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  • 4/23/2025
🌍 Europe stands at a critical turning point.
In this insightful episode of Dialogue Works, economist and author Tony Norfield dives deep into the pressing question:
Does Europe know what it truly wants — economically, politically, and strategically?

Discussion highlights:
🔹 Europe’s internal divisions and lack of cohesive vision
🔹 Dependency on the U.S. vs. sovereignty ambitions
🔹 The EU’s role in global conflicts and economic instability
🔹 Why Europe’s next decisions could reshape the world order

⚖️ Is Europe forging its path, or following someone else’s?
📢 Join the conversation and don’t forget to Like, Comment & Subscribe for more bold geopolitical dialogue.

#TonyNorfield #DialogueWorks #EuropePolitics #EuropeanUnion #EUatCrossroads #Geopolitics #GlobalStrategy #EconomicSovereignty #EUUSRelations #WorldAffairs #EuropeFuture #EuropeanEconomy #InternationalRelations #Eurozone #GlobalPowerShift #ForeignPolicy #UKandEU #EuropeDebate #TransatlanticRelations #PoliticalAnalysis

Category

🗞
News
Transcript
00:00Hi, everybody. Today is Monday, April 21st, 2025, and our friend Tony Norvill is back with us.
00:12Welcome back, Tony.
00:13Thanks, Jeff.
00:16Tony, let's start with Europe and the European countries.
00:23When you look at Europe today, in your opinion, what do they want?
00:29What do they want in terms of the conflict in Ukraine?
00:37Basically, they want to continue as it was before, really.
00:42They were completely shocked by the change in stance from the Trump administration.
00:48And the overall thing is that their foreign policy, broadly speaking, has followed U.S. dictates for really quite a long time.
01:03So they pretty much followed up the trade restrictions on China, for example.
01:11They've even done more anti-Russia sanctions than the U.S. did.
01:17And there were, you know, there's data coming out showing that there's still trade going on on a small scale between the U.S. and Russia.
01:28But the Europeans made a big effort to close the whole thing down.
01:33They still do some trade, but it's kind of a roundabout trade.
01:38And their line, in a sense, is based upon pretty much a Cold War mentality that we have the Russian enemy on the doorstep.
01:54So we must show fortitude against the threat that we have.
02:01And, you know, they will completely ignore all the assessments that were made up to the end of 2021 about the nature of Ukraine.
02:13You know, massive corruption, scandals, everything.
02:18So all that gets pushed to one side.
02:20And instead Zelensky becomes a Churchillian figure who, you know, is leading the great fight for democracy.
02:28This kind of thing is a complete joke, really.
02:30But it ties in with a longstanding really Russophobia, although it was less evident in more less evident before they they stepped it up in particular following Russia's taking control of Crimea.
02:55And so many of the sanctions really got going from then back in 2014.
03:03And since then, they've they've basically been doubling down all the time.
03:09And with the change in the U.S. administration to the Trump regime, they were really quite shocked about the apparent vote fast.
03:21And that shouldn't have been so shocking.
03:24It's been pretty evident that Trump wanted to exit from what was a losing proposition.
03:31But they still kind of didn't really believe it.
03:35And so they're now trying to come to terms of it.
03:39What they want is is difficult really to say.
03:43Because in many ways, maybe they think the U.S. won't really pull out.
03:53To an extent, I think that's true.
03:55And so what they have instead is using the Russian threats, as they would put it, to justify big programs of armaments buildups.
04:10Despite the fact that they also recognize, this is the lunacy of it, that they recognize they're in no position whatsoever to have a military conflict with Russia.
04:23And they're almost advertising five years ahead that, well, we do it in 2029, 2030, something like that.
04:32And I think the difficult thing to judge is that this is fairly universal among most of the politicians in the European Commission
04:48and in charge of the EU, pretty similar in the UK as well, both political parties, conservatives and Labour,
04:59not followed, I would say, in a number of European countries, and not necessarily either by popular opinion.
05:08So you then get, how can I put it, almost like a Western hegemony, bunch of self-deluded idiots going along with these policies,
05:25despite the fact that they haven't really got the material means to follow them through.
05:31And the big support that they were relying upon before, namely from the US, is probably no longer going to be there.
05:44So that's the mess that they're in.
05:47So you find these rhetorical flourishes from Starmer and Macron about what they will do.
05:56But they don't really amount to anything.
05:58And it's pretty unlikely.
06:00I mean, it's possible, but it's unlikely, I think, they will actually put troops on the ground in Ukraine,
06:08because all of their plans for doing it depend on their first being a ceasefire.
06:17And there probably won't be a ceasefire.
06:19So the issue doesn't then arise.
