On 22 December 1996, Airborne Express Flight 827 stalls and crashes into mountainous terrain near Narrows, Virginia, during a post-modification functional evaluation flight, killing all six occupants.
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00:00scoops
00:02pilots from airborne express
00:05are testing a plane
00:06that's been recently modified
00:08kick the tires, light the fires
00:10and make sure she's exactly as advertised
00:13next thing is our
00:14stall series
00:15these pilots were trying to test
00:18the stall warning system
00:19feeling some buffet here
00:21that's a stall right there
00:23but something goes terribly wrong
00:25that's number two engine
00:30pull up
00:31really?
00:33really?
00:35flight 827 crashes into a mountain in Virginia
00:39everyone on board is killed
00:41it was just
00:43complete devastation
00:44while the flight data confirms the plane
00:47entered a stall
00:48and then here, airspeed falls off a cliff
00:51it doesn't explain why the pilots
00:53weren't able to recover from the very
00:55condition they were testing
00:57it's a sobering thought
00:59a significant one
01:00it's three days before Christmas
01:24at Piedmont Triad International Airport
01:27in Greensboro, North Carolina
01:29the crew of airborne express flight 827
01:32and three technicians in the cabin
01:35have been waiting more than four hours
01:37for maintenance to be completed
01:39think we're getting out of here tonight?
01:41at this rate I think we're all going to be
01:43spending Christmas together in this cockpit
01:45what do you think Terry?
01:47I think you can explain that one to my wife and kids
01:49flight 827
01:51aircraft cleared and released
01:53have a good flight
01:54and a merry Christmas
01:55roger 827
01:56happy holidays dispatch
01:57finally
01:58just after 5pm
02:03flight 827
02:04is given clearance
02:05to fly
02:05the flight engineer
02:10is 52 year old
02:11military veteran
02:12Terry Welty
02:13taxi and pre-takeoff checklist
02:16brakes
02:18flying tonight
02:20is 37 year old
02:21Captain Keith Lemming
02:23checked
02:24checked
02:25cabin and film compressors are off
02:28anti-skid
02:30armed
02:32while not flying
02:3348 year old
02:35Captain Garth Avery
02:36is the designated pilot
02:38in command
02:38they were very experienced
02:41as pilots
02:42the flight engineer
02:42was incredibly experienced
02:44and they all knew
02:44the DC-8
02:45had many many hours
02:46in this airplane
02:47taxi and pre-takeoff
02:49checklist complete
02:50tower
02:52ABX 827 heavy
02:53is ready to go
02:54the flight crew
02:57is operating
02:58a modified
02:58McDonnell Douglas
03:00DC-8
03:01the DC-8
03:03is an incredibly
03:04reliable machine
03:05and it always has been
03:06the DC-8
03:08is a long-range
03:09narrow-body jetliner
03:11introduced in 1959
03:13as long as you use it
03:18exactly the way
03:19it was designed
03:20they're just as tough
03:21as nails
03:21P1
03:23rotate
03:24at 5.40pm
03:31flight 827
03:32takes off
03:33positive rate
03:41gear up
03:43positive rate
03:441,000 feet
03:49Roger
03:51although it's a
03:52lesser-known airline
03:53Airborne Express
03:55or ABX
03:56is one of the
03:57largest cargo carriers
03:58in the United States
04:00after both
04:01Federal Express
04:02and UPS
04:03in a bid
04:05to expand
04:06its fleet
04:07ABX
04:07purchased the aircraft
04:09that would become
04:09flight 827
04:10and modified it
04:12before putting it
04:13into service
04:14ABX 827
04:17is
04:182,500
04:19for 5,000
04:21MCT set
04:23ignition off
04:25but before this
04:27plane can be added
04:28to the fleet
04:29it has to be taken
04:30for a test flight
04:31this is known
04:35as a functional
04:35evaluation flight
04:37or FEF
04:38a functional
04:41evaluation flight
04:42is basically
04:43to see that
04:43everything is
04:44as it's supposed
04:45to be
04:45kick the tires
04:46light the fires
04:47go out and fly
04:48and make sure
04:49she's exactly
04:50as advertised
04:51after departing
04:53Greensboro
04:54flight 827
04:55is scheduled
04:56to spend
04:57about 2 hours
04:58flying the FEF
04:59before returning
05:00to the airport
05:01ABX 827
05:02for our maintenance
05:03check
05:03can we get a block
05:04of 1,0
05:05to 1,2000
05:06the flight crew
05:08needs a dedicated
05:08block of airspace
05:10to perform the tests
05:11could you take
05:12a block
05:12of 13 to 15
05:14we can do that
05:17ABX 827
05:20Roger
05:21climb and maintain
05:22block altitude
05:22of 13,000
05:23through 15,000
05:24having reached
05:27a quiet
05:28block of airspace
05:29the crew
05:30works its way
05:31through the
05:31FEF checklist
05:32scoops
05:35on
05:39the DC-8
05:41scoops
05:41are part
05:42of its
05:42pressurization
05:43system
05:44didn't get
05:45the left one
05:46try again
05:46it's really
05:49common
05:49on test flights
05:50to have
05:51issues crop up
05:52this airplane
05:53had undergone
05:54so many changes
05:55that it needed
05:56a thorough test flight
05:57all right
05:58scoops
05:58off
05:59left one
06:04ain't working
06:05with multiple
06:08redundancies
06:08built into
06:09the pressurization
06:10system
06:11the pilots
06:11are safe
06:12to continue
06:13their flight
