:15and the concern
39:17is that all
39:17the kind of information,
39:18whether it be
39:19biometric,
39:19whether it be
39:20commercial,
39:20whether it be
39:21sensitive data
39:22about supply chain
39:23routes
39:24and cargo flows,
39:26all that information
39:27can go back
39:28to Beijing
39:28and that would
39:29constitute
39:29a national security
39:30threat for the
39:31United States.
39:33Dr. Berg,
39:35is it true
39:36that a Chinese national
39:37was arrested
39:38in January
39:39of this year
39:39in Miami's airport
39:40for conducting
39:41espionage activities?
39:44Congressman,
39:45I'll have to get
39:45back to you
39:46on that.
39:47I'm not aware
39:47of that particular.
39:49Yeah,
39:50I'd like to enter
39:50this into the record.
39:52Mr. Chairman,
39:53this is an article,
39:55Chinese national
39:55targeted in
39:56federal spy investigation
39:57arrested at
39:58Miami International
39:59Airport.
40:00According to the article,
40:01he had transmitted
40:0447 pages.
40:07There were schematics,
40:08graphs,
40:09diagrams related
40:10to nuclear weapons.
40:12Mr. Lazarus,
40:12I want to come back.
40:13Without objection.
40:14Thank you, sir.
40:15Mr. Lazarus,
40:16I want to come back
40:16to you.
40:17Do you believe
40:17that the Chinese
40:19are engaged
40:20in unrestricted
40:21warfare with
40:22the United States,
40:23i.e. economic
40:24warfare, attacks
40:25on critical
40:25infrastructure,
40:26espionage,
40:27IP theft,
40:28et cetera?
40:31Congressman,
40:33we've seen evidence
40:36time and time again,
40:37whether it be
40:38the FBI
40:40under former
40:41director Christopher Wray
40:42talking about
40:44how China-based
40:45hackers,
40:46whether it be
40:47Salt Typhoon,
40:48Vault Typhoon,
40:49have infiltrated
40:51critical infrastructure
40:52throughout the United States,
40:54and that would,
40:55of course,
40:55be a national security
40:57concern,
40:58and that they are
40:59potentially pre-positioning,
41:01if there is ever
41:01a conflict
41:02with the United States,
41:04say,
41:04over the Straits of Taiwan
41:06or the South China Sea,
41:07that the Chinese
41:08could retaliate
41:10by shutting down
41:12some of that
41:12critical infrastructure.
41:13The concern
41:14is that
41:14many of the same
41:15tactics,
41:17some of the same
41:17companies
41:18that are concerned
41:20here in the United States
41:21are also operating
41:22in Latin America
41:23and the Caribbean.
41:26I yield back.
41:28Gentleman yields back,
41:29and I recognize
41:30the gentleman
41:30from New York,
41:31Mr. Kennedy.
41:34Sorry,
41:35he left.
41:35Okay,
41:36and I recognize
41:36the gentleman
41:37from Louisiana,
41:38Mr. Carter.
41:40Thank you,
41:40Mr. Chairman,
41:41and thank our witnesses
41:42for being here today.
41:44I'm deeply concerned
41:45about the long-term
41:46consequences
41:46of the Trump-Musk
41:47administration's
41:48systemic dismantling
41:50of USAID,
41:52foreign aid,
41:52and other
41:53international development
41:54programs,
41:55actions that have
41:56significantly weakened
41:57America's global
41:59influence,
41:59especially on
42:01our own hemisphere.
42:02In the past
42:03several months,
42:05critical U.S.
42:05investments
42:06in diplomacy
42:07and development
42:08have been slashed,
42:10frozen,
42:11or redirected
42:11to serve
42:12narrow political goals.
42:14This isn't just
42:15bad policy.
42:17It was a strategic
42:18mistake
42:19that has had
42:21real consequences
42:22on our national
42:23security
42:24and regional
42:25stability.
42:27In Latin America,
42:28these decisions
42:29have been nothing
42:29short of a gift
42:30to authoritarian
42:31regimes in Cuba,
42:33Venezuela,
42:33and Nicaragua.
42:35By retreating
42:37from our role
42:38as a champion
42:38of democracy
42:39and development,
42:40we left a vacuum
42:41that autocrats
42:42have rushed to fill.
