• 7 months ago
The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic holds a hearing entitled "Overseeing the Overseers: A Hearing with NIH Deputy Director Lawrence Tabak".

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Transcript
00:00:00 The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic will come
00:00:07 to order.
00:00:07 I want to welcome everyone.
00:00:08 At the discretion of the Chair and pursuant to an agreement
00:00:11 with the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Chairman
00:00:13 and Ranking Member of the Committee on Energy
00:00:16 and Commerce, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
00:00:19 Mr. Morgan Griffith and Ms. Kathy Kastor are permitted
00:00:22 to participate in today's hearing for the purposes
00:00:26 of questions and give three-minute opening statements.
00:00:30 Without objection, the Chair may declare recess at any time.
00:00:33 I now recognize myself for the purpose
00:00:37 of making an opening statement.
00:00:39 Good morning.
00:00:41 I would first like to highlight the action taken by NIH
00:00:46 and HHS yesterday to immediately suspend
00:00:49 and propose debarment of EcoHealth Alliance.
00:00:53 The Select Subcommittee, while investigating the origins
00:00:57 of COVID-19, uncovered multiple instances of wrongdoing
00:01:00 by both EcoHealth and its President, Dr. Peter Daszak.
00:01:03 EcoHealth faces an immediate government-wide suspension
00:01:07 and hold on all taxpayer funds pending a formal
00:01:11 debarment investigation.
00:01:13 I've said it before, but our investigation into EcoHealth
00:01:16 and Dr. Daszak's actions is not over.
00:01:19 Dr. Daszak owes us documents and explanations for what appears
00:01:25 to be untruths or lies before this subcommittee.
00:01:29 Today, we will hear from Dr. Lawrence Tabak,
00:01:33 Principal Deputy Director and former Acting Director
00:01:36 of the National Institutes of Health.
00:01:38 The Select Subcommittee has serious concerns regarding the
00:01:43 processes in which NIH awards federal grants
00:01:46 and conducts oversight of these grants.
00:01:48 EcoHealth and its subgrantee, the Wuhan Institute
00:01:52 of Virology, highlighted numerous inadequacies
00:01:55 in the NIH grant management and oversight process.
00:01:59 This is especially true regarding oversight of gain
00:02:02 of function work on potential pathogens,
00:02:04 pandemic capable or otherwise.
00:02:07 Oversight of grant management is crucial,
00:02:11 regardless of anyone's operative definition of gain of function.
00:02:15 When the United States government is actively funding
00:02:19 research in this area, as we saw with EcoHealth
00:02:21 and the Wuhan Institute of Virology,
00:02:23 we need to have the highest possible standards in place.
00:02:27 Unfortunately, there does not appear
00:02:29 to have been adequate oversight of EcoHealth and its experiments.
00:02:33 This issue has highlighted broader concerns with the NIH,
00:02:37 especially that it is up to the grantee to oversee themselves.
00:02:42 This is a recipe for waste, fraud, abuse, and deception.
00:02:47 We've heard conflicting testimony regarding late grant
00:02:50 reporting, the dates experiments were conducted,
00:02:53 the interactions with the Wuhan Institute,
00:02:56 whether grant terms actually applied or not.
00:02:59 We've uncovered outrageous conduct,
00:03:02 like intentionally using personal email to avoid FOIA
00:03:07 or deleting federal records from a senior NIAID official,
00:03:12 Dr. David Morins.
00:03:14 Put simply, Dr. Tabak, the select subcommittee,
00:03:18 has serious concerns regarding the NIH's ability
00:03:21 to conduct necessary and proper oversight of its grant processes
00:03:29 by what seems to be its current grant process constructs.
00:03:35 So the American people pay for this scientific research,
00:03:39 and the research needs to be for the benefit
00:03:41 of the American people, first and foremost.
00:03:44 We hope we can put forth some solutions
00:03:47 to help going forward.
00:03:48 Unfortunately, as EcoHealth President Dr. Peter Daschak
00:03:52 made the select committee fully aware
00:03:56 during a hearing earlier this month,
00:03:58 such oversight and responsibility
00:04:00 is not always taking place.
00:04:02 In securing your testimony today, Dr. Tabak,
00:04:05 NIH assured the select subcommittee
00:04:07 that you would be able to speak to these issues
00:04:09 on behalf of the agency, and we appreciate that.
00:04:13 NIH insisted we do not need to have a hearing with Dr. Lauer,
00:04:17 the NIH official in charge of compliance,
00:04:20 because you would be knowledgeable on these matters.
00:04:23 In anticipation of this hearing,
00:04:25 the select subcommittee provided you
00:04:27 with a list of specific issues that require answers.
00:04:30 The select subcommittee has been entirely open
00:04:33 and transparent in what it requires of the NIH.
00:04:36 We expect the same courtesy today.
00:04:38 Forward-looking policy recommendations
00:04:41 require us to review what happened in the past
00:04:45 and what went wrong in the first place.
00:04:47 Without our extensive report on EcoHealth,
00:04:49 I don't believe that HHS would have been able
00:04:52 to propose debarment, and we're very happy
00:04:56 the department accepted our recommendation.
00:04:58 While we acknowledge HHS's actions
00:05:02 with respect to EcoHealth, more work needs to be done.
00:05:05 How do we prevent this from happening again?
00:05:07 While I understand the temptation
00:05:10 to simply look forward,
00:05:11 we can't learn how to prevent and respond to the next pandemic
00:05:15 if we do not learn any lessons from the last one.
00:05:18 So I appreciate my colleagues' assistance
00:05:21 in demanding answers from EcoHealth.
00:05:24 Our actions have led to real change
00:05:28 and a benefit to the American people.
00:05:30 I hope you all will join me today
00:05:32 in examining what we can do better going forward,
00:05:36 and I look forward to a robust and on-topic discussion.
00:05:40 So thank you very much.
00:05:42 I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Ruiz
00:05:44 for the purpose of making an opening statement.
00:05:46 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:05:48 Fifteen months ago, the Select Subcommittee
00:05:50 declared a mission of getting to the bottom
00:05:52 of the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
00:05:55 As ranking member, I made a promise to keep an open mind
00:05:58 about how the pandemic started,
00:05:59 because understanding whether the novel coronavirus
00:06:03 emerged from a lab or from nature
00:06:05 is essential to better preventing
00:06:06 and preparing for future public health threats
00:06:09 and to better protecting the American people.
00:06:11 And as the origins of the novel coronavirus
00:06:14 remain inconclusive, I stand by this commitment.
00:06:18 But as we approach the three-quarter mark
00:06:19 of the Select Subcommittee's work this Congress,
00:06:21 we must acknowledge the fact that the majority's probe
00:06:25 into our public health agencies and federally funded research
00:06:28 has left us with no better understanding
00:06:29 of how the novel coronavirus came to be.
00:06:32 We have poured over nearly 450,000 pages of documents
00:06:37 provided to us by federal agencies,
00:06:39 universities, and private citizens.
00:06:41 We have conducted more than 100 hours of closed-door interviews
00:06:44 with 20 current and former federal officials and scientists.
00:06:47 And we have held multiple hearings,
00:06:49 all in what has at times appeared to be an effort
00:06:51 to weaponize concerns about a lab-related origin
00:06:54 to fuel sentiment against our nation's scientists
00:06:57 and public health officials for partisan gain.
00:06:59 And while the Select Subcommittee's probe
00:07:01 has uncovered efforts by Dr. Peter Daszak
00:07:04 to mislead his funders at the National Institute of Health
00:07:07 and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases,
00:07:09 it has not substantiated any allegations
00:07:12 that federal grant funding for Echo Health Alliance
00:07:16 created the COVID-19 pandemic.
00:07:18 This is a critically important distinction.
00:07:21 As Dr. Tabak explained in a letter to the Committee
00:07:24 on Oversight and Reform in October of 2021,
00:07:27 research performed under Echo Health Alliance's grant,
00:07:30 including at the Wuhan Institute of Virology,
00:07:33 involved viruses that are too genetically distant
00:07:36 from SARS-CoV-2 to be its progenitor virus.
00:07:39 The Select Subcommittee has obtained no evidence,
00:07:42 this Congress, to suggest otherwise,
00:07:45 nor has it nearly spent equivalent time and energy
00:07:48 meaningfully examining the still very real possibility
00:07:52 that the novel coronavirus could have emerged
00:07:54 through zoonosis in nature.
00:07:56 And so at the end of the day, nearly a year and a half
00:07:59 into House Republicans' majority,
00:08:01 we are right where we started
00:08:02 when it comes to understanding COVID's origins.
00:08:06 Now, as a ranking member of the Select Subcommittee,
00:08:09 I also promise to follow the facts wherever they lead.
00:08:11 And as we examined earlier this month,
00:08:14 the facts indicate that Dr. Zazak and Echo Health Alliance
00:08:17 may have deliberately misled federal regulators
00:08:19 and investigators, including at NIH,
00:08:22 regarding their compliance with reporting requirements
00:08:26 and the nature of their scientific work.
00:08:28 And we can all agree that demonstrating
00:08:31 a reckless disregard for transparency
00:08:33 and accountability to the American taxpayers
00:08:36 who fund your research is unacceptable,
00:08:39 and this misconduct should be taken seriously.
00:08:41 But we should also bear in mind
00:08:43 that as Echo Health misconduct has been identified,
00:08:46 NIH has taken decisive actions to rectify the issue at hand,
00:08:51 including by recommending the debarment
00:08:53 of the Wuhan Institute of Virology
00:08:56 and instituting unprecedented conditions
00:08:59 on Echo Health's use of funds.
00:09:00 And just yesterday, the Department of Health
00:09:03 and Human Services announced that it had immediately
00:09:05 suspended funding to Echo Health
00:09:08 and initiated debarment proceedings
00:09:10 for the organization.
00:09:11 While the discussion of how we can continue to strengthen
00:09:15 oversight of the use of taxpayers' funding
00:09:17 is always an important one,
00:09:19 it is my hope that we can use this conversation
00:09:21 to generate constructive, forward-looking solutions
00:09:24 to fortify the work of our nation's public health agencies
00:09:27 and workforce as opposed to denigrating them
00:09:30 for partisan gain.
00:09:32 As members of the Select Subcommittee,
00:09:34 we have an obligation to confront the challenges
00:09:36 of declining confidence in science and public health
00:09:40 to advance pandemic preparedness,
00:09:42 not further weaken it by sowing extreme
00:09:44 conspiratorial accusations
00:09:46 that our public health leaders caused
00:09:48 and sought to cover up the origins of the novel coronavirus
00:09:52 for the sake of scoring political points.
00:09:54 So as we look toward the future,
00:09:56 it is my hope that we can work together
00:09:57 to build on the progress Congress made
00:09:59 to fortify our shores for future public health threats
00:10:02 that when Democrats pass the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
00:10:06 reforms that strengthen protections
00:10:09 against undue influence in our biomedical research,
00:10:13 improve training and transparency
00:10:15 for the handling of select agents,
00:10:17 pave the way for the interagency collaboration
00:10:21 to fortify zoonotic disease prevention,
00:10:24 and invest it in our infectious disease workforce.
00:10:28 And it is my hope that we can work
00:10:29 with the Biden administration
00:10:31 to continue to fortify biosafety,
00:10:34 including by collaborating on the implementation
00:10:36 of new guidelines,
00:10:37 the Office of Science and Technology Policy
00:10:40 announced earlier this month
00:10:42 to strengthen oversight of dual use research of concern
00:10:47 and research involving pathogens
00:10:49 with enhanced pandemic potential.