06:22But their policy, as I say, is basically one that was following on from the previous mode of the US policy,
06:32the complete Russophobia, anti-Russia, and how can we defeat the Russians, inflict a strategic defeat on them,
06:44and, you know, force a regime change, or something like this.
06:49But now they're looking a bit ridiculous because of the US pulling back from that previous stance.
06:58When we look at Europe from outside, Tony, and we're not living in Europe,
07:10and we don't know, we're just watching what's going on,
07:16these sort of political changes that the people are asking for.
07:20And when we look at Europe and compare it with the United States,
07:25in the United States, people wanted some sort of change.
07:28They decided to vote for Donald Trump, and they got it.
07:32And you can say that Donald Trump is not that much of change.
07:36It's not drastically changing.
07:38But he's just shaking the foreign policy of the United States.
07:43Somehow we can say that.
07:45But in Europe, when you look at Europe, look at Germany, look at United Kingdom,
07:52Boris Johnson, Liz Cross, and Sunak, and right now Starmer.
07:57Look at Germany, all of Scholz and the new Chancellor of Germany.
08:02Meloni, they were talking, it's the right wing, I don't know, somehow this, that.
08:08But nothing came out of the government in Italy.
08:13And you see the same in France.
08:17For us, that we are watching what's going on in Europe.
08:23We are witnessing the people in Europe, they're demanding some sort of changes
08:28in their domestic or in the foreign policy, whatever that would be.
08:33But they're not getting it.
08:35What is the difference between Europe?
08:37I'm talking about the Western European countries and the United States.
08:41Probably that the U.S. has got other options.
08:50And essentially what they're trying to do is dump Ukraine onto the Europeans
08:56so they can move on to China.
08:59That's the grand plan, really.
09:03And all of the recent statements really back that up.
09:06And from the point of view, I would guess, of, you know, public opinion in the U.S.,
09:16you know, they may not like Russia, but they won't really see Russia as a threat.
09:20And I think most opinion polls are along those lines.
09:24So with Russia being next to Europe, you know, adjoining, so to speak,
09:30it's easier for the West Europeans to make a fuss about, you know, potential invasion,
09:39that sort of thing.
09:40And so in that sense, it's a more easy ideological stance to take.
09:51So the issue, though, is that would they actually get popular opinion enough
10:02in favor of an anti-Russia stance to do proper mobilization
10:09with the idea that it may not be too long before there's actually a war with Russia?
10:15And I think that's a completely different ballgame.
10:19And they're nowhere near doing that, I don't think.
10:23But as I think I mentioned before, the problem is you have the political elites
10:33with few exceptions.
10:37You know, you've got Slovakia and Hungary and one or two other countries
10:41who are more dissident on these questions.
10:44But the, you know, France, Italy, Germany, UK, they're pretty much in the same ballgame
10:52because they've been part of the Western hegemony as junior gang members, basically,
11:00when the gang was run by the Americans.
11:03So they're now upset that the gang boss has changed his mind about some things.
11:10And they're still in this mode of doing what they were doing before.
11:19And, yeah, they're kind of in the mess.
11:23They're left a bit high and dry, really.
11:26And they find themselves with nothing really much to offer.
11:31You know, we've spoken before about, you know, the economics of Europe.
11:39It doesn't look attractive at all.
11:41You've got very weak economic growth.
11:43You've got large deficits.
11:45You've got all kinds of issues now coming to the fore with military spending plans
11:50against cutbacks in welfare spending.
11:56And that's across every single country, basically.
12:00So, yeah, they're in a mess.
12:03And they basically don't know how to handle coming away as kind of like,
12:13in a way, you can't even say second tier because it's not as if you have the US
12:18and then second tier is Europe.
12:21They've now got a problem of China being economically powerful
12:27and more and more showing its political stance.
12:33So they've got this issue of being third tier, really.
12:39And that's a real comedown for, you know, this center of Western civilization
12:46and all these sorts of things, you know.
12:49So it causes them more, if you like, political anxiety.
12:57And so that's also why you have the French and the British causing most trouble
13:04and the ones most aggressively talking up doing something in Ukraine
13:11because their status has been greatly diminished by the decline of Europe,
13:18the rise of other powers and their realization that they don't really have that much to offer.
13:29If Europe is to choose between the United States and China,
13:33in terms of the economy and the ties they're having,
13:37which country is more important?
13:39Again, it's important, I think, to see this transition period
13:49because clearly the US was the more important country for the Europeans than China.
13:56And just some figures on trade, it's changing
14:03because China's become far more economically powerful in the past 10, 20 years.
14:10So you find, for example, that, let me just see,
14:15the, sorry, just to say, there's something like about 20% of EU,
14:33the EU 27 countries, their imports come from China.
14:37Their exports, though, about 20% go to the US.
14:45So, you know, they depend upon the US market for selling their stuff.