42:44With China
42:45taking the lead,
42:46instead of supporting
42:47reformers
42:48and pro-democratic
42:49movements,
42:50we left them
42:52under-resourced
42:54and isolated.
42:56While despots
42:57like Nicolas Maduro
42:59tightened their grip,
43:00foreign aid
43:01is not a charity.
43:03It's a wise investment
43:04in stability,
43:04security,
43:05and American values.
43:07When we help
43:08communities thrive
43:09and support
43:09democratic institutions,
43:11we make it harder
43:12for authoritarianism,
43:14corruption,
43:15and extremism
43:16to take root.
43:17Cutting these programs
43:18undermines regional security
43:20and contributes
43:21to the very conditions,
43:24violence,
43:25poverty,
43:26and political repression
43:27that drive migration
43:29to our southern border.
43:32Rebuilding USAID
43:33and reaffirming
43:34our commitment
43:35to global development
43:36is not just morally right,
43:37it's strategically necessary.
43:39America must lead again,
43:40not just with the might
43:42of our military,
43:43but with the strength
43:43of our values
43:44and the reach
43:46of our engagement.
43:49Dr. Berg,
43:51given the maritime shipping
43:52is heavily dominated
43:54by Chinese vessels,
43:55including those
43:56coming in and out
43:57of U.S. ports,
43:59what kind of insight
44:00does that give
44:00the Chinese
44:01into maritime traffic
44:02in the U.S.,
44:03and how could China
44:04use this information
44:05to our detriment?
44:06Thanks for the question,
44:08Congressman.
44:09I think we've seen
44:10multiple instances
44:11in which the Chinese
44:13have used ports
44:15as dual-use infrastructure,
44:17not just to have
44:18the PLA Navy
44:19make port calls
44:20in some of the
44:20deep water ports,
44:21but all of that data,
44:22that information
44:23that is contained
44:24in a port
44:24is important
44:25for the Chinese.
44:28The comings
44:28and goings
44:29of ships,
44:30cargo manifests,
44:31with what frequency?
44:32This is all very important
44:33if we're talking
44:33about building safe
44:34and secure supply chains
44:35as well.
44:36I had the privilege
44:37of being before
44:37this committee
44:38in February
44:39when we were talking
44:39about the very issue
44:40of ports,
44:41and this issue
44:42also came up then,
44:43specifically with reference
44:45to the Panama Canal,
44:46the two Hong Kong-based ports
44:48that are at the strategic
44:49approaches to the canal,
44:50also a critical issue,
44:51Congressman.
44:52In your testimony,
44:54you recommended
44:54enlisting neighbors
44:55like Bahamas,
44:57Dominican Republic,
44:58and Jamaica
44:58to combat intelligence
44:59gathering from China
45:00and Cuba.
45:02How can federal
45:03international development
45:04assistance programs
45:04help achieve this goal?
45:07Congressman,
45:08I would advocate
45:09that we build
45:10on Secretary of State
45:11Rubio's very successful
45:12visit to the Caribbean
45:13in recent weeks.
45:14I think it's important
45:15that the Secretary of State
45:16has already taken
45:17two trips to the region
45:18in just over two and a half
45:20months of his time
45:21in office,
45:23and I think those countries
45:24once made aware
45:25of the extent
45:26of Cuba's espionage activities
45:28and therefore their vulnerabilities
45:29will be quite willing
45:31to partner with this.
45:32It's in their interest
45:33just as it's in ours
45:34not to have Cuba
45:35snooping on their
45:36signals intelligence.
45:38Mr. Lazarus,
45:40how can China
45:40use its investments
45:41in Cuba
45:42to disrupt shipping routes
45:43that lead to major
45:45U.S. ports
45:45like the port
45:46of New Orleans
45:47or the port
45:47of southeast Louisiana
45:48in my home state?
45:51Well, I understand
45:51that those two ports
45:52in the United States
45:53represent about 20 percent,
45:55more than 20 percent
45:56of cargo entering
45:58to the U.S.