00:10:52 And I look forward to a hearing
00:10:53 of the constructive work that is ongoing right now
00:10:57 that will actually prevent and help us better prepare
00:11:00 for the next pandemic by the administration.
00:11:04 And it is my hope that we can make objectively
00:11:06 examining the origins of the novel coronavirus
00:11:10 a part of this forward-looking work.
00:11:12 And I stand by my commitment
00:11:14 to take a serious balanced look at all possibilities
00:11:17 for the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
00:11:20 And I stand ready to work
00:11:21 on this critically important mission
00:11:22 so that we can save future lives.
00:11:25 Thank you, and I yield back.
00:11:27 And I'll recognize Ms. Caster to make an opening statement.
00:11:31 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:11:32 Thank you for the ability to participate in today's hearing.
00:11:35 And I want to thank Dr. Tabak
00:11:36 for your years of service to America
00:11:38 and the National Institutes of Health,
00:11:41 especially during the COVID-19 pandemic,
00:11:44 one of the darkest periods in our lifetimes.
00:11:48 Approximately 1.2 million Americans died due to COVID-19,
00:11:53 well over, they estimate over 7 million worldwide.
00:11:58 And even today, the mortality rate for COVID-19
00:12:03 is higher than the flu,
00:12:06 as is the risk for hospitalization.
00:12:09 In early 2020, when there were tens of thousands
00:12:13 of new cases of COVID-19 in America each day,
00:12:16 Dr. Tabak was one of many public servants
00:12:19 who ensured that NIH's best in class scientific research
00:12:23 was focused on preventing
00:12:25 and treating this terrible new disease.
00:12:28 Overall, this Congress's effort
00:12:31 to examine the cause of the pandemic
00:12:34 has brought more heat than light.
00:12:37 Plus, so many, including me, are frustrated
00:12:41 that instead of taking time to learn critical lessons
00:12:44 from our nation's response to the pandemic,
00:12:46 Republicans in Congress have focused on eroding trust
00:12:50 in public health and science.
00:12:54 In the Energy and Commerce Committee,
00:12:55 we had a tremendous opportunity
00:12:58 to build on the very difficult lessons learned
00:13:00 throughout COVID by passing the Bipartisan Pandemic
00:13:04 and All Hazard Preparedness Act, or PAPA,
00:13:06 which has historically been bipartisan.
00:13:10 We wanted to give the necessary resources
00:13:12 and authorities to agencies working to address
00:13:15 and prevent pandemics.
00:13:17 But Republicans in my committee
00:13:19 refused to move consensus legislation forward.
00:13:22 Instead, they doubled down on ideological partisanship
00:13:26 and refused to work together on bipartisan solutions.
00:13:31 In closed-door transcribed interview
00:13:33 after closed-door transcribed interview,
00:13:36 public health officials have been hauled in
00:13:38 and asked numerous questions.
00:13:40 But it doesn't seem like the Republican majority
00:13:42 is actually interested in the answers.
00:13:45 We've not learned anything more about the origins of COVID-19,
00:13:48 but we have learned a lot about NIH's diligent work
00:13:52 to tackle the pandemic,
00:13:53 as well as the decades of scientific work
00:13:56 preceding 2019 that dramatically accelerated
00:14:00 America's ability to develop and manufacture vaccines
00:14:04 in record time, saving countless lives.
00:14:07 I hope that we can use today's hearing
00:14:09 to learn how Congress can be a better partner to NIH
00:14:13 as it continues to prepare us for pandemic threats,
00:14:17 rather than lob speculative conjecture
00:14:20 at our hardworking public health officials.
00:14:23 I also hope the remaining transcribed interviews
00:14:26 will be released quickly
00:14:28 so that the public can read for themselves
00:14:30 the complete answers that we've heard from top scientists
00:14:33 like Dr. Fauci,
00:14:35 instead of having to rely on misleading tweets
00:14:37 about their testimony.
00:14:38 I appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
00:14:41 Thank you, Dr. Tabak, and I yield back.
00:14:46 -Our witness today is Dr. Lawrence Tabak.
00:14:48 Dr. Tabak is the principal deputy director
00:14:51 of the National Institutes of Health
00:14:53 and served as acting director of the NIH
00:14:56 from December of 2021 to November of 2023.
00:15:02 Thank you, Dr. Tabak, for your many years of service.
00:15:06 Pursuant to Committee on Oversight
00:15:08 and Accountability Rule 9G,
00:15:10 the witness will please stand and raise his right hand.
00:15:13 Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony
00:15:19 that you are about to give is the truth,
00:15:21 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
00:15:26 Thank you. Let the record show
00:15:27 that the witness answered in the affirmative.
00:15:30 The select subcommittee certainly appreciates you
00:15:33 for being here today,
00:15:34 and we look forward to your testimony.
00:15:36 Let me remind the witness
00:15:38 that we have read your written statement,
00:15:40 and it will appear in full in the hearing record.
00:15:43 Please limit your oral statement to five minutes.
00:15:46 As a reminder, please press the button
00:15:49 on the microphone in front of you so that it is on
00:15:52 and the members can hear you.
00:15:54 When you begin to speak,
00:15:55 the light in front of you will turn green.
00:15:58 After four minutes, the light will turn yellow.
00:16:00 When the red light comes on, your five minutes has expired,
00:16:04 and we would ask that you please wrap up.
00:16:06 I now recognize Dr. Tabak to give an opening statement.
00:16:10 -Thank you, Chairman West-Wenstrup,
00:16:15 Ranking Member Ruiz,
00:16:16 and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
00:16:19 I appreciate the opportunity to be here today
00:16:21 to discuss your investigation into the origins of COVID-19.
00:16:26 It has been an honor to serve the NIH
00:16:28 in various roles over the past 24 years,
00:16:31 and I am pleased to continue my service
00:16:33 as the NIH Principal Deputy Director
00:16:35 under the leadership of NIH Director Dr. Monica Bertagnoli.
00:16:41 I have deep respect for the role of congressional oversight.
00:16:44 Since the beginning of the 118th Congress,
00:16:47 NIH has worked diligently with HHS
00:16:50 to respond to letters and inquiries
00:16:52 from this subcommittee,
00:16:53 providing written responses, document productions,
00:16:56 and providing NIH employees for full days of interviews.
00:17:00 I am here today to answer questions
00:17:02 related to your investigation.
00:17:05 Like all the subcommittee members here today,
00:17:07 I strongly support efforts to identify
00:17:10 the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.
00:17:16 NIH strongly believes that a thorough,
00:17:18 expert-driven investigation into the origins of SARS-CoV-2
00:17:22 is critical to prepare for the next potential pandemic.
00:17:27 While it is frustrating, it is not a surprise
00:17:30 that we still do not know with certainty
00:17:32 how this virus came to be.
00:17:34 It took 14 years to find a single bat population
00:17:38 containing the necessary genetic components of SARS-CoV-1,
00:17:42 the virus that caused the 2003 SARS epidemic.
00:17:47 Determining the origin of a virus is rarely fast or easy,
00:17:51 and sometimes not possible.
00:17:54 While NIH is not an investigative agency,
00:17:57 we do support scientific research
00:17:59 into the origins of SARS-CoV-2,
00:18:01 and we'll continue to make this a priority.
00:18:04 We are open to all possibilities,
00:18:07 and we'll follow where the science leads us.
00:18:09 The body of publicly available scientific evidence thus far
00:18:13 suggests a natural evolution,
00:18:16 and points to the theory that SARS-CoV-2
00:18:19 may have come from a wild animal market in Wuhan.
00:18:23 Importantly, agencies in the US intelligence community
00:18:26 agreed that the virus was not developed
00:18:29 as a biological weapon,
00:18:30 and most agencies assessed that SARS-CoV-2
00:18:34 most likely was not genetically engineered.
00:18:38 A full understanding of the origins of SARS-CoV-2
00:18:43 will require cooperation from other countries,
00:18:46 including China, and an independent investigation
00:18:49 with coordination from the intelligence community.
00:18:54 We may not know the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic yet,
00:18:57 but we have learned a great deal
00:18:59 to improve the nation's preparedness
00:19:01 for future pandemics.
00:19:03 Decades of investment in fundamental biomedical research
00:19:07 were essential to the NIH's rapid development
00:19:10 of safe and effective vaccines, diagnostics, and treatments.
00:19:14 It took 10 years for a measles vaccine to be approved.
00:19:17 We had a COVID vaccine with emergency use authorization
00:19:21 in just 11 months.
00:19:22 Countless lives have been saved because of this work.
00:19:27 The pandemic also demonstrated the need to build,
00:19:30 leverage, and sustain partnerships
00:19:32 across the United States government, academia,
00:19:35 industry, and not-for-profit organizations
00:19:38 to rapidly integrate clinical trial networks across sectors,
00:19:42 streamlining and expediting research efforts
00:19:45 during the emergency.
00:19:47 Data-sharing efforts supported by NIH
00:19:50 accelerated the field tremendously
00:19:52 by allowing for immediate public access
00:19:55 to COVID-19 publications and open scrutiny of research
00:20:00 outcomes.
00:20:02 The world looks to science for definitive answers.
00:20:06 However, the complexities of nature take time to unravel.
00:20:10 Scientific discovery is iterative,
00:20:13 and we continually try to improve scientific approaches
00:20:16 to drive toward more rapid, efficient, and accurate
00:20:20 assessments of the world around us.
00:20:22 With your continued partnership and support,
00:20:25 NIH will continue to make good on these efforts.
00:20:28 Thank you for your time, and I welcome your questions.
00:20:33 Thank you, Doctor.
00:20:34 I now recognize myself for questions.
00:20:37 Dr. Tabak, we understand that the HHS has suspended
00:20:41 EcoHealth's federal grants and is proposing debarment,
00:20:46 and we appreciate that.
00:20:47 While I understand that HHS will have
00:20:50 to conduct their own review before debarring EcoHealth--
00:20:53 I understand that-- do you think HHS
00:20:56 would have been able to issue this suspension
00:20:58 without the select subcommittee's investigation?
00:21:02 And will it be helpful--
00:21:04 the investigation to date--
00:21:06 will it be helpful toward creating new policies going
00:21:09 forward, either through NIH or Congress itself?
00:21:16 As you point out, Mr. Chair, the suspension and proposal
00:21:22 to debar was conducted by HHS, and so I really
00:21:26 can't comment on what input they considered in preparing
00:21:32 that documentation.
00:21:35 Well, I look forward to working with NIH
00:21:37 on proposals for better processes going forward,
00:21:41 based on what we learned.
00:21:43 And we have several proposals already.
00:21:45 We'll follow up with you further on that.
00:21:49 First, does the suspension apply to Dr. Daszak personally
00:21:53 or just EcoHealth?
00:21:55 My understanding is this suspension relates only
00:21:58 to the organization.
00:22:00 I would ask that NIH evaluate the option of Dr. Daszak.
00:22:04 It's himself.
00:22:06 I think that if we look through some of the findings
00:22:09 that we have obtained to date, there
00:22:13 may be cause to consider a suspension on Dr. Daszak
00:22:19 himself.
00:22:20 Next, the ARM, the Action Referral Memorandum,
00:22:24 only mentions three active NIH grants,
00:22:29 but it doesn't mention the R01 that
00:22:33 was used to involve the Wuhan Institute of Virology
00:22:37 and not the grant in conjunction with Colorado State
00:22:41 to start a bat colony.
00:22:43 Does the suspension include those grants as well?
00:22:45 Did we miss that?
00:22:46 The suspension includes all grant activities
00:22:50 for that organization.