06:13ABX 827
06:19turn right
06:19heading up
06:20360
06:20vectors for
06:21traffic
06:21air traffic
06:23control
06:24monitors the
06:24airspace
06:25redirecting
06:26flight 827
06:27when necessary
06:28ABX 827
06:30right
06:30360
06:31and then
06:34we're going to
06:34do our
06:34manual drop
06:35you ready for
06:36hydraulics to
06:37come off
06:37Keith
06:38yeah go right
06:39ahead
06:40okay go ahead
06:41Terry
06:41the manual drop
06:44tests the plane's
06:45landing gear
06:46without the use
06:46of hydraulics
06:47okay
06:49gear freefall
06:501.5
06:51VS 0
06:52okay you ready
06:53ready
06:54gear down
06:55gear
06:58down
06:593 green
07:01got it
07:02we're getting
07:05a little bit
07:05of ice here
07:06the biggest
07:09hazard from
07:10icing is that
07:11it changes
07:11the shape
07:12of the wing
07:13and the
07:14airplane doesn't
07:15fly nearly as
07:15well as it
07:16did
07:16the crew
07:18comes up
07:19with a plan
07:19to avoid
07:20performance issues
07:21from ice buildup
07:22Garth if we go
07:24up 15 I think
07:25we can get out
07:25of this stuff
07:26uh yeah
07:27you can go up
07:28there we've got
07:29that block
07:30as the flight
07:41climbs out
07:41of the weather
07:42the crew
07:43continues
07:43the tests
07:44next thing
07:47is our
07:47stall series
07:48for the
07:49stall
07:50series
07:50the pilots
07:51will
07:51intentionally
07:52slow the
07:53airplane
07:53until it's
07:54just about
07:54to stall
07:55to determine
07:56when the
07:56stick shaker
07:57activates
07:58most commercial
08:01planes use
08:01a stick
08:02shaker
08:02system
08:02it's a
08:05vibrating
08:05warning
08:06on the
08:06control
08:07column
08:07that alerts
08:08the pilots
08:08to take
08:09action
08:09before the
08:10plane
08:10actually
08:10stalls
08:11we should
08:12stall
08:12at 122
08:13I'm gonna
08:14set that
08:14in my
08:14interior
08:15bug
08:15the pilots
08:16set their
08:17target speed
08:18for when
08:18the plane
08:18is expected
08:19to stall
08:19mine
08:20set
08:21shaker
08:22128
08:22you just
08:23call it
08:24your numbers
08:24I'll record
08:25them
08:25they have
08:27to write
08:27down
08:28the air
08:28speed
08:28at which
08:28the
08:29stick
08:29shaker
08:29triggers
08:30and then
08:31they have
08:31to write
08:31down
08:32the air
08:32speed
08:32at which
08:32the stall
08:33begins
08:34captain
08:35lemming
08:35slows
08:36the plane
08:37at a rate
08:37of one
08:38knot
08:38per second
08:38to reach
08:39the stall
08:40speed
08:40feeling
08:44some buffet
08:45here
08:45the pilots
08:47detect a
08:47change
08:48in the
08:48aircraft
08:48yeah
08:49that's
08:49pretty
08:49early
08:50as an
08:53airplane
08:54approaches
08:54stall
08:54it starts
08:55talking
08:55to the
08:55pilots
08:56the airplane
08:57starts
08:58vibrating
08:59or buffeting
09:00they quickly
09:01take action
09:02to avoid
09:03a stall
09:03set max
09:04power
09:04133
09:06then
09:13one of the
09:13planes
09:14left engines
09:15begins
09:15to surge
09:16that's
09:24number two
09:25engine
09:25but that's
09:28not normal
09:29and you know
09:29it's not
09:30normal
09:30and so
09:31something like
09:31that's gonna
09:32get your
09:32attention
09:32pull it
09:33back
09:33you got it
09:40the plane
09:42the plane
09:42now banks
09:43to the
09:43left
09:43and begins
09:47to drop
09:48the pilots
09:55attempt to
09:56level the wings
09:56and slow
09:57the plane's
09:58descent
09:58all right
10:00okay
10:01got it
10:03realizing that
10:16the plane
10:16is descending
10:17below his
10:18jurisdiction
10:18the controller
10:19assigns the
10:20pilots to
10:21a new
10:21radio
10:21frequency
10:22827
10:23changed
10:24to
10:24indianapolis
10:24128.4
10:26but the
10:31controller's
10:31calls to
10:32change
10:32frequencies
10:33go unanswered
10:34the flight
10:35crew is
10:35busy
10:36trying to
10:36recover
10:37the plane
10:37ABX827
10:46indianapolis
10:46128.4
10:48ABX827
10:50gonna stay
10:50on this
10:51frequency
10:51a minute
10:51descending
10:52through
10:528000
10:53call you
10:53right back
10:54ABX827
10:57you're in
10:57an emergency
10:58descent
10:58yes sir
10:59airborne express
11:04flight 827
11:05is out of
11:06control
11:06and plummeting
11:07to the ground
11:08rudder
11:09yeah
11:09got it
11:10seeing that
11:18flight 827
11:19is in
11:20trouble
11:20the controller
11:21checks air
11:22traffic in
11:22the area
11:23to find a
11:24safe altitude
11:24for the
11:25plane
11:25okay
11:28can you hold
11:307000
11:31but there's
11:33no answer
11:33flight 827
11:37is less than
11:385000 feet
11:39from the ground
11:40and descending
11:41fast
11:41now bring it
11:44back
11:44left rudder
11:45okay good
11:48easy
11:49they could tell
11:51they were in
11:51an emergency
11:52they could tell
11:52they'd lost control
11:53they were probably
11:54frightened to death
11:55the pilots
11:56continue their
11:57efforts to recover
11:58the aircraft
11:59but are now
12:00too low
12:00pull up
12:01terrain
12:04terrain
12:04pull up
12:05just half an hour
12:13into a standard
12:14test flight
12:14the DC-8
12:19crashes into the
12:20East River Mountain
12:21in Narrows, Virginia
12:23ABX-827
12:27do you copy?
12:31ABX-827
12:32do you copy?