46:00And the concern
46:01is that whether
46:03it be a nuke tech,
46:04whether it be
46:04a China Harbor
46:05engineering company,
46:06because China Harbor
46:08and China Communication
46:09Construction Corporation
46:09also have key projects
46:12in Cuba,
46:14those companies
46:16that have direct ties
46:17to the People's Liberation Army
46:19can gather information
46:22about U.S. port operations,
46:24cargo flows,
46:26potentially see
46:27our supply chain vulnerabilities.
46:30They can also use
46:31those areas
46:32as a way to issue
46:34cyber attacks
46:35or cyber disruptions
46:39in and around
46:40the port operations.
46:42And they could,
46:43of course,
46:43create plausible deniability,
46:45which is, of course,
46:47an MO that they've been doing
46:48for quite some time as well.
46:51Mr. Chairman, at U.S.
46:52Gentleman Yales
46:53and I recognize
46:54the gentlewoman
46:55from South Carolina,
46:56Ms. Biggs.
46:59Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
47:00and thank you
47:01to our guests today
47:02for highlighting
47:03these important aspects
47:05of our topic today.
47:07So I have personally
47:08been to Key West
47:10and involved
47:12in military training there,
47:14so this topic
47:15really does catch my attention.
47:18Also, I would like to say
47:19that I'm excited
47:20about our current administration,
47:23the ideas of increasing
47:25our innovation
47:26and rebuilding our military
47:28and strengthening our defense
47:31for the very purpose of this.
47:33U.S. intelligence officials,
47:36military strategists,
47:38and regional experts
47:39have drawn parallels
47:40between China's current activity
47:43and the Cold War era
47:44use of Cuba
47:46by the Soviet Union
47:47as a forward surveillance outpost.
47:50Yet the tools of today,
47:52especially in digital surveillance,
47:55constitute a sophisticated threat
47:57of a different order.
47:59So my first question
48:00is for Mr. Martinez Fernandez.
48:03is for China's activities
48:05in Cuba
48:06more reminiscent
48:07of Cold War-style
48:09strategic encirclement,
48:11or are they more aligned
48:13with a new model
48:14of digital influence
48:16and persistent surveillance?
48:20Thank you for the question,
48:21Congressman.
48:21I think that there are
48:24many aspects
48:25of China's engagement
48:26in Cuba
48:26that are reminiscent
48:28of the Cold War era
48:31engagement
48:31by the Soviet Union.
48:33And they align
48:35primarily with,
48:37or often with,
48:38military and geostrategic aims
48:41for those reasons.
48:42I think, you know,
48:43certainly we're seeing
48:44an increased leveraging
48:45of modern technologies
48:48as well as
48:49the more deep economic ties
48:53that China has globally
48:55as compared to maybe
48:56the Soviet Union.
48:58as part of what's
49:00being leveraged
49:01in Latin America
49:03and the Caribbean
49:03and with Cuba
49:04to create this kind
49:06of broader surveillance
49:07and operational infrastructure
49:10for China.
49:11And that raises
49:14many concerns
49:15because we,
49:16obviously,
49:17we saw the consequences
49:19and the risks
49:20during the Cold War
49:21of this presence
49:24from hostile,
49:25extra-hemispheric actors
49:27just 90 miles
49:29off of our shores.
49:32And we're seeing that,
49:34I think,
49:34at a new level,
49:35as I said,
49:36because of these new
49:37and in some ways
49:39expanded capacities
49:40that the Chinese governments
49:43can employ
49:45because of its resources,
49:46because of its capacities.
49:50So my next question
49:51is for Dr. Berg.
49:55Could China's posture
49:57in Cuba serve
49:58as a springboard
49:59for influencing
50:00or disrupting
50:01U.S. diplomatic
50:02or military efforts
50:04outside the region,
50:06such as in the Indo-Pacific?
50:10Congresswoman,
50:11thank you for the question.
50:12I think it's critical.
50:13We hope this never happens,
50:17but if there is a conflict
50:18in a different theater
50:19of the world,
50:20let's say there's a conflict
50:20in the Indo-Pacific,
50:22the United States,
50:24if it is to come,
50:25for example,
50:25to Taiwan's aid,
50:27will need to shift forces
50:28from the Atlantic
50:29to the Pacific.