00:22:51 Thank you.
00:22:53 Dr. Tabak, EcoHealth, like every other NIAID grantee,
00:22:58 was required to submit a five-year progress report,
00:23:01 as you know.
00:23:02 This report was submitted nearly two years late.
00:23:06 Dr. Daszak testified that EcoHealth
00:23:08 had tried to submit the report on time,
00:23:12 but was locked out of the NIH system.
00:23:16 Dr. Lauer testified that a forensic audit was conducted
00:23:20 and no such system error was detected.
00:23:23 Is NIH willing to share the findings of this forensic audit
00:23:27 with the select subcommittee?
00:23:29 We certainly will work together with you
00:23:31 to obtain things that you require, sir.
00:23:33 Thank you.
00:23:33 Does the audit indicate that EcoHealth could have submitted
00:23:36 their report on time?
00:23:38 That's what our audit indicates, yes.
00:23:41 When EcoHealth eventually submitted its year five report,
00:23:45 Dr. Daszak testified it took 11 days to unlock the NIH system.
00:23:49 Is this true?
00:23:50 We have no evidence of that.
00:23:53 Does NIH allow grantees to update progress reports
00:23:57 with information gathered outside the scope
00:24:01 of the applicable budget period?
00:24:03 It has happened in the past.
00:24:07 Occasionally, investigators will, for context,
00:24:10 add in additional information.
00:24:13 So that is possible.
00:24:16 Despite what Dr. Daszak testified,
00:24:18 the select subcommittee recently uncovered an email
00:24:21 that he wrote on October 1, 2021,
00:24:25 to the personal email of Dr. David Moritz.
00:24:29 He said, "Here's the truth behind this mystery."
00:24:33 Quote, "Here's the truth behind this mystery.
00:24:35 We got our report ready to file for the year five grant.
00:24:40 But when it was funded, we assumed we didn't need to.
00:24:44 It was the first time we'd had a renewal.
00:24:47 We then had our grant terminated by Trump
00:24:51 and assumed we definitely wouldn't need to at that point.
00:24:55 End quote.
00:24:56 Does this sound like a more accurate description of events
00:25:00 as opposed to a system lockout?
00:25:03 I can't comment on his email.
00:25:06 All I can say to you is that our system did not lock them out,
00:25:10 and there was no impediment for them
00:25:12 to provide that report on time.
00:25:15 Thank you.
00:25:16 Are grantees still required to submit progress reports,
00:25:19 even if they received that year's funding?
00:25:22 They are, indeed.
00:25:23 Thank you.
00:25:25 One of the reasons for the debarment was a dispute
00:25:27 regarding whether an experiment
00:25:29 that showed unexpected viral growth was conducted in year four
00:25:36 or five of that grant.
00:25:37 Unexpected viral growth.
00:25:39 Basically, increased pathogenicity.
00:25:41 Would you agree with that?
00:25:44 No. Again, just to put a finer point on it,
00:25:47 increased viral growth does not necessarily mean
00:25:50 increased pathogenicity.
00:25:52 It just simply means that the virus is growing more rapidly.
00:25:55 Okay. I appreciate that clarification.
00:25:58 So going back to that, whether it was conducted in year four
00:26:03 or five of the grant, what is NIH's determination?
00:26:06 Did it occur in year four or five?
00:26:09 It was our evaluation that it occurred in year five,
00:26:14 but because of the uncertainty,
00:26:18 we asked for the original metadata.
00:26:20 That is the electronic records and the actual lab notebooks
00:26:24 that would have memorialized the actual events.
00:26:27 And as you know, we never received those.
00:26:30 Thank you.
00:26:31 Dr. Desik wrote in an email that he "verified" this experiment
00:26:37 by calling Dr. Shi at the Wuhan Institute of Virology
00:26:41 and asking her, "Is that alone sufficient
00:26:44 to meet his requirements to oversee subgrantees?"
00:26:48 It is not, sir, which is why we asked
00:26:50 to see the metadata, the electronic records,
00:26:52 and the laboratory notebook.
00:26:54 Were the lab notebooks that Dr. Desik failed to produce,
00:26:58 provide information
00:26:59 that may potentially validate this experiment?
00:27:02 I certainly hope they would, yes.
00:27:04 And he never produced those to you?
00:27:06 That's correct.
00:27:07 Okay. Thank you.
00:27:10 I'd now like to recognize the ranking member for questions.
00:27:15 Thank you.
00:27:18 As I've said from the outset
00:27:19 of the Select Subcommittee's work last year,
00:27:22 better understanding the origins
00:27:25 of the COVID-19 pandemic is essential for preventing
00:27:28 and preparing for future pandemics.
00:27:30 Dr. Tabak, regardless of whether the novel coronavirus came
00:27:33 from a lab or from nature, do you agree
00:27:36 that we can better protect the American people
00:27:38 if we understand the risk factors leading
00:27:41 to either potential pathway?
00:27:43 Yes, absolutely.
00:27:44 So for the past 15 months,
00:27:46 my Republican colleagues have demonstrated
00:27:48 that they're more concerned
00:27:50 with proving their extreme narrative
00:27:52 about Dr. Fauci orchestrating a cover-up
00:27:55 of federal funding causing the COVID-19 pandemic than they are
00:28:00 with conducting an objective, balanced analysis
00:28:04 of the pathways by which the novel coronavirus could
00:28:07 have emerged.
00:28:08 But three-quarters of the way through this Congress,
00:28:11 Select Subcommittee Republicans still have not succeeded
00:28:14 in substantiating their allegations that NIH and NIAID
00:28:18 through a grant to Echo Health Alliance created SARS-CoV-2
00:28:22 and conspired to cover it up.
00:28:24 And while we can agree
00:28:25 that Echo Health Alliance has defied its obligations
00:28:28 to be a transparent steward of taxpayer dollars,
00:28:31 let me be clear about this.
00:28:33 No evidence provided to the Select Subcommittee demonstrates
00:28:36 that Dr. Fauci lied about gain-of-function research
00:28:40 in Wuhan.
00:28:41 No evidence demonstrates that Dr. Fauci
00:28:44 and NIH led a cover-up of any kind.
00:28:47 And no evidence demonstrates that work performed
00:28:50 under the Echo Health grant, including at the Wuhan Institute
00:28:53 of Virology, led to the creation of SARS-CoV-2.
00:28:57 To date, my colleagues on the other side
00:28:59 of the aisle have been unable to demonstrate that any
00:29:02 of the viruses studied
00:29:03 under the grant could even possibly have been SARS-CoV-2's
00:29:08 progenitor virus.
00:29:09 Dr. Taubach, in October 2021, you sent a letter and analysis
00:29:14 to then-Oversight Committee Ranking Member James Comer
00:29:18 regarding the Echo Health Alliance grant.
00:29:20 That letter and accompanying analysis, in your words,
00:29:23 "demonstrated that the naturally occurring bat coronaviruses used
00:29:28 in experiments under the NIH grant from 2014
00:29:31 to 2018 are decades removed from SARS-CoV-2 evolutionarily."
00:29:38 In the letter, you also confirmed
00:29:40 that those viruses, "could not have been the source
00:29:43 of SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 pandemic."
00:29:48 That was more than two years ago,
00:29:51 and the majority still has not identified a single virus
00:29:54 related to the grant, whether in Wuhan or elsewhere,
00:29:58 that could be the progenitor virus.
00:30:01 Dr. Taubach, could you remind us why none of the viruses studied
00:30:04 under the Echo Health grant could have been the progenitor
00:30:07 virus to the SARS-CoV-2?
00:30:09 The viruses that were approved for study
00:30:13 under the Echo Health grant are very removed,
00:30:19 evolutionarily speaking, from SARS-CoV-2.
00:30:23 It would take many, many years for a virus of the type
00:30:28 that they use to evolve into SARS-CoV-2.
00:30:32 Okay. And is it correct that the closest known viruses
00:30:36 to SARS-CoV-2 are the RATG13 and the BANIL-52 viruses,
00:30:43 neither of which were discovered or created with NIH funds?
00:30:47 That is correct.
00:30:48 Those two viruses are 96 and 97% identical,
00:30:54 and although that may seem close,
00:30:57 in fact that is very far apart.
00:31:00 And you already made all of this known
00:31:02 to Oversight Committee Republicans almost three years
00:31:06 ago in October 2021, correct?
00:31:09 That's what the letter outlined, yes.
00:31:11 Yeah. So, you know, it is unfortunate
00:31:14 that for the past year and a half,
00:31:16 the Select Subcommittee has fallen short of its obligation
00:31:19 to objectively promote the American public's understanding
00:31:23 of the virus's origins.
00:31:25 And Dr. Taubach, in your view, what actions should Congress take
00:31:30 to better understand the origins of the novel coronavirus
00:31:34 and to prevent and prepare for future pandemics?
00:31:38 Well, again, we need to continue the studies
00:31:42 about the evolution of these viruses.
00:31:46 We have to somehow encourage foreign partners to engage
00:31:52 because it's only through engagement of foreign nations
00:31:56 that we're going to truly get to the bottom of this.
00:31:58 As you know, these viruses do not originate in this country.
00:32:02 They originate in, you know, in Southeast Asia.
00:32:06 Yeah. Well, let me just be clear once again
00:32:09 that it could have been lab leak,
00:32:13 and it could have been zoonotic.
00:32:16 Although what we haven't proven,
00:32:19 because so far there's no evidence, is that it was created
00:32:24 from grant money from NIH or NIAID to Echo Health
00:32:30 and that there was a cover-up, which is what my colleagues
00:32:33 on the other side have been repeatedly mentioning throughout
00:32:38 these investigations.
00:32:39 So I do think that we need to continue to do the research,
00:32:45 to investigate if it was a lab leak, where and how,
00:32:48 and how to create better biosafety,
00:32:51 which is what the administration is currently undertaking.
00:32:56 I think it would be helpful to hear from them, their efforts,
00:33:00 and what we can do to bolster the administration's efforts
00:33:04 to keep lab safety a priority in our country
00:33:07 and in our efforts in other countries.
00:33:10 And I think we should also have more hearings on zoonotic,
00:33:15 high-risk detection in other countries
00:33:20 so that we can set up better systems to build capacity
00:33:24 to identify emerging novel viruses immediately
00:33:27 and contain them at the source site.
00:33:30 So with that, I yield back.
00:33:33 >> I now recognize Ms. Malliotakis from New York
00:33:36 for five minutes of questions.
00:33:37 >> Thank you, Dr. Tabic.
00:33:39 Dr. Daszak came before us and said he was not sure
00:33:43 of all the work or all the research being conducted
00:33:46 at the WIV.
00:33:47 Are you aware of all the work that was being done
00:33:50 at the WIV?
00:33:51 >> Certainly not.
00:33:52 We just have window into what we support.
00:33:55 >> Okay. Are you aware or were you aware that the CCP,
00:34:00 the military wing, was doing work at the WIV?
00:34:03 >> I am not personally aware of that, no.
00:34:06 >> Okay. And just for the record,
00:34:07 Dr. Collins came before us and said that the hypothesis
00:34:12 that the COVID-19 pandemic was a result of a lab leak
00:34:15 or lab-related accident is not a conspiracy theory.
00:34:18 Would you agree with that?
00:34:20 >> I think it's just an alternate theory
00:34:22 that needs to be considered.
00:34:24 >> And we also had the former head of the CDC come before us
00:34:28 and say that it was American tax dollars that went to the WIV
00:34:32 and it wasn't just NIH funding.