12:35no one has survived
12:37the mountains lit up
12:40and there was a
12:41explosion
12:42black
12:43smoke
12:45and red
12:46and blue flames
12:47coming up off it
12:48news of the crash
12:51quickly spreads
12:52throughout the community
12:53grief counselors
12:56arrived today
12:57at Airborne's headquarters
12:58to help family
12:59and friends
13:00cope with their loss
13:01obviously
13:03it's just a terrible
13:04time for everyone
13:05here
13:05particularly
13:06at this time
13:07of year
13:08Bob McIntosh
13:10from the NTSB
13:11the National
13:11Transportation Safety
13:12Board
13:13leads the investigation
13:14we know this was a
13:16maintenance
13:17examination flight
13:18obviously it was not
13:20successful
13:20and that's about all
13:22I can tell you
13:22right now
13:23the wreckage site
13:25certainly presented
13:26some challenges
13:27we were going to have
13:28to deal with
13:29some mountainous terrain
13:30we had to get to work
13:32Benjamin Berman
13:36is one of the first
13:37team members
13:37to arrive
13:38at the crash site
13:39I got to the top
13:41of the mountain
13:41and I looked out
13:43at the scene
13:43and it was just
13:46complete devastation
13:47I really thought
13:50you know
13:50what is it
13:51that could have
13:51brought that plane
13:52down
13:52that's our job
13:55as NTSB investigators
13:56investigators begin
13:58their painstaking efforts
14:00to transport pieces
14:01of the demolished plane
14:02to a hangar
14:03for examination
14:04we found the four corners
14:09looks like the plane
14:11was intact
14:11when it hit the mountain
14:12so if you can see
14:14all four corners
14:15which are the nose
14:16the right wing tip
14:17the tail
14:18and the left wing tip
14:19in close proximity
14:21probably means
14:22the airplane was
14:23intact
14:24until it hit the ground
14:25this particular
14:29wreckage scene
14:30told us
14:31that we most probably
14:32had a loss of control
14:33and that we were
14:34going to have to find
14:35the reason
14:37for that loss of control
14:38we recovered the CVR
14:40and FDR
14:41let's get them off
14:43to Washington
14:44the cockpit voice recorder
14:46was going to
14:47tell us not only
14:48what they said
14:49but how they said it
14:51while investigators
14:57wait for the CVR download
14:59got the checklist
15:00for the FEF
15:01they review the checklist
15:03the flight crew
15:04was using
15:05during the functional
15:05evaluation flight
15:07to get a better understanding
15:08of what they were doing
15:09prior to the crash
15:11looks like standard
15:14FEF stuff
15:15testing the flaps
15:18rudder
15:19landing gear
15:21stall system
15:23there's nothing unusual
15:24on the list of tests
15:26the pilots were performing
15:27maybe there was a problem
15:29with the plane
15:29before the FEF
15:30I'll get Berman
15:32to talk to the maintenance team
15:33that modified the plane
15:34it was an old airplane
15:38but it had just come out
15:40of a major retrofit
15:42can you take me through
15:44exactly what you guys
15:45did to the airplane
15:46well it was a fairly
15:47major overall
15:48investigators learned
15:49that extensive maintenance
15:51and modifications
15:52were carried out
15:53on the aircraft
15:54over the course
15:54of six months
15:55yeah it looks like
15:57you guys pretty well
15:57took the whole thing apart
15:58and put it back together
15:59huh
15:59as we looked
16:02at the maintenance records
16:03we could find
16:04that there was
16:05a great deal of work
16:06that had been done
16:07on the aircraft
16:08perhaps something
16:10had fallen through
16:11the cracks
16:11could technicians
16:13have overlooked
16:14something during
16:15the modification
16:15of the airplane
16:16causing the pilots
16:18of flight 827
16:19to lose control
16:20pull up
16:22corrain
16:24corrain
16:24really
16:25pull up
16:25really
16:26got the dispatch logs
16:30for the plane
16:30right here
16:31investigators review
16:33airborne express
16:34flight 827's
16:35dispatch logs
16:36to see if any
16:37malfunctions were reported
16:39after the plane
16:39was released
16:40from maintenance
16:41looks like they
16:42finished the modifications
16:43and delivered the plane
16:44on December 15th
16:46one week before the crash
16:48wait a second
16:51this wasn't the pilot's
16:54first attempt
16:55at this flight
16:56the fact that they
17:00tried to do the fight
17:02earlier
17:03that was really relevant
17:04look here
17:05the pilots conducted
17:07a partial FEF
17:08the day before the crash
17:10scrapped it midway through
17:13low hydraulic pressure
17:14that can mean
17:16getting the landing gear
17:17down and in place
17:18or not
17:18or being able to power
17:20the flight controls
17:21or not
17:21if the hydraulic pressure
17:23is not right
17:24that's very serious
17:25okay
17:27and what do you think
17:29caused the low
17:30hydraulic pressure
17:31did a hydraulic issue
17:33cause a loss of control
17:35got it
17:35okay
17:36maintenance crews
17:37say that they suspected
17:38that trapped air in the lines
17:39led to low hydraulic
17:40quantity indication
17:41did they fix it
17:42yeah
17:43they replaced nose gear
17:44actuator the day
17:45of the accident
17:45but
17:46was that the end of it
17:47or
17:48could our pilots
17:50end up having issues