14:52But from the importance of getting supplies,
14:57it's been dominated by, you know, the Chinese economic,
15:01economic machine, which is kind of really growing without really any constraint.
15:11And it's a similar kind of picture with the British,
15:15where you have, on a smaller scale,
15:19but they've got, I think it was about,
15:25sorry, just looking at some numbers here,
15:26the US exports, sorry, UK exports to China are about 7% of the total,
15:38and about 16% of UK exports go to the US.
15:42On the import side,
15:45they get about roughly the same 12% of imports from China
15:49and about 10% from the US.
15:52But all of these US numbers were bigger in previous years.
15:58And the problem they face is that's kind of bilateral trade.
16:03If you look at the
16:05implicit supplies via other countries,
16:12then the importance of China really comes out
16:17because quite a lot of Chinese inputs go to other countries
16:23that then export to Europe, for example.
16:30You know, and there's the importance of China
16:33in all global supply chains is really very important indeed.
16:38And this is something that, you know,
16:40the US under Trump is now finding out that,
16:43you know, by putting all these tariffs on,
16:47they're causing all kinds of trouble
16:48for goods coming into their country.
16:55Do you think that the Trump administration,
17:02because one of the things that Trump keeps saying
17:04is the case of American cars.
17:07And I was in Germany,
17:11I literally agree with whatever Donald Trump said about
17:14they don't,
17:16they're not interested in American cars.
17:18Is that all about the quality of the cars?
17:22Is that all about that their economy is somehow protective?
17:25And they're trying to protect their economy
17:28by giving, I don't know,
17:30their products an advantage
17:32to win over the American ones.
17:34What's the main problem with American cars
17:39that are not getting that much popularity in Europe?
17:45Well, they're not much good is one big problem.
17:50That the, you know,
17:53we've got old established brands,
17:55you know, General Motors, Vauxhall in,
17:58you know, under different names in different countries,
18:00Opel in Germany,
18:01and Ford, obviously.
18:06But the American car industry
18:08has been through all kinds of problems for decades.
18:12And they're in real problems right now.
18:17The American style cars don't sell
18:22because they're basically too big.
18:25You know, the,
18:27and that's still broadly the case.
18:30And,
18:30you know,
18:33not that they won't sell any,
18:35obviously,
18:36they'll sell quite a lot.
18:38But they have to already design
18:42local brands effectively
18:45rather than brands that are sold
18:48in the U.S.
18:51and,
18:52you know,
18:54when it comes to innovation
18:56of different kinds,
18:57different,
18:57you know,
18:58special gadgets on the car
19:00and all that kind of thing,
19:01they're not really up to much.
19:05And,
19:05if anything,
19:07you're finding most of the innovation
19:09in car production
19:12is being done by China these days.
19:15You know,
19:16and obviously on the electric vehicles
19:18and everything like this
19:19is a big deal.
19:20So,
19:21and the Americans
19:23have been very slow
19:24at getting into electric vehicles.
19:27You know,
19:27there's the big headline thing of Tesla,
19:30but they're,
19:31they're kind of,
19:31you know,
19:32super expensive
19:33things really
19:35for ordinary Europeans.
19:37So,
19:37that's why they wouldn't sell that money.
19:41Tony,
19:41here in Brazil,
19:43we see,
19:44what I see here in Brazil
19:45is that the
19:46Chinese car production
19:48is here,
19:49it's just growing.
19:50drastically.
19:51And,
19:52I do believe
19:54that in the next
19:55five to ten years,
19:56they're going to dominate,
19:58100%
19:59dominate
20:00the car industry
20:02here in Brazil.
20:03is that the same
20:05happening in Europe?
20:08Less so
20:09because
20:10there are not that many
20:12car plants
20:13producing in Europe.
20:15Some of the
20:16East European countries
20:17are opening up to...
20:19Which is the case,
20:20by the way,
20:21here in Brazil,
20:21they have car plants here.
20:23Yeah,
20:24yeah,
20:24yeah.
20:24And I think
20:25there are not that many
20:27Chinese car plants
20:28in Europe.
20:30Let's say,
20:31some of the East European countries
20:32are thinking
20:33we're doing deals
20:34with China
20:35in order to
20:35get that going.
20:37And that would make sense.
20:38That's something
20:39that the Chinese
20:40are quite open
20:41about doing.
20:42And,
20:43you know,
20:44they're having
20:45an easier time,
20:46though,
20:46expanding their
20:48capacity
20:48for production
20:50in many
20:51Asian countries.
20:53And,
20:54you know,
20:54they're doing deals
20:55with a whole bunch
20:56of countries
20:57in the region.