00:34:34 It was funding from Department of State,
00:34:36 Department of Defense, USAID.
00:34:39 Are you aware of that?
00:34:41 >> I am aware that they received funding
00:34:42 from other organizations, but I don't know the specifics.
00:34:45 >> Okay. So there's still the possibility
00:34:47 that American tax dollars did make their way to the WIV
00:34:50 and that this was a lab leak
00:34:51 and we can put together the dots here.
00:34:53 But aside from that, I want to actually focus on NIH.
00:35:00 When NIH certified EcoHealth's compliance
00:35:03 and renegotiated the grant, was NIH aware
00:35:06 of the EcoHealth would still be communicating
00:35:09 with the DeBard-Wuhan Institute of Technology?
00:35:11 Last year was when they were DeBard
00:35:13 and they were still obtaining data and conducting experiments
00:35:16 with that information.
00:35:18 >> Once they were DeBard, I do not believe
00:35:26 that there is any requirement
00:35:29 that they can no longer have conversations with WIV.
00:35:35 Is that the time frame you're thinking about?
00:35:37 >> Well, no.
00:35:38 Well, WIV was DeBard and EcoHealth was still talking
00:35:41 to them.
00:35:41 Are we certain that no federal funds have gone
00:35:44 to the WIV since the DeBardment?
00:35:46 >> No NIH funds have gone to the WIV since the DeBardment.
00:35:52 >> Okay. And is that possible that it's gone
00:35:54 through the EcoHealth to WIV as a subgrant?
00:36:00 >> We have -- we've checked USA.spending
00:36:07 and to my knowledge, no funds, once they were DeBard,
00:36:10 went to WIV from NIH.
00:36:13 >> Okay. Well, that is why Wiesemann yesterday passed a
00:36:15 bill to make sure that all this information is made public,
00:36:18 these subgrants, so we know exactly
00:36:20 where this money is going once they're given --
00:36:22 because we don't believe EcoHealth should have received
00:36:24 this money, number one.
00:36:25 Number two, the fact that they were working with this lab
00:36:28 in Communist China that had subpar conditions is
00:36:31 very disturbing.
00:36:33 But we also know that at least 20 more EcoHealth research
00:36:39 projects received funding since March of 2020
00:36:42 and they're conducting research, NEPA, zoonic viruses,
00:36:47 bat coronaviruses, Mars, they're doing a lot
00:36:50 of this research mostly actually
00:36:52 in third world countries, subpar safety conditions.
00:36:56 How do you ensure that our federal dollars are not going
00:37:00 to do risky experiments in countries
00:37:03 where there are subpar safety regulations and do you believe
00:37:08 that that should be a criteria that is put forth to ensure
00:37:12 that the money doesn't?
00:37:14 >> Well, again, once we established special conditions
00:37:20 for award on EcoHealth Alliance,
00:37:23 we have monitored them very carefully with regard
00:37:27 to expenditure and with regard
00:37:31 to their various administrative processes.
00:37:37 There was never a concern with the danger, if you will,
00:37:47 of the experiments that NIH approved for EcoHealth Alliance
00:37:52 to work under subaward with WIV.
00:37:56 As I just indicated, the viruses that they were working
00:38:00 with are non-human pathogens and presented no threat.
00:38:04 >> But you said that you don't know all the work
00:38:06 that was being conducted at WIV.
00:38:09 >> I can only speak to the funds that NIH approved
00:38:13 and the work that we approved.
00:38:14 I cannot speak to the other--
00:38:16 >> How are you sure about the work that we approved?
00:38:19 How did you go there?
00:38:21 Did you-- I mean, did you talk to WIV officials?
00:38:23 How did you confirm that the money was not used?
00:38:26 >> We monitor reports.
00:38:28 We monitor their publication record.
00:38:30 >> The WIVs reports?
00:38:32 >> The EcoHealth Alliance reports.
00:38:35 Because as a subawardee, we do not directly connect to WIV.
00:38:41 >> I just have one last question.
00:38:42 In October 2021, NIH changed the website for the definition
00:38:46 of a gain of function.
00:38:47 Who authorized that change?
00:38:49 >> I don't know if anybody specifically authorized it.
00:38:52 >> Well, who made the change?
00:38:53 >> The change was made by our communications department
00:38:56 because of the confusion that people have
00:39:02 about the generic term of gain of function
00:39:05 and the specific term gain of function.
00:39:08 >> So you don't know who specifically made the change?
00:39:11 >> It was done by our communications office
00:39:13 that runs the--
00:39:13 >> But the communications office is communications,
00:39:15 they're not scientists.
00:39:16 So somebody must have gave them the--
00:39:18 >> The website, the content was vetted.
00:39:22 >> By who?
00:39:23 >> By individuals who are subject matter experts.
00:39:26 >> OK. Well, we would like to find out who that person is,
00:39:29 who is the subject matter expert,
00:39:30 if you could let the committee--
00:39:32 >> Now recognize Ms. Castor from Florida
00:39:35 for five minutes of questions.
00:39:37 >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:39:39 Dr. Tabak, in your transcribed interview of January 5th,
00:39:43 2024, you shared that during the COVID-19 pandemic,
00:39:47 we happen to know a lot about coronaviruses because of a lot
00:39:51 of antecedent work.
00:39:53 How did Congress's years of investment
00:39:55 in basic research accelerate NIH's ability to respond
00:39:59 to the pandemic and what would have been different had those
00:40:03 investments not happened?
00:40:05 >> In many ways, the congressional investment allowed
00:40:09 NIH to understand the biology of the SARS family of viruses.
00:40:15 It allowed us to understand how they are, you know,
00:40:19 able to attach to host, how they are able to infect
00:40:23 and then induce pathogenesis.
00:40:25 It enabled us to understand better how the host would
00:40:29 respond to the virus.
00:40:30 So it gave us insight
00:40:32 into what potential targets there might be in order
00:40:35 to develop therapeutics as well as vaccines.
00:40:39 The spike protein, which many people have heard about,
00:40:42 represented such a target for a vaccine and indeed,
00:40:46 that turned out to be the case.
00:40:49 It also laid the groundwork for rapid testing for the virus,
00:40:54 which was important as well as we sought
00:40:57 to control the pandemic.
00:41:00 >> I also think it demonstrated how vital it is
00:41:03 that American scientists and our agencies are able
00:41:07 to monitor new potential public health threats
00:41:11 because right now we're faced with an avian flu.
00:41:16 We're monitoring, of course, new COVID-19 and flu variants,
00:41:21 measles outbreaks.
00:41:23 Just in my time in Congress, we've had to deal
00:41:25 with outbreaks of Zika and monitor Ebola
00:41:30 in other countries.
00:41:31 So confronting public health threats requires a strong,
00:41:35 resilient NIH, which is why I was so disappointed
00:41:38 in my Republican colleagues proposed
00:41:40 in the last fiscal year to slash the budget of NIH
00:41:44 by almost $4 billion because, as you stated,
00:41:48 this reliable support has helped accelerate our response
00:41:53 to COVID-19 and it will continue to lay the foundation
00:41:57 for a response to future pandemics.
00:42:00 Dr. Tebeck, what would be the effect
00:42:02 of slashing $4 billion from NIH?
00:42:07 What would be the effect on our preparedness
00:42:09 for the next pandemic?
00:42:12 >> Obviously, with fewer resources,
00:42:15 our progress would be slowed.
00:42:18 >> In your transcribed interview,
00:42:19 you also shared examples
00:42:21 of what productive cross-departmental coordination
00:42:23 to tackle disease threats look like.
00:42:26 In some parts of the country, including my home state
00:42:29 of Florida, we learned the hard way what a failure
00:42:32 to collaborate and coordinate looks
00:42:34 like when Governor DeSantis deliberately hid death
00:42:38 and infection information from the public.
00:42:45 More people died in Florida from COVID-19 after a safe
00:42:50 and effective vaccine was available, I believe,
00:42:53 largely due to the state's disinformation campaign.
00:42:57 Democrats in the Energy and Commerce Committee tried
00:42:59 to implement the lessons learned through the reauthorization
00:43:03 of the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act.
00:43:07 A lot of the things that Dr. Ruiz mentioned.
00:43:09 We tried to develop plans for public-private partnerships
00:43:13 and also focus on data sharing across local, state,
00:43:17 and federal -- the federal government.
00:43:20 Unfortunately, Energy and Commerce Republicans refused
00:43:23 to work with us on this critical legislation.
00:43:26 In your transcribed interview, you shared that we
00:43:29 as a country have had a mixed response when it comes
00:43:32 to applying the lessons learned from COVID-19
00:43:35 and that we can't become complacent as the pandemic wanes.
00:43:40 Aside from maintaining critical funding, what does NIH need
00:43:43 to see from Congress in order
00:43:45 to help the agency best implement the lessons learned
00:43:49 from COVID-19?
00:43:50 >> Well, I think the forward thinking
00:43:52 of making the fundamental investments
00:43:55 so that we can investigate the remaining viral families
00:43:58 of concern.
00:44:00 Sometimes it's difficult to understand why
00:44:04 such basic research is critical when at the end of the day,
00:44:07 you know, where's the vaccine, where's the therapeutic?
00:44:10 But until you have that fundamental knowledge,
00:44:13 you can't get to that final step, which is so crucial.
00:44:17 I think also in, you know, facilitating
00:44:21 in whatever way the Congress has at its disposal,
00:44:24 the cross-departmental integration of things,
00:44:27 which is very helpful.
00:44:28 We did that.
00:44:29 We came together to do that.
00:44:31 Hopefully, we are able to sustain that in the future
00:44:33 and do it in even better ways.
00:44:36 >> We still have time in this Congress
00:44:38 to implement a bipartisan bill and to establish new policy
00:44:46 on lessons learned from COVID-19.
00:44:48 We've learned a lot.
00:44:49 And I want to thank you again for your service
00:44:50 and urge my colleagues to work in a bipartisan way
00:44:53 on the real solutions.
00:44:55 Thank you.
00:44:56 >> I now recognize Ms. Lesko from Arizona
00:44:58 for five minutes of questions.
00:45:00 >> Thank you, Mr. Chair.
00:45:02 Dr. Tabak, did NIH fund gain-of-function research
00:45:06 at the Wuhan Institute of Virology through Echo Health?
00:45:11 >> It depends on your definition of gain-of-function research.
00:45:15 If you're speaking about the generic term, yes, we did.
00:45:20 Because -- but this is research.
00:45:23 The generic term is research that goes on in many,
00:45:26 many labs around the country.
00:45:28 It is not regulated.
00:45:30 And the reason it's not regulated is it poses no threat
00:45:32 or harm to anybody.
00:45:34 >> Thank you.
00:45:35 Dr. Tabak, since COVID-19, we've seen many problems
00:45:40 with the Wuhan Institute of Virology
00:45:42 and the Chinese Communist Party hiding information and refusing
00:45:47 to provide data to the United States.
00:45:51 Do you believe this lack
00:45:52 of transparency cost Americans their lives?
00:45:57 >> I can't speak to that directly.
00:45:59 I can tell you that the failure of the Wuhan Institute
00:46:03 of Virology to provide us with the data that we requested
00:46:07 and the lab notebooks that we requested certainly impeded our
00:46:11 ability to understand what was really going
00:46:14 on with the experiments that, you know,
00:46:16 we have been discussing this morning.
00:46:18 >> And because of that, do you think we should continue
00:46:21 to provide -- or the NIH should continue to provide grants
00:46:26 where lab work will be done in China?