17:51with the hydraulics again
17:52we needed to figure out
17:56what had been going on
17:57could something have gone wrong
17:59in that maintenance
18:01investigators are able to recover
18:06the plane's rudder components
18:07from the crash site
18:08they examine them
18:10for any signs of damage
18:11to the hydraulic system
18:13no pre-impact hydraulic leaks
18:16hydraulic system
18:18was working fine
18:19the hydraulic system
18:21wasn't a probable cause
18:23for the mishap
18:24and loss of control
18:25if it wasn't the hydraulic system
18:27what was it
18:28we should call the witness
18:31and listen
18:32maybe
18:32somebody saw something
18:33you were outside your home
18:42at the time
18:42and what did you hear
18:45the team begins
18:46to interview witnesses
18:47to see if anyone heard
18:48or saw something
18:49that could point
18:50to the cause of the crash
18:51the local newspaper people
18:53were there
18:54asking people
18:55what they had heard
18:56and seen that night
18:57all you could see
18:59was just parts
19:00it just
19:01the plane
19:02had cleared out
19:03a big path
19:04that area
19:05was full of information
19:07witnesses describe
19:09seeing the plane
19:10descend out of the clouds
19:11at a steep angle
19:12and hit the mountain
19:13at high speed
19:15thank you so much
19:20for your time
19:20I think we've got something
19:23three witnesses
19:24confirmed
19:25they could hear
19:26the plane
19:26making a banging sound
19:28followed by a
19:29slapping sound
19:30kind of odd noise
19:33it sounded
19:35kindly low
19:37and it started
19:37coming up
19:38real loud
19:38the witnesses
19:41told us
19:42that there was
19:42slapping and banging
19:43that they heard
19:44if airflow
19:51entering the engine
19:52is disrupted
19:53it can cause
19:54the engines
19:55to backfire
19:55if airflow
19:58over a wing
19:59is disrupted
20:00it can make
20:01a slapping sound
20:02both can be
20:04signs of a stall
20:05if the witness
20:08reports were true
20:09it suggested
20:10that possibly
20:11there was
20:12an engine issue
20:13that may have been
20:14part of the
20:14sequence of events
20:15however it would
20:16require
20:17further examination
20:19of the flight
20:19data recorder
20:20NTSB investigators
20:22turned to the
20:23plane's flight
20:24data recorder
20:25to confirm
20:26whether flight
20:26827
20:27was in a stall
20:28before it crashed
20:29isolate the airspeed
20:32there's a gradual
20:36reduction
20:37in airspeed
20:38here
20:38one knot
20:39per second
20:40looks like
20:40they were
20:40setting up
20:41for the stall
20:41series
20:42and then
20:43here
20:44airspeed
20:45falls off
20:45a cliff
20:46that's a stall
20:48let's see
20:50the engine
20:50parameters
20:51they search
20:52for further
20:53confirmation
20:53that flight
20:54827
20:55stalled
20:56that looks
20:57like a
20:57compressor
20:58surge
20:58from the
20:58number
20:58two
20:59engine
20:59that tracks
21:04with what
21:05the witnesses
21:05said they were
21:06hearing
21:06lack of airspeed
21:08and a compressor
21:08surge
21:09are clear
21:09signs
21:10that the
21:10plane
21:11stalled
21:11give me the
21:12roll angle
21:13they were
21:16banking
21:17left
21:17right
21:18left
21:18right
21:19left
21:20they were
21:22in a
21:22roll
21:22reversal
21:23a roll
21:25reversal
21:26is a
21:26phenomenon
21:27that occurs
21:27when a
21:28plane
21:28banks
21:28steeply
21:29to the
21:29left
21:29and
21:30right
21:30the airplane
21:32started to
21:32roll
21:33radically
21:34from side
21:35to side
21:36if you look
21:36at the
21:36flight recorder
21:37traces
21:37you can see
21:38an 80 degree
21:39bank
21:39one way
21:40115 degree
21:41bank
21:41the other way
21:42which is
21:42more than
21:43more than
21:44knife-edge
21:45flight
21:45and now
21:48the airplane
21:48does exactly
21:49the opposite
21:49of what you
21:50were asking
21:50it to do
21:51yeah that's
21:57four roll
21:58reversals
21:58before the
21:59crash
21:59how did
22:01the crew
22:01of flight
22:02827
22:02allow their
22:03plane
22:04to get
22:04so out
22:05of control
22:06with the
22:10arrival
22:10of flight
22:11827's
22:11cockpit
22:12voice
22:12recorder
22:13or CVR
22:14investigators
22:15zero in
22:16on the
22:16tests
22:16the
22:16pilots
22:17were
22:17conducting
22:18immediately
22:18before
22:19the
22:19plane
22:19stalled
22:20are you
22:22ready
22:22ready
22:24next thing
22:27is our
22:27stall
22:27series
22:27we should
22:28stall
22:28at 122
22:30I'm going
22:30to set
22:30that
22:31in my
22:31interior
22:31bug
22:32mine
22:34set
22:35shaker
22:36128
22:37if you
22:37just call
22:38all your
22:38numbers
22:38I'll
22:38record
22:39them
22:39investigators
22:45listen to
22:45the pilots
22:46working their
22:47way through
22:47the stall
22:48series
22:49feeling some
22:51buffet here
22:51yeah it's
22:53pretty early
22:54so the
22:59plane
22:59entered
23:00the stall
23:00sooner than
23:01they
23:01expected
23:01yeah
23:02when I was
23:05looking through
23:06the transcript
23:07before there was
23:08something that
23:08captain lemming said
23:09earlier in the
23:10flight
23:10uh
23:11captain lemming
23:13we're getting a
23:14little bit of
23:14ice here
23:15garth if we go up
23:1815 I think we can
23:19get out of this
23:20stuff
23:20uh yeah you can