20:59And the
21:00thing to remember
21:02is that
21:03because the
21:05Chinese market
21:06is completely huge,
21:08you know,
21:08if you've got
21:081,400 million people
21:11and you've got,
21:12you know,
21:13300 or 400 million
21:14in the middle class,
21:15so to speak,
21:17you're going to have
21:18a very big market
21:19on which to
21:20design,
21:23you know,
21:26get economies
21:27of scale
21:28in your design
21:29and do all kinds
21:30of things
21:31that would,
21:32you know,
21:32streamline production
21:33and reduce costs.
21:34So,
21:35it's not at all
21:36about having
21:36cheap Chinese labor
21:38doing these things.
21:39It's about
21:40being very efficient
21:42at producing.
21:44And,
21:44you know,
21:45they're generally
21:47pretty open
21:48about
21:48setting up
21:51factories
21:52in other countries.
21:53You know,
21:54there's no great
21:55restriction
21:55on doing that.
21:57I remember
21:58when she,
21:59last time
22:00he visited Europe,
22:01he went to Serbia
22:02and Hungary
22:02and they were
22:04talking about
22:05car plants
22:06to be
22:07in Hungary,
22:08if I'm not
22:09mistaken.
22:10And they're
22:10then going to
22:11send it to
22:12other European
22:14countries.
22:14That would be
22:15an option.
22:15And on the other
22:16hand,
22:16how about
22:17the tariffs?
22:19Is the tariff
22:20on the,
22:22on Chinese car
22:24is influencing
22:25that?
22:26Or
22:26how much
22:28of influence
22:28do the tariffs
22:30have on
22:31on the Chinese
22:33car in Europe?
22:35They,
22:35they do have
22:37an influence,
22:38but the,
22:40and that would
22:41be,
22:42you know,
22:42say Hungary's
22:43plan to get
22:44Chinese car
22:46production,
22:47you know,
22:47that,
22:47that would be
22:48a way around
22:48the tariffs
22:49if they're
22:49produced,
22:50produced domestically.
22:52And this
22:53is commonly
22:55what countries
22:55do.
22:56And obviously
22:56Trump is doing
22:57that big time
22:58with the tariffs
22:59there,
23:01trying to get
23:03direct investment
23:05inside the
23:06US rather
23:07than having
23:08an import.
23:10You know,
23:10it's a standard
23:11measure,
23:12although he's
23:13used it in
23:14an abrupt
23:15and stupid
23:16manner,
23:17but basically,
23:19yeah,
23:20there's
23:21cars produced
23:25within the
23:26European single
23:27market would
23:28would then
23:29basically have
23:30no tariffs
23:31on them
23:31in the
23:32whole,
23:32in the
23:33whole of
23:33the 27
23:34country area.
23:37Yeah.
23:38Tony,
23:39when it
23:41comes to
23:42the
23:44situation
23:45in Ukraine
23:46right now,
23:48Donald Trump,
23:49I don't know
23:50if you heard
23:50that Donald
23:50Trump and
23:51his secretary
23:52of state,
23:53Marco Rubio,
23:54they were
23:54talking about
23:55if they don't
23:55want to go
23:56after some
23:56sort of
23:57ceasefire,
23:57they're
23:58going to
23:58leave.
23:59And
24:00nobody knows
24:02what does
24:03that mean.
24:04Are they
24:05going to
24:05leave Europe
24:06being responsible
24:08for Ukraine,
24:09for the
24:09conflict in
24:09Ukraine?
24:11Because he's
24:12talking about
24:12business in
24:13terms of the
24:14relationship
24:14between the
24:15United States
24:15and Ukraine
24:16and between
24:18the United
24:18States and
24:19Russia.
24:19What's
24:20missing here
24:21is the
24:22real cause
24:23of the
24:23war in
24:25Ukraine.
24:26And it
24:26doesn't seem
24:27that Europe
24:27is that
24:28much helping
24:29the United
24:29States in
24:30finding some
24:31sort of
24:31way to
24:32get out
24:32of the
24:32conflict.
24:36No,
24:36they're not
24:37because they
24:37believe their
24:38own propaganda,
24:39you know,
24:40unprovoked,
24:41full-scale,
24:42brutal invasion,
24:43all that kind
24:44of stuff,
24:44you know,
24:45ignoring
24:45everything that
24:46went on
24:46from 2014
24:48and ignoring
24:50actually that,
24:51you know,
24:52far from being
24:52a full-scale
24:53invasion,
24:54it was a
24:54pretty limited
24:55invasion,
24:56and far from
24:57being brutal,
24:58they've gone
24:59out of their
24:59way to avoid
25:00civilian
25:00casualties.
25:02But the
25:03Europeans
25:06then are
25:08even less
25:09likely to
25:10look upon
25:11what led
25:11up to
25:12this,
25:13and partly
25:13because they
25:14were fully
25:15responsible for
25:16it.