00:46:30 >> Well, as you know, the Wuhan Institute
00:46:33 of Virology has been disbarred, so we will not be doing --
00:46:36 >> How about any other labs?
00:46:37 Should we fund any work in labs in China?
00:46:43 >> I think if you look at the new policy
00:46:46 that has just been released, there is mention of consideration
00:46:50 for funding in countries of concern,
00:46:54 and China is one of those countries.
00:46:57 >> So I don't understand your answer.
00:47:00 Does that mean you don't want to fund labs in China anymore?
00:47:03 >> That would have to come under very,
00:47:05 very high scrutiny before it was done.
00:47:10 >> Dr. Tabak, at the time of funding to EcoHealth,
00:47:14 did NIH have a concrete, understandable definition
00:47:18 of risky of concern gain
00:47:21 of function research throughout NIH?
00:47:26 >> I can't talk for the whole of NIH,
00:47:29 but certainly the organizations that support this type
00:47:33 of research, I don't understand.
00:47:35 >> All right.
00:47:36 In the United States, what level of biosecurity would be used
00:47:40 for the type of research that was being done
00:47:44 at the Wuhan Institute of Virology
00:47:46 under the sub-grant from EcoHealth?
00:47:50 >> There were two types of experiments they did.
00:47:53 The experiments involving cell culture would likely be done
00:47:58 at a BSL-2 level, and the experiments involved
00:48:02 with mice would likely be done at a BSL-3 level.
00:48:06 >> Thank you.
00:48:08 And how much time do I have?
00:48:10 Oh, I've got some time.
00:48:11 Good. NIH boasts a rigorous grant review process.
00:48:16 Dr. Morens, a senior advisor to Dr. Fauci,
00:48:20 stated the following about Peter Daszak,
00:48:22 the president of EcoHealth.
00:48:26 Quote, "Peter Daszak is one of my oldest and best friends,
00:48:30 and I talk to him all the time," unquote.
00:48:33 Indeed, after one of Dr. Daszak's EcoHealth grants
00:48:39 from NIH was suspended in response
00:48:42 to EcoHealth's violation of grant policies,
00:48:46 Dr. Morens wrote to Dr. Daszak from his private Gmail instead
00:48:52 of his official email.
00:48:54 It appears from what our committee has learned
00:48:56 that Dr. Morens and Dr. Daszak regularly conspired
00:49:00 to reinstate Dr. Daszak's grant,
00:49:04 all while avoiding federal records laws
00:49:06 and the transparency of FOIA.
00:49:09 My question is, do you believe these statements that were made
00:49:12 and actions between Dr. Morens
00:49:15 and Dr. Daszak undercut NIH's claim
00:49:19 of a rigorous grant review process?
00:49:22 >> I can't speak to the specifics
00:49:24 because I am not privy to any of this,
00:49:28 but certainly one would not have a federal official having
00:49:33 discussions of that type with a potential grantee.
00:49:37 >> And does Dr. Morens still work for NIH?
00:49:40 >> Dr. Morens is an employee of NIH, yes.
00:49:43 >> And was there any repercussions
00:49:45 for him using private emails and avoiding FOIA?
00:49:49 >> We do not discuss personnel issues, as you know.
00:49:53 >> Well, I certainly hope that when somebody violates federal
00:49:57 law that there should be some type of repercussions.
00:50:01 So it seems very convenient that you can't tell us anything.
00:50:06 But I thank you and I yield back.
00:50:09 >> I now recognize Ms. Dingell from Michigan
00:50:11 for five minutes of questions.
00:50:13 >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:50:14 Internal documents and testimony provided by EcoHealth Alliance
00:50:18 and the NIH and the National Institute of Allergy
00:50:22 and Infectious Diseases, NIAID,
00:50:24 officials demonstrate potential efforts on EcoHealth's part
00:50:28 to mislead the federal government.
00:50:31 As Democrats stated in our recently released staff report,
00:50:34 these efforts raise serious questions
00:50:36 about EcoHealth's credibility as a continued recipient
00:50:40 of taxpayer funding.
00:50:42 For example, EcoHealth has argued to this committee, NIH,
00:50:46 that they're not at fault
00:50:47 for submitting their year five progress report nearly two
00:50:51 years late.
00:50:53 One of EcoHealth's defenses is
00:50:54 that NIH's report submission system locked them
00:50:57 out from submitting the report.
00:51:00 NIH investigated EcoHealth's claims.
00:51:04 Dr. Tabich, we spoke to Dr. Michael Lauer,
00:51:08 the NIH official responsible
00:51:10 for overseeing EcoHealth's compliance
00:51:12 with NIH grant policy.
00:51:14 He testified that NIH performed an electronic forensic
00:51:18 investigation and found no evidence
00:51:21 that the system had locked out EcoHealth.
00:51:24 Do you have any reason to dispute Dr. Lauer's testimony
00:51:27 about the electronic forensic investigation
00:51:30 that NIH conducted?
00:51:31 >> None at all.
00:51:33 >> Thank you.
00:51:34 When it was finally submitted,
00:51:36 that year five report ended up becoming a point
00:51:39 of disagreement between NIH and EcoHealth.
00:51:42 EcoHealth makes certain representations
00:51:44 about the results in that report, and for good reason,
00:51:48 it appears that NIH is not entirely convinced.
00:51:52 For example, EcoHealth has argued
00:51:54 that its viruses did not grow in excess of permitted thresholds,
00:51:58 and therefore EcoHealth had no obligation
00:52:01 to immediately notify NIAID.
00:52:04 Dr. Tabich, in October '21,
00:52:07 you wrote to then oversight ranking member James Comer
00:52:11 that EcoHealth had failed
00:52:12 to immediately report the year five results as was required
00:52:16 by the terms of the grant.
00:52:19 EcoHealth submitted its year five report nearly two
00:52:22 years late.
00:52:24 Do you consider that immediate notification?
00:52:26 >> Certainly not.
00:52:28 >> Thank you.
00:52:29 So EcoHealth has argued they did immediately notify NIAID
00:52:34 of the experiments in the year five report
00:52:37 because those were the same experiments
00:52:40 in the year four report.
00:52:43 Now, if you're watching this on C-SPAN,
00:52:46 I want to tell you something.
00:52:48 EcoHealth's argument is as convoluted as it sounds.
00:52:53 Dr. Tabich, in your transcribed interview, you testified
00:52:56 that NIH disagrees with EcoHealth and thinks
00:53:00 that years four and five reports probably show two different sets
00:53:04 of experiments.
00:53:06 Is that still NIH's view today?
00:53:08 >> That is our view, and that's why we requested the electronic
00:53:13 records, metadata, and lab notebooks
00:53:15 so that we could reconcile this issue.
00:53:18 >> Thank you.
00:53:19 When misconduct on EcoHealth's part has been identified,
00:53:23 NIH worked in good faith
00:53:25 to ensure improved transparency and compliance.
00:53:28 For instance, NIH required EcoHealth to submit all
00:53:31 of its subaward agreements to submit invoices
00:53:34 for work performed as NIH determined appropriate
00:53:38 reimbursement and to submit two progress reports per year.
00:53:43 Dr. Tabich, do you agree that those special conditions
00:53:46 like the general conditions on all grants helped
00:53:50 to ensure the grantee was a responsible steward
00:53:53 for American taxpayer dollars?
00:53:55 >> They certainly are designed to do that, yes.
00:53:58 >> So may not -- we have some issues, and we're all talking
00:54:01 to him about them.
00:54:02 Prior to his hearing just a couple of weeks ago,
00:54:05 EcoHealth President Dr. Peter Disack submitted written
00:54:09 testimony to the select subcommittee stating
00:54:13 that because of the additional conditions NIH instituted
00:54:17 to monitor EcoHealth's grant, no other research organization
00:54:21 in the United States has more oversight than EcoHealth.
00:54:25 Yesterday, HHS announced that it would proceed
00:54:29 with disbarment proceedings against EcoHealth
00:54:32 and bar the organization from receiving federal funding.
00:54:36 Pursuant to that announcement,
00:54:38 HHS has suspended federal funding immediately
00:54:41 and noted the many decisive actions NIH took
00:54:45 to investigate EcoHealth's conduct
00:54:47 and use of taxpayer dollars.
00:54:50 I believe we have worked constructively
00:54:52 on a bipartisan basis.
00:54:54 I know we all here are deeply concerned on a bipartisan basis
00:54:58 to examine EcoHealth's potential misconduct,
00:55:01 and I commend the administration for taking the action
00:55:04 that you now have to ensure
00:55:05 that all federal grantees use federal taxpayers' dollars
00:55:10 responsibly and transparently,
00:55:13 and that's what we all must guarantee going forward.
00:55:16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:55:17 I'm out of time, and I yield back.
00:55:20 >> And I recognize the chairman of the full committee,
00:55:22 Mr. Comer, from Kentucky for five minutes of questions.
00:55:25 >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:55:25 And Dr. Tabak, I want to thank you
00:55:27 for being here today representing NIH.
00:55:30 I want to ask both about the situation regarding EcoHealth
00:55:35 and a few questions regarding the Institute's record
00:55:38 retention policies.
00:55:39 Starting with EcoHealth,
00:55:40 yesterday HHS proposed debarring them from federal funds,
00:55:46 from receiving federal funds.
00:55:47 Does NIH agree with this decision?
00:55:49 >> Yes, we do.
00:55:50 >> Back in 2020 when NIH originally terminated
00:55:52 and then suspended the EcoHealth grant,
00:55:54 many scientists were outraged.
00:55:56 We have emails where Dr. Dasik called NIH actions Stalin-esque.
00:56:02 He called you, NIH acting dentist director Tabak,
00:56:07 and your oversight actions as an anti-science shit show.
00:56:11 And that's a quote, not my word.
00:56:13 Dr. Tabak, do you agree with the request NIH made of EcoHealth?
00:56:18 >> Oh, absolutely.
00:56:20 >> Dr. Tabak, do you agree
00:56:21 with the actions NIH has taken against EcoHealth?
00:56:24 >> Completely.
00:56:25 >> Is anyone entitled to receive federal funds?
00:56:28 >> Of course not.
00:56:29 You have to demonstrate your ability
00:56:31 to oversee them correctly.
00:56:33 >> Got it.
00:56:34 And did EcoHealth fail to satisfactory,
00:56:38 satisfactorily answer NIH's request?
00:56:41 >> They have.
00:56:42 >> Got it.
00:56:43 So NIH reinstated EcoHealth's grant on the condition
00:56:48 that there would be no work in China
00:56:50 and the Wuhan lab had already been debarred.
00:56:54 Dr. Dasik testified that since then and during the course
00:56:58 of the grant, he spoke routinely with the Wuhan Institute
00:57:02 of Virology to get data and publish papers.
00:57:06 Did Dr. Dasik ever inform the NIH that he would keep working
00:57:10 with the Wuhan lab even though they were debarred?
00:57:14 >> Not to my knowledge.
00:57:15 >> Shifting to some questions regarding NIH's document
00:57:18 retention policies, Dr. David Moran, a senior advisor
00:57:23 to Dr. Fauci for decades, wrote in an email to Dr. Dasik,
00:57:28 "I learned from our FOIA lady here how
00:57:31 to make emails disappear after I am FOIA'd
00:57:34 but before the search starts.
00:57:36 So I think we are all safe.
00:57:39 Plus, I deleted most of those earlier emails
00:57:43 after sending them to Gmail."
00:57:46 Is that consistent with NIH document retention policies?
00:57:50 >> It is not.
00:57:51 >> Does the NIH FOIA office teach employees how
00:57:55 to avoid transparency?