23:22go up there
23:22we've got that
23:23block
23:23so ice builds up
23:27disrupts air flow
23:28over the wing
23:28decreases lift
23:29increases drag
23:30and the plane
23:31would have
23:31stalled at a
23:32higher airspeed
23:32than the
23:33calculated
23:33did ice
23:37accumulation on
23:38flight 827
23:39cause a
23:40premature
23:41stall
23:41it's happened
23:46before
23:46December the
23:4812th
23:491985
23:49evidence
23:51suggested that
23:52shortly after
23:52taking off from
23:53gander
23:54international
23:54airport in
23:55wintry
23:56conditions
23:56a buildup
23:58of ice on
23:58arrow air
23:59flight
23:591285
24:00caused the
24:01plane to
24:02stall
24:02at a
24:03higher
24:03airspeed
24:04leading to
24:05a crash
24:06that killed
24:06all 256
24:07people on
24:08board
24:09investigators
24:12study
24:13meteorological
24:13reports
24:14to determine
24:15if flight
24:15827
24:16was flying
24:17through
24:17icing
24:17conditions
24:18there's a
24:19scattered area
24:20of light
24:21rain here
24:22along 827's
24:23flight path
24:24cloud tops
24:26out at around
24:2614,000 feet
24:28what was our
24:30altitude block
24:30again
24:3013 to 15,000
24:33the type of
24:35weather they were
24:36in the night
24:36of the accident
24:37was really
24:38conducive to
24:39icing
24:39they were in
24:40prime territory
24:41to pick up
24:41ice whenever
24:42they were in
24:42the clouds
24:43what speed
24:45did the
24:45pilots say
24:46they expected
24:46the stall
24:47stall
24:49122
24:50shaker
24:50128
24:51well
24:55according to
24:55the FDR
24:56the plane
24:57stalled
24:57at 126
24:58knots
24:59it's only
25:03four knots
25:04earlier
25:04so even if
25:06there was
25:07ice it was
25:07likely to have
25:08had little
25:08impact
25:08I mean
25:09certainly not
25:09enough to
25:10make the
25:10plane
25:10unrecoverable
25:11whether
25:14there was
25:15a great
25:15deal of
25:16contribution
25:16from ice
25:17we could
25:18never
25:18determine
25:19but
25:20the
25:20consensus
25:21was that
25:22it was not
25:23a major
25:23element
25:24in the
25:24cause
25:25of the
25:25accident
25:25you said
25:30stall
25:30122
25:31knots
25:31shaker
25:32128
25:32well
25:33when we
25:34were listening
25:34to the
25:34CVR
25:35I don't
25:35remember
25:35hearing
25:36the
25:36stick
25:36shaker
25:36the
25:40purpose
25:40of the
25:40stick
25:40shaker
25:41is to
25:41get your
25:41undivided
25:42attention
25:43not only
25:44by noise
25:44but by
25:45shaking
25:45you
25:45cause
25:50there's only
25:51one thing
25:51that that's
25:51telling you
25:52and that
25:52is
25:52if you
25:53slow
25:53anymore
25:54I'm
25:54gonna
25:54stall
25:54let's
25:55have a
25:55listen
25:55did
25:58the
25:58pilots
25:59receive
25:59proper
26:00warning
26:00that
26:00their
26:01plane
26:01was
26:01entering
26:02a
26:02stall
26:02feeling
26:05some
26:05buffet
26:05yeah
26:06that's
26:07pretty
26:07early
26:07that's
26:08a
26:08stall
26:08right
26:08there
26:09that
26:09ain't
26:09no
26:09shaker
26:10so
26:16they're
26:16slowing
26:17the
26:17plane
26:17down
26:17waiting
26:18for
26:18the
26:18shaker
26:18to
26:18activate
26:19then
26:19all
26:19of a
26:20sudden
26:20they're
26:20in
26:20a
26:20stall
26:20no
26:21warning
26:21so
26:22the
26:22shaker
26:22failed
26:23with
26:25no
26:25stall
26:25warning
26:26there
26:26the
26:26pilots
26:27had
26:27in
26:27a
26:27sense
26:28a
26:28right
26:28to
26:28believe
26:29they
26:29weren't
26:29stalled
26:29well
26:31what's
26:31going
26:31on
26:31here
26:31well
26:31it's
26:32not
26:32a
26:32stall
26:32because
26:32the
26:33stick
26:33shaker
26:33is
26:33not
26:33vibrating
26:34well
26:36the
26:36question
26:36is
26:36when
26:37did
26:37it
26:37fail
26:37during
26:38the
26:38flight
26:38or
26:38before
26:39to
26:50determine
26:50if the
26:51stick
26:51shaker
26:51malfunctioned
26:52investigators
26:53search
26:54the
26:54wreckage
26:55for
26:55stall
26:55components
26:56that
26:56might
26:56have
26:56survived
26:57the
26:57fiery
26:58crash
26:58nothing
27:04huh
27:04that's
27:06what
27:06we
27:06thought
27:07stall
27:07system
27:08was
27:08completely
27:08destroyed
27:09we
27:11never
27:11were
27:12able
27:12to
27:12exactly
27:13identify
27:14what
27:15that
27:15failure
27:16point
27:16was
27:16in
27:17the
27:17system
27:17our
27:19team
27:20wanted
27:20to
27:20find
27:20out
27:20how
27:21much
27:21maintenance
27:22and
27:22inspection
27:23had
27:23taken
27:23place
27:24on
27:24the
27:24system
27:25with
27:30no
27:30clues
27:31in
27:31the
27:31wreckage
27:31NTSB
27:33investigators
27:33speak
27:34to the
27:34maintenance
27:35technician
27:35about
27:36flight
27:36827
27:37stall
27:37warning
27:38system
27:38did
27:39you
27:41test
27:41the
27:41stick
27:42shaker
27:42yeah
27:43we
27:43did
27:44on
27:46on
27:49December
27:495th
27:50two
27:51weeks
27:51before
27:52the
27:52accident
27:52how
27:52extensive
27:53the
27:53test
27:53quite
27:54extensive
27:54envelope
27:56the
27:59shaker
28:00the
28:00heating
28:00components
28:01the
28:02stick
28:02shaker
28:02system
28:03passed
28:03all
28:04those
28:04pre-flight
28:04maintenance
28:05checks
28:06what
28:07about
28:07the
28:08transducer
28:08let me
28:10check
28:11the
28:13transducer
28:14is a
28:14small
28:15flap
28:15nestled
28:16in the
28:16recessed