25:17You know,
25:17you had
25:18the Merkel
25:19of Germany
25:19and the
25:20was it
25:21Hollande
25:21of France,
25:23you know,
25:23and various
25:24other people
25:24in the
25:25Minsk
25:25agreements,
25:26so they
25:27came out
25:28later,
25:29you know,
25:30as now
25:30is well
25:31known,
25:32admitting
25:33that the
25:34whole thing
25:34was a
25:35sham just
25:35to give
25:36Ukraine
25:37time to
25:37rearm.
25:40So,
25:41basically,
25:42they almost
25:44can't
25:45address.
25:45By the way,
25:46when Donald
25:46Trump right
25:47now is
25:47talking about
25:48ceasefire,
25:49in my
25:49opinion,
25:49Russia feels
25:50the same
25:51way as
25:51means to
25:52and they're
25:54feeling that
25:54if they go
25:55after some
25:56sort of
25:56ceasefire,
25:57if not the
25:58United States
25:59under the
26:00Trump
26:01administration,
26:02the other
26:03European countries,
26:04I'm talking
26:04about the
26:05European countries
26:05would help
26:06Ukraine to
26:07build up its
26:08military and
26:08fight again,
26:09fight back again.
26:10it's extremely
26:12unlikely that
26:13Russia would
26:13agree to a
26:14ceasefire.
26:15I think what
26:16they're doing
26:16is just
26:18playing along
26:19and,
26:21you know,
26:21continuing the
26:23war on the
26:23ground,
26:24basically,
26:24because they
26:25have to,
26:28I think,
26:29do something
26:30more decisive.
26:32It's been a,
26:32you know,
26:33pretty slow
26:33process over
26:34three years
26:36now.
26:37But they
26:38have to
26:39bring it
26:39to a
26:39conclusion,
26:41you know,
26:41quite when,
26:42who knows.
26:44But many
26:45people,
26:46including myself,
26:47would see
26:47the importance
26:49of doing
26:49something about
26:50Odessa on
26:51the Baltic Sea
26:52coast as
26:53being really
26:53quite critical.
26:55And so
26:56far,
26:57the Russian
26:59policy has
26:59just been to
27:00really consolidate
27:01the four
27:02regions they've
27:04got,
27:04you know,
27:04Kersan,
27:05Zaporizhia,
27:07Lugansk,
27:08and Donetsk.
27:09And they
27:09haven't got
27:10all of them
27:11yet.
27:13You know,
27:13they've got
27:14all of Lugansk,
27:16about 80%
27:17of the other
27:17regions,
27:18but not the
27:19whole region
27:20under their
27:21control.
27:22So now
27:23you've got
27:24this absurdity
27:24of Trump
27:26talking about
27:27taking over
27:29the Zaporizhia
27:30nuclear power
27:31plant.
27:32It's just
27:33ludicrous.
27:34you know,
27:35it's run
27:35by the
27:36Russians
27:36and is
27:37part of
27:38their
27:38system.
27:39So I
27:40think there's
27:42almost a
27:44kind of a
27:44silly pocket
27:45book approach
27:46that Trump
27:47is playing
27:48here,
27:49just trying
27:50to find a
27:51way of
27:51getting some
27:52money and
27:53getting some
27:54quid pro quo
27:56deals.
27:56things.
27:58But I
27:59think that
28:00there won't
28:01be any
28:01real benefit
28:03from Russia
28:05on that,
28:06although
28:06Putin did
28:09some weeks
28:09ago now,
28:10you know,
28:10he even
28:11suggests that,
28:12well,
28:12if the U.S.
28:14wanted to
28:14invest in
28:15Russian raw
28:16materials,
28:16we'd be happy
28:17to discuss
28:18it.
28:18So he's
28:20been doing
28:22that.
28:23But the
28:23idea of
28:24agreeing to
28:25a ceasefire
28:26under,
28:29you know,
28:30whether it
28:31be a
28:32Trump version
28:33of one or
28:34whether it
28:34be a
28:34European
28:34version of
28:35one,
28:36I think
28:37forget it.
28:37You know,
28:38that would be
28:38seen as a
28:40really stupid
28:41move because
28:42they're
28:44winning,
28:44they don't
28:45need to
28:45have a
28:46ceasefire,
28:47they don't
28:47need to
28:48have a
28:49period when
28:50Ukraine can
28:51sit back
28:53and reorganize
28:55itself and
28:56rebuild up
28:56its military
28:57in order to
28:58start again,
28:59you know,
29:00after a
29:00month or
29:01so.