50:31China's ability
50:32to disrupt that process
50:34could be done
50:35through its activities
50:37in Cuba
50:38or, as we heard
50:39at the February hearing
50:40of this very committee,
50:41through some of those controls
50:43of the ports
50:44at the strategic approaches
50:45to the Panama Canal,
50:46there are multiple
50:47important critical
50:48choke points
50:49in this hemisphere
50:50that would be a part
50:51of that surge,
50:52that transition of forces
50:53from the Atlantic
50:54to the Pacific theaters
50:55where China's presence
50:57in the Caribbean,
50:58as my colleagues
50:59have pointed out,
50:59would be incredibly important.
51:01So they would have
51:02the ability,
51:03in my opinion,
51:04to attempt at least
51:05to block
51:06some of that shifting
51:07of force
51:08from Atlantic
51:09to Pacific,
51:09Congresswoman.
51:10Thank you so much
51:11and I yield back.
51:14Gentleman yields
51:15and I recognize
51:15the gentleman
51:16from New York,
51:16Mr. Garbarino.
51:20Thank you,
51:21Mr. Chairman.
51:22Mr. Berg,
51:24China's state-owned
51:25tech companies
51:26like Huawei and ZTE
51:27have played a key role
51:29in building Cuba's
51:30digital infrastructure.
51:32These companies
51:33are known
51:33to have deep ties
51:34to China's military
51:35and intelligence services
51:35and their equipment
51:36has been flagged
51:37globally
51:37for creating backdoors
51:38enabling surveillance.
51:39How likely is it
51:41that these Chinese-built
51:42networks are enabling
51:43Beijing to conduct
51:44sustained cyber operations
51:46or espionage
51:46targeting U.S. government
51:47or commercial entities
51:49either directly
51:50or by proxy
51:51through Cuban servers?
51:54Congresswoman,
51:55I think it's...
51:55Congressmen,
51:56excuse me,
51:57I think it's very likely
51:58that that's what
51:59they're attempting.
52:00Excuse me.
52:00That's okay.
52:01I've been called worse.
52:04Excuse me again.
52:05Congressman,
52:06I think it's very likely
52:07that that is what's happening.
52:09Cuba is offering China
52:11some of the best real estate
52:12that it can possibly have
52:1390 miles off U.S. shores
52:16and we've seen
52:17in multiple other instances
52:18how Chinese state-owned
52:19enterprises
52:20like Huawei and ZTE
52:21have provided
52:21a backdoor
52:22in other contexts
52:24such as spying
52:25on the African Union
52:26and other organizations.
52:27So I see no reason
52:29to believe
52:29why we shouldn't believe
52:31that they're trying
52:31to do the same
52:32against the United States,
52:33their principal competitor
52:34in the 21st century.
52:35Has there been
52:36credible analysis
52:37or confirmation
52:38that Chinese intelligence
52:39has used Huawei
52:40or ZTE-connected infrastructure
52:41in Cuba
52:42to intercept
52:43sensitive U.S. communications
52:45or conduct cyber?
52:46I mean,
52:47we believe they are,
52:47but has there been
52:48any analysis
52:49or confirmation?
52:51Congressman,
52:51not on the open source side.
52:53What we've collected here
52:54is the facilities
52:55that we think are likely
52:56the Chinese are using
52:57and we've done this
52:59in conjunction
53:00with some of the public reporting
53:01that's been done.
53:02In fact,
53:02drawing back
53:03to your previous question
53:04on Huawei and ZTE,
53:05Politico
53:05and Wall Street Journal,
53:07the two who were first
53:08to report on this,
53:09felt that there was
53:10a high degree of confidence
53:11that some of these facilities
53:12were in fact being used
53:13by the PRC
53:14because our intelligence agencies,
53:16again,
53:17this was reported
53:17in the open source,
53:18were tracking individuals
53:19from Huawei and ZTE
53:20coming and going
53:21at some of these facilities.
53:24But I think
53:24the answer to your question
53:25is more likely
53:26to be found
53:26on the high side,
53:27which is again
53:28why I've recommended
53:29in my testimony
53:29that all members of Congress
53:31should be able
53:31to get access
53:32to a classified briefing
53:33on this topic.
53:35Thank you very much.
53:36Mr. Martinez-Fernandez,
53:38the deeper China's
53:39tech infrastructure
53:40is embedded
53:41in Cuban society,
53:42the harder it becomes unwind.