28:17part
28:17of the
28:17wing
28:17it
28:18moves
28:19backwards
28:19when
28:20airflow
28:20is
28:20detected
28:21when
28:22there
28:22is
28:22insufficient
28:23air
28:23over
28:23the
28:24wings
28:24it
28:24moves
28:24forward
28:25and
28:26triggers
28:26the
28:26stick
28:26shaker
28:27to
28:27activate
28:27no
28:33no
28:35it
28:35doesn't
28:35look like
28:36we
28:36tested
28:36the
28:36transducer
28:37that part
28:41is not
28:42covered
28:43by the
28:43pre-flight
28:43test
28:44it
28:45suggests
28:46that
28:46the
28:47failure
28:47of the
28:47stick
28:47shaker
28:47to work
28:48was a
28:48bad
28:49transducer
28:49but
28:53but
28:53to me
28:54why
28:54it
28:55failed
28:55wasn't
28:55as
28:55important
28:56as
28:56what
28:58the
28:58effect
28:58of
28:58it
28:59failing
29:00was
29:00on
29:00the
29:01crew
29:01doing
29:03some
29:03buffet
29:03here
29:04yeah
29:04that's
29:04pretty
29:05early
29:05that's
29:06a
29:06stall
29:06right
29:06there
29:06that
29:06ain't
29:07no
29:07shaker
29:07even
29:08without
29:09the
29:09stick
29:09shaker
29:09activating
29:10the
29:11flight
29:11crew
29:11knew
29:12they
29:12were
29:12in
29:12a
29:12stall
29:13that's
29:16number
29:16two
29:16engine
29:16bring
29:17it
29:17back
29:18okay
29:18good
29:19but
29:20if
29:20they
29:20knew
29:21left
29:22rudder
29:22why
29:23couldn't
29:23they
29:23recover
29:24pull
29:25up
29:26rudder
29:26really
29:28investigators
29:37returned
29:37to
29:38flight
29:38827
29:39CVR
29:40to get
29:40a better
29:41sense
29:41of the
29:41actions
29:42the
29:42pilots
29:42took
29:43when
29:43their
29:43aircraft
29:44went
29:44into
29:44a
29:45stall
29:45that's
29:46a
29:46stall
29:46right
29:47there
29:47that ain't
29:47no
29:47shaker
29:47set
29:50max
29:50power
29:50133
29:52so
29:55as soon
29:55as they
29:56recognize
29:56they're
29:56in a
29:56stall
29:57they push
29:57power
29:58to the
29:58engines
29:58that's
29:59the
29:59right
29:59move
29:59that's
30:03number
30:03two
30:03engine
30:03there's
30:04the
30:04engine
30:04surge
30:05pull
30:05it
30:06back
30:06so
30:11what
30:12did
30:12do
30:12next
30:12all
30:15right
30:15okay
30:17start
30:19bringing
30:19the
30:19nose
30:19back
30:20up
30:20they
30:26pulled
30:27the
30:27nose
30:27up
30:27but
30:28that
30:28would
30:28make
30:28the
30:28stall
30:28worse
30:29pulling
30:30back
30:30on the
30:31control
30:31column
30:31in
30:32response
30:33to
30:33a
30:33stall
30:34is
30:34inconsistent
30:34with
30:35a
30:35normal
30:36stall
30:36recovery
30:36and
30:37would
30:37not
30:38reduce
30:38angle
30:39of
30:39attack
30:39and
30:40break
30:40the
30:41stall
30:41well
30:43that's
30:43what
30:43would
30:43have
30:44triggered
30:44the
30:44roll
30:44reversal
30:45how'd they
30:47deal
30:47with
30:48that
30:48rudder
30:51got it
30:52rudder
30:52got it
30:54left rudder
30:55left rudder's
30:56buried
30:57investigators
30:58discover
30:59that in
30:59addition to
31:00moving the
31:00control wheel
31:01right and
31:02left
31:02the pilots
31:03also used
31:04the rudder
31:04to stop
31:05the plane
31:05from
31:06rolling
31:06you have
31:08to be
31:08ahead of
31:09it
31:09and that's
31:10a very
31:10difficult
31:10thing
31:11to do
31:11so they
31:14spend
31:14almost a
31:15minute
31:15trying to
31:16fight the
31:16roll
31:17reversal
31:17with the
31:18rudder
31:18no mention
31:19of a
31:20stall
31:20investigators
31:23suspect
31:23that the
31:24pilots
31:25were so
31:25preoccupied
31:26dealing
31:27with the
31:27roll
31:27reversal
31:28that they
31:28failed to
31:29realize
31:30that the
31:30plane
31:30was in
31:31a
31:31stall
31:31still
31:35doesn't
31:36explain why
31:36captain
31:36lemming
31:37would have
31:37pulled back
31:37on the
31:38yoke
31:38to try
31:38to recover
31:39from the
31:39stall
31:39to recover
31:44from the
31:45stall
31:45you can't
31:46pull back
31:46you need
31:47to point
31:48the nose
31:48of the
31:48airplane
31:49down
31:49even more
31:50in order
31:51to gain
31:51speed
31:52or you
31:52will not
31:53recover
31:53you will
31:54fly into
31:55the
31:55mountaintop
31:55in
31:55Virginia
31:56terrain
31:57terrain
31:58pull
31:59up
31:59terrain
32:01terrain
32:02and we
32:05wanted to
32:06know
32:06why
32:07why did
32:08he do
32:08that
32:08especially
32:10at those
32:10most
32:10critical
32:11moments
32:11morning
32:17mom
32:17looking to
32:19see if
32:19there's
32:19anything
32:20in
32:20abx's
32:20operations
32:21manual
32:21on the
32:22dc-8
32:22here's a
32:23copy
32:23investigators
32:25search through
32:26abx's
32:27procedures
32:28to understand
32:29why
32:29captain
32:30lemming
32:30pulled
32:30back
32:31on the
32:31control
32:32column
32:32to
32:32recover
32:33from
32:33flight
32:33827
32:34stall
32:35wait
32:36bob
32:38did
32:38you
32:38see
32:38this
32:38it
32:40says
32:41that
32:41priority
32:42in
32:42stall
32:42recovery
32:43is
32:43to
32:43maintain
32:43altitude
32:44by
32:44increasing
32:45the
32:45pitch
32:46pull
32:48pulling
32:49back
32:49on the
32:50control
32:50column
32:50increases
32:51the
32:51pitch
32:52of an
32:52aircraft
32:52it
32:54might be
32:55okay
32:55for an
32:55approach
32:55to a
32:56stall
32:56but not
32:56for an
32:57actual
32:57stall
32:57so
33:00so the
33:00things that
33:01you do
33:01to recover
33:02from an
33:03approach
33:03to stall