29:02When we
29:03look at the
29:04concept of
29:05Novorusia
29:07and the
29:08concept that
29:08they're using
29:09that Donets
29:10to Gans
29:11Zaporozhia
29:12and Kherson
29:13and we
29:14have beyond
29:15that,
29:15we have
29:16Kharkov,
29:17we have
29:18Odessa,
29:18Nikolayev,
29:19Nepepetrovsk,
29:21and this
29:21it seems
29:23that if
29:24with the
29:24current line
29:25of the
29:26conflict,
29:27if they
29:27decide to
29:28go after
29:29some sort
29:29of Ukrainian
29:30settlement,
29:31there has
29:31to be
29:32some sort
29:33of understanding
29:34for the
29:35rest of
29:36Russian,
29:38ethnic
29:38Russians
29:38that are
29:40living in
29:41that
29:41in
29:42Odessa,
29:44Nikolayev,
29:44Nepepetrovsk,
29:45and Kharkov,
29:47and these
29:47are
29:48considerable
29:49amount of,
29:51just a
29:51considerable
29:52percentage
29:53of the
29:54population
29:54in this
29:55region.
29:58And beyond
29:59that,
29:59we have
29:59in
30:00Latvia
30:02and
30:04Latvia
30:08and the
30:09other
30:10states,
30:11the little
30:11states that
30:12have
30:12considerable
30:13ethnic
30:15Russians.
30:18Russians,
30:19but
30:19Lithuania,
30:22Latvia,
30:23and Moldova,
30:25if I'm
30:25not
30:25mistaken.
30:25These
30:26are
30:29considerable
30:29for
30:30Russia,
30:31because if
30:32you decide
30:33to go
30:34after some
30:34sort of
30:35Ciswa
30:35with the
30:36West,
30:36you have
30:37to consider
30:37one of the
30:39main objectives
30:40of the
30:41conflict is
30:41to just
30:42protect
30:43ethnic
30:44Russians in
30:44the eastern
30:45part of
30:45Ukraine.
30:47If they
30:47find some,
30:49it seems
30:50that Russia
30:51is looking
30:52at that,
30:53is looking
30:54at a
30:55broader
30:55issue in
30:56terms of
30:56ethnic
30:57Russians.
30:59And I
31:00don't know
31:00if Europe
31:01is able
31:02to participate
31:03in such
31:03sort of
31:04negotiations,
31:05in such
31:06sort of
31:07dialogue.
31:09No,
31:10it looks
31:10like the,
31:12whereas the
31:13U.S.
31:13is floating
31:14the idea
31:16of,
31:17OK,
31:17we'll
31:17recognise
31:17Crimea
31:18and probably
31:19we'll
31:19recognise
31:20the four
31:21regions
31:21that Russia
31:22has got
31:22control of
31:23already,
31:23more or
31:23less.
31:26You know,
31:26the Europeans
31:27don't even
31:27want to
31:28accept that,
31:29let alone
31:30go another
31:31step and
31:32say we
31:32need to
31:33sort out
31:33something
31:34else.
31:35Now,
31:35there's
31:35been all
31:36kinds of
31:36speculation
31:37on this
31:38as to
31:38whether
31:39there would
31:41be some
31:43months,
31:43even a
31:44year down
31:44the road
31:45there would
31:45be
31:45referendums
31:47in different
31:47parts of
31:48Ukraine
31:48where,
31:51you know,
31:51say in the
31:52Odessa
31:52region,
31:54how many
31:54people there
31:55would want
31:56to ally
31:56with Russia
31:57rather than
31:58with,
31:58you know,
31:59Western Ukraine,
32:00that kind of
32:01thing.
32:01So,
32:02you know,
32:03many,
32:03many things
32:04are up in
32:05the air
32:05and it's
32:08hard to tell
32:09how they're
32:09going to pan
32:10out.
32:10you know,
32:10I could
32:11pin down
32:13what Russia
32:14should probably
32:15do,
32:16but,
32:16you know,
32:17since they
32:18haven't even
32:19really moved
32:19on Odessa
32:20yet,
32:22you know,
32:22this is all
32:23really quite
32:24some way down
32:25the road,
32:25I think.
32:26So,
32:27the war is
32:29going to
32:29continue,
32:30basically,
32:30for a good
32:31number of
32:31months,
32:33you know,
32:33hopefully not
32:33for another
32:34year,
32:34but,
32:35you know,
32:35it looks like
32:35at least
32:36until the
32:36end of
32:36the year.
32:38And I
32:38think it's
32:39going to
32:40take a
32:43kind of
32:43coming to
32:45terms of
32:46reality on
32:46the part
32:47of the
32:47Europeans
32:47before they
32:50really get
32:51the grips
32:51of this,
32:52that not
32:52only has
32:53Ukraine badly
32:55lost in the
32:56actual war
32:57itself,
32:58but these
32:59are the
32:59political
32:59implications
33:00of it.
33:02And,
33:03you know,
33:03yeah,
33:03we're a long
33:04way from
33:04that,
33:05yeah.