53:43I mean,
53:44that's true for anywhere.
53:45I mean,
53:45just look at London.
53:47Huawei technology
53:47is all over London.
53:51So this creates
53:52a long-term dependency
53:53that goes far beyond
53:54hardware itself.
53:56What strategic leverage
53:57does China gain
53:59over Cuba
53:59by controlling
54:01the architecture
54:02of its digital ecosystem?
54:06Thank you for the question.
54:07I think it's crucial.
54:09It's a central part
54:10of China's strategy.
54:12You know,
54:12in Cuba,
54:13there's,
54:14I think,
54:15a more willing partner
54:16that doesn't necessarily
54:18require this
54:19the same level
54:20of active
54:21pressuring
54:23or malign
54:24influence.
54:25influence,
54:26but certainly
54:28building up
54:29capacities
54:31over critical infrastructure
54:32such as telecommunications
54:33for China
54:34puts countries
54:37like Cuba
54:37and democratic nations
54:40across the Americas
54:41at a significant dependence
54:43on the Chinese Communist Party.
54:46And that's the kind of thing
54:48that I think
54:49is a significant vulnerability,
54:52particularly in
54:53in the case of conflict,
54:55but as we move,
54:56we've seen elsewhere
54:57the realm of economic
54:59and infrastructure
55:00capacities
55:02and influence
55:03being leveraged
55:04beyond
55:05that sphere
55:06into going
55:07into the political,
55:08into the,
55:09even the military,
55:10where
55:10this capacity
55:13is then
55:14used to push
55:15governments
55:16to make decisions
55:17that are more favorable
55:19to the Chinese
55:20Communist Party.
55:21So it does create
55:22significant questions,
55:24particularly for the longer term.
55:25If we are
55:27blessed with seeing
55:30a shift
55:30in Cuba
55:31as far as
55:32a return to democracy,
55:34these will be challenges
55:35that a future
55:37Cuban government
55:38will have to confront.
55:39You mentioned
55:40actually in your answer
55:43about how this could be
55:44in conflict.
55:45What,
55:45how could they leverage
55:46these vulnerabilities
55:47in a regional
55:48conflict
55:49or confrontation
55:50involving the U.S.?
55:52Well,
55:52I think as far
55:53as telecommunications,
55:55this,
55:56this feeds into
55:57the presence
55:58in telecommunication
55:59infrastructure,
56:00this feeds into
56:01a broader
56:01intelligence capacity
56:02for,
56:03for China,
56:04which is substantial,
56:05as we've discussed,
56:06going into
56:08signals intelligence,
56:09even to
56:11deep space monitoring.
56:12We also see
56:14a worrying buildup
56:16around critical infrastructure,
56:18maritime routes,
56:18where the capacity
56:21for disruptive action
56:23and subversion
56:24is substantial
56:25and could,
56:27frankly,
56:28cripple
56:29the U.S. economy
56:30and aspects
56:31of U.S. military
56:34planning,
56:34even,
56:35limiting the capacity,
56:36for example,
56:37of transit
56:39for U.S. military
56:41resources
56:41and warships
56:42across,
56:43for example,
56:43the Panama Canal
56:44or other
56:45key points.
56:47So it's substantial.
56:49I ran out of time,
56:51so I yield back.
56:53Gentleman yields back.
56:56This hearing
56:57kind of whets
56:59our appetite
56:59and I think
57:00we're going to take,
57:01Dr. Berg,
57:02your advice
57:03and we need to go
57:04into a classified
57:04setting
57:05to look at
57:07the depth
57:07of this issue
57:08and how serious
57:10it is
57:10to American security
57:12and get us
57:15from some folks
57:15that can give it
57:17to us
57:17in a classified setting.
57:18And so
57:18I want to thank
57:20the witnesses
57:21for their time
57:23and their testimony.
57:25Members of the subcommittee
57:26may have additional
57:27questions for the witnesses
57:28and we would ask
57:30the witnesses
57:30to respond to these
57:31in writing.
57:31Pursuant to
57:33Committee Rule 7E,
57:34the hearing report
57:35will be open
57:35for 10 days
57:36and without objection
57:38the subcommittee
57:39stands adjourned.