33:04are
33:05totally
33:05different
33:06from what
33:06you do
33:07to recover
33:08from an
33:08actual
33:09stall
33:09if you're
33:10right over
33:11the trees
33:11you got to
33:12try the
33:12approach
33:12to stall
33:13recovery
33:13because
33:14you're
33:14going to
33:14hit the
33:14trees
33:15if you're
33:16at 36,000
33:17feet
33:17and you
33:17stall
33:18if you
33:19don't put
33:19the nose
33:20down
33:205 or
33:2110
33:21degrees
33:22you're not
33:23going to
33:23recover
33:23that can't
33:24be the
33:25current
33:25procedure
33:25can it
33:26I've got
33:37a joint
33:38memo
33:38with the
33:38FAA
33:39investigators
33:40discover
33:41an update
33:41to
33:42Airborne
33:42Express's
33:43flight
33:43test
33:43procedures
33:44what's
33:45it say
33:45the
33:46updated
33:47procedure
33:47called
33:47for a
33:48reduction
33:48of
33:48pitch
33:49to
33:49recover
33:49from
33:50a
33:50stall
33:50the
33:52revised
33:53procedure
33:53called
33:54for
33:54pilots
33:54to
33:55lower
33:55the
33:55nose
33:55when
33:56entering
33:56a
33:56stall
33:57the
33:57opposite
33:58of
33:58what
33:58captain
33:59lemming
33:59did
34:00the
34:01change
34:01was
34:01made
34:02after
34:02a
34:02loss
34:02of
34:02control
34:03incident
34:03May
34:041991
34:05what
34:07flight
34:09was
34:09that
34:09it
34:11was
34:11a
34:11DC-8
34:12doing
34:12a
34:12post
34:12modification
34:13FEF
34:13the
34:15same
34:15plane
34:15and
34:16flight
34:16as
34:16A27
34:17on
34:18May
34:18the
34:1816th
34:191991
34:20another
34:21Airborne
34:22express
34:22DC-8
34:23lost
34:23control
34:24during
34:24an
34:25FEF
34:25the
34:27pilots
34:27managed
34:27to
34:27recover
34:28from
34:28the
34:28stall
34:28and
34:29the
34:29policy
34:30has
34:30been
34:30to
34:30reduce
34:31pitch
34:31during
34:31a
34:31stall
34:32ever
34:32since
34:32so
34:34why
34:35didn't
34:35the
34:35crew
34:35of
34:35flight
34:36827
34:36use
34:36the
34:36updated
34:37procedure
34:37okay
34:41we learned
34:44that the
34:44director
34:44of
34:44flight
34:45technical
34:45programs
34:46was
34:46responsible
34:46for
34:47the
34:47procedures
34:47the
34:48checklists
34:49and
34:50the
34:50selection
34:50and
34:50training
34:51of
34:51pilots
34:51as
34:52a
34:52result
34:53we
34:53wanted
34:53to
34:53talk
34:54to
34:54him
34:54to
34:54learn
34:54more
34:55the
34:56NTSB
34:56meets
34:57with
34:57the
34:57airline's
34:58director
34:58of
34:58flight
34:59technical
34:59programs
35:00to
35:00determine
35:00why
35:01the
35:01crew
35:01of
35:01flight
35:02827
35:02didn't
35:03follow
35:03the
35:03updated
35:04procedure
35:05just have
35:06a few
35:06questions
35:06to ask
35:07and then
35:07I'll let
35:08you get
35:08back
35:08to
35:08work
35:08of
35:09course
35:09how do
35:10ABX
35:10pilots
35:11train
35:11to
35:11recover
35:12from
35:12a
35:12stall
35:12I
35:13tell
35:13them
35:14whatever
35:14you
35:14do
35:14don't
35:14lose
35:15altitude
35:15so
35:21from
35:21the
35:21updated
35:21policy
35:22which
35:22calls
35:22for
35:22a
35:22nose
35:23down
35:23pitch
35:23recovery
35:23correct
35:27he
35:28just
35:28didn't
35:29agree
35:29that
35:29that
35:29was
35:29necessary
35:30if
35:31you
35:31increase
35:31the
35:31pitch
35:31it
35:31will
35:31make
35:32the
35:32stall
35:32even
35:32worse
35:33the
35:34engines
35:34are
35:34properly
35:34spooled
35:35as
35:35you're
35:35approaching
35:36a
35:36stall
35:36you
35:37can
35:37power
35:38your
35:38way
35:38out
35:38of
35:38it
35:39the
35:39director
35:40believed
35:40that
35:40if
35:41the
35:41engines
35:41were
35:41running
35:42properly
35:42pilots
35:43could
35:43increase
35:44thrust
35:44and
35:45fly
35:45out
35:46of
35:46a
35:46stall
35:46he
35:47had
35:51and
35:51they
35:51were
35:51not
35:52in
35:52agreement
35:52with
35:53the
35:53proper
35:54procedure
35:54see
36:04what
36:05I
36:05don't
36:05get
36:05is
36:06old
36:07procedure
36:07new
36:08procedure
36:08there
36:08is
36:09no
36:09procedure
36:09that
36:10says
36:10to
36:10pull
36:10back
36:11for
36:11the
36:11duration
36:11of
36:11the
36:11stall
36:12I
36:12keep
36:12going
36:12back
36:13to
36:13the
36:13way
36:13they
36:13were
36:13dealing
36:13with
36:13this
36:14role
36:14reversal
36:14rudder
36:18rudder
36:19got
36:20it
36:21and
36:21left
36:21rudder
36:22the
36:23crew
36:24were
36:24unable
36:24to
36:25recover
36:26the
36:26airplane
36:26in
36:27the
36:27approximately
36:2890
36:29seconds
36:29that it
36:29took
36:30from
36:30when
36:31the
36:31lack
36:32of
36:32the
36:32stick
36:32shaker
36:33was
36:33identified
36:33to
36:34when
36:34it
36:34impacted
36:34terrain
36:35and
36:36our
36:36question
36:36was
36:36why
36:37investigators
36:38assess
36:39APX's
36:40DC-8
36:40flight
36:41simulator
36:41to see
36:42exactly
36:42how
36:43the
36:43flight
36:43crew
36:43experienced
36:44a
36:44stall
36:45during
36:45their
36:45training
36:46now
36:47I'm
36:47going
36:47to
36:47slow
36:48this
36:48thing
36:48down
36:48into
36:49a
36:49stall
36:49there's
36:56the
36:56shaker
36:57there's
37:00the
37:01stall
37:01now we're
37:02going to pull back on the yoke like our pilots did
37:04so I
37:06continued to raise the nose
37:09up higher and higher
37:10and I was just astounded at what the simulator did
37:15or mainly what it didn't do
37:18while we're in a stall
37:27and there's no roll