00:57:57 >> I certainly hope not.
00:57:59 >> He also later wrote Dr. Dasik, and I quote,
00:58:03 "We are all smart enough to know to never have smoking guns
00:58:07 and if we did, we wouldn't put them in emails.
00:58:11 And if we found them, we would delete them."
00:58:14 End quote.
00:58:15 Is that consistent with NIH document retention policies?
00:58:19 >> It is not.
00:58:20 >> Finally, emails show
00:58:23 that Dr. Moran would share internal discussions regarding
00:58:26 upcoming FOIA releases with Dr. Dasik.
00:58:30 He would then help Dr. Dasik craft responses
00:58:33 to documents being released in these FOIAs.
00:58:37 Are those actions consistent with NIH policies?
00:58:41 >> If those actions occurred, they would not be consistent.
00:58:44 >> So do these actions concern you, Dr. Tabak?
00:58:48 >> It does indeed.
00:58:50 >> What is Dr. Moran's current employment status?
00:58:54 >> He is an employee of NIH.
00:58:57 >> Well, I think you see where my lines
00:59:02 of questioning were leading.
00:59:04 We have some serious concerns.
00:59:08 We have fought in the select subcommittee,
00:59:12 the oversight committee on obtaining information.
00:59:17 And, you know, here you have admission
00:59:21 of deleting information, going to great lengths
00:59:25 to not be transparent in an apparent cover up of something
00:59:29 that I think we would agree in a bipartisan manner is one
00:59:34 of the most serious issues that our country has ever faced,
00:59:37 the COVID-19 pandemic.
00:59:40 So I appreciate the work of Chairman Winthrop
00:59:45 and the full committee here to try to get to the truth,
00:59:50 give the American people the truth,
00:59:51 because that's what they want.
00:59:52 That's what this committee's role is.
00:59:55 But we also want to hold people accountable for wrongdoing.
00:59:58 So we look forward to working with you
01:00:02 to help us achieve what the American people want us
01:00:05 to achieve in this select committee.
01:00:06 With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
01:00:10 >> Now recognize Ms. Ross from North Carolina
01:00:12 for five minutes of questions.
01:00:14 >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. Tabak,
01:00:17 for being with us today.
01:00:19 As we've heard earlier and really ever
01:00:23 since COVID came to light, there's been a lot of controversy
01:00:27 and confusion about gain of function research.
01:00:30 And I think some of that has been caused by the fact
01:00:33 that we've heard different people use the same term
01:00:36 to mean completely different things
01:00:39 with completely different definitions.
01:00:41 But as an institution, it seems like you and your colleagues
01:00:45 at NIH and NIAID have been fairly consistent
01:00:50 in that your North Star with respect
01:00:52 to proposed research has consistently been the context
01:00:56 of the federal regulation.
01:00:58 Is that correct?
01:01:00 >> It is.
01:01:01 >> And I'd like to turn to the definition of gain
01:01:05 of function research that Republicans raised
01:01:07 at your transcribed interview.
01:01:10 Republican questioning referred to it as a, quote,
01:01:13 "broad definition."
01:01:15 And it defined gain of function research as a type of research
01:01:19 that modifies a biological agent so it confers new
01:01:24 or enhanced activity to the agent.
01:01:28 I believe that the definition existed at some point
01:01:31 in a digital media kit on NIH's news and events webpage.
01:01:37 And I understand that you made several --
01:01:39 had several levels removed from where the assessments
01:01:46 like this are made.
01:01:47 But for the purpose of the NIAID staff assessing whether the
01:01:51 proposed research is or is not gain of function research,
01:01:55 did that very broad definition have any
01:01:58 regulatory significance?
01:02:02 >> It does not.
01:02:03 That -- the broad definition is unregulated because those types
01:02:07 of experiments are conducted in virtually every lab
01:02:10 across the country with no consequence
01:02:12 of safety to anybody.
01:02:14 >> And in your experience as Deputy Director of NIH,
01:02:19 you were interested in reading government guidance or --
01:02:23 if you were interested in getting government guidance
01:02:26 or regulations relevant to an issue, would that news
01:02:30 and events webpage maybe be your first stop?
01:02:35 >> It likely would be one of the stops, yes.
01:02:38 >> And with respect to EcoHealth Alliance's grant,
01:02:41 program staff had to assess at different points
01:02:44 in time whether the proposed research was
01:02:46 or was not gain of function research.
01:02:49 At those different points of time, did staff refer
01:02:53 to government guidance and regulation
01:02:55 such as the P3CO framework when making their assessments?
01:03:00 >> Yes. Once it was instituted, that's correct.
01:03:04 >> And the definitions for gain of function research provided
01:03:07 in government guidance and regulations were very much
01:03:10 different than that broad definition we discussed earlier.
01:03:14 Is that correct?
01:03:14 >> That is correct.
01:03:16 >> And did NIAID staff ever use the broad definition
01:03:19 when assessing proposed research as far as you know?
01:03:22 >> No, it wouldn't be applicable.
01:03:24 >> So I think there's a natural logic to that process.
01:03:28 NIAID, as the regulator, refers to regulation
01:03:31 when determining whether proposed research is
01:03:34 within the scope of the regulatory term of art.
01:03:38 And just to be clear, each time NIAID program staff was asked
01:03:42 to answer whether the proposed research
01:03:44 on the EcoHealth grant met the regulatory definition of gain
01:03:49 of function research, the answer was no.
01:03:52 Is that correct?
01:03:53 >> That's correct.
01:03:54 >> So I'm just going to end by saying
01:03:56 that I believe it's a disservice
01:03:59 to our nation's scientific enterprise
01:04:01 when there are attempts
01:04:03 to make regulators judge research outside
01:04:07 of the regulatory context.
01:04:09 And if we want to have a serious conversation
01:04:12 about regulation, we can do that.
01:04:15 And the Democrats support those conversations.
01:04:18 That's why the Biden administration recently
01:04:21 announced a new policy for overseeing high-risk research
01:04:26 that could otherwise cause the next pandemic.
01:04:31 Dr. Tabak, I want to thank you for your many years of service
01:04:35 and for appearing before the committee today.
01:04:38 And I yield back.
01:04:40 >> Now recognize Dr. Joyce from Pennsylvania
01:04:42 for five minutes of questions.
01:04:44 >> Thank you, Chairman Wenstrup, for convening this hearing.
01:04:46 And to you, Dr. Tabak, for taking time
01:04:48 to speak with us this morning.
01:04:51 I think it's time to really reset the table
01:04:54 of what the core agenda of this select subcommittee is.
01:04:59 We want to evaluate how the effects
01:05:03 of the COVID virus affected America.
01:05:05 We want to come up with best practices.
01:05:08 And we want to see what investing
01:05:11 in a Chinese Communist Party-guided Wuhan Institute
01:05:16 of Virology, what those effects were
01:05:18 and how our taxpayer dollars were spent.
01:05:22 Earlier this month, we heard from Dr. Peter Daszak
01:05:25 before this committee and examined how he was misled,
01:05:29 how he misled the NIH to secure taxpayer funds,
01:05:33 which were used to perform gain-of-function research
01:05:36 at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
01:05:39 The important work of this committee has led HHS
01:05:42 to spending all active grants to eco-health
01:05:45 and commencing formal debarment proceedings.
01:05:49 We must now scrutinize the system
01:05:50 that allowed the reinstatement of Federal funds to eco-health.
01:05:55 During questioning about the term
01:05:56 of eco-health's renegotiated grant with NIAID,
01:06:00 Dr. Daszak revealed that eco-health continues
01:06:02 to communicate with the Wuhan Institute of Virology and relies
01:06:06 on them for the data required to carry out the reinstated grant.
01:06:11 This level of communication and reliance on Wuhan Institute
01:06:15 of Virology to meet grant terms is alarming.
01:06:19 And based on this information,
01:06:20 I question how eco-health could have fulfilled grant
01:06:23 requirements without violating the terms
01:06:26 of the Wuhan Institute of Virology's debarment.
01:06:29 Dr. Tabak, at the time NIH certified eco-health's
01:06:33 compliance and NIAID renegotiated the grant,
01:06:37 was NIH aware that eco-health would still be
01:06:40 in communication with the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
01:06:44 Not to my knowledge.
01:06:45 At the time that the NIH certified eco-health's compliance
01:06:49 and NIAID renegotiated the grant, was NIH aware
01:06:53 that eco-health would rely on data from the Wuhan Institute
01:06:57 of Virology to meet the aims of the grant?
01:07:02 To put a point on it, data that they already had
01:07:05 in their possession or data that they had yet to gain?
01:07:08 Both.
01:07:10 We assumed that they would use data that was already
01:07:13 in their possession, but we did not assume
01:07:16 that they were still interacting about data
01:07:19 that they did not yet have.
01:07:20 So there was no awareness of continued interaction?
01:07:23 I had no awareness of that, no.
01:07:25 Does the NIH consider that ongoing relationship
01:07:27 and reliance on the WIV as a violation
01:07:31 of the WIV's debarment?
01:07:33 I would have to consult with attorneys,
01:07:35 but it would seem to me that that would be inappropriate.
01:07:38 It certainly seems to this subcommittee member that it is.
01:07:41 Is the NIH certain that no federal funds have been
01:07:44 obligated to the WIV or in furtherance
01:07:47 of the WIV's research activities since it was debarred?
01:07:51 I have been told that there have been no funds issued
01:07:54 to the WIV since their debarment.
01:07:56 By NIH.
01:07:59 I think one of the key components
01:08:00 of what we've learned from the select subcommittee hearing is
01:08:04 that no taxpayer dollars should go towards research
01:08:08 by the Wuhan Institute of Virology or EcoHealth.
01:08:12 The NIH must improve their grant processes to ensure
01:08:16 that information relied on for funding is truthful
01:08:20 and that information is complete.
01:08:22 While it is apparent that Dr. Daszak
01:08:24 and EcoHealth did make false statements during the
01:08:27 grant negotiations, NIH must ensure that the grants
01:08:31 that they provide are responsible use
01:08:34 of the taxpayer dollars.
01:08:37 This select subcommittee, I will reiterate,
01:08:39 looks to learn the lessons and be prepared for best practices
01:08:44 in face of any future attack by a virus from within these borders
01:08:50 or from outside these borders.
01:08:52 I thank you again for being here to present to us this morning,
01:08:56 and Mr. Chairman, I yield.
01:08:59 >> Now recognize Dr. Jackson from Texas
01:09:02 for 5 minutes of questions.
01:09:05 >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
01:09:06 Thank you, sir, for being here today.
01:09:08 I just wanted to start off with just to make a point that,
01:09:12 you know, federal money doesn't grow on trees around here
01:09:14 in D.C. despite what people around here sometimes think.
01:09:17 It's provided by hardworking Americans
01:09:18 and the Constitution entrusts Congress with the responsibility
01:09:21 to utilize public dollars to provide
01:09:23 for the national defense and to create programs
01:09:25 that benefit those who are paying for them
01:09:27 in the first place in the case of NIH
01:09:29 and critical research that's beneficial
01:09:31 to the citizens of this country.
01:09:33 Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth Alliance were dishonest
01:09:36 in their stewardship of taxpayer dollars,
01:09:37 and ultimately they were caught and tried to find ways
01:09:40 to cover this up, and that's pretty obvious
01:09:41 from what we've heard today.
01:09:43 Dr. Daszak's testimony in front of this committee contradicted
01:09:45 statements of the National Institute of Health
01:09:47 and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease,
01:09:50 and we appreciate you, Dr. Tebek, for taking time
01:09:53 to clarify the record today.