33:06Tony,
33:06in terms
33:07of the
33:07war in
33:07Ukraine,
33:09we know,
33:10everybody knows
33:10that the
33:12role of the
33:12United States
33:13in terms of
33:14providing
33:14intelligence,
33:15weapons,
33:15and everything
33:16to Ukraine
33:17is so much
33:17important.
33:18And without
33:19the United
33:19States,
33:19they're not
33:20capable of
33:20continuing
33:21this conflict.
33:22I think
33:23so far
33:24we've learned
33:25that.
33:26But,
33:27on the
33:28other hand,
33:29if just
33:30stopping the
33:30war doesn't
33:31solve the
33:31problem,
33:33and here
33:34comes the
33:35role of
33:35Europe and
33:36European
33:36countries,
33:38I think
33:39it's much
33:42more important
33:43than the
33:43United States
33:44one.
33:45And Russia
33:47needs to
33:47talk with
33:48Europeans,
33:49with European
33:50countries.
33:51Do you see
33:52the level of
33:54leverage that
33:54the United States
33:55has on
33:56Europeans?
33:57Are they
33:58really able
33:58to force
33:59them into
34:00some sort
34:00negotiations
34:01with Russia?
34:06They could
34:07probably say
34:08this is what
34:08we would
34:09like,
34:09and then,
34:11you know,
34:11because if
34:12they pull
34:13out,
34:14then that's
34:15going to be
34:16a choice that
34:17the Europeans
34:17will be faced
34:18with.
34:18But the
34:19big problem
34:20is that the
34:21Russians do
34:22not trust the
34:22Europeans at
34:23all,
34:23given all
34:24the Minsk
34:24facade and,
34:26you know,
34:27betrayals.
34:28So,
34:30you know,
34:30there's no
34:31way that
34:31the Russians
34:33would,
34:34you know,
34:34expect to
34:36have a
34:36sensible
34:37conversation
34:37with the
34:38Europeans.
34:39I think
34:40it's going
34:41to have to
34:42be presenting
34:43them more
34:43or less
34:43with a
34:44fait accompli.
34:46So,
34:46again,
34:46it's a
34:48good number
34:48of months
34:49down the
34:49road,
34:49rather than
34:50being something
34:50that can
34:51be solved
34:52in any
34:53near-term
34:54sense.
34:56Steve,
34:56you're...
34:57Yeah,
34:57sorry,
34:58I was going
34:59to say,
34:59you know,
34:59as we were
35:00mentioning
35:00before,
35:01that the...
35:03Well,
35:05I would
35:06agree with
35:06you that
35:07the Europeans
35:07have to
35:08play a
35:08role in
35:09the sense
35:09of being
35:09involved
35:10in some
35:10manner,
35:11simply
35:12because they're
35:13on the
35:13other side
35:13of the
35:14border,
35:15so to
35:15speak.
35:16But in
35:17terms of
35:17playing a
35:19decisive role
35:21in what
35:22kind of
35:22negotiation
35:23there are,
35:25I think
35:25they're just
35:26going to
35:26have to
35:26accept what
35:28they're
35:28dealt,
35:29basically.
35:33How about
35:35the conflict
35:35in the Middle
35:36East,
35:37Tony?
35:37Right now,
35:38the United
35:39States and
35:39Iran are
35:40talking to
35:40each other
35:41and they're
35:42trying to
35:42find some
35:44sort of
35:45solution for
35:45the conflict
35:46between the
35:47two parties.
35:48On the
35:49other hand,
35:49I would
35:51say I
35:52don't know
35:53what is
35:54the position
35:55of Europe
35:55in what's
35:56going on.
35:57And
35:57Netanyahu
35:58wants a
35:58war.
36:00Reuters
36:00reported that
36:01they want to
36:01attack Iran
36:02even in the
36:03coming month.
36:04And they
36:05want to
36:06attack Iran,
36:06they want to
36:07attack the
36:07nuclear facilities
36:08in Iran.
36:10What is the
36:11position of
36:12Europe?
36:12Is there
36:14any sort
36:14of unity
36:15among the
36:15European
36:16countries in
36:17terms of
36:17the conflict
36:18in the
36:18Middle East,
36:19specifically
36:20between Iran
36:21and the
36:21United States
36:22and the way
36:23that they're
36:23trying to
36:24negotiate
36:24on the
36:25issue?
36:27Well,
36:28the Europeans
36:29are almost
36:31unanimously
36:32pro-Israel.
36:36And,
36:37you know,
36:37that's been
36:37evident for,
36:39you know,
36:39for a very
36:40long time.
36:41But the
36:42issue is a
36:44bit different
36:45if it comes
36:45to a war
36:46with Iran.
36:48And the
36:48key issue
36:51there is
36:52what then
36:53happens to
36:53energy supplies
36:54because the
36:56Europeans do
36:57rely upon
36:57Middle Eastern
36:58oil.