37:30no pitch down
37:31nothing like you would see in a real life stall
37:34the simulator just kind of reached the end of its program
37:38it just sat there
37:40if this is how they were trained
37:43if this is how they were trained they would have no idea how a stall truly feels
37:45their training was not only zero training it was negative training
37:53it gave them a false impression of what they would experience
37:56they would have been startled
37:59left
38:00and what the wings did with the roll
38:03okay easy
38:03don't
38:04don't
38:05and
38:06they would not have recognized it necessarily as
38:09a symptom of a stall
38:11because in their simulator it didn't have that symptom
38:14maybe they didn't realize they were still in the stall but surely there were other indicators that they were falling out of the sky
38:21why didn't the pilots of flight 827 realize they were diving towards a mountain
38:33okay
38:34put yourself in the pilot's shoes
38:37you realize you're in a stall
38:40feeling some buffet here
38:42yeah it's pretty early
38:44that's a stall right there
38:45that ain't no shaker
38:46you push power to the engines
38:48pull back on the yoke
38:50start bringing the nose back up
38:52your number two engine surges
38:57that's number two engine
39:08pull it back
39:08now you're dealing with a roll
39:12planes banking left and right
39:21you're applying rudder
39:23rudder
39:24got it
39:25rudder
39:25rudder
39:26got it
39:27you've got ATC in your ear telling you to switch frequencies
39:31827 change
39:32you're standing at list 128.4
39:34you look outside what do you see
39:37nothing
39:39right
39:45because it's pitch black out and you're in the clouds
39:47there's no visible horizon you're just flying on instruments
39:51they had no visual cues
39:53exactly
39:54you're now removing the visual aspect of a horizon out there that can help anchor you
40:01you're just stacking the deck against yourself
40:04now the question is what were they doing flying a stall series test at night in the first place
40:10investigators review the flight's dispatch logs to retrace the pilot's steps on the day of the accident
40:18the FEF was scheduled for 1.20 p.m. but the maintenance delays pushed it past sundown
40:25had they just pushed it to the next day none of this would have happened
40:28so why didn't they
40:29why go through with the FEF at night
40:32all right
40:36one of the key decisions was to conduct the check flight later at night than they planned in the darkness hours
40:45and so you know did anyone pressure him to doing that
40:48what is the ABX policy on when to fly an FEF
40:52investigators return to ABX's director of flight technical programs
40:57to find out why the pilots proceeded with an FEF at night
41:01no policy necessarily just a preference to fly them during the day
41:07do ABX pilots understand the risks of flying an FEF at night
41:10sure
41:11and I'd rather they conduct them during the day but
41:14there's no prohibition against doing them at night
41:17what are the recommended weather conditions for flying an FEF
41:20preferences to fly in clear skies and not on instrument but we have no specific restrictions on that
41:27we discovered that there was no written policy prohibiting this flight from being conducted at night
41:36the NTSB's investigation has uncovered numerous factors that led to the crash of flight 827
41:43stick shaker malfunction
41:46incorrect stall procedure
41:48negative simulator training
41:51FEF at night
41:52had just one of these factors not been present the crew would likely have survived
42:01I think this accident was caused by a failure to recognize that a functional evaluation flight requires rigorous preparation and criteria and controls to be placed on it to protect the pilots who are flying it
42:17start bringing the nose back up
42:21this was not God reaching down and slapping an airplane out of the sky
42:25there were reasons for this happening and
42:27this could have been avoided
42:30in the wake of the crash of flight 827 the NTSB makes a series of recommendations to make functional evaluation flights safer and to better prepare pilots for stall conditions
42:42this accident brought a lot of significant changes to the industry
42:49we issued recommendations to try to improve airline oversight and FA oversight of functional evaluation programs and those efforts were successful
43:02flight simulators used for airline training were made much more realistic
43:07every airline pilot receives training in recovering the airplane from the high altitude stall
43:14where they have to use this airborne express revised stall recovery procedure to get the job done
43:22the report also recommends a revision to the DC 8 maintenance manual calling for regular calibration and testing of the complete stall warning system
43:32there might have been other airplanes out there you know flying around in service
43:36where the stall warning system really wasn't working
43:39it's a sobering thought and a significant one
43:43the strength of aviation safety is a direct result of learning the most we can learn from every single accident
43:53this wasn't an accident in vain yes it could have been prevented but now we know how
43:57we know how
43:58we know how