01:09:55 However, we're having this hearing today
01:09:57 because NIH has failed policies and procedures and lack
01:09:59 of oversight that granted EcoHealth Alliance dollars
01:10:02 to conduct dangerous gain-of-function research
01:10:04 in the first place.
01:10:06 And despite what you hear from colleagues
01:10:08 on the other side of the aisle often hear,
01:10:10 I'm astonished that they continue to bury their head
01:10:12 in the sand on this issue.
01:10:14 The evidence is overwhelming from what we've heard
01:10:16 on this committee that the virus did not evolve naturally,
01:10:18 but was a result of some sort of gain-of-function manipulation.
01:10:22 It's not logical to assume at this point
01:10:24 that this is a total coincidence and that it just happened
01:10:27 to emerge in Wuhan, China, and it just happened to be
01:10:29 where Dr. Fauci, Peter Daszak, and NIH and EcoHealth Alliance
01:10:33 just happened to be funding gain-of-function research
01:10:37 on a coronavirus with US taxpayer dollars.
01:10:40 And that's becoming more and more obvious every day.
01:10:42 We saw that the funding was suspended by HHS
01:10:45 just yesterday.
01:10:47 I have an article here that I was reading online
01:10:49 just before coming in here that was published last night.
01:10:51 It says, "For years now, EcoHealth has generated
01:10:53 "immense controversy for its use of federal grant money
01:10:56 "to support gain-of-function research
01:10:57 "on bat coronaviruses in the Wuhan lab."
01:11:00 It goes on to say, "In a memo justifying
01:11:03 "its funding suspension, HHS said that EcoHealth
01:11:06 "had failed to properly monitor the work
01:11:08 "it was supporting at Wuhan.
01:11:09 "It also failed to properly report the results
01:11:11 "of experiments showing that the hybrid viruses
01:11:14 "it was creating there had improved the ability
01:11:17 "to infect human cells."
01:11:19 That was from HHS.
01:11:20 And then it goes on to describe some of the research
01:11:23 and what it was intended to do, and it says,
01:11:24 "Soon enough, EcoHealth used some of the viruses
01:11:27 "that they collected to create chimeric or hybrid viruses
01:11:30 "that might be better able to infect human lung cells
01:11:33 "in genetically engineered humanized mice."
01:11:35 I think that in my particular opinion,
01:11:40 it's become obvious that NIH has become too independent,
01:11:44 too rogue, and too unregulated at this particular point.
01:11:47 There needs to be a complete audit
01:11:48 of the policies and procedures and proper oversight
01:11:51 from outside entities at this point.
01:11:53 It's become obvious that NIH is just another
01:11:56 government bureaucracy to some extent that's too large
01:12:00 and refuses to hold those who do wrong accountable.
01:12:03 This is evidence, in my opinion,
01:12:04 by what we've heard today from you,
01:12:06 unfortunately, with the continued employment of Dr. Morano
01:12:11 and your insistence that you have no obligation
01:12:14 to discuss personnel matters, quote, "personnel matters,"
01:12:16 with members of Congress that provide millions
01:12:18 and millions of dollars to perform research
01:12:22 and pay for the salaries of employees such as Dr. Moran.
01:12:26 I wanna ask you, in August of 2021,
01:12:29 the NIH finally received EcoHealth Alliance's
01:12:32 five-year annual progress report
01:12:33 nearly two years after September 2019 deadline.
01:12:36 In September 2019, 2023, the Wuhan Institute of Virology
01:12:40 was funded by EcoHealth Alliance,
01:12:42 was disbarred from receiving federal funds
01:12:44 because of the implications in the development
01:12:46 of the COVID-19.
01:12:47 Then on November 14th, Dr. Dasik testified
01:12:50 that samples from experiments funded by the United States
01:12:53 are in possession of the Chinese Communist Party
01:12:55 in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
01:12:57 Today, some of those samples remain
01:12:59 in the custodian, under the custodianship of the CCP.
01:13:04 Dr. Tabak, in your opinion, and with this information,
01:13:06 was Dr. Dasik a good steward of taxpayer dollars?
01:13:10 - He was not.
01:13:13 - Okay, I'm running out of time here,
01:13:15 so I'm not gonna ask the following questions I have.
01:13:17 I'll just submit those for the record.
01:13:19 But I just wanna reiterate that, you know,
01:13:22 one of the things that drives me crazy
01:13:23 on all of the committees I'm on,
01:13:24 this one included, is the complete lack of accountability
01:13:27 when things go wrong.
01:13:28 I think there has to be accountability.
01:13:30 I think that when we come up with stuff here
01:13:32 that's a danger to our country,
01:13:34 when we find out that we're on the wrong path
01:13:35 on something like this research that was happening
01:13:37 at NIH, that we were funding what was going on
01:13:40 in Wuhan Institute of Virology,
01:13:42 that we have to make corrections,
01:13:43 that it has to be bipartisan efforts to do that,
01:13:45 and that entities like NIH and people like you
01:13:48 that are in leadership roles have to have
01:13:51 the level of responsibility to,
01:13:54 there has to be some accountability,
01:13:55 and you have to be accountable not only to yourself
01:13:58 and to your institution, but to members of Congress.
01:14:00 Thank you, with that I go back.
01:14:02 - Now recognize Ms. Takuda from Hawaii for five minutes.
01:14:06 - Thank you, Mr. Chair.
01:14:08 Dr. Tabak, I want to quickly clarify for the record
01:14:12 a crucial distinction regarding the relevance
01:14:14 of different definitions of gain-of-function research.
01:14:17 To make it abundantly clear,
01:14:18 under the regulatory definition of gain-of-function,
01:14:21 which is the applicable definition
01:14:23 for the purposes of evaluating and funding proposals,
01:14:25 NIH and NIAID at no point funded gain-of-function research
01:14:30 through the EcoHealth Alliance grant, is that correct?
01:14:33 - That's correct.
01:14:34 - And the website's broad definition,
01:14:36 the non-regulatory definition,
01:14:38 is not relevant for these purposes, is that correct?
01:14:41 - That's correct.
01:14:42 - Okay, thank you.
01:14:43 I want to move on now to some of the comments
01:14:47 we received last week.
01:14:48 During the select subcommittees last hearing
01:14:50 with EcoHealth's president, Dr. Dejac,
01:14:53 it became abundantly clear that he and EcoHealth
01:14:55 had fallen markedly short of their obligation
01:14:58 to use taxpayer dollars transparently and with care.
01:15:01 And so truly appreciate the initiative department proceedings
01:15:04 that are currently underway.
01:15:06 With my time today, I'd like to make sure the record
01:15:07 is clear about an issue that I discussed with the doctor.
01:15:10 That issue involves representations he made
01:15:12 to NIAID officials regarding EcoHealth's access
01:15:15 to key samples when their grant
01:15:17 was being considered for reactivation.
01:15:19 In transcribed interviews, NIAID officials told us
01:15:22 that part of the logic in reactivating the EcoHealth grant
01:15:25 was preserving access to the grant's bat samples
01:15:27 previously collected by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
01:15:31 However, it appears that Dr. Dejac may have misrepresented
01:15:34 his access to the samples.
01:15:36 The truth is Dr. Dejac did not have access to the samples
01:15:40 as they are currently sitting in freezers in Wuhan.
01:15:43 That truth notwithstanding, it seems that Dr. Dejac
01:15:45 told a NIAID division director
01:15:47 that he had access to the samples.
01:15:50 We spoke to the NIAID division director
01:15:52 and she explained that Dr. Dejac
01:15:53 had directly informed her he had access.
01:15:56 She further explained that she had known that the samples,
01:15:59 that had she known, excuse me,
01:16:01 that the samples were in Wuhan
01:16:03 and inaccessible to EcoHealth,
01:16:05 NIAID would have reconsidered reactivating
01:16:09 EcoHealth's grant.
01:16:10 When Dr. Dejac appeared before this committee two weeks ago,
01:16:13 he suggested that the NIAID division director
01:16:16 may have mistaken sequences for samples
01:16:19 during their conversation.
01:16:21 Dr. Tabak, do you think it's likely that the director
01:16:24 of NIAID's Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
01:16:27 does not understand the difference
01:16:29 between sequences and samples?
01:16:32 - I am sure she does.
01:16:35 - And that would make sense to all of us here,
01:16:36 and given the work and expertise she has.
01:16:39 In our conversation with the division director,
01:16:41 she demonstrated no lack of understanding
01:16:43 that we saw for the difference between bat virus sequences
01:16:47 and bat samples.
01:16:49 We're concerned about the apparent gap in understanding
01:16:51 between NIAID and EcoHealth regarding the location
01:16:54 of previously collected bat samples
01:16:55 and EcoHealth's access to them,
01:16:57 particularly when we step back
01:16:58 and consider all the other instances mentioned today
01:17:01 and during our last hearing
01:17:03 that draw into question EcoHealth's integrity
01:17:05 and professional conduct as a grantee.
01:17:08 Dr. Tabak, do you share our concerns?
01:17:10 - I do.
01:17:12 - Thank you very much.
01:17:13 Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
01:17:16 - I now recognize Dr. Miller-Meeks
01:17:18 from Iowa for five minutes of questions.
01:17:20 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. Tabak,
01:17:23 for testifying before the select subcommittee this morning.
01:17:26 As you've heard and as you know,
01:17:28 Dr. Dazak testified in front of the select subcommittee
01:17:31 on May 1st and clearly highlighted the need
01:17:34 for more effective oversight of federal grants,
01:17:36 as has been elucidated by my colleagues.
01:17:38 In 2024, the National Institute of Allergy
01:17:41 and Infectious Diseases, NIAID,
01:17:43 awarded EcoHealth Alliance almost $4 million
01:17:46 for understanding the risk of bat coronavirus emergence,
01:17:50 which included the collection of coronaviruses
01:17:52 at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
01:17:55 While Dr. Dazak denied using American taxpayer dollars
01:17:58 for gain-of-function research,
01:18:00 the evidence indicates otherwise,
01:18:01 and it has been incredibly challenging
01:18:03 obtaining information from both EcoHealth and the NIH.
01:18:07 Members of this committee on both sides of the aisle
01:18:09 were right to question Dr. Dazak's integrity
01:18:11 and handling of funds,
01:18:12 which also highlighted NIH's sloppy oversight process.
01:18:18 Dr. Tabak, are you aware of the different definitions
01:18:21 various federal agencies use
01:18:23 to define gain-of-function research?
01:18:25 -I am aware of two different definitions,
01:18:27 one very broad and generic, which is unregulated,
01:18:31 and one more precise and certainly regulated.
01:18:35 -Yes, it seems to me that this is sort of like
01:18:37 what the definition of "is" is.
01:18:39 Do you believe having one definition
01:18:41 that is universally employed would be more effective?
01:18:45 -It would.
01:18:46 The broad definition is lab jargon.
01:18:52 It's just the way scientists speak.
01:18:54 The precise definition, which is regulated,
01:18:57 of course, that's the important one
01:18:59 because that's the one that regulates the experiments
01:19:02 that people are concerned about.
01:19:04 -Well, it seems that there was gain-of-function research
01:19:06 occurring but denied that it was occurring
01:19:09 because it didn't meet that precise definition.
01:19:12 Do you believe that having multiple definitions
01:19:14 of gain-of-function research has led to gaps in oversight?
01:19:18 -I believe it leads to confusion.
01:19:21 I think those who are regulating things
01:19:23 understand that they need to use the regulatory framework.
01:19:26 -Have grant recipients like EcoHealth
01:19:28 exploited these inconsistencies?