36:59Okay,
37:00they've got
37:00their own
37:01oil production,
37:02you know,
37:02from the
37:02North Sea,
37:03the UK,
37:04and Norway,
37:05and various
37:06other odds
37:06and ends
37:07of energy
37:07sources.
37:08But whereas
37:11the U.S.
37:11is more
37:14energy
37:15independent
37:15these days.
37:17But they're
37:17dependent on
37:18in the Red
37:19Sea,
37:20they're totally
37:22dependent.
37:22If something
37:23happens,
37:24it's not just
37:24the Red
37:26Sea going
37:26to be just,
37:27yeah,
37:27go ahead.
37:28Yeah,
37:29so basically,
37:31yeah,
37:32you've got
37:32the Red
37:33Sea issue
37:35with Yemen's
37:36actions already
37:37is causing
37:38them lots
37:38of trouble
37:38because the
37:40shortest
37:41transit route
37:43for ships
37:44from Asia
37:44to Europe
37:46is obviously
37:47via the Red
37:47Sea and the
37:48Suez Canal,
37:49and instead
37:50they're doing
37:51a big trip
37:52around Southern
37:53Africa.
37:55So,
37:56yes,
37:56that's
37:57already a
37:59problem,
38:00but if there
38:01were a war
38:02with Iran,
38:04that would then
38:05threaten the
38:06supply of oil
38:07coming from
38:08the Gulf,
38:09and that's
38:12a much bigger
38:13issue.
38:13So,
38:14whereas now,
38:15oil tankers,
38:16if you like,
38:17can go via
38:18South Africa
38:18to get around
38:20to Europe,
38:21well,
38:22if the
38:22Strait of Hormuz
38:23is closed
38:24by the Iranians,
38:25then,
38:26you know,
38:27forget it,
38:27basically,
38:29and let alone
38:31if there's any
38:31attacks on any
38:32of the oil
38:33installations
38:34in the region.
38:36you know,
38:37the Saudi
38:37ones or
38:38UAE and
38:39various other
38:40countries.
38:42Tony,
38:43do you see
38:44Donald Trump
38:46being able
38:46again to
38:47force a
38:49ceasefire
38:49on Netanyahu?
38:54Doesn't really
38:55look like it.
38:57It looks like
38:58he
38:59favors the
39:01idea of
39:01some kind
39:02of deal
39:02with Iran,
39:03but even
39:05that is
39:06up in
39:06the air
39:06really as
39:08to,
39:09you know,
39:10because
39:10Iran hasn't
39:13declared it
39:13wants to
39:14build a
39:14nuclear weapon.
39:15It's actually
39:15declared the
39:16opposite.
39:16It doesn't
39:17want to
39:17build a
39:17nuclear
39:18weapon.
39:19But
39:20closing down
39:21Iran's
39:22nuclear
39:23power
39:25system
39:25is something
39:27unacceptable
39:28really to
39:30to Iran
39:30and it's
39:31unclear
39:32whether the
39:33Trump
39:35administration
39:36is pushing
39:36for that
39:37as well.
39:39So I
39:41think that
39:42Trump being,
39:45you know,
39:45very much in
39:46the pay of
39:47a lot of
39:48Zionist
39:49funding
39:49has been
39:51following this
39:52kind of line
39:53for quite a
39:54while.
39:54but it
39:55did look
39:56recently
39:57as if
39:59he wasn't
40:01so open
40:02of going
40:02gung-ho
40:03against Iran
40:04as the
40:04Israelis
40:06would like.
40:08So
40:08some kind
40:10of deal
40:10he wants
40:11to get
40:11going,
40:12whether that's
40:12acceptable
40:13to Iran
40:13is a
40:14completely
40:14different
40:14matter.
40:14and the
40:16talks are
40:16obviously
40:17going ahead
40:18now.
40:20You know,
40:20no doubt
40:21he would
40:22see great
40:24economic
40:24opportunities
40:25with Iran
40:26at some
40:27point.
40:28And that
40:28was true,
40:29you know,
40:30a good few
40:31decades ago.
40:34But there
40:35are many
40:35burnt
40:36bridges
40:37basically.
40:38So,
40:39you know,
40:39how the
40:41US would
40:42turn around
40:42on that,
40:43I don't
40:44know,
40:44because
40:45they've,
40:46you know,
40:46they've got
40:46so many
40:47sanctions
40:47and measures
40:48against Iran
40:49to unwind
40:51them would
40:51be pretty
40:53difficult.
40:55Yeah.
40:56Yeah.
40:57Thank you
40:58so much,
40:58Tony,
40:59for being
40:59with us
41:00today.
41:01Great
41:01pleasure as
41:02always.
41:03Take care.
41:04Bye.
41:05Bye-bye.

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