01:19:31 -I can't speak to that.
01:19:32 I don't know.
01:19:33 -As I mentioned, the understanding the risk
01:19:35 of bat coronavirus emergent grant
01:19:37 was an almost $4 million grant
01:19:40 that partially went to the Wuhan Institute of Virology
01:19:43 and the Wuhan University of Public Health.
01:19:45 Do you believe this grant was an effective use of taxpayer dollars
01:19:48 and would you support issuing the same grant today?
01:19:51 -Well, with the benefit of what we know today,
01:19:54 no, of course not.
01:19:55 -There is great concern with Dr.
01:19:57 Daszak's interaction with NIH and NIAID
01:20:00 pertaining to the one long-growth term of the award.
01:20:03 The NIH relied on Dr. Daszak to monitor and report virus growth
01:20:07 after being a month late on his annual reporting requirements,
01:20:11 which were outlined in the grant.
01:20:13 Dr. Tabak, looking back, did the NIH rely too much
01:20:16 on Dr. Daszak's self-reporting information?
01:20:20 -Again, with the benefit of hindsight,
01:20:22 we did because we never received the information, unfortunately.
01:20:25 -Well, as an ophthalmologist, hindsight is always 20/20.
01:20:28 Was the information NIH received accurate?
01:20:33 -From Dr. Daszak?
01:20:35 We don't think so,
01:20:36 and that's why we asked for the additional materials,
01:20:39 the metadata, the electronic records,
01:20:41 the laboratory notebooks,
01:20:43 which hopefully would have been able to clarify
01:20:47 all of these issues.
01:20:48 -And I think it's one of the reasons why HHS yesterday
01:20:51 took the extraordinary step after the great work
01:20:54 of this select subcommittee under Dr. Winstrup's leadership,
01:20:59 took the extraordinary step of defunding ecohealth,
01:21:02 which was appropriate given the inconsistencies,
01:21:05 inaccurate information, and denial of research.
01:21:08 With that, I yield.
01:21:09 Thank you.
01:21:11 -Now recognize Dr. McCormick from Georgia
01:21:13 for five minutes of questions.
01:21:15 -Thank you, Mr. Chair.
01:21:16 I love that statement about the ophthalmologist
01:21:18 and hindsight being 20/20.
01:21:20 In the ER, we just say, "I have no idea
01:21:22 what's just about to happen."
01:21:25 I am happy to have you here today.
01:21:26 Thank you for your testimony.
01:21:29 We have a lot of things to sort out here,
01:21:31 and I just want to make sure we're getting things in order.
01:21:34 I'm hoping you can provide some clarity
01:21:35 on some previous statements that were made by both Dr.
01:21:38 Daszak and other folks that are coming together right now.
01:21:41 Some of the things you've already testified on.
01:21:43 Dr. Tabak, when the National Institute of Health
01:21:45 requested the notebooks from ecohealth,
01:21:48 was ecohealth required to produce them
01:21:50 under its grants terms?
01:21:52 -Yes, they were. -Okay.
01:21:53 Thank you.
01:21:54 When NIH requested the notebooks from ecohealth,
01:21:57 should ecohealth have been able to access them
01:22:00 or already have access to them?
01:22:03 -That's correct. -Okay.
01:22:04 Thank you.
01:22:04 Did ecohealth ever produce the requested notebooks?
01:22:09 -They have not. -Never did.
01:22:11 Thank you.
01:22:12 Dr. Daszak testified two weeks ago
01:22:14 that he was not required to produce the lab notebooks.
01:22:17 Would NIH disagree with that testimony?
01:22:20 -Yes, we disagree with that testimony.
01:22:22 -Thank you, Dr. Tabak, for clarifying that.
01:22:26 The testifying here today
01:22:28 clarifies the inconsistency between Dr. Daszak's testimony
01:22:32 and the testimony of numerous NIH officials
01:22:37 and NIAID officials, also including yourself.
01:22:42 Dr. Daszak continues to thwart congressional oversight
01:22:46 through semantics and outright dishonesty, quite frankly.
01:22:50 He has routinely failed to produce pertinent documents
01:22:53 and made countless misleading statements
01:22:55 to the select subcommittee right here.
01:22:58 I think he needs to be held accountable, Mr. Chair.
01:23:00 I'm looking forward to that, and with that, I yield.
01:23:03 -Thank you.
01:23:10 Thank you for coming before the select subcommittee
01:23:12 this morning, Dr. Tabak.
01:23:14 We appreciate your testimony.
01:23:16 We're pleased that the American people
01:23:18 had a chance to hear from you directly today.
01:23:21 The purpose of today's hearing was to have
01:23:23 a transparent examination of the process
01:23:26 in which NIH awards federal grants
01:23:30 and conducts oversight on these grants.
01:23:32 If we find things that we can do better,
01:23:34 then that's where we want to go, and we're all subject to that.
01:23:40 It was important to hear from the deputy director
01:23:42 directly on this matter,
01:23:43 especially as it pertains to EcoHealth Alliance.
01:23:46 While investigating the origins of COVID-19,
01:23:49 we uncovered very concerning behavior
01:23:52 and wrongdoing by EcoHealth Alliance
01:23:54 and its president, Dr. Peter Daszak.
01:23:57 It was made all the more troublesome
01:23:59 as EcoHealth had been awarded federal funding,
01:24:02 taxpayer dollars, and were conducting research
01:24:05 at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
01:24:08 Our investigation was essential, I should say,
01:24:13 for uncovering this behavior
01:24:15 and for laying out the facts for all to see,
01:24:19 because just two weeks after publishing
01:24:21 our report on EcoHealth's wrongdoing,
01:24:23 they now face an immediate government-wide suspension
01:24:26 and hold on all taxpayer funds
01:24:28 pending a formal debarment investigation.
01:24:32 That's appropriate and a good result, in my opinion.
01:24:36 I want to reiterate my proposal
01:24:38 that NIH consider personally suspending EcoHealth president,
01:24:42 Dr. Peter Daszak, in addition to EcoHealth,
01:24:45 from receiving federal funds
01:24:46 and also be immediately suspended
01:24:48 from the current federal funding.
01:24:50 We understand, based on past history,
01:24:52 the possibilities of natural origins
01:24:56 of COVID and pandemic type of viruses.
01:25:00 We recognize the need for surveillance,
01:25:05 the benefits of enhanced predictability.
01:25:08 We applaud those efforts.
01:25:10 What is new and in need of greater study
01:25:14 is the culpability and the capability
01:25:18 of creating a pandemic
01:25:20 or creating a pathogen
01:25:23 that is capable of being more infectious.
01:25:28 You know, even in 2012, in an interview
01:25:32 when Dr. Fauci was questioned
01:25:34 about gain-of-function research,
01:25:36 and the question was,
01:25:38 aren't you concerned about something getting out of the lab
01:25:41 and creating a pandemic?
01:25:43 He felt at that time that the benefits outweighed the risk
01:25:46 and that the risk was small.
01:25:48 I think we have greater concerns today
01:25:51 when it comes to biosafety standards.
01:25:53 And so there is a concern
01:25:55 about biosafety standards throughout the world
01:25:57 being inadequate.
01:25:59 We need to address that as best we can as a nation,
01:26:02 not having control over other nations.
01:26:05 That's a concern on who we engage with.
01:26:07 So that's a concern throughout the world.
01:26:11 And so I appreciate, Dr. Tabak, you testifying today
01:26:14 that not only is a lab leak theory, not a conspiracy,
01:26:18 but it's a hypothesis, and I'll use your words,
01:26:21 that should be considered.
01:26:22 I agree with you 100%,
01:26:24 and I have felt that way from the beginning.
01:26:27 And I've said in this committee from the very beginning
01:26:31 that we need to consider nature
01:26:34 and we need to consider a lab
01:26:36 because the capabilities of creating something in lab
01:26:39 didn't exist 100 years ago when we had a pandemic.
01:26:44 They didn't exist 50 years ago, but they do exist today.
01:26:49 Look, I believe the origins of COVID
01:26:52 will likely only be potentially resolved
01:26:55 through intelligence,
01:26:57 as testified by former CDC directors, Redfield and Walensky.
01:27:02 That's where we're going to figure it out.
01:27:05 Why? Because China's not cooperative.
01:27:07 And I agree with that because China's not been transparent,
01:27:12 they've not been accountable, so it makes it very difficult.
01:27:16 The threats of existing gain-of-function technology
01:27:22 in the hands of bad actors is and should be a huge concern
01:27:27 to every American and freedom-loving people everywhere.
01:27:31 This is not to be taken lightly.
01:27:34 And when we had Dr. Fauci in a transcribed interview,
01:27:40 I did question him on whether he,
01:27:42 you know, he said that the conspiracy theory is possible.
01:27:47 But I asked him if he reviewed studies
01:27:50 or scientific evidence related to that possibility
01:27:53 of creating this in a lab.
01:27:56 And he said, no.
01:27:57 I asked him, I said, are you familiar
01:27:59 with the published research on site-directed mutagenesis?
01:28:04 He said, no, no, I'm not.
01:28:06 Well, if you're open to it, we should be researching it.
01:28:09 We should be looking at it.
01:28:11 And many of us have been.
01:28:13 I have since 2020 when I discovered that Ralph Baric
01:28:17 with Zeng Liqi in China created a chimera.
01:28:21 That concern has been there for me since that time.
01:28:24 We don't know all the viruses that EcoHealth
01:28:28 and/or the WIV, either with EcoHealth Alliance
01:28:32 or independently or possibly with the PLA
01:28:36 or with their Academy of Military Medical Science,
01:28:40 we don't know all the viruses that they created.
01:28:42 So for some here to say that it's impossible
01:28:46 for COVID-19 to have originated from this work,
01:28:51 it's possible it didn't come from their work directly.
01:28:55 But that's inconsistent with the known unknowns,
01:28:58 including testimony from numerous public health officials
01:29:01 and from Dr. Peter Daszak himself.
01:29:04 So I appreciate Dr. Tabak testifying
01:29:07 that we do not know everything that was occurring
01:29:09 at the WIV and that we just had a window of insight.
01:29:14 It's important that we recognize our vulnerabilities
01:29:18 so that we can improve upon them in the future.
01:29:20 I appreciate you, Dr. Tabak,
01:29:23 and I appreciate you clarifying that the NIH found
01:29:26 that their reporting system did not, in fact,
01:29:29 lock Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth out of their account,
01:29:32 which impeded them from submitting their report on time.
01:29:37 That honesty is tremendously welcomed here.
01:29:40 The more we look into Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth,
01:29:43 the more concerned I get
01:29:45 and the more untruths it seems to uncover,
01:29:47 and we will continue our work.
01:29:49 Today's hearing was important
01:29:51 as we continue our investigation into the origins of COVID
01:29:54 and the effects of the pandemic
01:29:55 on the United States and the world,
01:29:56 and work to uncover any impropriety
01:29:59 by public health officials or grantees.
01:30:02 You know, in a government of we the people,
01:30:05 truth, justice, transparency, and accountability matter.
01:30:10 And on that note, I thank you for being here today,
01:30:14 Dr. Tabak.
01:30:15 With that and without objection,
01:30:20 all members will have five legislative days
01:30:22 within which to submit materials
01:30:24 and to submit additional written questions for the witnesses,
01:30:27 which will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
01:30:31 If there's no further business, without objection,
01:30:33 the select subcommittee stands adjourned.
01:30:35 (gavel bangs)
01:30:38 (gavel bangs)
01:30:40 [BLANK_AUDIO]

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